ARKTOUROS

Hellenic Studies

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Hellenic Studies presented to
Bernard M.W. Knox
on the occasion
of his 65th birthday

Edited by
Glen W. Bowersock · Walter Burkert
Michael C. J. Putnam

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εὖτ᾽ ἂν δ᾽ Ἀρκτοῦρον προσίδῃ ῥοδοδάκτυλος Ἠώς,
ὦ Πέρση, τότε πάντας ἀποδρέπειν οἶκαδε βότρυς

Hesiod

Preface

'Bernard hates festschriften', somebody said, and this may well be true. Yet there is an argument for the defense, worn out by frequent use and misuse but simply true for once: this is a special case. For there exists at Washington, D.C., a very special, nay unique institution, the Center for Hellenic Studies, where year after year eight Hellenic scholars of various nationalities, beyond the level of doctorate but not yet fully installed and absorbed in the university system, are offered an opportunity to pursue a research project of their own choice in an atmosphere of serene *scholé*, with a magnificent library right at hand and a chance for talks and discussions of all sorts. Thus, ever since the Center's beginnings in 1961, an ever growing community of former junior fellows has been spreading all over the world – ex-centrics they might be called –, cherishing memories of the year at 'The Center' and drawing on the stimulating experience and the progress achieved in this place. Many recent publications can be seen to contain an introductory remark acknowledging the importance of the year at the Center for the growth and final outcome of the work. But it is not the stipend, the housing, the library that could have these
itself, were there not the all-pervading presence of a unique personality to animate the institution, a man of indisputable authority and competence yet known to all just by his first name: Bernard. And this has been the most special fact in all these years.

The idea to pay tribute to the Center and its director by bringing together studies of former fellows has been put forth repeatedly. It is at the same time a formidable undertaking, as it means to expose various seeds that germinated in the sheltered abodes at Whitehaven Street to the gusty winds of international criticism, which might turn honest intentions of doing honor to its very contrary. Yet 'the risk is beautiful', while the wisdom of silence is questionable; it seemed worth while after all to take a chance now and not to delay plans indefinitely, since, in the words of Sophocles, 'All things long uncounted time brings forth from obscurity and buries once they have appeared'.

The result is nothing like an encyclopaedia or a systematic layout of Hellenic studies, but still a fairly extensive survey of the field, a suggestive indication of its complexity and variety as to subjects and methods. It ranges from Homer to Planudes and to Thomas Morus, not to forget the Roman offshoots; it comprises literary studies as well as history and philosophy, touching at the same time on archaeology, law, epigraphy, and papyrology. If drama stands out as a central topic, this is an immediate result of the gravitational force exerted by the work of Bernard Knox. Yet there is nothing like conformity in method or approach. There are the old philological and historical problems of establishing and dating a text, with manuscripts, conjectures, interpolations; there are new materials provided by inscriptions and papyri; there is the novel stimulus of modern philosophical or hermeneutical positions, including structuralism; and there is the all-embracing fascination of the Greek phenomenon that should hold together these studies, as it brought together the people who pursue them.

This book has no aspirations of being a *monumentum aere perennius*, but a testimony here and now to an institution, to a man, and to the Hellenic spirit.

The publication was made possible through the combined efforts of senior and junior fellows, and through a generous grant by the Loeb Classical Library Foundation. Besides the authors of the papers printed in this volume, the following have provided active support: Apostolos N. Athanassakis, Ann Bergren, Anna Morpurgo Davies, John K. Davies, Robert H. Drews, J. P. Elder, Gerald F. Else, David J. Furley, John Glucker, N. C. Hourmouziades, Henry R. Immerwahr, John Keaney, Ernst R. Sandvoss, Dirk M. Schenkeveld, Hans-Peter Stahl, Leonardo Taran, Erich Thummer, Daniel B. Tompkins, John Van Sickle, Nicholas P. White. The editors were joined in their work by David J. Furley and Henry R. Immerwahr. Frances S. Eisenhauer from the Department of Classics at Brown University, and Marco Danieli from the Klassisch-Philologisches Seminar at Zürich have spent much time and energy in taking care of the correspondence and the manuscript. The editors wish to express their gratitude to all of them.

The invitation for contributions was sent out early in 1977. There had to be an artificial deadline: the junior fellows of 1975/6 were the last to join. New crops from the Center have matured since then. It is to be hoped that there will be no limit to the future of Hellenic studies.

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JOHN PERADOTTO

Originality and Intentionality

This discussion has to do with the much vexed relationship between the conventional and the personal (or "autonomous," "original") in literary production. By way of introduction, we may consider the following parable, which not only concretizes some of the more abstract theoretical considerations to follow, but also offers something like an extreme case of "originality" in antiquity, and of society's response to it. It is the case of Heraclitus. In Diogenes Laertius' biography of him he is described as a supercilious loner, antisocial in the extreme, preferring knuckle-bones with youngsters in the temple of Artemis to the political life of his adult fellow Ephesians. Absolutely self-educated, he claimed that he knew all there was to know, but that his predecessors, by contrast, knew nothing, including Homer, who he thought deserved a flogging, and Hesiod, who couldn't, he said, tell that day and night were really one. He authored a treatise *On Nature* purposely filled with obscurity, we're told, precisely to avoid the contempt bred of conventional familiarity. Like so many other ancient biographies, the story of his end is a masterpiece of conventional poetic justice, served up out of the stockpot of his own trivialized apothegms, the system's vengeance paid out for his mockery of it. Diogenes tells us that Heraclitus' misanthropy reached such a pitch of intensity that he left society altogether to wander in the mountains, sustaining himself on grass and herbs, until dropsy forced him back to the city and to the practitioners of medicine. Even in these direst of circumstances, he is represented as incapable of a straight statement. Unregenerate riddler to the end, he asks them if they can turn a rainstorm into a drought. When they show no comprehension, Heraclitus buries himself in warm cow-dung to draw off the moist humor, but to no avail, and so dies: a fitting end for a man who had said "It is death for souls to become water" (fr. 26), and "A dry soul is wisest and best" (fr. 118), and "Corpses are more worthless than dung" (fr. 96). Here was a strange man indeed, whose proverbial remoteness and dark unintelligibility seemed to contradict his own

strong reminder that "we must follow that which is common . . . for even though the *logos* is common, the many live as if each man possessed his own private wisdom" (fr. 2).

Much of that story is doubtless apocryphal, but it serves nonetheless as a paradigm of the consequences attending behavioral and linguistic unconventionality, or better, of the ancient Greek attitude toward it, and perhaps, within a narrow range of variability, of all societies toward it. If Heraclitus follows any convention, it is, as he himself intimates, the convention of Delphi, neither naming things nor wholly concealing them, but signifying them (fr. 93). Unfortunately, part of that same convention is the appearance of madness. And ancient Greeks seemed readier to allow linguistic irregularity in Apollo's spokeswoman than in one's fellow townsman.

If we look for more extreme examples of "originality" and widen our horizon beyond the Greek context, Heraclitus seems not quite so bizarre. After all, learned men have made and continue to make sense out of him, some of it, sad to say, even pretty banal and conventional sense. But in our search for more monstrous examples of "originality" – purely in the interests of defining the limits of our discussion – we might have difficulty surpassing the so-called Voynich manuscript first discovered in Prague in 1666. "Its 204 pages comprise," in George Steiner's description, "a putative code of 29 symbols recurring in what appear to be ordered 'syllabic' units. The text gives every semblance of common non-alphabetic substitution. It has, up to the present time, resisted every technique of cryptoanalysis including computer-simulation." It has been conjectured, Steiner continues, that "we are, in fact, looking at an elaborate nonsense structure, an assemblage of systematic, recurrent, rule-governed characters signifying strictly nothing."[1]

From a purely linguistic point of view, the opposition between originality and convention logically opens up a wide spectrum of language-events that make us wonder about its usefulness as a critical or analytic tool, or at least about the reasons for our own dogged attraction to the idea of origins, originality, creativity.[2] At one pole of such a spectrum we find, in Steiner's words "a pathology of Babel, autistic strategies which attach hermetic meanings to certain sounds or which deliberately invert the lexical, habitual usage of words. At the other extreme, we encounter the

[1] G. Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation (Oxford 1975) 168.

[2] On the fascination with origins and originality, see especially E. W. Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York 1975).

currency of banal idiom, the colloquial shorthand of daily chatter from which constant exchange has all but eroded any particular substance."[3] But all new language-events, even the most solipsistic or eccentric of them, "will be parasitic on a public and preceding model"; the Voynich manuscript is a clear instance of that, and although the issue continues to be debated hotly, most philosophers argue against the possibility of a purely "private language." One of them characterizes the situation as follows: "a privately referring-with-a-word person is not a referring-with-a-word person at all. A person who is privately referring with a word is not a logical possibility."[4]

That there are no private speech-acts is a natural conclusion of modern linguistic theory. The basic distinction on which modern linguistics is based is Ferdinand de Saussure's separation of language as *langue* from language as *parole*.[5] Language as *langue* is a finite system, a compulsory code, a set of interpersonal rules and norms, whose existence is merely virtual, but out of which are generated an infinite number of actual utterances – language as *parole*. Learning a language is not a matter of memorizing actual utterances – *parole*; it is rather a matter of assimilating, in most cases, wholly unconsiously, the system of rules and norms – *langue* – out of which the speaker may generate utterances, many, perhaps most, of which are unprecedented, but none of which can be said to be truly private.

In assessing the work of individual artists against the background of their respective literary conventions, the archaic Greeks themselves did not appear to have concerned themselves very much if at all with originality, creativity, newness, the unprecedented, the personal and private, but rather with the standard of *excellence*. Excellence differentiates *performance* within a conventional system: it evaluates *parole* in terms of agility or virtuosity – a combinatorial skill – in exploiting the potentialities of the underlying *langue*. Excellence is relatively easy to recognize, for *competence* in the *langue* (which in all language-users far outstrips their

[3] Steiner (above, note 1) 171.

[4] M. Perkins, Two Arguments Against a Private Language, in E. Morlick (ed.), Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds (New York 1967) 109. See also N. Garver, Wittgenstein on Private Language, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (1960) 389–96.

[5] E. de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, ed. by C. Bally and A. Sechehaye (1916, repr. Paris 1960). See also R. S. Wells, De Saussure's System of Linguistics, in Michael Lane (ed.), Structuralism: a Reader (London 1970) 85–123, esp. 102–107; J. Culler, Structural Poetics (London 1975) 8–10; P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth 1976) 2–6.

actual *performance*) allows one to recognize both ungrammaticality and virtuosity, even though the listener himself may be incapable of the latter at the level of *performance*. Now "originality" suggests *newness* – what has not appeared before in the range of remembered *paroles*. But if an utterance is comprehended, it must by definition have been a possibility or potentiality of the underlying system. In these terms, *true* originality is a chimera, having more the nature of an effect than a cause. And it is axiomatic that, among those who analyze literature and other cultural manifestations from this linguistic perspective, the notion of the "subject" is rejected; it is "deconstrûcted" or "dissolved" as its functions are more properly attributed to the interpersonal systems that operate through it. While such a notion may seem an assault on the humanism cherished among practitioners of philology, it does not seem far from the tradition of the muse-inspired bards who thought of themselves more as graceful repeaters than as creators of the new and unprecedented.

Newness. That may in fact have less to do with saying something unprecedented (i.e., original) than with reinvesting the conventional with a sense of wonder, or in shattering the routine of a *narrowly performed*, publicly unexploited *langue* by this sense of wonder. The muses' gift is neither ordinary nor automatic, the meaningless endowment of what is already possessed in superfluity. It is prayed for or it comes unexpected, bearing all the character of a theophany. I do not mean to verge here into obscurantism or mystification. The sense of wonder to which I refer is not altogether mysterious: it is a *shock*, a departure from the habitual, an assault on perceptual and linguistic anaesthesia, but if it bears meaning and communicates – as opposed to the shocking, attention-getting, but unintelligible ravings of the madman (Heraclitus occupies, or better *dances* on the unstable borderline between these two states) – then it involves "defamiliarization" (*ostranenie*, Brecht's *Verfremdungseffekt*), a term given a great deal of currency by the Russian Formalist, Victor Shklovsky, who makes it, in fact, the distinctive feature which separates literature from other linguistic modes.[6]

Defamiliarization aims at a heightening of active awareness as a countermeasure to the lethargic torpor and erosion of meaning that results from

[6] On the concept of "defamiliarization," see L. T. Lemon and M. J. Reis (edd. and trans.), Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays (Lincoln, Neb. 1965) esp. the first essay, and F. Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: a Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism (Princeton 1972) 50ff.

habitual usage and perception. It is akin to the revolt of the Romantics against "custom," well characterized when Coleridge remarks, on Wordsworth's *Lyrical Ballads,* that he wanted "to give the charm of novelty to the things of every day, and to excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural, by awakening the mind's attention to the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the loveliness and the wonders of the world before us; an inexhaustible treasure, but for which in consequence of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude, we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand."[7] Coleridge's words, "feeling analogous to the supernatural," should remind us that Rudolf Otto's description of the sacred, which for him is "the wholly unfamiliar" (*Das ganz Andere*), as *mysterium fascinans et tremendum,* highlights the element of shock.[8] And the "film of familiarity and selfish solicitude" blinding us to the "wonders of the world" is precisely the condition which, in Hesiod's description, the muse-inspired bard dispels when he makes a man forget his private cares and puts him in mind of the wonderful deeds of gods and heroes (*Theogony* 98–103).

The process of revelation by concealment or estrangement is seen at work in its simplest forms in riddles, conundrums, puns, sexual euphemisms, where, like the Delphic oracle in Heraclitus, meaning is conveyed by avoiding conventional names, contexts, descriptions, where the goal often seems as much to heighten and refine awareness itself as to convey an idea or an object. It works against taking things for granted, and in this *it works against myth.* Except where the term is used loosely, myth is the stoutest embodiment of conventional reality; it maintains perceptual numbness from generation to generation. Even in form it is anonymous, lacking a unifying *conscious* intentionality, "speaking in men without their being aware of it" as Lévi-Strauss has said.[9] In its struggle to overcome or refine or even revivify myth, defamiliarization faces an endless Sisyphean task, for myth in infinitely voracious in conventionalizing or naturalizing everything. As Roland Barthes observes "Myth has the task of giving a historical intention a natural justification, and making contingency appear eternal. . . . It wrests from the meanings which give it its sustenance an insidious degraded survival . . . [and] turns them into speaking corpses. . . . It can

[7] Biographia Literaria, ch. 13, para. 2.

[8] R. Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. by J. W. Harvy (Oxford 1958, orig. 1917) esp. chaps. 4–6.

[9] C. Lévi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked, trans. by J. and D. Weightman (New York 1969, orig. 1964) 12.

even, as a last resort, signify the resistance which is brought to bear against it."[10]

The antagonism between defamiliarization and myth suggests a possible approach to distinguishing convention from artistic intentionality in the Homeric poems. (Note: *intentionality*, not *originality* or *creativity*.) Shklovsky has shown that one of the ways in which defamiliarization operates is at the level of narrative, where it gives primacy to plot and verbal texture over story or myth, where it takes the traditional story and retards, displaces, dismantles it, and introduces word-play, figures of speech, irony, satire – disruptive activities all, forcing us to be conscious of this language-event not as mere disposable medium (as in myth) but as *object*, as a *work*.[11] But for the fact that their conventions are so poorly documented, the Homeric poems would seem an ideal case for studying intentional defamiliarization of traditional narrative, occupying as they do a position between the artless anonymity of myth at one end of the spectrum and, at the other, a kind of literature (of which Greek tragedy is perhaps the clearest case) at once obsessed with *ipsissima verba* and intent on making very *explicit* its departure from tradition. For a poorly documented convention – that is, one in which as analysts we cannot distinguish familiar from unfamiliar, we cannot speak of defamiliarization unless the "sudden changes of context or viewpoint" carry enough of the old with them to allow us to see both old and new together. In other words, it may be in instances where the poet is, from one perspective, sloppy at his job, clumsy, illogical, where in some places traditional philology might argue the case for interpolation, that, paradoxically, intentionality may be most in evidence. For from our present linguistic perspective, it is as reasonable, perhaps more so, to assume not always elegant disruptive activity on traditional material by a single author intent on an unprecedented signification, as to assume interpolation within an original and perfect text by one or more *other* minds.

A simple example of this kind of disruption occurs in *Odyssey* 9, where the still green olive-wood club of Polyphemus, heated in the fire, is said to "glow terribly through and through, even though it was green": χλωρός περ ἐών, διεφαίνετο δ' αἰνῶς (381). It has been observed that this is precisely the opposite of what one should expect of fresh olive wood in a fire, and that the formula διεφαίνετο δ' αἰνῶς comes from a traditional

[10] R. Barthes, Mythologies, trans. by A. Lavers (New York 1972, orig. 1957) 133, 135, 142.

[11] B. Eichenbaum in Lemon and Reis (above, note 6) 119. See also H. N. Schneidau, Sacred Discontent: the Bible and Western Tradition (Berkeley 1977) 271–274.

context in which a metal object is used (a spit, perhaps, on which a technologically more sophisticated Polyphemus roasts his victims?), while χλωρός περ ἐών is an awkward, unsatisfactory makeshift to cover the disruption.[12] What the replacement of metal by olive-wood may intend need not be argued in detail here, but it would take little effort to show how neatly it falls into a pattern of other artistic choices calculated to highlight the distance of Polyphemus from culture.

A less simple but thematically weightier example is the insertion of Book 11 into the narrative of the *Odyssey*. The visit to Tiresias is motivated as follows: beginning at 10.490, Circe tells Odysseus he must visit the underworld to learn from the blind prophet ὁδὸν καὶ μέτρα κελεύθου νόστον τε – the measured or measurable stages of his journey home. But Tiresias tells him nothing of the ὁδὸν καὶ μέτρα κελεύθου and precious little about the νόστον, but concentrates on the aftermath of the return and the propitiation of Poseidon. Odysseus then returns to Circe's island for the obsequies of Elpenor, whose accidental death at the end of Book 10, described with a black humor unparalleled in Homer, had gone unnoticed, but whose shade is the first one encountered by Odysseus in Book 11. After the funeral rites, Circe herself tells Odysseus the ὁδὸν καὶ μέτρα κελεύθου – the measured stages represented by the Sirens, the Wandering Rocks, Scylla and Charybdis, and the Cattle of the Sun, *ending* where Tiresias had *begun*. All this points up the fact that the *motivation* cited in Book 10 for the visit to Tiresias in Book 11 is definitely not its *function*, for Circe fulfills that function herself in Book 12. This has the effect of drawing our attention all the more to the question of function in the visit to Tiresias. What that function is, again, we do not have space to elaborate here,[13] but it would be difficult to discount that the rough joins argue to intentionality.

[12] D. Page, The Homeric Odyssey (Oxford 1955) 10–11.

[13] In a yet unpublished monograph on the *Odyssey*, I have attempted to analyze the function of the visit to Tiresias. The general thesis of that monograph is that many of the narrative idiosyncrasies of the *Odyssey* can be explained as the collision of, and attempted mediation between two different kinds of narrative structure: one tending to stress the mortality and relative impotence of man in the face of what might the termed most generally *consistent external resistence* – the will of the gods, "fate," laws of nature inferred from experience, the incommensurability of the world, the inevitability of death; the other representing an optimistic, wish-fulfilling emancipation from this external resistance, born of human desire. The prophecy of Tiresias, as well as the prophecy of Nausithous about the ultimate fate of the Phaeacians – both unfulfilled within the confines of the *Odyssey* – are, I would suggest, strategems of silence to avoid saying "yes" to one system of organizing experience and "no" to another, in a higher and more complicated system – the poem –

Intentionality. Not "originality" or "creativity" understood after the analogy of creation *ex nihilo*. Not even "intent" understood as a fully shaped idea prior to and separable from the speech act that embodies it, and which when accessible apart from the speech act is mistakenly thought to serve as the only valid criterion of interpretation. The author's "intention is often unknown, sometimes redundant, sometimes useless, and sometimes even harmful as regards interpretation of the verbal meaning of his work. In even the better cases it has to be taken into account in the light of the text itself."[14] The so-called "intentional fallacy" overlooks the semantic autonomy of the text, rooted in the impersonal structure of *langue*. But there is an opposite fallacy – the one we have adverted to in speaking of the tendency to eliminate or "deconstruct" the subject. It does not account for the fact that a non-mythic text remains "a discourse told by somebody, said by someone to someone about something." Paul Ricoeur is, I think, right when he says that "it is impossible to cancel out this main characteristic of discourse without reducing texts to natural objects, i.e., to things that are not man made, but which, like pebbles, are found in the sand,"[15] (which is precisely the thing Lévi-Strauss claims of myth[16]). Intentionality accounts for the desire to make use of the impersonal code, to mean the unprecedented, rather than to repeat the constantly eroding given. Against convention or tradition or myth it seems to me finally more fruitful to set this term *intentionality*, which realizes itself through what I have called a "combinatorial skill," – perhaps better "combinatorial *daring*," the two of them best understood as a continuous

that only precariously maintains them both. In other words, the prophecy of Tiresias, unmarked as to its fulfillment, permits what the Russian Formalists call a "zero-degree" ending, neither explicitly "tragic" or explicitly "comic," but capable of becoming charged with either value.

[14] Ricoeur (above, note 5) 76. See also M. Hancher, Three Kinds of Intention, Modern Languages Notes 87 (1972) 827–851.

[15] Ibid. 30.

[16] Lévi-Strauss (above, note 9) 10: "Mythology has no obvious practical function: . . . it is not directly linked with a different kind of reality, which is endowed with a higher degree of objectivity than its own and whose injunctions it might therefore transmit to minds that seem perfectly free to indulge their creative spontaneity. And so, if it were possible to prove in this instance, too, that the apparent arbitrariness of the mind, its supposed spontaneous flow of inspiration, and its seemingly uncontrolled inventiveness imply the existence of laws operating at a deeper level, we would inevitably be forced to conclude that when the mind is left to commune with itself and no longer has to come to terms with objects, it is in a sense reduced to imitating itself as object; and that since the laws governing its operations are not fundamentally different from those it exhibits in its other functions, it shows itself to be of the nature of a thing among things."

operation. Merleau-Ponty considers *rearrangement* a major mode of realizing new meaning, of bridging the gap, formed by the inadequacy of existent signifiers, between intention and communication. The intention to signify, he says, acquires self-awareness and embodiment, at one and the same time, in the search for an equivalent in the system of available signifiers. It is a matter of realizing a certain arrangement of these already signifying instruments, which elicits in the listener or reader the inkling of a new and different signification and inversely accomplishes for the speaker or writer what Merleau-Ponty calls the "anchorage" of a meaning unprecedented in already available meanings.[17]

This "inkling of a new and different signification" teases the faculty of interpretation, and the greater the disruption of the system, the greater the need and effort of interpretation, and the longer the life earned for the text – like the words of Heraclitus who, even though he may have struck many of his contemporaries as a raving lunatic, is like the Sibyl of his own fragment 92, "with madness in her voice uttering things unlaughable, unembellished, and unperfumed, yet reaching over a thousand years with her voice, thanks to the god."

[17] M. Merleau-Ponty, Sur La phénomenologie du langage, in: Éloge de la philosophie (Paris 1963) 97. Compare the remark of Wittgenstein (Tractatus Log.-Phil. 4.03): "A proposition must use old expressions to communicate new sense."

CARL A. RUBINO

"A Thousand Shapes of Death": Heroic Immortality in the *Iliad*

The so-called heroic, or Homeric, code of the *Iliad* is founded upon external recognition: men fight and die in battle in order to receive honor and glory from other men. Thus the often cited words of Sarpedon to Glaucus in Book 12:

> Ah, cousin, could we but survive this war
> to live forever deathless, without age,
> I would not ever go again to battle,
> nor would I send you there for honor's sake!
> But now a thousand shapes of death surround us,
> and no man can escape them, or be safe.
> Let us attack – whether to give some fellow
> glory or to win it from him. (322–328)[1]

Much of the *Iliad* turns on the question of how his glory is to be realized. At the beginning of the poem it appears to reside in the possession of prizes granted for heroic exploits in battle, external emblems of *aretē*; but this is called into question by the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon. By stripping the prize from the man most deserving of prizes, Agamemnon corrupts the existing heroic system. This act of corruption drives Achilles to an extremely rigorous view of the heroic code, one that rejects any reliance on emblems or tokens of recognition. Achilles is led to conclude that prizes are of no real value, since men like Agamemnon can take them away; and thus he becomes both creator and creature of the Greek obsession: he longs for what cannot be taken away, for the inviolable, the absolute (Latin *absolutum*: the unrestricted, the unconditional, the free-and-clear).

[1] Translations of Homeric texts are by Robert Fitzgerald, Iliad (Garden City, N. Y. 1974); Odyssey (Garden City, N. Y. 1961).

What Achilles is after, what he demands from Zeus, is *kleos aphthiton*,[2] unfading glory that is perfect and therefore permanent, as it would have to be for a Greek (look, for example, at the discussion of happiness and permanence in the first book of Aristotle's *Ethics*). In order to attain this glory Achilles must die, and die young: only young men, says Priam (22.71–76), achieve glory in death; the old are merely disgraced by it. What we might call the logic of heroism demands the rejection of human life: the hero dies in order to live forever in glory; he loses his life in order to save it. Time and time again the words of Achilles testify to this logic. In a well-known passage from Book 9 he states unequivocally that he cannot have *kleos aphthiton* and human life at the same time; it must be one or the other:

> if on the one hand I remain to fight
> around Troy town, I lose all hope of home
> but gain unfading glory: on the order,
> if I sail back to my own land my glory
> fails – but a long life lies ahead for me. (412–416)

Achilles' words, with their mention of return to his homeland (νόστος εἰς πατρίδα γαῖαν), show that much more is at stake here than mere physical survival: the drive for glory demands the sacrifice of the whole of human life, spiritual as well as physical. This sense is reinforced by such passages as 18.70–126, where he tells his mother that he has lost his only friend (for the sake of his glory) and will never return home to his father and son; likewise, in 19.315–337, he mentions his dead friend Patroclus, his son bereft of a father, and his father Peleus, who is either dead or barely alive, awaiting the news that his son Achilles has died. Human life is excluded from the quest for unfading glory. Even our most obvious human needs must be ignored: in 19.145–237 and 305–308, Achilles' disdain for eating is contrasted with the more human attitude of Agamemnon and Odysseus, who here prefigures Joyce's Ulysses, Leopold Bloom.

Heroism, then, is bound up with loss of life: it is stimulated and dominated by the presence of death. We come back to the words of

[2] I am aware of Benveniste's important distinction between *kudos* and *kleos* and that I may seem to be ignoring it here. The limited scope of this paper prevents a detailed discussion of the matter; let me simply state that in my view the desire of Achilles is that Zeus arrange that he achieve glory among men, i.e., *kleos*. See E. Benveniste, Le Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européenes (Paris 1969) II 57–69; see also G. Nagy, Comparative Studies in Greek and Indic Meter (Cambridge, Mass. 1974).

Sarpedon: if we did not have to grow old and die, there would be no reason to go into battle; we fight for honor and glory only because those thousand shapes of death surround us and none of us can escape them. We are doomed to compete for glory. Thus Achilles, the man most dominated by death, becomes like unto death. In 6.407–439, Andromache tells Hector, whom Achilles is soon to kill and maim, that for her Achilles equals death: he has killed her father and all her brothers and caused the death of her mother. In 9.158–161, Agamemnon shrewdly compares the pitiless implacability of Achilles to the attitude of death itself; and his words are in Phoenix' mind as he makes his appeal to Achilles later on in Book 9 (496–498). Finally, both we and Achilles are well aware that he will soon be dead himself, he who causes the death of his only friend, the death of Hector, and the deaths of numberless others, Greeks and Trojans alike.

The central paradox of the *Iliad* is that it is death which gives significance to life: Achilles can win his glory only by causing the death of others (Patroclus must die so that Achilles will return to take revenge on Hector, thus achieving his *kleos*) and dying himself. In this regard, Achilles' description of the staff he holds while swearing his great oath in Book 1 is worth notice:

> But here is what I say: my oath upon it
> by this great statt: look: leaf or shoot
> it shall not sprout again, once lopped away
> from the log it left behind in the timbered hills;
> it cannot flower, peeled of bark and leaves;
> instead, Akhaian officers in council
> take it in hand by turns, when they observe
> by the will of Zeus due order in debate:
> let this be what I swear by then: I swear
> a day will come when every Akhaian soldier
> will groan to have Akhilleus back. That day
> you shall no more prevail on me than this
> dry wood shall flourish. (233–242)

Lessing, in *Laocoon*, and Lukács, in *Probleme des Realismus* (Berlin 1955), both call our attention to the differences between this description and that accorded to Agamemnon's sceptre in Book 2 (see 46–47, 101–109, and also 206, which may be an interpolation). Unlike the staff held by Achilles, the staff decribed in Book 2 is "forever imperishable" (ἄφθιτον αἰεί), was made by Hephaestus, presumably of metal, and was handed down from

the gods to the family of Pelops. Lessing and Lukács argue that Homer is not concerned merely to describe two sticks of different shape and material but that he means to depict the different kinds of power the staffs represent; here both stand opposed to Auerbach's well-known discussion in the first chapter of *Mimesis* (Bern 1946).

Yet we might go further and read Achilles' description of his staff, so striking in its detail, as a description of the man himself. The staff is made of dead wood, and its deadness is stressed in the description. It cannot sprout again, for it has been severed from the living tree from which it came; and it has been stripped of bark and leaves. In all these things it resembles Achilles, who will grow no more, will have no more sons, and will be bereft of parents and friends. Moreover, its deadness gives the staff significance: it is only because the staff is dead that it can give meaning to Achilles' oath and to the words of anyone who rises to speak in the assembly, where no one has the right to be heard unless he is holding that staff. If the staff were still alive, back home in the forest, it would not have this power: it would be insignificant. The hero, Achilles, is like the staff: he makes no sense, his life has no meaning, he is insignificant, until he is dead. Imperishable and unfading glory, perfect, permanent, and immune to corruption, is possible only after death, when change, decline, and corruption are rendered impotent. It is only when the body of the hero is consigned to corruption that his *kleos* becomes incorruptible. Hegel's remarks in the *Aesthetics* on the pyramids, monumental repositories for the bodies of dead kings, are very interesting in this regard: the pyramids remain the culmination of symbolic art; they cannot enter the realm of true art unless they lose their connection with the bodies within them, i.e., when those bodies decompose, disappear, and cease to be remembered, leaving the pyramids to be signs of themselves alone. An early death allows the hero to make of himself a work of art, to bequeath a sort of essence to posterity; we might paraphrase Solon and say "Call no man a hero until he is dead."

Nevertheless, this perfect and incorruptible *kleos* must be incarnate somewhere in the human world; it must be somehow tangible and available to posterity. If not, it would cease to exist. Helen's words to Hector in 6.354–358 tell us where to look for this incarnation of *kleos*: she says that his burden, her harlotry, and Paris' folly are

> our portion, all of misery, given by Zeus
> that we may live in song for men to come.

The hero's unfading glory lives in epic poetry: heroes and heroines live, suffer, and die to take on significance after death as the subjects of heroic song, the great signifiers of epic verse. Their death makes them and their lives meaningful by turning them into words in poems, by making them creatures of language. Unhappy and wasted lives make excellent stories!

It would seem that words are indeed a suitable material and repository for perfect and permanent glory, since they, their meanings, do not fade and are incorruptible. Thus Horace states that his *monumentum* (tomb-marker), which is made of the words of his poems, is *aere perennius* and superior to the pyramids: it cannot be worn away by time or the elements.[3] Words are not material; they will live as long as there are people who grasp their meaning, who know the language from which they come.

Yet here we have a second paradox to match the first. Achilles, who wished to depend on no human being, ends by depending upon epic poets and their audiences (us) to preserve, protect, and revere his *kleos*. Without epic poetry, there is no unfading glory, only oblivion. Thus our hero is at the mercy of words, of those who read and write about the heroic past. Worse yet, words, being incorruptible and untouchable, are by consequence also intangible, abstract, and insubstantial; they are part of what Hegel calls *das Geistige*, and thus they create a world all their own. Yeats, in "The Song of the Happy Shepherd," has a good deal to say on the matter of heroes, words, and worlds:

> Words alone are certain good.
> Where are now the warring kings,
> Word be-mockers? – By the Rood,
> Where are now the warring kings?
> An idle word is now their glory,
> By the stammering schoolboy said,
> Reading some entangled story:
> The kings of the old time are dead:
> The wandering earth herself may be
> Only a sudden flaming word,
> In clanging space a moment heard,
> Troubling the endless reverie. (10–21)

This remarkable first stanza, which mentions "grey truth" in its fourth line, sets us squarely in the world of Hegel, where "philosophy paints it

[3] *Carmina* 3.30; see T. Woodman, Exegi Monumentum, in T. Woodman and D. West (ed.), Quality and Pleasure in Latin Poetry (Cambridge 1974) 116.

grey in grey" and where "the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk."[4] Language and thought can only attempt to refashion something that has already passed away; this is why language, as Hegel says in the *Encyclopedia* (III 458), involves "active memory." Thus poets and readers recreate the hero, refashion him each time the poetic moment occurs. Heroes begin by pretending to be "men of action," and they constantly declare their contempt for "mere words" (witness Hector in 20.366–368, 20.430–437, and 22.279–282; likewise Aeneas in 20.244–258); but they end as the subjects of epic texts, no longer persons possessing their own individual subjectivity but mere constructions of language, "mere pomp of words," to borrow Sterne's phrase.

We must ask whether this is the unfading glory that Achilles wanted for himself, or whether he perceived the full implications of his request to Zeus at the end of Book 1. The text of the *Iliad* embodies not only his *kleos* but also the loss of his personal subjectivity, inscribing him in a tale. Zeus, in such a reading, becomes the first poet of the *Iliad,* for it is he, the god, who creates the plot (μῦθος) of the poem. Achilles naively asks Zeus for an ending – *kleos aphthiton,* but the receives a whole book instead! His text is made for him; and he does not read it until it is too late, until the death of his friend Patroclus makes an effective end to the human chapter of his life.

Homer, whoever that may have been (and the implications of the Homeric question for this reading are profound), is the second *Iliad*-poet, following Zeus. Achilles lived and died, and Homer recalls the text of his life as it was composed by Zeus. We say that Homer preserves the story of Achilles, and we know that the story belongs as much to Homer as it does to Achilles, its "subject." For us, Achilles is no more than a character, albeit the most important character, in Homer's *Iliad.* No poet, no hero: it is as simple as that. What does it mean to become such a "character," the "subject" of someone else's text? Here, perhaps, we have reached the real question of the *Iliad.*

Finally, it is we, the living readers of the *Iliad*, who recreate Achilles and his story all over again. We are the *Iliad*-poets in the world of today: like Odysseus at the trench, we supply the blood that allows the dead hero to live once more. Yet who is it that lives, and what do we mean when we say that readers "identify" with characters in texts? If we consider the

[4] From the preface to the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Berlin 1821); translation from T. M. Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Oxford 1952) 13.

answers to such questions, we might expect that Achilles would address us with the words he speaks in the *Odyssey* (11.489–491):

> Better, I say, to break sod as a farm hand
> for some poor country man, on iron rations,
> than lord it over all the exhausted dead.

Better to be alive; but it is too late, for Achilles has entered the world of language, where he is no longer himself. The *Iliad*, plotted by Zeus, composed by Homer, read by us, incarnates not Achilles but his loss of himself: in this poem, the word does not become the flesh of the hero but the body of a text. As for Achilles, his end is well described in Ariel's song from Shakespeare's *Tempest* (I.ii. 397–401):

> Of his bones are coral made:
> Those are pearls that were his eyes:
> Nothing of him that doth fade,
> But doth suffer a sea-change
> Into something rich and strange.

A sea-change, as we all know, is a change indeed.

WILLIAM WHALLON

Is Hector *androphonos*?

Though some of the talents given to Bernard Knox are widely recognized, few people know him to be the ablest and most generous editor any author could wish for. In the late 1960s he edited, and the Center published, my little book on formulaic poetry ("little" book is what certain "friends" of mine have called it), and I should like to declare his method – which was to read the typescript twice and both sets of proof, to make at each stage numerous suggestions of the highest value, and then to leave every decision to me. It is with a memory of that experience that I offer him this paper, which is arranged in two parts, the first supplementing my first chapter, the second my second. The paper was read 28 April 1973 at the Kentucky Foreign Language Conference on the invitation of Hubert Martin, Jr., a boon companion throughout my year at the Center; already at the time of the Conference there was talk of this Festschrift, and I planned from the beginning to publish the paper here or not at all.

I

Milman Parry, *The Making of Homeric Verse* (Oxford 1971) 184, regarded ἀνδροφόνος "man-slaying," ἱππόδαμος "breaker of horses," and ἀντίθεος "godlike" as the prominent figures in the leading family of "equivalent generic epithets," where equivalent means metrically identical, and generic means describing equally well all the members of a class (in this case, the class of heroes). My quarrel is that I do not believe ἀνδροφόνος, ἱππόδαμος, and ἀντίθεος are generic truly. The issue is twofold: whether the epithets are used as if generic, and whether the epic matter would permit such use of them.

Are ἀνδροφόνος, ἱππόδαμος, and ἀντίθεος used as if generic? To a degree they are, and to a degree they are not. They are used as if generic in that each of them describes, in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, more men than one alone. It is true that ἀνδροφόνος scarcely does so, and Parry 185

had misgivings about his theory at this point – misgivings which, however, he overcame. Where the epithets are not used as if generic is in their distribution among those whom they describe most often. Hector is by epithet ἀνδροφόνος 11 times, ἱππόδαμος 5 times, ἀντίθεος never; Diomedes, ἱππόδαμος 8 times, ἀντίθεος never, ἀνδροφόνος never; Odysseus, ἀντίθεος 10 times, ἀνδροφόνος never, ἱππόδαμος never.

Would the epic matter permit the use of ἀνδροφόνος, ἱππόδαμος, and ἀντίθεος as generic epithets? Parry 190 thought the poet could have used ἀντίθεος instead of ἱππόδαμος for Diomedes, "both of these epithets being equally applicable to Diomedes or any other hero." This is certainly wrong; ἱππόδαμος is not applicable to every other hero, though it is to some. Diomedes deserves to be called ἱππόδαμος because Argos his home is described as a good pasture for horses and because he captures the horses of Tros from Aeneas and wins the chariot race with them. Hector deserves ἱππόδαμος less, though the Trojans his countrymen are described as breakers of horses, and though Andromache has fed his horses with honey-hearted wheat and wine. Odysseus does not deserve ἱππόδαμος at all, for there are no horses on Ithaca, a place said to be unfit for them. These facts match the distribution of the epithet among Diomedes, Hector, and Odysseus: 8 times, 5 times, never. What I am looking for is evidence to match – at least somewhat – the use of ἀνδροφόνος: 11 times for Hector, never for Diomedes or Odysseus.

In a meaty double page entitled "The Casualty Lists in the Trojan War," Greece & Rome 16 (1969) 30f., C. B. Armstrong tells how many named men are killed by the leading heroes. Little has been left for me other than to revise his sums with the aid of Cunliffe's *Homeric Proper and Place Names*. These, then, are the warriors of the Iliad who kill no fewer than a dozen named men each: Agamemnon, 12; Ajax and Teucer, 15 each; Odysseus, 18; Diomedes, 20; Achilles, Hector, and Patroclus, 27 each.[1]

[1] (Those following in italics are the slayers; those in roman, the slain.) *Achilles:* Aenius Amphimachus Areithous Asteropaeus Astypylus Dardanus Deucalion Demoleon Demouchus Dryops Hector Ennomus Echeclus Eetion Thersilochus Thrasius Hippodamas Iphition Laogonos Lycaon Mnesus Moulius Mydon Ophelestes Polydorus Rhigmus Tros. *Hector:* Agelaus Anchialus Aesymnus Amphimachus Arcesilaus Asaeus Autonous Dolops Helenus Epeigeus Eioneus Hipponous Lycophron Menesthes Oenomaus Opites Oresbius Orestes Opheltius Patroclus Periphetes Stichius Schedius-1 Schedius-2 Teuthras Trechus Orus. *Patroclus:* Adrestus Amphoterus Areilycus Autonous Elasus Epaltes Epistor Erylaus Erymas Euippus Echeclus Echius Thestor Thrasymelus Ipheus Cebriones Melanippus Moulius Perimus Polymelus Pronous Pylartes Pyraechmes Pyris Sarpedon Sthenelaus Tlepolemus. *Diomedes*: Abas Agastrophus Agelaus Adrestus Amphius Astynous Axylus Dolon Echemmon Chromius Eniopeus Thoon Thymbraeus

Not counted are the same number killed by Patroclus nine at a time in three successive assaults (16.785), or the horde (11.304ff.) and the laggards (8.341f.) killed by Hector, or the dozen Trojans killed indirectly by Achilles when his shout causes a hubbub (18.230), or the dozen Trojan sons slain for the pyre of Patroclus (23.175), or the dozen unnamed Thracians slain in their sleep by Diomedes (10.487f.). Not counted either are those whose deaths have gone unrecorded. Nor is account taken of the help Hector has in killing Patroclus, nor of the help Achilles has in killing Hector. So the statistics are far from being final. Still, when numbers from the episodes (who kills how many named men?) augment those from concordances (who is called ἀνδροφόνος how often?) – and when passages of heroism (such as 5.703–710 and 11.299–309) balance those of sentimentality (such as 6.456–465 and 22.77–89) – the epithet appears significantly true to individual character. I am not saying that ἀνδροφόνος would be unfitting for Achilles or Patroclus (the hands of Achilles are ἀνδροφόνοι), nor that it is used as if relevant to context. I am saying only – what Parry disbelieved or failed to realize – that the epithet is true to character, seeing that Hector seems a bloodier man even than Diomedes or Odysseus (and seeing that he kills more of his enemies than all his countrymen put together do). This conclusion is a factual one, but to

Xanthus Pandarus Polyidus Calesius Hypeiron Phegeus Rhesus. *Odysseus*: Alastor Alius Alcandrus Deiopites Democoon Ennomus Thoon Hippodamus Coeranus Molion Noemon Pidytes Prytanis Hypeirochus Socus Charops Chersidamas Chromius. *Ajax:* Acamas Amphius Archelochus Doryclus Epiclees Hippothous Caletor Laodamas Lysandrus Pandocus Pylartes Pyrasus Simoeisius Hyrtius Phorcys. *Teucer:* Amopaon Aretaon Archeptolemus Gorgythion Daetor Imbrius Cleitus Lycophontes Melanippus Ormenus Orsilochus Ophelestes Periphetes Prothoon Chromius. *Agamemnon*: Antiphus Bienor Elatus Hippolochus Coon Adrestes Isus Iphidamas Odius Peisandrus Oileus Deicoon. *Antilochus*: Ablerus Atymnius Echepolus Thoon Melanippus Mermerus Mydon Phalces. *Menelaus*: Dolops Thoas Peisandrus Podes Pylaemenes Scamandrius Euphorbus Hyperenor. *Meriones*: Adamas Acamas Harpalion Hippotion Laogonus Morys Phereclus. *Idomeneus*: Alcathous Asius Erymas Oenomaus Othryoneus Phaestus. *Aeneas*: Aphareus Iasus Crethon Leiocritus Medon Ortilochus. *Leonteus:* Iamenus Hippomachus Menon Antiphates Orestes. *Polypoetes:* Astyalus Ormenus Pylon Damasus. *Euryalus:* Opheltius Pedasus Aesepus Dresus. *Eurypylus*: Apisaon Hypsenor Melanthius. *Meges*: Amphiclus Croesmus Pedaeus. *Paris:* Deiochus Euchenor Menesthius. *Poulydamas*: Mecistheus Prothoenor Otus. *Nestor:* Itymoneus Moulius Ereuthalion. *Sarpedon*: Alcmaon Tlepolemus. *Ajax* the less: Cleoboulus Santius. *Peneleos*: Ilioneus Lycon. *Agenor:* Elephenor Clonius. *Glaucus:* Bathyclees Iphinous. *Deiphobus*: Ascalaphus Hypsenor. *Lycomedes*: Apisaon. *Automedon*: Aretus. *Helenus*: Deipyrus. *Peirous*: Diores. *Polites*: Echius. *Thrasymedes*: Maris. *Acamas*: Promachus. *Leitus*: Phylacus. *Antiphus*: Leucus. *Thoas*: Peirous. (The Trojans among the slayers are Hector, Aeneas, Paris, Poulydamas, Sarpedon, Agenor, Glaucus, Deiphobus, Helenus, Peirous, Polites, Acamas, and Antiphus.)

account for it I can only reason myself into the unwritten, pre-Iliadic, pre-Odyssean, pre-Homeric epic tradition.

II

Parry, esp. 184, 130, 145f., 150, told (so to speak) of a process marked off into segments; a few travellers are still near the start; some have reached journey's end. First, when an epithet was originally used, it must have been relevant to context ("particularized"), like πολύτροπος in *Odyssey* 10.330 or ἄναλκις in 3.310. Secondly, while being used only when relevant to context it was repeatedly combined with one name alone (being now "distinctive," *spéciale*, as well as particularized), like Ἰθακήσιος or πελώριος. Thirdly, while being restricted to that one name alone it came to be used even when not relevant to context (becoming "ornamental" instead of particularized, though distinctive as before), like πολύτλας, κορυθαίολος, κύδιστος. Lastly, while being used even when not relevant to context it was applied to many names (having become "generic" instead of distinctive, besides being ornamental), like ἀνδροφόνος, ἱππόδαμος, ἀντίθεος, ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, χαλκοκορυστής. For example, ἀνδροφόνος (a) was coined to describe Hector – or someone else – in the act of killing a man, (b) was afterwards used to describe him – and him alone – as he killed men repeatedly, (c) came to be used for him even when he was not killing anyone, and (d) came to be available for describing any man who was not even killing anyone.

The idea – from the second and last segments – that the epithets were becoming less distinctive, more generic, is opposed by the principle of variety, which asks that for the sake of interest different epithets should create a distinction between major figures whose names are metrically identical, just as for the sake of interest the epithets πάντοσ' ἐΐση and θυσσανόεσσα create a distinction between the *aspis* and the *aegis*. The principle of variety has only moderate strength: it usually does not hinder a major figure from sharing an epithet with a minor figure (ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων, ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Εὔμηλος), and it has not absolutely forbidden even that two major figures should share an epithet between them (μέγας κορυθαίολος Ἕκτωρ, μέγας Τελαμώνιος Αἴας; δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς, δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς; βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Διομήδης, βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος). Nevertheless, from the principle, I think it likelier that Ἕκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο was replacing, than that it was being replaced by, Ἕκτορος ἱπποδάμοιο.

The idea – from the first and third segments – that the epithets were becoming less relevant to context, more ornamental, is opposed by the hypothesis that they were, once established, often exemplified or illustrated or alluded to, just as for the *sakos* of Ajax the adjectival epithet ἑπταβόειον has been illustrated in *Iliad* 7.247f. and the adverbial epithet ἠΰτε πύργον alluded to in *Odyssey* 11.556. I find in such allusion or illustration or exemplification – which sometimes occurs when the epithet itself is used, though usually not – that the tendency was towards, not away from, an affinity between style and content. What some will hold for a flaw in this hypothesis, though to my mind it is not a flaw by any means, must be acknowledged and in fact asserted: for the sake of interest the exemplification can be negative (Hector is not ἀνδροφόνος with respect to Achilles, Achilles is not πόδας ὠκύς with respect to Hector); the exact truth is that the poet was alert to the proposition implied by the phrase Ἕκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο.

The process I have ascribed to Parry, which regards the epithets as becoming less distinctive and less relevant to context, locates the most acute characterization – the use of the more distinctive and more relevant epithet – at the *start* of the tradition. That is, the process would have a poet best solve the difficulties in characterization just when he was least well equipped to do so. It is easier to say that a poet was creating acute characterization – with epithets that tended to be distinctive (because they distinguished more and more between men of metrically identical names) and tended to be relevant to the epic matter as a whole and sometimes to the immediate context (by virtue of being here and there exemplified) – at the *end* of the tradition. For by then the diction was highly developed and a poet could achieve things beyond the skill of his primitive forebear.

Can this reasoning be said to rest on any evidence? Is there some way to show that iron-age bards wrought more intricate designs than bronze-age bards did? Where shall we find a single instance of late to compare with early? What comes to mind is the twofold family of terms for the shield. The noun ἀσπίς (in its various forms and epithetic phrases) never scans the same as σάκος (in its own forms and phrases); this indicates that at one time ἀσπίς and σάκος were used as synonyms; but altogether contrary to expectation they are not so used in the *Iliad*. Early simplicity has been replaced by late complexity. The like is what I would argue for the personal epithet. The tendency was towards greater distinctiveness, and towards greater relevance to the epic matter.

Immediately upon its coinage the epithet ἀνδροφόνος was recognized as interesting; soon afterwards it may have been used with any name of appropriate length. The epithet may or may not have existed before it was used with the name of Hector, who may or may not have been already famous as a slayer of men. The phrase Ἕκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο was sooner or later used in a context where the epithet was not clearly relevant, and here ἀνδροφόνος conveyed that the slaying of men had some enduring connection with Hector. All poets began to use the phrase Ἕκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο, not for the epithet but merely as a metrical variant of the name: they associated the sound of the epithet with the sound of the name and the meaning of the epithet with the man referred to by the name. As a consequence of its affinity with Hector, ἀνδροφόνος was virtually restricted to him alone. Episodes involving Hector with the slaying of men were exceptionally likely to be created and to survive: for this reason Ἕκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο can be said to have influenced the shape of the epic matter. The epithet thus came to have greater contextual relevance than would have been the result of average luck, and also became more than ever true to the special nature of Hector.

KJELD MATTHIESSEN

Form und Funktion des Weltaltermythos bei Hesiod

In zwei Aufsätzen aus den Jahren 1960 und 1966 versucht Jean Pierre Vernant, sich dem Verständnis des bekannten Mythos von Entstehung, Leben und Untergang der fünf Menschengeschlechter bei Hesiod (Werke und Tage 106–201) auf dem Wege der Strukturanalyse zu nähern.[1] Er beruft sich hierbei auf das Vorbild von Victor Goldschmidt, der schon früher die Ansicht vertrat, es sei Hesiod bei seinem Mythos auch darum gegangen, bestimmte Strukturen des jetzigen Weltzustandes zu beschreiben.[2] Vernants Ausführungen haben viel Anklang gefunden, aber auch einigen Widerspruch erfahren,[3] sind jedoch, wie ich meine, noch nicht so gründlich gewürdigt worden, wie sie es verdienen. Ähnliches gilt für die These von Goldschmidt.

Die Form der Erzählung bei Hesiod ist in der Tat eigentümlich und bedarf der Erklärung. Besonders das tapfere und gerechte vierte Geschlecht, das der Heroen, das anders als die übrigen nicht nach einem Metall benannt ist und das die absteigende Linie der anderen Geschlechter unterbricht, ist immer wieder als störendes Element empfunden worden. An anderer Stelle habe ich die Vermutung geäußert und zu begründen versucht, daß Hesiod hier zwei Erzählungen, die er in der Tradition seines Volkes vorfand, die aber beide letztlich auf orientalische Quellen zurückgehen, miteinander verbunden hat, nämlich die Erzählung über die Abfolge von vier nach

[1] J. P. Vernant, Le mythe hésiodique des races, Essai d'analyse structurale, Rev. de l'Histoire des Rel. 157 (1960) 24–54 (= Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs I [Paris 1965] 13–41); derselbe, Le mythe hésiodique des races, Sur un essai de mise au point, Rev. de Philol. 40 (1966) 247–76 (= Mythe et pensée I 42–79).

[2] V. Goldschmidt, Theologia, Rev. d. Et. gr. 63 (1950) 33–39. Ähnlich auch schon E. Rohde, Psyche I, 5. Aufl. (Tübingen 1910) 95.

[3] Zustimmung: F. Vian, Rev. d. Et. anc. 68 (1966) 159; P. Gauthier, Rev. de Philol. 42 (1968) 124; G. S. Kirk, Myth (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1970) 232–37. Auch W. Marg (Hes., Sämtliche Gedichte [Zürich 1970] 348) übernimmt Vernants Gliederung in sechs Stufen. – Widerspruch: A. W. H. Adkins, Class. Rev. 21 (1971) 81; E. R. Dodds, The Ancient Concept of Progress (Oxford 1973) 3 Anm. 3; H. Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1971) 34 Anm. 36.

Metallen benannten, in absteigender Linie angeordneten Geschlechtern und eine andere über die Abfolge von zwei Geschlechtern, nämlich dem glücklicheren und gerechteren der Halbgötter oder Heroen und dem unglücklichen und ungerechten der jetzt lebenden Menschen.[4] Durch diese Annahme würden sich auch die Übereinstimmungen erklären, die zwischen manchen Aussagen Hesiods über das goldene Geschlecht und über den zu den Inseln der Seligen entrückten Teil des heroischen Geschlechts bestehen.[5]

Nach Goldschmidt ist die besondere Form der Erzählung bei Hesiod, insbesondere der Einschub des Geschlechts der Heroen in die Folge der nach Metallen benannten Geschlechter dadurch zu erklären, daß der Dichter die Entstehung der verschiedenen Gruppen von unter den Menschen wirkenden und in unterschiedlicher Weise verehrten Wesen unterhalb der eigentlich göttlichen Sphäre beschreiben wollte, nämlich der Dämonen, der Heroen und der im Hades weilenden Seelen der Verstorbenen.

Nun macht Hesiod tatsächlich über die Menschen des goldenen Geschlechts die Aussage, daß sie als δαίμονες ἐπιχθόνιοι fortleben und daß Zeus ihnen die Aufgabe übertragen hat, über die Taten der Menschen zu wachen und ihnen Reichtum zu spenden.[6] Insoweit ist Goldschmidt recht

[4] Das Zeitalter der Heroen bei Hesiod, Philologus 121 (1977) 176–88. Die Auffassung von P. Walcot (The Composition of the Works and Days, Rev. d. Et. gr. 74, 1961, 4–7), nach welcher der ursprüngliche Weltaltermythos vier Generationen umfaßte (Gold – Silber – Bronze – Heroen mit einer Abfolge guter und schlechter Generationen im Schema ABBA) und nach welcher das eiserne Geschlecht eine hes. Zutat ist, findet keine Grundlage im Text der Handschriften und nur eine schwache Stütze im V. 173 a der Nebenüberlieferung. Gegen Walcot auch M. S. Jensen, Tradition and Individuality in Hesiod's Works and Days, Class. & Mediaev. 27 (1966) 2. – Weitere orientalische Parallelen zu Einzelzügen der Weltaltererzählung bei U. Bianchi, Razza aurea, mito delle cinque razze ed Elisio, Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni 34 (1963) 144 Anm. 1, 187f.

[5] Damit schließe ich mich der Auffassung von Paley, Rohde, Mazon und anderen an, nach der den in V. 161 mit τοὺς μέν eingeführten teils vor Theben, teils vor Troia gefallenen die in V. 167 mit τοῖς δέ eingeführten zu Lebzeiten entrückten Heroen gegenübergestellt werden. Anders U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Hesiods Erga (Berlin 1928) 60; W. Nicolai, Hesiods Erga (Heidelberg 1964) 43–46. Daß die Entrückung wenigen Auserwählten vorbehalten bleibt, entspricht der epischen Tradition.

[6] Die Echtheit von V. 124f. wird zu Unrecht angezweifelt. Daß die als δαίμονες fortlebenden Menschen des goldenen Geschlechts nach der Vorstellung des Dichters identisch mit den von Zeus eingesetzten φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων sind, zeigt schon die Übereinstimmung von V. 123 mit 253. Diese Identität wird in der Weise des frühgriechischen Epos, das gleiche Sachverhalte mit gleichen Worten auszudrücken liebt, durch die Identität der Formulierung von V. 124f. und 254f. bekräftigt. Alle Handschriften enthalten die beiden Verse. Daß Plutarch, Makrobius und die Scholien V. 124f. nicht zitieren, will nicht viel besagen; denn zitiert wird nur so viel, wie für den jeweiligen Zweck des zitierenden

zu geben. Aber der Dichter führt diesen Gedanken offenbar nicht konsequent fort. Zwar läßt er die Menschen des silbernen Geschlechts als ὑποχθόνιοι μάκαρες fortleben, also als Wesen, denen eigenartigerweise Attribute zuteil werden, wie sie am ehesten zu den Heroen passen würden, die ja an ihren Gräbern kultisch verehrt werden.[7] Aber von den Menschen der ehernen Zeit heißt es nur, daß sie ruhmlos (νώνυμοι) in den Hades eingegangen sind. Sie genießen also weder eine besondere Verehrung, noch wirken sie in irgendeiner Weise auf das menschliche Leben ein. Über den Teil der Heroen, der nicht zu den Inseln der Seligen entrückt worden ist, also gerade über diejenigen, deren Gräber die Stätte des Heroenkults bilden und an deren weiterem Schicksal Hesiod nach Goldschmidts Ansicht besondert interessiert sein müßte, macht er keine Aussagen, verweilt dagegen ausgiebig beim anderen Teil, der fern von den Menschen ein seliges Leben führt und weder auf Verehrung angewiesen ist noch auf die menschlichen Angelegenheiten einwirkt.[8] Über die Weise des Fortlebens der Menschen des eisernen Geschlechts schließlich verliert Hesiod kein Wort.

Damit zeigt sich, daß Goldschmidts Aussage zwar für das erste und das zweite Geschlecht zutrifft, daß aber keine Rede davon sein kann, daß Hesiods Erzählung als ganze, also in jedem ihrer fünf Teile, und zwar insbesondere in dem eingefügten vierten Teil, die Funktion hätte, Aussagen über die Struktur der Welt, in diesem Falle über die verschiedenen Gruppen von Wesen unterhalb der göttlichen Sphäre zu machen.

Vernant greift bei seinem Versuch einer Strukturanalyse der Erzählung Hesiods einen Gedanken von Georges Dumézil auf, nach dem sich die Geschlechter in drei Paare gliedern lassen und sich jedes dieser Paare einer der drei Grundfunktionen und der diesen Funktionen entsprechenden Klassen in den Gesellschaften der indogermanischen Völker zuordnen läßt.[9] Nach dieser Auffassung hätte, ähnlich wie bei Goldschmidt, Hesiods Weltalter-

Autors erforderlich ist. Vgl. auch E. K. Rand, Horatian Urbanity in Hesiod's Works and Days, Amer. Journ. of Philol. 32 (1911) 138 Anm. 2; Jensen (s. oben Anm. 4) 17 Anm. 36.

[7] Die Menschen des silbernen Geschlechts haben ihre Weise des Fortlebens offenbar nicht durch ihren Lebenswandel verdient, sondern eher durch ihre niedrige Ordnungszahl und den Wert des Metalls, dem sie zugeordnet sind. Treffend bemerkt Goldschmidt (s. oben Anm. 2) 35: „Entre la vie terrestre et la récompense, le rapport, pourrait-on dire, s'il n'est pas, ici, causal, est au moins concessif."

[8] In V. 141 übernehme ich Peppmüllers Konjektur θνητοῖς für θνητοὶ der meisten Handschriften. Sie findet eine Stütze im Text der Handschriftengruppe Φ, der θνητοῖ lautet, was überlieferungsgeschichtlich über θνητοῖ» auf θνητοῖς zurückgehen könnte. Anders Rohde (s. oben Anm. 2) 101 Anm. 2; Wilamowitz (s. oben Anm. 5) 57; vgl. jedoch Goldschmidt (s. oben Anm. 2) 35 Anm. 2.

[9] G. Dumezil, Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus (Paris 1941) 259.

erzählung neben ihrem genetischen auch einen strukturellen Aspekt. Gegen die Annahme dieser zwei Aspekte ist grundsätzlich nichts einzuwenden. Denn auch der Theogonie wird man nur gerecht, wenn man beachtet, daß die Erzählung von der Entstehung der Götter kein Selbstzweck ist, sondern daß Hesiod mit ihr zugleich und sogar vor allem Aussagen über den Zustand der durch diese Götter beherrschten Welt machen will. Die Schwierigkeit für jeden, der Vernant folgen will, liegt jedoch darin, daß er, um drei Paare zu erhalten, mit ihm das eiserne Geschlecht in zwei Phasen unterteilen muß, nämlich in eine erste, in der noch Gutes mit Schlechtem gemischt ist und Aidos und Nemesis unter den Menschen weilen, und in eine zweite, in der das Schlechte eindeutig überwiegt und die beiden Göttinnen die Menschen verlassen haben. Doch sollte man seine Bedenken zunächst erst einmal zurückstellen und Vernants Thesen vorurteilslos zur Kenntnis nehmen.

Nach seiner Auffassung entsprechen das goldene und das silberne Geschlecht der Funktion des Herrschers und Priesters, das eherne und die Heroen der des Kriegers und das eiserne Geschlecht in seinen zwei Phasen der des Bauern. Und zwar erscheint die Funktion des Herrschers zunächst unter dem Aspekt der Dike, nämlich beim goldenen Geschlecht, sodann unter dem Aspekt der Hybris, nämlich beim silbernen Geschlecht. Umgekehrt erscheint die Funktion des Kriegers zunächst unter dem Aspekt der Hybris, nämlich beim ehernen Geschlecht, und sodann unter dem Aspekt der Dike, nämlich bei den Heroen, so daß sich im Hinblick auf Dike und Hybris eine kreuzförmige Anordnung der ersten vier Geschlechter ergibt. Die Funktion des Bauern ist dem eisernen Geschlecht zugewiesen. Sofern sich die Menschen dieses Geschlechts ihrer Aufgabe widmen, gehorchen sie der Dike. Sofern sie sich ihr entziehen, ergeben sie sich der Hybris. Sie leben in der ersten Phase in einer Welt, die von Dike und Hybris bestimmt ist, während es in der zweiten Phase, wenn Aidos und Nemesis die Erde verlassen haben, keine Macht mehr geben wird, welche die Menschen zur Dike anhält, so daß ihr Leben dann ganz von Hybris bestimmt sein wird. Ferner vergleicht Vernant die Menschen des goldenen Geschlechts mit den olympischen Göttern, sodann die Menschen des silbernen Geschlechts wegen ihrer Weigerung, den Göttern zu dienen, mit den Titanen, die des bronzenen Geschlechts wegen ihrer Kampflust und Gewalttätigkeit mit den Giganten und die Heroen wegen ihrer Gerechtigkeit mit den Hekatoncheiren. Für die Menschen des eisernen Geschlechts benennt Vernant keine Vergleichsgruppe, wie er es bei denen der anderen Geschlechter tat. Schließlich läßt sich nach seiner Auffassung jedes der drei Paare einem der

drei Lebensalter zuordnen, nämlich das erste Paar dem der Jugend, wobei am goldenen Geschlecht der positive Aspekt, nämlich das Fehlen der Beschwerden des Alters, betont wird, und beim silbernen der negative Aspekt, nämlich das Fehlen der Weisheit des Alters, ferner das zweite Paar dem der Reife, wobei der Dichter hier einerseits die rohe Körperkraft und andererseits die kriegerische Tapferkeit hervorhebt, und schließlich das eiserne Geschlecht, vor allem in seiner zweiten Phase, dem des Alters mit seinen Leiden, Sorgen und Beschwerden.

Die von Vernant vorgenommene Analyse der Struktur der Erzählung Hesiods läßt sich durch das folgende Schema veranschaulichen:

Gold	Herrscher	Dike	Jugend	positiv	Götter
Silber		Hybris		negativ	Titanen
Bronze	Krieger	Hybris	Reife	negativ	Giganten
Heoren		Dike		positiv	Hekatoncheiren
Eisen 1	Bauern	Dike/Hybris	Alter	gemischt	–
Eisen 2		Hybris		negativ	–

Vernants Hypothese ist geistreich, und man muß zugeben, daß manche seiner Beobachtungen zutreffen. Daß jedes Menschengeschlecht danach beurteilt wird, ob es sein Leben durch Dike oder durch Hybris bestimmen läßt, ist richtig. Schon daran läßt sich erkennen, daß die Weltaltererzählung als ein Teil der Rechtsparänese angesehen werden muß.[10] Ebenfalls ist richtig, daß die ersten vier Geschlechter sich zu Paaren gruppieren lassen. Beim goldenen und silbernen Geschlecht ist der Parallelismus deutlich erkennbar, beim ehernen Geschlecht und den Heroen hat schon Nietzsche auf die antithetische Zusammengehörigkeit hingewiesen.[11] Doch gibt es bei Hesiod eindeutig kein Sechserschema, und es gibt bei ihm auch keine Gliederung des fünften Geschlechts in zwei Phasen. Vielmehr hat der

[10] J. Fontenrose (Work, Justice, and Hesiod's Five Ages, Class. Philol. 69 [1974] 5) hält dagegen die Weltaltererzählung für einen Teil der Arbeitsparänese.

[11] F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, 1, 11, Werke II (Darmstadt 1966) 787: Er spricht von der „Verlegenheit Hesiods, als er die Abfolge der Kultur-Zeitalter aussann und sie in Gold, Silber, Erz auszudrücken suchte: er wußte mit dem Widerspruch, den ihm die herrliche, aber ebenfalls so schauerliche, so gewalttätige Welt Homers bot, nicht anders fertig zu werden, als indem er aus einem Zeitalter zwei machte, die er nunmehr hintereinanderstellte".

Dichter hier den auch in den vier anderen Fällen behandelten Programmpunkt „Untergang des Geschlechts" breiter ausgestaltet. Die Fünfgliedrigkeit ist aber eine Grundgegebenheit unseres Textes, die es zu respektieren gilt, ebenso wie die nur vom vierten Geschlecht unterbrochene absteigende Linie, die sich schon allein aus dem Wert der als Bezeichnungen verwandten Metalle ergibt. Die von Vernant beobachteten Beziehungen, die zwischen den beiden ersten und den beiden zweiten Paaren bestehen, haben gegenüber diesen Grundtatsachen allenfalls sekundäre Bedeutung. Die weitere Annahme Vernants, daß die drei Paare von Geschlechtern den drei gesellschaftlichen Grundfunktionen und damit den von Dumézil angenommenen Klassen der indogermanischen Gesellschaftsstruktur entsprechen, muß ebenfalls in Frage gestellt werden. Schon Kirk hat angemerkt, daß sich eine solche Klassengliederung zwar bei anderen indogermanischen Völkern beobachten läßt, aber nicht bei den Griechen.[12] Sie findet sich jedenfalls auch nicht bei Hesiod. Wenn man bei ihm Klassen unterscheiden will, so wird man zwei nennen müssen, nämlich die der adligen βασιλῆες in ihrer Funktion als Richter und die der Bauern, der Hesiod und Perses angehören. Bei diesen Klassen betont Hesiod in den übrigen Teilen seines Gedichts gerade nicht die Unterschiede, sondern die Gemeinsamkeiten, indem er nämlich die Adligen und die Bauern in gleicher Weise dazu aufruft, sich dem Gebot der Dike zu unterwerfen und Hybris zu vermeiden. Wenn, wie Vernant meint, Hesiod durch die Form, die er dem Weltaltermythos gibt, den strukturellen, also grundsätzlichen, unaufhebbaren Unterschied zwischen den Klassen der βασιλῆες und der Bauern hervorheben würde, dann würde er dadurch die Überzeugungskraft seiner Argumentation in den übrigen Teilen des Gedichts vermindern.

Was schließlich die sechste Spalte des Schemas, also den von Vernant selbst nicht zu Ende geführten Vergleich der Geschlechter mit verschiedenen Gruppen überirdischer Wesen betrifft, so läßt sich nur der Vergleich der Menschen des goldenen Geschlechts mit den Göttern aufrechterhalten, der sich auf eine Aussage im Text Hesiods stützen kann (112). Dagegen tragen die Vergleiche des zweiten, dritten und vierten Geschlechts mit Titanen, Giganten und Hekatoncheiren weder zum Verständnis der drei

[12] Kirk a.O. 210. Die von Dumézil in dem oben Anm. 9 genannten Buch vertretene Auffassung, daß die für Indien bezeugte Gliederung des Volkes nach den drei Grundfunktionen der Herrscher und Priester, der Krieger und der Bauern auch in Rom nachweisbar sei, wurde von anderen entschieden abgelehnt; vgl. z. B. H. J. Rose, Journ. of Roman Stud. 37 (1947) 183–86. Auch Dumézil selbst hat sie zuletzt nicht mehr vertreten; vgl. La religion Romaine archaïque (Paris 1974) 175f.

Menschengeschlechter noch zu dem der Titanen, Giganten oder Hekatoncheiren etwas bei.[13]

Man sollte darum an der schon oft geäußerten Ansicht festhalten, daß Hesiod in seine Erzählung von den Menschengeschlechtern die Heroen in erster Linie deswegen eingefügt hat, weil sie in der Überlieferung seines Volkes zu fest verankert waren, als daß er sie hätte übergehen können. Daneben läßt sich, wie ich meine, noch ein zweiter Grund dafür nennen, daß er dem Mythos von den Geschlechtern diese besondere Form gegeben hat. Durch die Einfügung der Heroen unter die Geschlecher der Vergangenheit stärkt Hesiod die Überzeugungskraft seiner Argumentation gegenüber den adligen βασιλῆες, den ungerecht richtenden, Geschenke fressenden Gutsherren von Thespiai, die neben seinem Bruder Perses die Adressaten seines Gedichts sind.[14]

Wir dürfen nicht vergessen, daß der griechische Adel seine Herkunft von den Heroen der Sagen ableitete, die ihrerseits, wie die Katalogdichtung es beschreibt, aus den Verbindungen von Göttern mit Menschentöchtern hervorgegangen waren. Wenn nun Hesiod in seiner Erzählung das Geschlecht der Heroen vom gegenwärtigen eisernen Geschlecht als ein vergangenes abhebt, dann betont er die Diskontinuität zwischen den adligen Herren seiner Gegenwart und ihren angeblichen heroischen Vorfahren. Diese deutlich antiaristokratische Auffassung entspricht der auch sonst vom Selbstbewußtsein des Bauernstandes geprägten Denkweise Hesiods. Wagt er es doch, das Wort ἀρετή, das bei Homer die Tapferkeit des Kriegers bezeichnet, auch für den Erfolg der mühevollen Arbeit zu verwenden (289). Auch Hesiods Berufung auf das Recht geschieht vom bäuerlichen Standpunkt aus. In der Adelsgesellschaft, wie sie in der Ilias dargestellt wird, spielt der Begriff des Rechts noch eine geringe Rolle.[15] Der adlige Krieger kann sich auf das Netz der Verwandtschaften und Verschwägerungen verlassen, das ihn mit seinen Standesgenossen verbindet. Er kann dessen gewiß sein, daß ihm die Schar seiner Brüder, Vettern und Schwager im Notfall beistehen wird, und zwar ohne Ansehen der Rechtslage. Der Bauer dagegen ist allein auf sein gutes Recht und den Beistand des Zeus angewiesen.

[13] Vgl. J. Pollard, Journ. of Hell. Stud. 86 (1966) 236.

[14] V. 202, 248, 263.

[15] Die Verse Π 386–88, die einzigen Verse der Ilias, wo Zeus als Hüter des Rechts erscheint, werden bezeichnenderweise weder von einem Gott noch von einem der handelnden Menschen gesprochen, sondern stehen eher beiläufig in einem Gleichnis. Erst in der Odyssee und bei Hesiod stehen Aussagen über Zeus in dieser Funktion an zentraler Stelle und haben programmatischen Charakter.

Das Geschlecht der Heroen, so stellt Hesiod fest, hat vor Theben und Troia den Tod gefunden oder ist zu den Inseln der Seligen entrückt worden.[16] Jetzt lebt das eiserne Geschlecht. Jetzt gelten andere Regeln, und zwar für alle, auch für die βασιλῆες, mögen sie auch noch so sehr auf ihre heroische Abstammung pochen. Welche Regeln jetzt gelten, zeigt der Fortgang des Gedichts. Hesiod ruft seinen Bruder auf, Gerechtigkeit zu üben, Hybris zu meiden und sich seinen Lebensunterhalt durch harte Arbeit zu erwerben. Freilich gibt es auch jetzt noch Unterschiede zwischen den Klassen; denn die Regel, daß nur der leben kann, der zur Arbeit bereit ist, gilt nur für den Bauernstand. Das Gebot der Gerechtigkeit aber gilt für Bauern und βασιλῆες in gleicher Weise.

Man hat gemeint, bei Hesiod von „Agitation", von einem „Appell an die Massen" sprechen zu können.[17] Das ist nicht richtig. Hesiod ist kein Revolutionär, sondern bei allem Selbstbewußtsein ein stiller, in sein Schicksal ergebener Mensch. Aber das ändert nichts daran, daß seine Gedanken in der griechischen Geistesgeschichte der folgenden Jahrhunderte revolutionär gewirkt haben, und zwar vor allem in Athen.[18] Das gilt freilich nur für den Rechtsgedanken. Das Arbeitsethos Hesiods wird nicht rezipiert. Daß auch harte Arbeit ihre ἀρετή hat, wollte den Athenern nie recht einleuchten. In diesem Punkt sind sie immer Aristokraten geblieben. Aber der Rechtsgedanke Hesiods wird, vermittelt durch Solon und aufgenommen durch Kleisthenes und Aischylos, zum Kerngedanken der attischen Demokratie.

[16] Manche Interpreten versuchen, Aussagen über das zeitliche Verhältnis zu machen, das zwischen den Ereignissen des vorausgehenden Prometheusmythos (42–105) und denen des Weltaltermythos besteht. Sie setzen z. B. den Beginn des eisernen Geschlechts auf den Zeitpunkt des Feuerraubes oder der Öffnung des Gefäßes durch Pandora an (Vernant, Mythe et pensée 32f.; Kirk 232f.). Zwar haben beide Erzählungen eine ähnliche Tendenz, indem sie bestimmte Aspekte des gegenwärtigen Weltzustandes erklären, aber eine zeitliche Koordination zwischen ihnen nimmt Hesiod nicht vor. Auch der moderne Interpret sollte diese Lücke nicht durch eigene Kombinationen auszufüllen suchen. Bianchi (s. oben Anm. 4) 194 Anm. 62 spricht sich ebenfalls dagegen aus, die beiden Mythen zeitlich zu koordinieren. Damit erkennbar wird, welche Schwierigkeiten bei einem solchen Versuch entstehen würden, sei daran erinnert, daß nach Hes. fr. 2, 4 und 9 M.-W. Deukalion der Sohn des Prometheus und der Stiefvater des Hellen, des Stammvaters der griechischen Heroen ist.

[17] E. Meyer, Hesiods Erga und das Gedicht von den fünf Menschengeschlechtern, Kleine Schriften II (Halle 1924) 23 (auch bei E. Heitsch, Hesiod, Wege der Forschung 44 [Darmstadt 1966] 477).

[18] Vgl. hierzu F. Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus (Ithaca 1949).

JOHN H. FINLEY

Sappho's Circumstances

In the ages since Sappho lyric poetry has increasingly conveyed conscious inner feeling. Philosophy and religion helped prompt the lone response. But people have doubtless always felt their uniqueness. Even birds do not exactly duplicate kindred birds' songs and often not their own. Through spring and early summer these variously proclaim territory and the joy of life; in later weeks they help fix the fledglings' accents. They come to mind of Bernard Knox's nobly double outpouring at once to the generations of the Hellenic Center and alone in his writing. The two sides are reciprocal, but few join them as he does. Singing birds are hardly on Darwinian principles exercising their powers; they are pouring out their lives. So does he in daily heightening the glad mood of the Center and in daily retreating to the song of his Greek. His far-heard double flight has nature's renewing brightness.

Pre-Socratic Greece largely lacked language for loneness. Events isolate the Homeric heroes forcing loneness on them. Most Iliadic fighters die like splendid but transient animals; Achilles and Hector are the exceptions. In his final soliloquy Hector suddenly understands that Zeus and Apollo long intended his death, and he wills to die gloriously (*Il.* 22.297–305). Achilles returns from his huge feats to the sympathy with Priam that in their tears acknowledges their common loss but in their memories their isolation (*Il.* 24.507–512). At the games for Patroclus he stood half-removed from his still appetitive former comrades; he was already alone. Homer carries both heroes, Achilles chiefly, to the other side of brilliant action. The steps are hard and gradual, seemingly for two main reasons: that the poetic tradition described actions, and that the heroes, like the tradition, reached isolation painfully. It is as if neither was fully prepared for it. Yet loneness is the final fact, and Homer's insistence on it is his ultimate theme, the dark root of his greatness. Odysseus in the *Odyssey* nowhere inwardly summarizes the teaching of his travels. The travels summarize him; his crowning sight of the Underworld gives the instruction that makes possible

his return. Even his famous lines to the mild suitor Amphinomus, "Such is the mind of mortal men as the father of men and gods brings on their day" (*Od.* 18.136–137), appear as advice, not as meditated summary. Achilles is the more inwardly known because the tragic *Iliad* progressively takes him to his self-acceptance, whereas Odysseus, isolated from the first, only slowly and through events learns his transient place in the alluring world. The events of the two poems carry both heroes to a like awareness, and if the *Odyssey* is the happier poem, it too looks to a mortal limit.

Sappho meets this isolation. It contrasts to her daylit, companionate joys and gives her poetry a nearly Homeric doubleness of fulfillment and loss. Alcaeus too faces loss, but it is political and he hopes to right it. The emotions being his, he no longer narrates but responds; he becomes, as it were, the speaking character of his personal *Iliad*. Sappho's sex denies her this role, but she keeps ties with the old poetry, with the legendary women notably. Her imagined joy in the wedding of Hector and Andromache (fr. 44 LP) keeps the spirit of her own radiant and companioned hours; her lone moments bring her closer to Helen and Penelope. Her bond with Penelope has to do with night. *Iliad* 9, the start of 23, and 24 show Achilles at night. His rejection of the embassy and prescience of his death if he should return to battle, his dream of dead Patroclus, and his meeting with Priam all take some of their tone from the surrounding darkness. Odysseus reaches the Underworld at night, and the time fits both the place and his enforced awareness of the dim dead. If the early mind lacked the later language of privacy, it well knew privacy's setting.

"Evening, you bring all things, as many as radiant dawn scattered. You bring the sheep, you bring the goat, you bring back the child to its mother" (fr. 104) – if that is the right rendering of the uncertain lines. In a wedding-song Sappho would have gone on to the contrast that Catullus makes: *Hespere, qui caelo fertur crudelior ignis? / Qui natam possis complexu avellere matris* (65.20–21). The fading hour will have fitted the further antiphonal song, possibly a folksong, "Girlhood, girlhood, where are you going leaving me? – I will never come back to you, never come back" (fr. 114). A woman's loneness at night speaks in the perhaps non-Sapphic poem (fr. 94, Diehl) which nevertheless resembles fr. 63, "The moon has sunk and the Pleiades. The hour passes and I sleep alone". The woman echoes Penelope. In her firelit meeting with the beggar, before telling her still quandary, like the nightingale's changeful song, whether to keep the house of her youth and happiness or to remarry and leave the house, Penelope says, "A time of glad rest will be his whom sweet sleep seizes. But

a god has sent me measureless woe, in that my joy by day is weeping and lament as I look to my and my women's tasks in the house but when night comes and rest takes all men, I lie in bed and thick about my thronging heart sharp cares rouse me lamenting" (*Od.* 19.510–517). The lone hour becomes one with her quandary, and when she goes on to tell her dream of an eagle killing her geese, of her lament for them, and of the eagle returning to name himself Odysseus and the suitors the geese, and the beggar calls the dream true, she will not believe him. She woke to see the geese still familiarly taking wheat from the water-basin; the house and her long pleasure in it are unchanged. The dream, she says, came from the false gates of ivory, not from the true gates of horn. It was a "dire dream", though "truly it would be welcome to me and my son" (*Od.* 19.568–569). Yet the beggar having predicted Odysseus' return at the new moon, tomorrow, she sufficiently believes to conceive tomorrow's test by the bow and axes. "Whoever", she sadly ends, "most lightly strings the bow and shoots through all the twelve axes, him will I follow, parted from this house, the house of my marriage, beautiful, full of substance, which I think I shall remember even in dream". Night, her time of brooding, also phrases her unspoken hope, a hope so deep that she will not acknowledge it. The time describes her more than do her words. It is the setting of her secret life.

Some such inwardness marks the contrast between two of Sappho's intensest poems, frs. 94 and 96. The former, to an unnamed girl, describes their parting. "Truly I wish to die. She weeping left me". The girl laments their parting, and Sappho lists the glad things that they did together and the beautiful places where they went: crowns twined with violets and roses, flowery necklaces, myrrh, grassy beds that fulfilled desire, a grove and a shrine. The memory touches Sappho, but the daylit description evokes bright scenes. The feeling resembles that of fr. 2, of water flowing from beneath apple boughs, roses, rustling leaves bringing sleep, a meadow, breezes, and Sappho's prayer to Aphrodite, that in golden cups the goddess pour nectar for their singing. These and other fulfilled moments deeply move Sappho. Their daylight includes love; their joy and beauty are her counterpart to the Iliadic flash of visible brilliance. Something like battle could mark them; love shakes her heart like wind from a mountain falling on oaks (fr. 47). The peopled and active scene of Hector's and Andromache's wedding is at the other extreme, purely joyous. Day speaks the fullness of Sappho's flashing life. Its beauty includes her emotion, but companionately.

The contrasting night-mood of fr. 96 is full of loneness – triply so in her yielding to the langourousness of the scented garden, in her companion's yearning for Atthis in distant Lydia, and in their sense of Atthis' cry from over the sea bidding them come to her. The fresh morning of the wedding-song takes sheep and goat and child gladly outward; the joy of dawn and youth is in the lines. At the dawn of his ascent to Purgatory Dante spies a winged angel swiftly guiding the ship of the redeemed to the bright shore (*Purg.* 2.25–48), but evening brings the hour that turns back travelers' hearts and pierces the new pilgrim with love who hears a far bell mourning the dying day (*Purg.* 8.1–6). The difference of bird-songs at dawn and dusk says the same; in bird and listener, day's summons are gone. Sappho's still garden as the rose-fingered moon rises over sea and fields and the dew falls and flowers are fragrant has this loneness. A marvel of the poem is her yielding to the mood, even grammatically. She begins by comparing Atthis' beauty among the Lydian women to the risen moon diminishing the stars, then has herself and her companion walking in the garden of the simile. Night and its emotions suffuse Sappho as does the moonlight the place. Distant Atthis seems equally in a garden; airs carry her longing voice. The three are each as helplessly alone as is Penelope in her lorn quandary, like the nightingale's changeful phrases, and as Penelope's quandary melts into her dream, Atthis' cry takes on a dreamlike presentness. All are surrendered to the mood of night. The beauty of the nightingale's tones subtly describes Penelope as the moonlit garden describes the other three. But the beauty only enhances their loss. Night in both cases gives the language, not the complexly inward language of later ages but the universal language of night.

Another moment of loss breaks on Sappho, of the sudden change from what had appeared fixed. It too looks backward to the former poetry. The repetitive epic language carried reassuring constants – people's names and origins, the visible certainties of animals, arms, and implements, and the sure sights of sky, land, and sea – but the movement of the poems struck down the seeming permanence. The show of fixity and of people's roles within it keeps recurring. Unlike her heroic sister, Ismene cannot grasp the sudden change that their brothers' deaths bring to them. Just before the revelation Oedipus grandly calls himself the child of kindly-giving Fortune, guided by his life's moons (*O. T.* 1080–1085); he thinks his onward course forever open. Royal Agamemnon foresees his victorious return. Roles in life give classic positions: husband or wife, parent or child, old or young, leader or follower, people's known and familiar stations. These mark them to others and to themselves. A funeral stele of a lady in middle life,

serenely seated and with a child or servant offering a box, shows her fulfilled, if not in further years yet in what middle life gives. So also the statues of young victors and of horses. They less present an individual than his translation into a noble norm, the type of what can be. The assumption extends even to the classic in literature, each kind of writing exemplifying its known form. Guiding constants give order and comprehensibility; classic exemplars affirm the expected. Herodotus holds that Hesiod and Homer fixed the pantheon (2.53). The judgment so far resembles Odysseus' comparison of Nausicaa to a young palm tree, in that both reduce the flux of things to a bright constancy. But mortal change is the other huge fact, and its sudden arrival shatters expectations.

What to more inward ages may have become Sappho's best known poems, her bereft prayer to Aphrodite (fr. 1) and the poem that Catullus imitated, on the sight of a beloved girl in the presence of her future bridgroom (fr. 31), may have been exceptional. She more commonly sings of her known doings in bright places among familiar people. Fraught with emotion though these moments are, they breathe the world's enticement. The lines on the dim dead woman who did not know the roses of Pieria (fr. 55) and the end of fr. 16, on others' prizing of horsemen, footmen, and ships (Alcaeus' delight) but her own yearning for absent Anactoria's lovely step and dazzle of brow suggest her major themes. They partly recur in the marriage-songs and the poems on her brother (fr. 5) and her daughter Kleis (fr. 132). But her companion's yearning of fr. 96 in the moonlit scented garden for distant Atthis recurs in fr. 31 of Sappho herself. Her nightly thoughts share Penelope's isolation. And as the beggar's answer to Penelope's dream of the eagle and geese promises fulfillment, so Aphrodite will answer Sappho's prayer. Her wasted lornness is intenser than Penelope's; she lacks even a beggar's company and is wholly alone. Yet the moment harks back. In the epics Athene sweeps from Olympus with divine aid; she and Hera descend between sky and earth in a gold-rimmed and gold-reined chariot to inspire Diomedes against wild Ares and on arrival take the form of doves (*Il.* 5.767–779); Athene at the suitor-slaying flies to the rafter as a swallow (*Od.* 22.240); the goddess casts on Penelope the ambrosial beauty wherewith Aphrodite decks herself when she joins the Graces' lovely dance, and the waking queen marvelingly touches her cheeks (*Od.* 18.187–200). Smiling Aphrodite descending in her sparrow-drawn chariot will bring Sappho a like renewal. Her bitter isolation will reach another outcome than that of Antigone or Oedipus, but the shock of change from what had been expected is similiar. The dark fact of lornness

breaks on what had looked more certain than it was. Hints of the suddenly known reality may already have come to her but, if so, had been obscured and put away, much as brooding Achilles pours out in the night-scene of the embassy the sense of early death which Thetis had foreseen in *Iliad* 1 (414–418). Oedipus' emotional confidence seems similarly to hide a secret doubt. Sappho's joyous self-surrender to her daylit delights may have been the greater for her secret knowledge of the apartness that wells passionately out in the night-poems. She personally reaches the isolation that Achilles reaches at the end of the *Iliad* and which Odysseus meets in the Underworld. She faces the residual, universal fact but in her vision of Aphrodite gains hope of something like the Ithacan pair's glad renewal.

In fr. 31 the sight of a loved girl, whose soft speech and bright laughter her bridegroom hears and who will soon be his, shatters Sappho. She cannot speak; an inner fire burns her; she hears nothing and her ears throb; sweat pours from her; she trembles, is greener than grass and near to death. The itemization suggests Iliadic deaths; Patroclus' eyes whirl when Apollo strikes him (*Il.* 16.792), and the progressive ruin of his formerly bright armor, Achilles' armor, is told. The pathetic Lycaon had been running from Achilles; he had thrown down his armor and spear; sweat wastes him, and weariness checks his knees (*Il.* 21.50–52). Pale fear seizes fighters, and trembling takes even Hector at the sight of Achilles (*Il.* 22.136). Sappho comes near these deaths, and at a similarly stark moment. Her world of daylit sharing and fresh scenes shrinks to this indoors setting. The girl's laughter to her bridegroom makes him appear godlike to Sappho; he wears for her something like the divinity that halts Patroclus. Her former fulfillments melt at the sight; the bridegroom has replaced her. Jealousy is unmentioned, though it may be implied in the girl's response to the man and though Sappho elsewhere knows of changed love (fr. 131). The girl's beauty is simply lost to her, and the change marks a deathlike end. There is no hope of recovery as in her prayer of fr. 1 to Aphrodite. Oedipus at the moment of revelation wishes that he could strike out his hearing as he has his sight (*O. T.* 1386–1389). The physical details of the stark moment blankly contrast to the details of scenes that she had thought secure.

Were her formerly bright moments as fulfilled as she portrays them? If not, she claims for her life something like the epic brilliance of heroism. By Hellenistic times women's lives were ambiguously both opener and narrower. Anyte of Tegea gently celebrates children, animals, and rural shrines (A. S. Gow and D. L. Page, Hellenistic Epigrams I [Cambridge 1965] 35–41), and Nossis of Western Locri, who claims affinity with

Sappho, commemorates beautiful friends, sometimes for their portraits (*ibid.* pp. 151–154). A more ancient sacral companionship is suggested in the tradition of yellow-dressed Athenian girls dancing as bears on the Acropolis for Artemis (schol. Aristoph. *Lysist.* 645 and Pausanias 1.33.1 with J. G. Frazer's notes there and on 8.13.1) and in the girls' cult of Helen at Sparta (Alcman fr. 1). Sophocles imagines Attic Oreithyia's Boread daughter as a girl running like a colt over the Thracian mountains, yet later reaching a confinement like Antigone's (*Ant.* 977–987). Pindar's Evadne of *Ol.* 6 (29–70) has an opposite but equally god-touched doubleness of life. Alone in a dark thicket she lays down her red and yellow dress and silver pitcher to bring to the light Apollo's god-minded child. In terror she leaves him on the ground, but the god brought to her aid Eleithyia and the Moirai, and two blue-eyed snakes tend the babe with bees' honey. When Evadne's father oracularly learns Apollo's parentage, they return on the fourth day to find the child in the wilderness, his gentle body suffused with the rays of gold and purple violets – from which and from the snake-brought honey Evadne eponymously names him Iamus. He too reveals his double heritage. Grown to youth, beneath the lone night-sky he prays Apollo for a brilliant future, and the god guides him down the Alpheus to Olympia, where he and his present descendent of this ode will win crowding glory. Loneness and brilliance, night and day, contrast for him and for girlish, brightly dressed Evadne in the dark thicket as they do for Sappho. She knows the interplay more intimately than does Pindar, and her outpouring is the response. It is hers alone in the sense that she alone lives it, yet more than hers in her mortal encounter with both fulfillment and deprivation. Day and night, companionateness and loss, gods' presence and absence are her inner language.

Deborah D. Boedeker

Sappho and Acheron

ου[
⟨˙–⟩
ἦρ᾽ ἀ[
δηρατ.[
Γογγυλα.[
⟨–⟩
ἦ τι cᾶμ᾽ ἐθε.[
παιcι μάλιcτα.[
μας γ᾽ εἴcηλθ᾽ ἐπ.[
⟨–⟩
εἶπον· ὦ δέcποτ᾽, ἐπ.[
ο]ὐ μὰ γὰρ μάκαιραν [
ο]ὐδὲν ἄδομ᾽ ἔπαρθ᾽ ἀγα[
⟨–⟩
κατθάνην δ᾽ ἵμερός τις [ἔχει με καὶ
λωτίνοις δροcόεντας [ὄ-
χ[θ]οις ἴδην Ἄχερ[
⟨˙–⟩
.]..δεcαιδ᾽.[
.]..δετο.[
μητι..[
⟨–⟩

Sappho 95 LP is one of three fragments in similar meters found on a sixth or seventh century parchment in Berlin, first published by Schubart in 1902.[1] About twenty-five words of the poem can be read; several restorations have been generally accepted (although I would question even one of these, cf. below at n. 15/7), making a total of some thirty words

[1] P. Berol. 9722, ed. W. Schubart, Neue Bruchstücke der Sappho und des Alkaios, Sitzungsber. Berlin 1 (1902) 195–206. References to poems of Sappho and Alkaios in this paper follow the text and numeration of E. Lobel and D. Page, Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta (Oxford 1955).

spread through sixteen lines of text.[2] What can be read is impressive and provocative: a conversation with a god, a desire to die, a brief and unusual description of the banks of Acheron.

Not surprisingly, the fragment has received its share of scholarly attention. In addition to editions and textual emendations, several interpretations of the meaning of the poem have been proposed. An early and influential hypothesis is that of H. Fränkel in his review of Lobel's 1925 edition of Sappho.[3] Fränkel deals especially with the psychological experience that motivated this poem, reading the text rather literally as an account of something that actually happened to Sappho: in some way she encountered the god Hermes (Fränkel rightly accepts Blass' restoration of Ἑρ- at the end of line 6), and willingly assented to his offer of death. In this poem, Sappho expresses her typical longing for beauty, Fränkel finds, but it turns shockingly into a desire for annihilation.[4]

The poem must have begun, according to this reconstruction, with Sappho's explanation that her life has become unhappy: "das Leben, Gongyla, ist mir vergällt." This declaration is connected to the epiphany of Hermes by Fränkel's own restoration of lines 5–6:

5 ἦ τι σᾶμ' ἐθέ[λης σύνετον κλύην (oder: ἄϊσαι σάφες)
παῖσι μάλιστα; [Zeitangabe γὰρ Ἑρ-

("Do you wish to hear some sign understandable to all?
For Hermes . . .")

Hermes' appearance then serves as proof of Sappho's weariness with life and her nearness to death.

Schadewaldt accepts Fränkel's suggestions for the general thought of the poem, commenting that in Sappho, as in all archaic Greek poetry, a death-wish is expressed only when its author feels that his total existence is at stake.[5] Sappho's total existence, according to Schadewaldt, centers on the force of love, and so separation in love always brings her near to death. Like Fränkel, Schadewaldt is cautious not to suggest a specific event leading to Sappho's despair (a tendency which he criticizes in Wilamowitz's excessively

[2] The fragmentary condition of the poem apparently appealed to Ezra Pound, who (mis)-translated the first three lines in his brief "Papyrus": "Spring . . . / Too long . . . / Gongula . . ." (Lustra, 1916). Cf. W. Seelbach, Ezra Pound und Sappho fr. 95 L.-P., Ant. & Abendl. 16 (1970) 83–84.

[3] H. Fränkel, Gött. gel. Anz. 6 (1928) 257–278, esp. 269–271.

[4] *Ibid.* 270.

[5] W. Schadewaldt, Zu Sappho, Hermes 71 (1936) 363–372, 367.

"biographical" interpretation of Fr. 94). A productive approach emerges in Schadewaldt's brief comparison of Sappho's death-wish with those of others in archaic Greek poetry, but he does not develop this line of analysis, turning back instead to the poet's existence in the world of love.

M. Treu, in his 1963 edition of Sappho, likewise approves of Fränkel's interpretation, although he prefers Diehl's restoration ἐθέσ[πισ- to Fränkel's ἐθέ[λησ, etc. in line 5.[6] With either reading, Hermes' appearance is the sign of Sappho's despair, in a poem concerned with events in her personal life.

Page's brief commentary on Fr. 95 uses the same implicitly biographical approach to the poem, even cautiously asking what caused Sappho's despair.[7] Page suggests that the death-wish *may* have come from unrequited love for Gongyla.[8] Unlike his German predecessors, however, he is not impressed with the level of sincerity in this poem: "We notice that Sappho is not so preoccupied with her desire to make an end of life that she cannot reflect on such decorative details as the lotus and dew on the banks of Acheron: the expressions in Fr. 94.1, τεθνάκην δ' ἀδόλως θέλω, and 31.16, τεθνάκην δ' ὀλίγω 'πιδεύης φαίνομ', ring blunt and sincere compared with this sophistication."[9]

Helmut Saake, in his recent *Sapphostudien*, looks at the same passage, reaches the opposite conclusion about Sappho's sincerity, and takes Page to task for his lack of sympathy with the poet and her methods.[10] Saake finds that the concrete details in the description of the underworld show that Sappho is thinking seriously about her death.[11]

The problem with this implicitly biographical approach, shared to some extent by all the commentators from Fränkel to Saake, is that it asks the wrong questions of the fragment. Probably no ancient poem, certainly not Sappho 95, will reveal how much the poet's life is connected with the subject-matter of the text. Page, discussing the formal complexities of

[6] M. Treu, Sappho (München 1963) 76–77 (text) and 213–214 (commentary).

[7] D. Page, Sappho and Alcaeus: An Introduction to the Study of Ancient Lesbian Poetry (Oxford 1955) 84–86.

[8] Page's hypothesis has been tentatively approved by several recent commentators, e.g. H. Saake, Sapphostudien (München 1972) 83; G. M. Kirkwood, Early Greek Monody: The History of a Poetic Type (Ithaca and London 1974) 127.

[9] Page, *op. cit.* 86.

[10] Saake, *op. cit.* 84.

[11] Saake emphasizes structural and thematic similarities between this poem and Fr. 96, and believes that both poems may have been motivated by separation from a loved one. This was previously suggested by C. M. Bowra, Greek Lyric Poetry from Alcman to Simonides[2] (Oxford 1961) 192.

some of Sappho's "personal" poems, concludes that such works are not "spontaneous expressions of emotion" – a judgment with which we must heartily agree.[12] Page is here referring to contexts in which earlier conversations are "recorded", such as in Fr. 1, 94, and apparently in 95 as well. Even if Sappho is the narrator here, and is expressing her *own* wish to die in lines 11–13, that wish is effectively removed from the narrative present of the poem by being reported as part of a past conversation.

We cannot even be sure, though, that Sappho is writing here in her own persona. The first-person verbs εἶπον and ἄδομ' (lines 8 and 10) would of course suggest that the poet is reporting her own words, and other, more complete poems provide many parallels for this interpretation (obvious examples include Fr. 1, 16, 31, and 94).[13] But in some instances, Sappho attributes a speech in the first person to another character: to Aphrodite in Fr. 1, to Parthenia in 114, to the departing woman in 94.[14] In other fragments, such as 102 ("I cannot ply the loom, sweet mother . . .") and 159 ("both you and my *therapon* Eros"), it seems unlikely that the first person refers to Sappho herself.

The death-wish in lines 11–13 is also generally attributed to Sappho herself. This reading of the text rests heavily on Blass' restoration of line 11:

κατθάνην δ' ἴμερός τις [ἔχει με καὶ
"some desire to die *holds me and* . . ."

Significant problems are involved in this proposed restoration. First is the difficulty of reading καί in verse-final position. καί never ends a line in Lesbian lyric, nor, as far as I know, in *any* archaic epic, elegiac, or iambic poetry. Its verse-final occurrences in lyric are extremely rare, especially before the fifth century.[15] The final word of Blass' restoration then would be unprecedented and almost unparalleled.

[12] Page, *op. cit.* 85.

[13] Cf. also Fr. 137, a dialogue attributed by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1367a) to Sappho and Alkaios, although Lobel and Page, like other editors, assign it to Sappho alone.

[14] Similarities between this poem and Fr. 94 are noted by Schadewaldt, *op. cit.*, 367 and by T. McEvilley, Sappho, Fragment Ninety-Four, Phoenix 25 (1971) 1–11, 9.

[15] Despite the frequency with which καί occurs, a survey of D. Page, Poetae Melici Graeci (Oxford 1962) and Supplementum Lyricis Graecis (Oxford 1974) reveals only the following examples of καί at the end of a line: (1) Ibykos 317.3 πανέλοπες λαθιπορφυρίδες ⟨τε⟩ καὶ (suppl. Bergk); (2) Fragmenta Adespota 935 (Telesilla 2 Diehl) 11, 13. It should be noted that word-break is not observed in the same metrical position (i.e. at the end of odd-numbered lines) twice in this 26-line poem (lines 17 and 25); (3) Adesp. S 387 (P. Oxy. 2624 fr. 1, *fortasse Simonidis*). 3]δ' ἐρήμα θνατῶν τε κα[ὶ (suppl. Page); (4) Stesichoros S 8 (P. Oxy. 2617 fr. 6). 5 ends in [. . . . .]και, where και may not be

The first word of the restoration presents some difficulties too, although these are not so serious. I can find no attestation of ἵμερος with ἔχω in early Greek poetry, except in *Theogony* 64, where the Charites and Himeros are said to "*have* their dwellings" near the Muses. This personification of Himeros is obviously very different from the usage in Sappho 95. The phrase ἵμερος ἔχει sounds especially flat compared to the normal epic use of ἵμερος with a form of αἱρέω, as in *Iliad* 3.446 etc.[16] We do not know what Sappho wrote in line 11, but on the whole it seems unlikely that she wrote . . . ἔχει με καὶ.[17] Consequently, however likely and attractive a hypothesis it is that the poet is here reporting her own wish to die, it is precarious to base an interpretation of the poem – and much less the poet's emotional state or level of sincerity – on the evidence of our text. The special difficulties in accepting Blass' restoration make a "personal-biographical" reading of this poem all the more tenuous.

What Fr. 95 *can* show us is not Sappho's reaction to an event in her personal life, but the poet's relationship to her material at a more formal level. In this poem Sappho uses several themes familiar elsewhere in archaic poetry.[18] All of them, as it happens, occur prominently in the *Odyssey*: an epiphany of Hermes, a description of Hades, a death-wish. Examining these three themes to see how Sappho develops the mythic and poetic background available to her can show more about her *poesis* (and thence, perhaps, about her "psychology") than attempting to reconstruct the poet's emotional biography.[19]

The first traditional *topos* in Fr. 95 is the appearance of the god. There has been some controversy as to whether the subject of εἴσηλθ' (line 7) was

a whole word. Unfortunately the verse-ends of many fragments of archaic lyric poems are no longer extant.

16 In Fr. 63.5 Sappho uses ἔλπις δέ μ' ἔχει, a fact which admittedly weakens my argument against the phrase ἵμερος ἔχει με. Nevertheless, the contrast with Homeric usage is not felt in 63.5 as it would be in 95.11.

17 Even the meter of the restored line may be incorrect, since we have no complete lines of this fragment, and the metrical identity of 95 with 96 is just a plausible assumption. Still, Blass' suggestion cannot be too far off the mark: a connective is required between the infinitives κατθάνην and ἴδην, and some predicate must be supplied for ἵμερος.

18 The question of Sappho's relation to epic diction and themes has been a rich source for understanding several of her great poems, especially Fr. 1. For a useful summary of various approaches to this relationship, cf. J. T. Hooker, The Language and Text of the Lesbian Poets (Innsbruck 1977) 43–46 and notes.

19 For a discussion of this critical posture, cf. M. R. Lefkowitz, Critical Stereotypes and the Poetry of Sappho, Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 14 (1973) 113–123. Lefkowitz concludes that male critics tend to apply emotional and biographical interpretations to the work of female poets.

Hermes at all, and this discussion rests on another of Blass' generally-accepted restorations of the text: ῾Ερ- at the end of line 6, before the attested -μας of line 7. In Fr. 141.3–4 the name of the god is spelled ῾Ερμαις (based on the reading of a single codex of Athenaeus 10.425c), and ancient grammarians included such masculine a-stems among the Lesbian forms showing *-ai-* for *-ā-*. There is no linguistic motivation for this variation, however, in the masculine a-stems, and most recently J. T. Hooker, following A. Braun, concludes that ῾Ερμας is not only acceptable but expected in Sappho's dialect.[20] The restoration of the god's name is further supported by Page's conjecture that, on contextual grounds alone, it is likely that the person addressed as δέσποτ' in line 8 "is none other than the god Hermes, conductor of souls to the world below."[21]

Epiphanies of Hermes to mortals in Greek epic are beneficent. The god appears at a time of dangerous transition: to Priam, for example, on his way to the shelter of Achilles (*Iliad* 24.339ff.) or to Odysseus as he approaches Circe's house (*Odyssey* 10.275ff.). Elsewhere in Sappho too the remembered or anticipated appearance of a god brings aid or joy to mortals (cf. the epiphanies of Aphrodite in Fr. 1, 2, and perhaps 96.26–29). Particularly helpful would be the presence of Hermes in the context of a death-wish; as Page suggests, his role as Psychopomp was well-known (e.g. in *Odyssey* 24.1ff.). I cannot agree, however, with Fränkel's interpretation that Hermes came offering death to the narrator, or that his appearance was a "sign" (σᾶμ' line 5) of despair.[22] Rather, the person addressing Hermes is refusing a sort of "exaltation" (οὐδὲν ἄδομ' ἔπαρθ' ἀγα[, line 10) presumably offered by the god; the desire to die appears to be an alternative preferable to his proposal. This contorts the usual epic associations of an epiphany of Hermes: one cannot imagine Priam or Odysseus refusing the god's offer and suggesting death instead.

Descriptions of the world of the dead in early Greek poetry provide even more abundant evidence for the poetic tradition behind an element in Fr. 95.[23] The fullest examples of this motif include Circe's and Odysseus'

[20] Hooker, *op. cit.* 30–34, citing the conclusions of A. Braun, Annali Triestini 20 (1950) 288.

[21] Page, *op. cit.* 86.

[22] In line 5 σᾶμ' could even signify "grave-marker", as it often does in epic and later Greek. The thought of the poem then might have been: someone (Gongyla?) has died, and the narrator encounters Hermes at the tomb when he comes to lead the soul to Hades. The wish "to die and to see the banks of Acheron" could then be explicitly a wish for reunion with the dead person. But in view of the extant text, this speculation is just as ungrounded as that of Fränkel *et al.*

[23] As is conventional, I shall use "Hades" to refer both to the place and the god of the dead.

descriptions of Hades in *Odyssey* 10–11, the descent of the Suitors to the underworld in *Odyssey* 24, the experience of afterlife reported by the ghost of Patroklos in *Iliad* 23, and the elaborate description of Tartaros (including the house of Hades) in *Theogony* 720–819. Euripides' *Alcestis* and Aristophanes' *Frogs* are examples of later works which apparently rely on well-established popular beliefs about Hades, and thereby provide important supplemental evidence for the traditional picture of the world of the dead. Finally, lyric poets from the seventh century on refer often to Hades in general, and to Acheron in particular; such passages further define the traditional view of the underworld and the usual attitude toward it.

There are of course many variations in the details of these descriptions, including even the location of Hades: beyond Okeanos in *Odyssey* 10–11, but elsewhere usually under the earth. Still, a fairly consistent picture emerges from these passages, and an even more consistent emotional coloring. Whatever its location, Hades is reached by a dangerous journey, usually over water. This transitional water is Okeanos in *Odyssey* 10–11 (cf. Antikleia's exclamation about "great rivers and dread streams" in *Odyssey* 11.157); "the river" in *Iliad* 23.73; a lake or swamp in the *Frogs*; the lake Acheron in the *Alcestis* 439–444, with Charon, its grisly ferryman of souls mentioned by name in 361. Hermes, with his golden staff, may conduct the souls of the dead on this journey, as in *Odyssey* 24.1ff., where the journey is "past the streams of Okeanos" (line 11).

Hades itself is a gloomy, dark and dank realm (cf. the formula ὑπὸ ζόφον ἠερόεντα, repeated with variations in *H. Dem.* 337, *Theogony* 729, etc.), entered through its proverbial gates (*Theogony* 773, *Iliad* 23. 71, etc.). Those who enter will not escape the house of Hades, with its exit guarded by a fierce hound (*Theogony* 769–773), and it may be entered only by those who have died and received due funeral rites (*Iliad* 23.71ff.; cf. the reactions of Antikleia, Agamemnon, Herakles, etc., when Odysseus enters Hades alive, *Odyssey* 11, *passim*). A horde of ghosts may confront one who arrives (Patroklos in *Iliad* 23.72, Herakles in Bacchylides *Ode* 5.63ff., Odysseus in *Odyssey* 11.37ff.; cf. the encounters of Dionysos with Aiakos and other frightening characters in the *Frogs*). In the *Odyssey* these ghosts have lost their consciousness (all except Teiresias, *Odyssey* 10.492–495, etc.) as well as their corporeality (*Odyssey* 11.214–222). Their condition resembles the "dim corpses" (ἀμαύρων νεκύων) inhabiting Hades in Sappho 55.4, a fragment which preserves a much more "typical" view of the underworld than does 95. The unhappy condition of souls in the afterlife is best expressed by Achilles in his speech to Odysseus

(*Odyssey* 11.487–491), where the great hero declares that he would rather serve a poor man on earth than rule among the dead.

In Sappho 95, by contrast, Hades is preferred to life among the living. Despite the appearance of Hermes, the motif of a dangerous journey is apparently not developed in this poem; there is no gloom or terror, no ghosts, no Charon or Cerberus, no dreaded gates. Only the mention of Acheron (line 13) reminds us that Sappho is here describing the realm of Hades. And it is a very different Acheron from the "water of woe"[24] typical of other descriptions of the underworld. Alkaios, for example, knows the Acheron as a whirling stream that cannot be avoided, not even by Sisyphos, the wisest of all mortals (Alkaios B 6.2–9); Pindar says that only the blessed gods escape the "heavy-groaning strait of Acheron" (Fr. 143 Snell-Maehler). But in the Sappho poem, Acheron is not a dread water that must be crossed; rather, it is a desired destination.

In other descriptions of Hades in Greek poetry, the waters of the underworld present a barren scene, often characterized by grim rocky landscapes: the cold water of Styx "which drips down from a steep sheer rock" (πέτρης, *Theogony* 785–787); "the black-hearted rock (πέτρα) of Styx and the crag (σκόπελος) of Acheron dripping with blood" (*Frogs* 470–471); "the rock (πέτρη) and meeting-point of the two loud-sounding rivers" where Pyriphlegethon and Kokytos flow into Acheron (*Odyssey* 10.513–515). If any plants are imagined along such streams, they are the black poplars and willows bordering Okeanos in the groves of Persephone (*Odyssey* 10.508–510).[25] These trees are well suited to the typical picture of the land of the dead: Aristotle (*de Mundo* 401 a 4) classifies black poplars

[24] The popular etymology Ἀχέρων/ἄχος seems to have been widely accepted, cf. Melanippides 759 Page and Likymnios 770 Page. This association may be felt in the catalogue of the waters of Hades in *Odyssey* 10.513–515, where the other rivers have appropriately evocative names. Cf. W. B. Stanford, The Odyssey of Homer, vol. I² (New York 1959) 379.

[25] Although they do not line the banks of streams, the "asphodel meadows" of Hades are of interest here, especially since asphodel (*a. ramosus*) is a flowering plant used as a primitive food, much like the Homeric lotos (cf. *Works and Days* 41). The asphodel meadows in epic are the home of heroes such as Achilles (*Odyssey* 11.538–539, 24.13ff.) and Orion (*Odyssey* 11.572–573), who continue there in some fashion their heroic activities. Had Sappho used asphodel rather than lotos in Fr. 95, the meaning of this scene would have been more clear and less subtle, lacking the associations of eroticism and nurture conveyed with lotos. For asphodel as a kind of divine food, cf. M. Detienne, The Gardens of Adonis (Atlantic Highlands, N. J. 1977) 46–49.

as "fruitless" (ἄκαρπα),[26] while willows are "fruit-destroying" (ὠλεσί-καρποι) in the *Odyssey* passage.[27]

The banks of Acheron in Sappho 95, however, are lush with lotos and dew (lines 12–13). Page has characterized these elements as mere "decorative details" in Sappho's death-wish.[28] In terms of the poetic tradition inherited by Sappho, however, they can be shown to color her description of Hades with specific and unexpected connotations. Lotos, first, implies the fertile beauty of flowers and the easy nurture of fruit effortlessly gathered. The same term denotes both a kind of clover eaten by horses (*Iliad* 2.776, *Odyssey* 4.603) and the "flowery food" (ἄνθινον εἶδαρ, *Odyssey* 9.84) or "honey-sweet fruit" (μελιηδέα καρπόν, *Odyssey* 9.94) of the Lotophagoi.[29] The *lethe* induced by the Odyssean lotos[30] may well have influenced Sappho's choice of plant in this setting: not only is her Acheron floral and fertile, perhaps it also nurtures oblivion to the cares which motivate the desire for death.

Dew, the ephemeral fertilizing moisture from the sky,[31] is another unexpected feature of Sappho's Acheron. In epic diction, "dewiness" is overtly contrasted with death, as in Hekabe's description of Hektor's corpse, paradoxically still ἐρσήεις after his death and exposure (*Iliad* 24.757, cf. 24.419 where Hermes describes the same corpse as ἐερσήεις).

Dew and lotos are mentioned together in one remarkable scene in Homeric epic. In the lovemaking episode of *Iliad* 14, a book obviously very

[26] Elsewhere in Aristotle, however, the same trees are classified as "fruit-bearing"; cf. *Mirabilia* 835b 2.

[27] A scholiast on *Odyssey* 10.510 reports that ὠλεσίκαρποι means that the willows *lose their fruit* before it matures. The same writer cites Theophrastus' opinion that willows *cause sterility* in those who eat their fruit. In comparison with other compounds of ὠλεσ-/ὀλεσ-, where this element always means "destroying" in an active sense, Theophrastus' explanation of the epithet seems more likely than the scholiast's.

[28] Page, *op. cit.*, 86.

[29] The nature of the lotos plant is not further described in the *Odyssey* passage, but Herodotus knows of certain Libyan Lotophagoi, who eat nothing but the "sweet fruit of the lotos" (Hdt. 4.177); in another context, the same author mentions an acacia-like "lotos" of Cyrene (Hdt. 2.96). Apparently, then, Herodotus thinks of the lotos as a fruit-bearing *tree*.

[30] Cf. the expressions φαγὼν νόστοιο λάθηται (*Odyssey* 9.102), νόστου τε λαθέσθαι (*Odyssey* 9.97), etc. This forgetfulness would cause the loss of one's *nostos*, and thus is the structural equivalent of death in other episodes of the wanderings of Odysseus.

[31] Cf. Alkman 57 Page: οἷα Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἔρσα τράφει / καὶ Σελάνας. δρόσος and ἔρση are semantic equivalents; only ἔρση and its variants are used in archaic epic; both forms coexist in Sappho and Pindar; in tragedy and later poetry (except for archaistic reversions to Homeric usage) δρόσος prevails. In a forthcoming essay I attempt to explain the origins of the terms and their mythic and poetic connotations.

familiar to Sappho,[32] where the *hieros gamos* of Zeus and Hera ironically is consummated as a result of Hera's seductive deception of her spouse, Earth brings forth a bed of flowers – "dewy lotos" (λωτόν θ' ἑρσήεντα), crocus and hyacinth, as a golden cloud glistening with dew (ἕερσαι) envelops the divine lovers (*Iliad* 14.348–351). The qualities which make dew and lotos appropriate in this erotic and fertile scene help us to understand why Sappho includes the same elements in her picture of a "desirable" Acheron. These same images influence Fr. 96 as well, where Sappho mentions dew and "honey-lotos" (melilot) in another imaginative scene with erotic overtones. An absent woman is likened to the moon as it shines on "salt sea and flowery fields, and the fair dew flows down, and roses bloom and tender chervil and flowery honey-lotos" (μελίλωτος ἀνθεμώδης, 96.9–14), while the woman "weighs down her heart with desire (ἰμέρωι, cf. ἵμερός τις in 95.11), remembering gentle Atthis" (96.15–17). The use of these images in Fr. 95 suggests that, through its association with dew and lotos, Acheron becomes in this poem a place of life and nurture, with *erotic* overtones as well. As T. McEvilley has noted, this imaginative death "can supply what is lacking in life".[33] The traditional connotations of elements in Sappho's Hades indicate that Acheron is transformed to a world of love, and thus reinforce the *erotic* nature of the death-wish as suggested by scholars from Schadewaldt to Saake.

Given these associations, it may seem that Sappho is imagining an afterlife in a place other than Hades, perhaps in one of the "paradises" described several times in archaic Greek poetry. Places such as the Isles of the Blest (*Works and Days* 167–173; Pindar, *Ol.* 2.68–83) or the Elysian plain (*Odyssey* 4.561–569) are happy alternatives to death and the dim afterlife in Hades. Although descriptions of such places invariably include accounts of fertility reminiscent of Sappho's Acheron, the speaker in Fr. 95 clearly wishes to *die* (κατθάνην, line 11), not to enjoy immortality – and certainly not the kind of communal immortality which characterizes the "blessed" in such a place (cf. *Frogs* 440–459, in addition to the passages just cited from Pindar, *Works and Days* and the *Odyssey*). Indeed, the mention of Acheron itself indicates that the place desired in Fr. 95 must be Hades. Acheron, which is used in later poetry by metonymy for all of Hades (Simonides 126.5 Diehl; Pindar, *Nem.* 4.85; *Py.* 11.21; Timocreon 731

[32] Sappho's use of language and motifs from *Iliad* 14 is especially evident in Fr. 1, where she uses some of the themes in the Homeric scene between Hera and Aphrodite. These resemblances are noted in Hooker, *op. cit.* 43–44.

[33] *Op. cit.* 9.

Page, etc.) never figures in an archaic Greek description of Elysium or another paradise.[34] Several "Acherons" were known in the upper world too; these streams likewise reflect the typical link with Hades. The Acheron in Thesprotia, for example, was bordered by a famous oracle of the dead (Herodotus 5.92.7); an Acheron in Elis flowed down from Hades' own Mount Mintha. Therefore, it appears that although Sappho's Acheron shares qualities with several early Greek paradises (places of immortality and happiness), the place described in Fr. 95 is meant to be Hades itself.

Sappho's Hades then is radically transformed from the usual picture of the abode of the dead. So too the longing "to see Acheron" differs from the typical reaction to the prospect of visiting Hades. Saake aptly terms this non-traditional attitude a "lyrische Umwertung": the only life worth living is death.[35] Such a death is not annihilation, however, since the narrator expects to retain consciousness in the afterlife (cf. ἴδην, line 13). Sappho's Acheron represents a transformation and fulfillment of life.

Several other fragments mentioning death, mourning, or the underworld provide some hints as to the reason why Acheron is expected to be such a welcome place. Aelius Aristides paraphrases Sappho's prediction that even in death she will avoid *lethe*, because the Muses have made her truly fortunate, in contrast with those women who only *seem* happy (Sappho Fr. 193). This prose summary has elements in common with Fr. 55, where Sappho predicts a typical gloomy afterlife for a woman who has no share in the Muses' gifts, the "roses of Pieria", and with Fr. 147: "I say that someone remembers us even (there?)." Elsewhere Sappho writes that *threnos* is not appropriate among servants of the Muses (Fr. 150). Moreover, in Fr. 65, she reports a conversation in which she herself is addressed (line 5), possibly by Aphrodite (Κύπρωι β[α]σίλ[, line 6); a few lines later the phrase "and you in Acheron" can be read (line 10). The cumulative effect of such passages certainly gives the impression that Sappho sometimes writes of a happier afterlife resulting from a god's protection. In Fr. 95 also, expectations of divine favor may influence the speaker's attitude toward Hades, especially with the mention of Hermes and (probably) a goddess (μάκαιραν) in lines 7–9. Divine benevolence is another feature of the poetic traditions about the Isles of the Blest (*Works and Days* 167–168; cf. also Pindar, *Ol.* 2.68–70, 79–80) and Elysium (*Odyssey* 4.563–564).

[34] In Vergil's more elaborate topography of the underworld, the gloomy regions around Acheron, Styx, etc. are not far distant, it seems, from the abode of the blessed (*Aeneid* 6.295ff., 385ff., 637ff.).

[35] Saake, *op. cit.* 84.

The third traditional *topos* in Fr. 95 is the expression of a desire to die; here too Sappho seems to upset the conventions of the poetic tradition. Several types of death-wish are attested in that tradition. The speech of Achilles in *Iliad* 18.97–126 is a good example of one form, in which the hero expresses not so much a desire to die, but a willingness to *accept* death once a specific deed has been accomplished (in this case, the killing of Hektor). Similarly, in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, Anchises declares himself willing to die once he has slept with his beautiful "bride" (*Hom. Hymn.* 5.149–154).

Two other kinds of death-wish occur when characters find themselves in perilous or emotionally unbearable situations. In such circumstances, some heroes wish that they had died *before* the situation arose: e.g. Odysseus, facing the final storm sent against him by Poseidon (*Odyssey* 5.306–312); or Helen, regretting her marriage to Paris (*Iliad* 3.172–176, 6.343–348, and especially in her lament for Hektor, *Iliad* 24.763–764). Other characters wish or pray for death in the *present,* as does Penelope in *Odyssey* 18.201–205, in a wish which is expanded in her prayer to Artemis in *Odyssey* 20.61–82. Such a death-wish is most like the one in Sappho 95, although this is probably the report of a wish expressed in the past. It is noteworthy that a desire to die in the present time is often associated in early Greek poetry with the pain of separation in love, as in Penelope's death-wishes, and probably also in Anakreon 411 Page: "May I come to die, for there would be no other release from toils such as these." Such expressions then indirectly support the hypothesis that in Fr. 95 the desire to die is caused by unfulfilled love.

The startling effect in this poem comes not only from unconventional treatment of familiar epic themes, but from the juxtaposition of *topoi* elsewhere quite distinct. In Sappho 95, a death-wish is followed by a description predicting what the world of the dead will be like; but for the characters of epic, as for the elegists (e.g. Mimnermus 1 West, Theognis 173ff.) and lyric poets, death is desired or accepted as the final alternative to life, as annihilation. In looking forward to their death they give no thought to afterlife, good or bad. In the Sappho fragment, however, "to die and to see the flowery, dewy banks of Acheron" means to change from one level of conscious existence to another. The change, moreover, is a positive one. In this poem as elsewhere in Sappho,[36] landscape is a

[36] As in Fr. 2, where the scene is set for an epiphany of Aphrodite; or in Fr. 94, in the evocation of past scenes shared by Sappho and the woman who has left her. The

metaphor for the state of the soul. The place created in Fr. 95 provides a lush, vaguely erotic setting, imagined in response to the unhappiness motivating the death-wish. The process is similar to what McEvilley has described in Fr. 96: the dramatic present, with all its frustrations, is "tempered in some way by the sojourn in memory or imagination".[37]

The "sojourn" is all the more remarkable because Sappho clearly recalls well-known epic motifs concerning death and the afterlife, and then reverses her audience's expectations: a death-wish is not hope for annihilation; Acheron is not a sterile water to be crossed; even Hermes, it seems, does not help the narrator to avoid danger. Such use of epic material with "non-epic" consequences has been interpreted by Svenbro (in reference to Fr. 1) as an aristocrat's attempt to participate in a heroic world no longer available to her.[38] Rather, I believe, it presents a consciously "anti-heroic" persona, specifically perhaps an anti-Odysseus: the narrator *refuses* the offer of Hermes, *desires* rather than fears a transition to the world of death, and imagines a Hades of fertility and tranquility. The poem becomes a new, personal statement of values, a denial and reshaping of epic-heroic ideals. Its shocking effect[39] depends on Sappho's subtle manipulation of themes deeply familiar to her audience to create a scene that only she could envision: a death that nurtures, an Elysian Acheron.

imaginative recreation of these past experiences is discussed in R. Bagg, Love, Ceremony and Daydream in Sappho's Lyrics, Arion 3 (1964) 44–81.

[37] T. McEvilley, Sapphic Imagery and Fragment 96, Hermes 101 (1973) 257–278, 277.

[38] J. Svenbro, Sappho and Diomedes, Museum Philologum Londinense 1 (1975) 37–49, 46–49.

[39] Cf. the reaction of Fränkel, *op. cit.* 270.

WALTER BURKERT

Kynaithos, Polycrates, and the Homeric Hymn to Apollo

Outstanding by its size and complexity and addressing the god who is thought to represent the paragon of the Greek ideal, the hymn to Apollo has elicited more scholarly debate than any other of the Homeric hymns.[1] Even the 'Homeric question' seems to repeat itself at a minor scale, with analysts and unitarians taking sides. Quite a few details of the text are enigmatic, and the date and scope of the composition has remained controversial. Unique information about its author adds to the bewilderment: The poem professes to be the work of the 'blind man of Chios', identified as Homer as early as Thucydides, while an anonymous scholiast gives a name and a date for its composer with uncanny precision: Kynaithos of Chios, 504/1 B.C.

There is no easy solution to all the problems raised by this text. The modest purpose of this paper is to draw attention to two pieces of evidence not yet sufficiently discussed in this context, though they may throw some light on the situation of the poem within the framework of archaic Greek literature.

[1] For bibliography, see F. Càssola, Inni Omerici (Verona 1975) 103f.; basically important remain Th. W. Allen, E. E. Sikes, The Homeric Hymns (London 1904), 2nd ed. by Th. W. Allen, W. R. Halliday, E. E. Sikes (Oxford 1936); U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Die Ilias und Homer (Berlin 1916) 440–462; F. Jacoby, Der homerische Apollonhymnos (Sitzungsber. Berlin 1933, 682–751) = Kleine Philologische Schriften I (Berlin 1961) 139–218; more recent studies: A. Lesky, 'Homeros', Pauly-Wissowa RE Suppl. XI (1968) 826f.; M. Forderer, Anfang und Ende der abendländischen Lyrik. Untersuchungen zum Homerischen Apollonhymnos und zu Anise Koltz (Amsterdam 1971); A. Heubeck, Gedanken zum homerischen Apollonhymnos, in: Festschrift K. J. Merentitis (Athen 1972) 131–146; J. Schroeder, Ilias und Apollonhymnus (Meisenheim 1975); M. L. West, Cynaethus' Hymn to Apollo, Class. Quart. 25 (1975) 161–70. See further F. Dornseiff, Die archaische Mythenerzählung. Folgerungen aus dem homerischen Apollonhymnus (Berlin, Leipzig 1933); H. T. Wade-Gery, Kynaithos, in: Greek Poetry and Life. Essays pres. to G. Murray (Oxford 1936) 56–78 = Essays in Greek History (Oxford 1958) 17–36; on Delian archaeology, H. Gallet de Santerre, Délos primitive et archaique (Paris 1958).

1.

The notorious passage about Kynaithos is contained in a scholion on Pindar, Nemean 2,1, explaining the term 'Homerids':[2] "Homerids they called in ancient times the descendants of Homer, who also used to sing his poetry by right of succession; afterwards also the rhapsodes who no longer claimed descendance from Homer (were called Homerids). Prominent became Kynaithos and his like, who are said to have interpolated many verses in the poetry of Homer. Kynaithos was Chian by origin, and he wrote, among the works attributed to Homer, the hymn to Apollo and fathered it on Homer. This Kynaithos was the first to recite Homer's verses at Syracuse in the 69th olympiad (504/1 B.C.), as Hippostratus (FGrHist 568 F 5) says".

This testimony has hardly ever been accepted at face value. To most critics, the date seemed to be a mere absurdity.[3] Thus Kynaithos has been confidently transferred to the 8th century[4] and even made to coincide with 'Kinaithon of Lakedaimon', who appears among the shadowy authors of the 'Homeric Cycle'.[5]

In this situation it is striking news, which however does not seem to have spread far, that one Kynaithos of 6th century Sicily has risen to tangible existence in 1957:[6] At Gela, re-used in a building of Timoleon's time, an ashlar block was found with an archaic inscription, written *bustrophedon*: ϙ]ΥΝΑΙΘΟ ΤΟ Α[ΓΑΛ]ΜΑ ΤΟ ΕΠΟΨΟ.[7] Judging by its size, the block must have been the basis of quite a conspicuous monu-

[2] Schol. Pind. Nem. 2,1c, III 29,9–18 Drachmann: Ὁμηρίδας ἔλεγον τὸ μὲν ἀρχαῖον τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου γένους, οἱ καὶ τὴν ποίησιν αὐτοῦ ἐκ διαδοχῆς ᾖδον· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ οὐκέτι τὸ γένος εἰς Ὅμηρον ἀνάγοντες. ἐπιφανεῖς δὲ ἐγένοντο οἱ περὶ Κύναιθον, οὗς φασι πολλὰ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσαντας ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Ὁμήρου ποίησιν. ἦν δὲ ὁ Κύναιθος τὸ γένος Χῖος, ὃς καὶ τῶν ἐπιγραφομένων Ὁμήρου ποιημάτων τὸν εἰς Ἀπόλλωνα γεγραφὼς ὕμνον ἀνατέθεικεν αὐτῷ. οὗτος οὖν ὁ Κύναιθος πρῶτος ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐραψῴδησε τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη κατὰ τὴν ξθ' Ὀλυμπιάδα, ὡς Ἱππόστρατός φησιν (shorter: Schol. 1e, III 31,15–9 Drachmann; Eust. 6,39–41).

[3] Dornseiff (1933) 39: "Das fürchterliche Datum . . . ist vogelfrei".

[4] Allen-Halliday-Sikes (1936) 184.

[5] G. Welcker, Der epische Cyclus I (Bonn 1865²) 227. Some Pindar codices (n. 2) write Κίναιθος. On Kinaithon G. L. Huxley, Greek Epic Poetry (London 1969) 85–9, without a word on Kynaithos.

[6] P. Orlandini Kokalos 3 (1957) 94–6, fig. 22/3; M. Guarducci Annuario Sc. Atene 37/8 (1959/60) 270 (justly recognizing Ἔποχος as a proper name); Bull. epigr. 1962 nr. 397; not yet in L. H. Jeffery, The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece (Oxford 1961).

[7] The supplement A[NAΘE]MA seems equally possible. On ϙ, Jeffery 263; 346f.

ment. The letters suggest a 6th century date, though in view of the scarcity of archaic Sicilian inscriptions, precision is hardly possible.[8]

Caution is called for, of course: There is nothing to prove that the son of Epochos is identical with the Homerid from Chios. Yet the name Kynaithos is exceedingly rare[9], while Gela and Syracuse are close enough, and the dates seem to be compatible. If 'Kynaithos' is attested just twice for Sicily about the same time, and for a conspicuous personality in both cases, the identification remains a distinct possibility.

Even this possibility will give more reality to a Homerid Kynaithos performing at Syracuse towards the end of the 6th century; it will advise us not to alter the date, but to reconsider the testimony with the question, how far it can be based on analogous, inscriptional evidence. In fact one feature of it could easily go back to Kynaithos himself, the glorious 'first' in a context of success: "Kynaithos was the first to recite Homer's verses at Syracuse", this could be the paraphrasis of a votive epigram. There is one slightly later example of a poet's votive inscription giving even the exact date: the tripod with epigram dedicated by Simonides on account of his dithyrambic victory at Athens in 476 B.C.[10] Still it is difficult to imagine how Kynaithos could have given a similar chronological indication. One might toy with the idea that he mentioned an Olympic victor; but apparently there was no Sycracusan victor at the time[11], while dating by olympiads was in the manner of Hippostratus.[12] We are left with the old hypothesis that Hippostratus made use of some official list;[13] records of musical contests were kept in many places during the archaic epoch, and there were specialitsts writing on the development of music and poetry as early as the 5th century.[14] There is a real chance that the information about Kynaithos performing at Syracuse in 504/1 is basically solid, documentary evidence.

It has often been rejected, because it seems to imply that Homer was unknown in Sicily before this date, which seems absurd; there is no more

[8] Orlandini tentatively thought of the first half of the 6th century.

[9] Pauly-Wissowa lists no other Kynaithos. A friend of Demetrios Poliorketes bore the name, Luc. Pr. Im. 20; 22. Kynaitha is a town in Arcadia.

[10] Fr. 147 Bergk = 77 Diehl; cf. Fr. 145 Bergk = 79 Diehl.

[11] Cf. L. Moretti, Olympionikai (Roma 1957) 79f.

[12] Cf. FGrHist 568 F 4.

[13] A. Kirchhoff, Sitzungsber. (Berlin 1893) 904.

[14] Spartan *Karneonikai*, Hellanikos FGrHist 4 F 85/6; Σικυονίων ἀναγραφή, FGrHist 550; Glaukos of Rhegion, F. Jacoby Pauly-Wissowa RE VII 1417–20; Damastes of Sigeion, Περὶ ποιητῶν καὶ σοφιστῶν, FGrHist 5 T 1.

'homerizing' poet than Sicilian Stesichorus,[15] whose activity seems to dominate the first half of the 6th century. Yet the question is what 'knowledge of Homer' would mean at this period. Of course there was general familiarity with heroic epic, the Trojan and the Theban cycle throughout the Greek world; but few will ever have taken a look into a written text of, say, the Iliad. Poets were literate by then, but most of their training must still have been based on hearing other specialists performing in view of their audience, and memorizing. The public in general was totally dependent upon the institutionalized forms of performance. It is in this perspective that the impact of Stesichorus comes out: Linked to his name there is a new form of mythological poetry evidently competing with the epic of 'Homeric' style, trying to make it seem oldfashioned and jejune. Be it the fate of Troy, the return of Telemachus, the deed of Orestes, or even the siege of Thebes, be it Heracles, Pelias, or the Calydonian boar: all this was now available and was performed in the new, effective style and will have commanded the attention of the public by the middle of the 6th century. Fashion, however, became outmoded soon, and behind Stesichorus there appeared Homer more dominant than before:[16] it was an act of restoration when rhapsodes were admitted to the great festivals to recite the 'real', uncorrupted Homer, the first making of a classic. At Athens, Hipparchus obtained the 'genuine' text of Homer and organized Homer recitals at the Panathenaia;[17] the 'first' of Kynaithos was to start the same Homeric revival in the very homeland of Stesichorus.[18]

So far the testimony of Hippostratus is fully acceptable. Yet it concerns only the last sentence of the scholiast's text. This in fact is the only information that can have been contained either in a votive epigram of Kynaithos or in an official record. Kynaithos cannot have declared: "I forged Homer's hymn to Apollo", and no archive can have given specifications about interpolated lines in Homer. This is not any sort of documentary evidence, but literary polemics; this is seen to dominate the first three sentences: There are genuine and there are so-called Homerids;

[15] The new fragments in Supplementum Lyricis Graecis S 7–150 and Zeitschr. f. Pap. u. Epigr. 26 (1977) 7–36. On the date, M. Robertson Class. Quart. 19 (1969) 207–21; cf. M. L. West, Stesichorus in Sparta, Zeitschr. f. Pap. u. Epigr. 4 (1969) 142–149.

[16] Cf. Simonides, Page 564: "Homer and Stesichorus".

[17] Plat. Hipp. 228b; K. Friis Johansen, The Iliad in Early Greek Art (København 1967). The discussion on the 'Pisistratean redaction' cannot be reviewed here; cf. Mus. Helv. 29 (1972) 78, 19.

[18] Cf. Càssola (1975) 101. Wade-Gery (1958) 32 assumes that the Homerids went West after the collapse of Polycrates.

Kynaithos and his like belonged to the latter group, and they were prone to forgery; thus the hymn to Apollo was really written by him. This is a series of insinuations emanating, as it seems, from self-declared 'genuine' Homerids or those who later took up their claims.

And there is a reason why the hymn to Apollo, out of all the other hymns, got tied up in this polemics: it is the only Homeric poem that explicitly refers to its author, the 'blind man of Chios' (172). This sphragis has remained an intriguing puzzle. Most modern interpreters, though, seem to acquiesce in the assumption that this is some anonymous Chian poet speaking, accidentally blind, otherwise unknown.[19] This overlooks the implications of verse 173, with the poet "all of whose songs are the very best among posterity".[20] What a strange claim for an obscure, anonymous author! The best poet of all times, the absolute classic: this is meant to be Homer.[21] Few, however, have believed the assertion, even in antiquity;[22] or else the quarrel about Homer's homeland would never have started.[23] Thus it is on account of the *sphragis* that the hymn to Apollo was bound to become an outstanding fake among the works of Homer. In such a case, it was customary for ancient critics to ask for, and to supply a name of the forger, the 'real' author. There are lists of such authors for Orphic and Pythagorean writings[24] as well as for the epic 'Cycle'. An obvious candidate was a man who had been indicted for forgery in another case; hence the splendid career of Onomacritus[25] who, having been convicted of interpolating one piece in the oracles of Musaios, became the reputed author of the major *Orphica* and a redactor or forger of *Homerica*. In the same vein, the search for the 'real' author of the 'spurious' hymn to Apollo would

[19] Allen-Halliday-Sikes (1936) on v. 172; Wilamowitz (1916) 368; 453; 456 (with the hypothesis that the name in v. 171 has been deleted by some redactor).

[20] μετόπισθεν, cf. Il. 20,308.

[21] For Semonides (Fr. 89 Diehl) or rather Simonides (Fr. 8 West, cf. M. L. West, Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus [Berlin 1974] 179f.), if sufficed to say "a man of Chios" to refer to Homer.

[22] Thucydides did. The argument, often repeated, that this proves at least the antiquity of the poem, since Thucydides could not be fooled by a comparatively recent composition, does not hold: he had no methods at all to assess the date of a text. – Recently W. Schadewaldt, Der Aufbau der Ilias (Frankfurt 1975) 23f. has joined the belief of Thucydides.

[23] Aristarchus, who believed Homer to have been an Athenian, must have ignored the hymn as spurious.

[24] W. Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism (Cambridge, Mass. 1972) 129f.

[25] Hdt. 7,6; G. Kinkel, Epicorum Graecorum Fragmenta (Leipzig 1877) 238–40; F. Graf, Eleusis und die Orphische Dichtung Athens (Berlin 1974) 146–9.

inevitably lead to disreputable Homerids. "Prominent became Kynaithos and his like": the result is the text we read in the scholion.

This is plausible reconstruction, not more; but it will suffice to destroy the reliability of the hymn's ascription to Kynaithos. Just because the discovery at Gela gives some background to Kynaithos' career in Sicily, his connection with the hymn to Apollo disappears in the turmoils of ancient literary feuds.

2.

The central problem of interpretation is the combination of a 'Delian' and a 'Pythian' part in the hymn to Apollo. Differences in outlook, style, language and metrical technique have been noted; still the combination is not accidental and definitely not attributable to manuscript corruption: both parts are parallel in structure to such extent that, if they are not by the same author, one part is modeled on the other.[26] Here disagreement starts: while Wilamowitz and Jacoby established a communis opinio as to the priority of the 'Delian hymn',[27] Martin West has forcefully argued for the contrary.

But the problem is not to be solved on a merely aesthetic-literary level. The discovery of oral poetry, together with general insights of more modern literary criticism, has taught us that an archaic Greek poem cannot be understood without viewing the situation of live performance for which it was destined. An archaic author is not writing a book text; he is working for and acting in symbiosis with his audience. Thus it is reasonably assumed that the Homeric hymns were *prooimia*, performed to address the god and the audience at some specific local festival, as an introduction to epic recital proper; the Demeter hymn, e.g., would evidently suit Eleusis.[28] But in this perspective, the Apollo hymn, as we read it, seems to become an impossibility: the first part in fact describes the festival and addresses an audience at Delos, but the second part presupposes a Boeotian-Phocian

[26] Wilamowitz (1916) 411; West (1975).

[27] Cf. Lesky (1967) 826f.; Jacoby 732 thought of the first half of the 7th century, Allen (n. 4) of the 8th. Schröder (1975) (contra: N. J. Richardson Class. Quart. 28 [1978] 145f.) and E. Heitsch in: Kyklos, R. Keydell zum 90. Geburtstag (Berlin 1978) 20–37 have argued that some passages of the hymn are prior as against the Iliad; a similar thesis, with different arguments, in K. Schefold, Wort und Bild (Basel 1975) 43–52. Wade-Gery (1958) assigned the Pythian part to Kynaithos.

[28] N. J. Richardson, The Homeric Hymn to Demeter (Oxford 1974) 3f.; 12.

setting. How can this piece ever have been performed as a whole? The only conclusion left seems to be that this is a purely literary composition, perhaps a kind of *thesauros* for rhapsodes, from which to choose on proper occasions for live production. But this would force us to revise our concepts of archaic Greek poetry basically.

There is, however, a different solution: There was one unique occasion when a great festival at Delos was at the same time a Pythian festival. This was when Polycrates of Samos took measures to celebrate his predominance in the Aegaean, probably in 522 B.C.:[29] he dedicated the island of Rheneia to Apollo by the spectacular act of fettering it to Delos with an iron chain,[30] and on this occasion he celebrated at Delos, with the endorsement of the Delphic oracle, 'Delian and Pythian games' combined. Immediately afterwards, however, Polycrates was met by his cruel and miserable fate; thus the memory of the festival was propagated as a sinister example: "This is Delia and Pythia for you", meaning: and that is the last of it.

This story is preserved in the ancient collections of proverbs, with Menander and Epicurus being cited for the saying.[31] Scholars will be sceptical of 'late' sources, outside the classical narrative of Herodotus. Still the paroemiographers go directly back to well-informed 4th century

[29] H. W. Parke, Polycrates and Delos, Class. Quart. 40 (1946) 105–8, on whom Gallet de Santerre (1958) 307–9 and G. Gottlieb, Das Verhältnis der außerherodoteischen Überlieferung zu Herodot (Diss. Bonn 1963) 33 depend. Polycrates died late in 522, Pauly-Wissowa RE XXI A 1727. Parke gives 523 as a date for the Delian festival; the spring of 522 is closer to the catastrophe. – It is a pleasure to note that the combination with the Hymn to Apollo has been independently made by R. Janko (Trinity College, Cambridge) in his forthcoming dissertation on dating criteria in the Homeric Hymns.

[30] Thuk. 3,104,2.

[31] Zenob. Athous 1,62, p. 356 Miller (~ Zenob. 6,15, Paroem. Gr. I 165f.; Suda τ 174): Ταῦτά σοι καὶ Πύθια καὶ Δήλια· ἡ παροιμία εἴρηται ἐπὶ τῶν ὕστατα καὶ τελευταῖα ποιούντων. Μέμνηται δὲ αὐτῆς Μένανδρος ἐν Ἑαυτὸν τιμωρουμένῳ (Fr. 134 Koerte). Φασὶ δὲ ὅτι Πολυκράτης ὁ Σαμίων τύραννος ἑλὼν Ῥήνειαν καὶ ἀναθεὶς αὐτὴν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ ἐν Δήλῳ καὶ θεὶς ἀγῶνα κάλλιστον ἠρώτα πέμψας εἰς Δελφούς, πῶς δεῖ καλεῖν τὸν ἀγῶνα, Δήλια ἢ Πύθια. Ὁ θεὸς ἀπεκρίνατο αὐτῷ· ταῦτά σοι καὶ Δήλια καὶ Πύθια. ἐσήμαινε γὰρ ὅτι εὐθέως ἀποθανεῖται. Ὀροίτης γὰρ αὐτὸν ὕστερον ὁ Πέρσης ἐσταύρωσεν. Phot. Πύθια καὶ Δήλια· Φασὶ Πολυκράτην τὸν Σάμου τύραννον Πύθια καὶ Δήλια ποιήσαντα ἅμα ἐν Δήλῳ πέμψαι εἰς θεοῦ χρησόμενον εἰ τὰ τῆς θυσίας ἄγει κατὰ τὸν ὡρισμένον χρόνον· τὴν δὲ Πυθίαν ἀνελεῖν· ταῦτά σοι Πύθια καὶ Δήλια, βουλομένην δηλοῦν ὅτι ἔσχατα. μετ' ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον αὐτὸν ἀπολέσθαι συνέβη. Ἐπίκουρος δ' ἔν τινι τῶν πρὸς Ἰδομενέα ἐπιστολῶν ταῦτα (~ Suda π 3128; Apostol. 15,9, Paroem. Gr. II 629). H. W. Parke, D. E. W. Wormell, The Delphic Oracle (Oxford 1956) II nr. 67. If the observation of P. P. Dobree, Adversaria I (Cambridge 1831) 607 is accepted that there is an etymological play on δηλεῖσθαι and πύθειν, the sequence of Zenobius Athous should be the original one: Delian and Pythian.

writers;[32] it has recently been shown how another proverb from the same tradition gives a most valuable detail about the battle of Marathon.[33] As to Polycrates, Thucydides gives the striking detail of the iron chain, not mentioned by Herodotus. And the historical setting makes sense: It was Peisistratos who had forcefully intervened at Delos, making it a basis for Athenian hegemony among the Ionians. After his death in 528, Polycrates could step in. The conspicuous act of dedicating Rheneia called for a notable festival. The most celebrated of Apollo's festivals were the Pythian games, Delphi attaining the peak of influence and wealth just at that time. What a chance for the ruler of the sea to remind the Greeks that the Pythian god was Delian by origin. One might ask how Delphi ever could endorse such a move which would be a threat to its own preeminence; 522 was even a year of Pythian games. Probably the god's response, though diplomatic, was meant to be restrictive: Delian-Pythian games, yes, but not plainly Πύθια; specified sacrifices to honour the Pythian god, ταῦτά σοι καὶ Δήλια καὶ Πύθια, not more. In fact a Pythian sanctuary was installed at Delos.[34] Others, possibly at Athens, resented the tyrant's aspirations, and gladly turned to the new interpretation after his catastrophe: and that was the last of it.

Whatever Polycrates did to give splendor to his festival, Apollo would not be content with sports events, music required a special place. At Athens, the Peisistratids had recently adorned the Panathenaia with rhapsodic contests, with recitals of 'Homer'. It was just natural for Polycrates to follow suit: Hipparchos had probably dealt with the Homerids of Chios, Polycrates brought them to Delos. In fact the hymn to Apollo describes the γυμνικὸς and μουσικὸς ἀγών at Delos,[35] with recitals of heroic mythology (160); and it tells the assembled Ionians who is the best poet of all times: the blind man of Chios, Homer.

This brings us back to the *sphragis*. Robert Dyer[36] recently proposed an interpretation of the passage that would get rid of imposture: "We",

[32] O. Crusius, Analecta critica ad Paroemiographos Graecos (Leipzig 1883); repr. in: Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum, Supplementum [Hildesheim 1961] II) 147 referred the text to the Atthidographer Demon (FGrHist 327).

[33] N. G. L. Hammond Journ. of Hell. Stud. 88 (1968) 39f. on Suda χ 444 χωρὶς ἱππεῖς, attributed to Demon by O. Crusius Rhein. Mus. 40 (1885) 316–20.

[34] Gallet de Santerre (1958) 308.

[35] Thuc. 3,104,4. In fact the version of v. 146 as transmitted by Thucydides would make sense for a newly installed festival: 'Αλλ' ὅτε Δήλῳ, Φοῖβε, μάλιστά γε θυμὸν ἐτέρφθης, ἔνθα τοι . . . 'But when you took most pleasure in Delos – well, here we are . . .'

[36] Class. Philol. 70 (1975) 119–21, inadvertently reviving an idea of W. Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur I 1 (München 1929) 234.

distinguished form "I", is said to mean "we, the group of Chian Homerids", advertising their patron, Homer, the blind man of Chios. Unfortunately the distinction, which is contrary to the conventions of epic poetry, is not clearly marked in the text, and the present tense of πωλεῖται (170) and οἰκεῖ (172) suggests that the poet in question is alive and present, not a classical author of the past. There seems to be, after all, some mystification which cannot be totally resolved. There is, in addition, the *locus conclamatus* of v. 171: the transmitted text, either ΑΦΗΜΩΣ (Thucydides) or ΑΦΗΜΩΝ (manuscripts of Hymns) does not seem to make sense.[37] Still it is worth while to reconsider an idea expressed, and rejected, by Wilamowitz:[38] ἀφήμως in the sense of ἀνωνύμως. Wilamowitz referred to Plato's use of φήμη in the sense of ὄνομα[39], and Hesychius has ἄφημοι· ἀνώνυμοι, ἀκλεεῖς. In addition, there is a lemma in Hesychius: ἀφήμονες· ἄρρητοι, οὐκ ὀνομαζόμενοι. This would make possible a variant ἀφήμων to ἀφήμως: "If anybody asks you . . . which poet do you like most, all of you should very well answer – you need not mention a name: a blind man, he lives at Chios".[40]

This is dealing with riddles. There remains, as a result, the fact that the Delian-Pythian festival of Poycrates at Delos, 522 B.C., presents a uniquely suitable situation for a combined Delian-Pythian hymn to Apollo, and the hypothesis that a Homerid from Chios in fact composed or arranged the text we have for this occasion. This is very well compatible with the thesis of Martin West – but for the connection with Kynaithos –: an older composition with a Delphic setting was somehow obtained and provided with a Delian counterpart. This does not mean that the whole of the Delian hymn is that 'late'; the theme of Apollo's birth on the island may well have been traditional. Thus most of the problems of analysis and interpretation will remain. Still it is gratifying to recover the live context even of a 'late' Homeric composition.

There are at least two features of our text which suit a Polycratean date better than any other: Delos is presented as the place of reunion for 'the Ionians' *tout court*. But the proper center of 'the Ionians' was, of course,

[37] εὐφήμως (one branch of Thucydides-Codices; Wilamowitz [1916] 453f.; Càssola) is an ancient or byzantine, ἀμφ' ἡμῶν (F. Marx Rhein. Mus. 62 [1907] 619f.; Allen) a modern conjecture. The Thucydides scholia, as well as Hesychius, explain ἀφήμως· ἐν κόσμῳ, ἡσυχῇ.

[38] Wilamowitz (1916) 454.

[39] Plat. Leg. 704a; 935a.

[40] One might compare τὴν ἀριγνώτην γυναῖκα in Anacreon Page PMG 347,12. Some thought a proper name had been suppressed (n. 19); metrically Ὅμηρος would fit.

the Panionion at Mykale.[41] In the days of Polycrates, however, the continent had fallen under Persian domination, while the islands, headed by Polycrates, could still hope to retain their independence. This would give renewed importance to Delos, however ancient the tradition about Apollo father of Ion may have been. Once more Polycrates seems to have followed the steps of Peisistratos: Was not Ion said to have been born at Athens, of all places?

The other, even more salient feature, is the role of Apollo's temple, the special mark of his domination on the island (52; 56; 80). Artemis is hardly mentioned and definitely has to stand back (158f.). But archaeological exploration leaves no doubt that the sacred precinct was really Artemis'; it was her temple that was built first, about 700 B.C., and that remained the basic sanctuary.[42] Apollo's temple, the *porinos naos*, was constructed on virgin soil about 540/30 B.C.,[43] though with its huge golden statue it immediately surpassed the sister's modest chapel. Archaeologists have been trying hard to find an 8th century temple suiting the accepted date of the hymn;[44] they looked in vain.

[41] Jacoby (1933) 717 therefore thought the hymn might be earlier than the Panionion league.

[42] Gallet de Santerre (1958) 129–34; 252–7; B. Bergquist, The Archaic Greek Temenos (Lund 1967) 26–30.

[43] Gallet de Santerre 138; 251; 301. R. Pfeiffer's justly famous article on The Image of the Delian Apollo and Apolline Ethics, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute 25 (1952) 20–32 = Ausgewählte Schriften (München 1960) 55–71 is to be corrected in this point.

[44] Gallet de Santerre 91–3; 138–40 optioned for the Mycenaean 'edifice Γ'; contra, Bergquist 28f.

WILLIAM J. SLATER

Pindar's Myths: Two pragmatic explanations

> C'est la tâche de la philologie d'étudier aussi les réalites pour 'comprendre' les textes.
> L. Robert, J. des Savants (1961) 99.

The scholar whom we honour in these pages has an enviable knowledge of the Realien of Mediterranean life; and such knowledge can often open up aspects of ancient thought, where text and philology alike fail to provide historical understanding. The following notes result initially from asking the question: what did an athlete actually do when he went to the games and won?

Pythian 11: honouring the victor

Our earliest source for the story that Orestes sought refuge with Strophios is the eleventh Pythian Ode, but it has not surprisingly remained a mystery what this has to do with the victory of Thrasydaeus of Thebes at Delphi. We owe to David Young[1] the demonstration that previous explanations of the ode are without foundation and I may ignore them here.

"Thrasydaeus was victorious in the rich fields of Pylades, the ξένος of Laconian Orestes, whom Arsinoe his nurse, at the death of his father, rescued from the fierce hands of Clytemnestra away from bitterly lamented treachery at the time when . . ." The introduction to the myth depends on a kenning for Delphi in the same way as the myth of O. 1 depends on a kenning for Olympia (O. 1.24). In both places the formulaic relative clause is followed as often by a temporal clause; and in both places verbal ring composition indicates a key concept, κλέος in O. 1 (23:93) and ξένος in P. 11 (16:34).

1. Verbal and temporal ring composition

Since these similarities suggest an underlying structure, we should attempt to see what clues Pindar himself offers us from his conventions of

[1] D. Young, Three Odes of Pindar (Leiden 1968) 1–26. His tentative explanation of the myth is on p. 20; it is implicitly rejected here.

narrative. If we then examine his longer mythical narratives from their temporal aspect only[2], we find that three types may be clearly discerned, even if one or two odes defy analysis[3]: all occur in Homer, where the most important was first indicated by Schadewaldt[4]. I should like to refine his terminology for use in Pindar. Schadewaldt had determined that in three of the longest myths of Homer, the narrative began not at the earliest chronological point but later at a point "crucial from the point of view of the narrator", returned then to its earliest point, then in normal fashion proceeded to its end[5]: this form he called "lyric narrative". I distinguish here "simple lyric narrative" where the end and the beginning are chronologically the same, and "complex lyric narrative" whereby the end of the myth is posterior to its beginning. Both forms will then of necessity be distinguished by concentric ring composition in time[6], and opposed to the straightforward narration of events in time, which I call "epic narrative". The three types I should, not without a certain hesitation, group as follows:

[2] Illig's thesis, Zur Form der pindarischen Erzählung (Berlin 1932) has had little effect. T. Krischer (in his refinement of Zielinski's law: Formale Konventionen der homerischen Epik [München 1971] 93ff.), M. West (in Hesiod, Works and Days [Oxford 1978] 43ff.), Illig and I are all talking about the same thing; West's "prospect, mis-en-scene" = Krischer's "Ankündigung" = Schadewaldt's crucial point = Illig's *kephalaion*, on which see R. Hamilton, Epinikion (Den Haag 1974) 68n. 5. But this is no place for a unified field theory of narrative.

[3] P. 4 is eccentrically long, O. 7 is a baroque experiment, and in I. 6 everything depends on a lacuna. I do not claim in the compass of this article more than a general validity, and there is certainly room for argument about a few of my attributions, e.g. R. Hamilton *per epistolam* queries doubtfully P. 5, 6, 8; nonetheless the main lines I hold to be clear enough.

[4] W. Schadewaldt, Iliasstudien[3] (Darmstadt 1966) 83ff. D. Lohmann, Die Komposition der Reden in der Ilias (München 1972) deliberately excludes from his comprehensive treatment of simple lyric narrative all the examples of complex lyric (7 n. 6; cf. 26 n. 34) for no clear reason.

[5] Young (*op. cit.* 4 n. 3) noted the phenomenon of the "resume of victims as terminal to a myth" and the "formulaic crucial acts" but like R. W. B. Burton, Pindar's Pythian Odes (Oxford 1962) 9 he lumps things together that belong apart. What is noticeable is that the last part of a myth told as a complex lyric narrative and which is posterior chronologically to the point at which the myth began, tends to be an account of the hero's exploits and successes (Pelops in Ol. 1; Asclepius in P. 3; Perseus in P. 10, Orestes in P. 11). In O. 10 the Olympic games are analogous; In P. 2 the example of Ixion is negative; in P. 12 the heroine is Athena, the terminal exploit being the naming of the tune. The perverse notion of Wilamowitz, Pindaros (Berlin 1922) 469 that the final exploits of Perseus in P. 10 precede temporally the body of the myth runs counter to all parallels and is supported by nothing in the myth itself; yet he persuaded Burton, loc. cit. and A. Köhnken, Die Funktion des Mythos bei Pindar (Berlin 1971) 177.

[6] The term is that of Illig, *op. cit.*, 59; Lohmann, *op. cit.*, 18.

a) complex lyric: O. 1, 10; P. 2, 3, 10, 11, 12.
b) simple lyric: O. 3; P. 6, 8, 9; N. 7, 10.
c) epic: O. 8, 9, 13; P. 5; N. 1, 3, 4, 6; I. 8.

Though the lyric form often causes confusion for the modern reader[7], who naturally seeks the epic form, in Pindar the backwards movement is announced by the almost formulaic relative (missing only in N. 10 and P. 2)[8] followed by either a temporal clause (O. 1, 10; P. 2, 3, 11, 12; P. 8) or an equivalent aorist participle (P. 10; O. 3; P. 6). All complex lyric narratives show this hallmark, and only three of the simple forms do not (P. 9; N. 7; N. 10). The ancient reader was therefore made aware of the temporal form immediately and apprized of what the narrator considered to be a crucial moment; in P. 11 he sees that this is the arrival of Orestes in Delphi.

Quite different is the common phenomenon of verbal ring composition. It may occur in any myth of any form or even outside it and by itself is merely a form of emphasis; but it may of course also emphasize a structural element, as in O. 1 the verbal ring of κλέος begins and ends the myth or in P. 10 the ring of θαῦμα precedes and follows the myth. Now since lyric narrative will have to return to the same point in time at which it began and to the same theme, whether it finishes there or not, we would expect that there would often be also a verbal ring. But in fact P. 11 is the only complex lyric narrative in which the temporal ring is emphasized by the verbal ring; the verbal repetition of ξένος particularizes the temporal and thematic emphasis on the welcome of Orestes at Delphi. Here I think is where Pindar is telling us to seek meaning.

2. Gnomic Progression

If Pindar's narrative style often causes confusion, his use of gnomic material can be even more baffling. In the centre of the myth of Orestes we find the following:

[7] J. T. Kakridis, Philologus 85 (1930) 474ff. determined that the temporal narrative of O. 3 – particularly clear example of lyric narrative – was hopelessly confused, generalized this to a theory that Pindar's myths were deliberately confused, and was thereby enabled to introduce confusions into other myths, esp. O. 1, where they were not obvious. In O. 1 structural considerations alone would be sufficient to show that ἐπεί in 1.36 was temporal not causal, as τότε in 1.40 in the event proves; but he has unfortunately managed to persuade Köhnken Class. Quart. 27 (1974) 199ff. and others.

[8] F. Dornseiff, Pindars Stil (Berlin 1921) 120, who also notes the temporal ring of the myth.

a) Adultery is a great error, not to be concealed.
b) One's fellow citizens are evil speakers.
c) Prosperity invites corresponding envy
d) He of low aspirations mutters obscurely

These are not the words of a madman, but an archaic form of "gnomic progression", whereby every sentiment is related only to the one after it and the one before, so that the reader proceeds as it were on a series of mental stepping stones[9]. This striking feature of Pindaric style was no doubt much admired for its cleverness. But we insist that while these words may have some relevance to athletic victory, inasmuch as success encourages denigration, yet they have the primary appeal of a sophistic jump from adultery to condemnation of the unadventurous, the function of separating the temporal backwards and forwards movement of the myth, practically nothing to do with the rest of the myth, and nothing at all to do with the main point of the myth.

3. Negative and positive *exempla*

If we number the temporal sequence of events from a to d, the story proceeds in this concentric fashion[10]:

d) Orestes as ξένος
c) Orestes' rescue by Arsinoe
b) Clytemnestra's killing of Cassandra and Agamemnon
a) either: Iphigeneia's murder or: Clytemnestra's seduction.

(So far backwards; now comes the gnomic centre, then forward to)

b) Agamemnon's death, whereby he(!) kills Cassandra, after the fall of Troy.
d) Orestes as ξένος.
e) Orestes' exploits of vengeance.

[9] First noted as far as I know by M. L. West on Hesiod, Theogony 94–7. It is related to H. Fränkel's concept of the "mittlere Proportionale" (Lohmann, *op. cit.*, index, s. v.) and based on the Pindaric two-sided gnome (Illig, op. cit., 61, who notes how often it is used to separate two series of actions). S. Radt, Gnomon 46 (1974) 199ff. criticizes Köhnken for neglecting this aspect at N. 7.23 and elsewhere, esp. N. 8.21–2. It seems to me impossible to press such gnomic progressions in search of a modern sense of organic unity without resulting errors of overinterpretation.

[10] On the morphology of *exempla* see now Lohmann, *op. cit. supra* n. 4.

We note that what is emphasized by repetition is the death of Agamemnon and Cassandra, and the ξενία offered to Orestes. Pindar makes it even clearer where the opposition lies:

1.31,35: Θάνεν μὲν αὐτὸς ἥρως Ἀτρείδας ἵκων . . . ὁ δ' ἄρα γέροντα ξένον Στροφίον ἐξίκετο.

On the one hand Agamemnon came home to Amyclae and so brought death to the ξένη[11] Cassandra: on the other hand Orestes found refuge as ξένος of Pylades and his father at Delphi. We have a clear positive and negative example of strangers coming to seek the rights of hospitality: Cassandra is murdered, Orestes is succoured[12].

4. The *Grundgedanke*[13]

If as we expect, Orestes is exemplary for the victor, it is still not clear how Thrasydaeus can be said to have been accorded hospitality at Delphi. The clue is given by P. 5.31, where the victorious charioteer is ὕδατι Κασταλίας ξενωθείς. To be victorious was to be like Orestes, treated as a ξένος and awarded ξένια by the Delphians. The award of ξένια to celebrities can be illustrated by many inscriptions[14]. Pausanias tells us that the victors at Olympia were honoured by a banquet in the prytaneum in the Altis[15], and it can be assumed that the Delphians honoured their victors as they did so many others with a banquet in the prytaneum also[16]. Later of course in his home town the victor would again be invited to a banquet in the prytaneum[17].

[11] She could not habe been raped by Ajax in Pindar's version, and her status is not that of a slave; Pindar does not say she is entitled to the rights of hospitality but takes it for granted.

[12] I do not think it it a coincidence that in one of the three examples of Homeric complex lyric narrative, Phoenix' story Il. 9.447–83, the theme is also one of hazardous escape from family to refuge abroad, that there the temporal ring is also emphasized by the verbal ring (448 = 478 φεύγων) and that the same key word as here ἐξικόμην (479) follows.

[13] I seek to redeem the concept as outlined in Class. Journ. 72 (1977) 197ff., despite Wilamowitz, Textg. der Bukoliker (Berlin 1906) 179: ". . . wer von Grundgedanken und zarter Ausführung redet, der täte besser die Hand von Poesie zu lassen."

[14] Larfeld, cited by Schulthess in Pauly-Wissowa RE 5A (1927) s. v. Sitesis col. 390; L. Robert, Op. Min. Sel. (Amsterdam 1969) II, 1052; M. Holleaux, Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques II (Paris 1938) 181.

[15] Pausanias 5.15.12 quoted by S. Miller, Prytaneum (Berkeley 1978) 202. Eur. fr. 282,15 seems to suggest that the banquet was the main honour given to the victor.

[16] Examples in Miller, *op. cit.* 187–9.

[17] See esp. IG I² 77,4–18 and Timocles, fr. 8K, cited by Miller, op. cit. 131, 139. Banquets could also be held in temples (of Apollo, SIG³ 707,42; of Heracles, Aristophanes'

The myth of P. 11 is therefore an example of how proper ξενία operates. The treatment of Cassandra by her hosts Agamemnon and Clytemnestra is opposed to the treatment of Orestes ἐν ξένᾳ ξένος by his hosts Strophios and Pylades. Thrasydaeus like Orestes has been feted by the Delphians when he came to Delphi. The victor was presumably young like Orestes[18], and would have been flattered by the comparison.

Pythian 8: taking the omens

The story of the Seven against Thebes is an example of the disaster that arises from failure to heed divine omens[19], while the Epigoni set out with fair omens and were therefore successful. This opposition of *exempla* is again brought out by Pindar. Though the myth starts as a lyric narrative with the usual relative and temporal clauses (39–41), it consists almost entirely of the speech of Amphiaraus, and is terminated in a unique manner by a parallel between Amphiaraus and the chorus, one rejoicing that Alcmeon his son was successful, the chorus rejoicing that Alcmeon gave a true prophecy, i.e. prophesied success for the victor. What is the point of this myth here, and what, how and to whom did Alcmeon prophesy?

A father Amphiaraus rejoices to see his son triumphant. The father was notoriously a failure because of the opposition of the gods, who though they had sent him negative omens had not been able to prevent the enterprise. Adrastus was a failure too and even in the second expedition will have his success impaired by the death of his son. One aspect of the exemplary nature of the myth is obvious enough: some fathers (like Amphiaraus) as opposed to others (Adrastus) are able to enjoy success in their sons when they themselves have failed. That the father of the victor almost certainly had failed or at any rate had no successes – a fact tactfully not mentioned –, seems nonetheless certain, in that Pindar enumerates the

Daitaleis), in a hierothyteion (at Rhodes, Kontorini, Bull. de Corr. hell. 99 [1975] 97–117) and elsewhere; see W. Burkert, Gr. Religion (Stuttgart 1977) 157 n. 111 and M. P. Nilsson, G. der gr. Religion[3] (München 1967) I 830.

[18] Orestes and Strophios are contrasted as γέροντα and νέα κεφάλα. It is no proof that the victor won as a youth but it supports that view.

[19] C. Robert, Gr. Heldensage (Berlin 1921[4]) 952ff.; N. 9.21; Eur., Suppl. 155–7 with Collard's note, and for the contrast with the good omens of the Epigoni esp. Iliad 4.406–9. Overlooked is an early Corinthian vase (M. Robertson, History of Gk. Art [Cambridge 1975] 2, pl. 84b and 1,121ff.) showing the departure of Amphiaraus; animals fill the vacant spaces representing evil omens.

successes of even more distant relatives in the catalogue of the family's triumphs (35ff.). The father in enjoying his son's victory (1.72), ought to feel the same pride as Amphiaraus.

The myth is however doubly exemplary, for it also illustrates the value of good omens. The chorus gives thanks to Alcmeon for correctly prophesying victory for Aristomenes. Athletes were as prone as all Greeks embarking on enterprises of moment to seek spiritual advice prior to contests[20], and could doubtless receive portents in a variety of ways, but the commonest method would be by a vision seen either in normal sleep or in incubation, whereby they might even learn the ruse that would bring them victory. Alcmeon need not even have been normally prophetic to give such dream advice, though his genealogy suggests it. Certainly γείτων καὶ κτεάνων φύλαξ ἐμῶν are consistent with his status as a local hero[21], and such visions could be obtained by merely sleeping near a statue of the hero[22], who would be considered a σύμβουλος.[23]

We are not in a position to say exactly who had the vision[24]. The historical parallels suggest that it would be the athlete himself, and the alleged precision of the vision and the detail of Alcmeon suggest that there was only one visionary and not a larger number. But I would suggest two reasons for Pindar's mode of expression here. In N. 3.70 the victor is

[20] H. A. Harris, Sport in Greece and Rome (Cornell 1976³) 244ff. gives many later examples. Of earlier examples I know Alexis fr. 272K cf. *Nubes* 747. Closest is a fourth century inscription from Epidaurus, cited by Weinreich, Antike Heilungswunder (Gießen 1909) 91: a boxer has a dream in which Asclepius teaches him a trick to defeat a famous opponent. Similar is the Delphic inscription for the Thessalian Sisyphus, Bull. de Corr. hell. 21 (1897) 592; for a study of all these dream inscriptions see F. T. van Straten, Bull. ant. Beschaving 51 (1976) 1–38. For collections of athletic oracles see J. Jüthner, Philostratos über die Gymnastik (Leipzig 1909) 92ff. For incubation at Aegina see Aristoph. *Vesp.* 121.

[21] For γείτων cf. P. 3.77, Soph. *O. T.* 919, Aesch. *Septem* 502. Lloyd-Jones Journ. of hell. Stud. 93 (·973) 119 n. 3 cites Satyrus but L. Robert, Essays for C. B. Welles (New Haven 1966) 176 shows that this is hellenistic usage only. For φύλαξ see W. Seelbach, Die Epigramme des Mnasalkes (Wiesbaden 1964) 73 where add Philostratus, *Heroicus* p. 132, 13K.

[22] Hopfner in Pauly-Wissowa RE 14 (1928) s. v. Mantike col. 1272–3.

[23] Philostratus, *Heroicus* p. 146, 5K.

[24] The scholia have already seen that the chorus speak for the victor, and this is pointed out by Floyd Gr., Rom. & Byz. Stud. 6 (1965) 18 and others; but this is in itself no evidence, since the scholiasts are merely guessing at a λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου in Aristarchean fashion, on which see especially the evidence collected by H. Dachs, Die λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου: ein exegetischer . . . Grundsatz Aristarchs, Diss. (Erlangen 1913). See further Bundy, Studia Pindarica 2 (Berkeley 1962) 69 and cf. Köhnken, op. cit. 210; Fränkel, Dichtung und Philosophie² (München 1962) 543 n. 12.

shown to have been part of the theoric group[25], and such circumstances could easily lead a chorus of fellow demesmen, pilgrims or companions to refer to themselves as co-visionaries, and urbanely associate themselves with him[26]. But I suspect above all that the chorus are endeavouring to parallel the expedition of the theoric group closely with that of the Epigoni. They were they claim given good tidings by Alcmeon just as the Epigoni were given good omens by Alcmeon's father. Since Pindar has chosen and constructed the whole myth to parallel a historical incident, he must needs obscure the details to produce a better analogy than perhaps the facts would warrant; as a result the first person is obscure, and conceals the actual visionary, while the vague ἰόντι obscures the place where it occurred. In the end we cannot even be sure what basis in fact the chorus had for their assertion; it suffices that they claim the exemplum of the Epigoni, to illustrate both how sons can bring their fathers success eventually, and how an enterprise blessed by the gods in bound to be successful[27].

[25] The Theorion of the Pythian (Apollo) at N. 3.70 can scarcely refer to magistrates, as Wilamowitz thought (*op. cit.* 277; cf. Robert, Op. Min. Sel. 1,452) or to a temple of Apollo Theorios, but only to the Aeginetan *theoroi* as a group, who must have gone to Delphi by sea (Ziehen in Pauly-Wissowa RE 5A [1934] s. v. Theoria, col. 2232): cf. G. Rougemont, Théores d'Andros a Delphes, Bull. de Corr. hell. Suppl. 4 (1977) 36–47 for the background.

[26] If these singular first persons or imperatives are translated by the corresponding plural, most of these difficulties associated with them in ancient and modern scholarship prove to be illusory. Strabo xvii. 801 shows however that one could indulge in incubation on behalf of others (the text needs emendation accordingly).

[27] For the importance of this σὺν θεοῖς motif, see Class. Journ. 92 (1977) 202 n. 49.

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καὶ κείνοις: Pindar, *Nemean* 5.22

Pindaric poetry is *Gelegenheitsdichtung*. This means that the poems contain numerous allusions to events of a personal or private nature which we – unlike Pindar's audience – will never fully understand. Furthermore, it is our inadequacy in this respect that has led to the proposal of so many conflicting theories and solutions by different schools of interpretation.

If our knowledge in this field remains inevitably incomplete there is another in which we can possibly stand on equal terms with Pindar's fifth century audience, and that is in the field of mythology. Pindar's method of relating myths is well known: his style is brief and condensed with sudden flashes of light to illuminate, as it were, the mythological landscape. He also expected his audience to follow him in the rapid succession of references to mythological persons, places, and events. Like other Greek poets (and some prose writers as well, e.g. Herodotus) Pindar was enthralled by names and genealogies; the mere mention of a god or hero or the slightest reference to an act of valour or beauty would open up a world of immeasurable delight. We must therefore ensure that we too grasp these mythological references in the way Pindar's audience did, or our appreciation of his poetry will be severely impaired. But alas, Pindaric criticism abounds in misunderstandings, and the brief allusion hidden in καὶ κείνοις in N. 5.22 is just another example of an almost total insensitivity to Pindar's words and their meaning.

The fifth *Nemean* was composed sometime in the 480:ies in honour of Pytheas, an Aeginetan youth who had won the pancratium for ἀγένειοι at Nemea. A few years later Pindar was to write *Isthmians* 6 and 5 for Pytheas' younger brother Phylacidas, and in all three odes he praises their ancestry which goes back to Aeacus – the Aeginetans are Aeacids.[1]

[1] For ἀγένειοι as a class see A. Severyns, Bacchylide (Liège/Paris 1933) 49 and 153–58; for Pindar's repeated praise of the Aeacids see T. Oksala, Polymythia in Pindars

Nemean 5 opens with the programmatic part in which Pindar announces Pytheas' victory. In 7–8 the poet concludes this section with praise of the victor's native city and the Aeacids, and moves into the world of myth in 9.[2] However, this myth is brought to a sudden stop (the *Abbruchsformel* αἰδέομαι and στάσομαι in 14 and 16); this is one of Pindar's so-called "hush-passages" (14–18). Aeacus' three sons, Peleus and Telamon by Endais, and Phocus by Psamatheia are described as being united in prayer for Aegina, but the mention of Phocus directs Pindar's thoughts to his ill-fated death – he cannot bear to pronounce openly that Phocus was killed by his brothers but states (15–16) that a δαίμων forced them to leave Aegina:

14 αἰδέομαι μέγα εἰπεῖν
ἐν δίκᾳ τε μὴ κεκινδυνευμένον,
πῶς δὴ λίπον εὐκλέα νᾶσον,
καὶ τίς ἄνδρας ἀλκίμους
16 δαίμων ἀπ' Οἰνώνας ἔλασεν.
στάσομαι· οὔ τοι ἅπασα κερδίων
φαίνοισα πρόσωπον ἀλάθει' ἀτρεκές·
18 καὶ τὸ σιγᾶν πολλάκις ἐστὶ σοφώ-
τατον ἀνθρώπῳ νοῆσαι.

In 19–21 Pindar makes a fresh start in order to introduce a myth in which he can praise the Aeacids without any inhibition:[3]

εἰ δ' ὄλβον ἢ χειρῶν βίαν ἢ σιδαρίταν ἐπαινῆ-
σαι πόλεμον δεδόκηται, μακρά μοι
20 αὐτόθεν ἅλμαθ' ὑποσκά-
πτοι τις· ἔχω γονάτων ὁρμὰν ἐλαφράν·
καὶ πέραν πόντοιο πάλλοντ' αἰετοί.

In 22 Pindar sets out to tell the Peleus-Thetis myth and begins with a

Aigineten-Oden, Arctos 7 (1972) 93–105. Pytheas' victory at Nemea was also praised by Bacchylides (ode 13).

[2] As so often Pindar uses a relative (τάν) to mark the border between the two worlds; in 37 ὅς κτλ. announces the return into this world.

[3] For other variations of this device see Fogelmark, Pindar, *Nemean* 7.50–52, Ant. class. 45 (1976), 126–30; E. L. Bundy, Studia Pindarica 2 (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1962) 64; cf. P. 11.38–40, N. 3.26–27, 5.50, I. 3.1–3, O. 6.82–83, etc.

description of their bridal feast:[4]

22 πρόφρων δὲ καὶ κείνοις ἄειδ' ἐν Παλίῳ
Μοισᾶν ὁ κάλλιστος χορός, ἐν δὲ μέσαις
24 φόρμιγγ' Ἀπόλλων ἑπτάγλωσσον
χρυσέῳ πλάκτρῳ διώκων
ἄγειτο παντοίων νόμων·

"Also for them" is the usual rendering of καὶ κείνοις in 22, but the actual meaning of these words is disputed. Scholars agree almost unanimously (and correctly) that κεῖνοι refers to Aeacus' sons (Peleus and Telamon), who are here represented by Peleus.[5] But καί seems to have confused almost every scholar who has acknowledged its existence: some ignore it completely whereas others have recognised its presence in their translation (as "also") but have not provided the explanatory note necessary for any correct understanding of the passage.[6]

The scholia have nothing to say on καὶ κείνοις, and in Slater's *Lexicon to Pindar* a reference to this passage appears (correctly) under καί D. 1.b, "also". In other quarters, the words are ignored by some commentators

[4] The continuation in 25ff. in which Pindar tells how Peleus won Thetis by his observance of the laws of Zeus Xenios is irrelevant to a correct understanding of καὶ κείνοις in 22; nor does it matter in this context that in other poems (N. 3.33–36, 4.54–65; cf. I. 8.27–47) Pindar presents apparently conflicting versions of this myth (which, after all, may not be so problematic: see J. Kaiser, Peleus und Thetis [München 1912] 58ff.; cf. Dissen's comment on N. 3 [in Boeckh, 2.2.370] "*ceterum observes*" etc.).

[5] The idea that κεῖνοι refers to Peleus and Thetis, as some would have it, is not correct. Pindar does sometimes stimulate interest and excitement by indirect references to a person before revealing his identity a few lines further on (as he does in 27, where ξυνᾶνα Μαγνήτων σκοπόν becomes clear only through ἀκοίταν in 28 and Ἀκάστου in 30; a splendid example of this device (with a postponed and highly dramatic juxtaposition) is I. 7.44–47). But in this context Thetis is not mentioned and appears only as the joint subject (i.e., with Peleus) of the Muses' song in the passage which follows.

[6] Translations without "also": Gin (1801), Murison (1933), Lattimore (1947), Werner (1967), and, most recently, Swanson (1974); translations with "also" but without explanatory comment: Thiersch (1820), Hartung (1856), Schnitzer (1860), Donner (1860), Myers (1884), Dornseiff (1921), Puech (1923), Sandys (3rd ed. 1937), Wolde (1958), and Hölscher (1962; Donner's translation with Hölscher's notes). So far as translations are concerned I have only had access to a very limited number, since most libraries do not care much for this kind of material. Some 16th century translations will be discussed below, but most are in Latin without a commentary, e.g. the ones accompanying the Greek text in the editions of Estienne (1560, 1566, 1586 (brief notes by Casaubon, 411–14), Plantin (1567), Porto (1598; brief notes, 171–80), Hanard (1598), etc. For the translations of Paley, Farnell, Bowra, and Conway see below.

who touch very briefly on N. 5.22,[7] and also by some distinguished scholars who have studied the Peleus-Thetis myth both in general, and as it occurs in Pindar.[8] But most scholars do have an opinion on καὶ κείνοις, and their ideas are reviewed in this brief, but fairly complete, summary.

A number of German scholars favour the view that καί includes a reference to Pindar and Pytheas: "*ut ipse Pytheae, sic etiam Peleo, uni ex Aeacidis, Musarum chorus carmen in Pelio monte cecinit*", to use Christ's words in his 1896 major edition. This interpretation was suggested by Tycho Mommsen in 1845 and repeated by others; Schadewaldt even improves on it by maintaining that "Pindar seine Bereitwilligkeit kundgibt, hinter den Musen nicht zurückstehen zu wollen."[9] It seems, however, to have escaped the notice of those who support this interpretation that it in fact goes back to the 16th century, appearing already in Le Sueur's Latin translation: "*Nec solus veterem concelebro domum: / hanc olim umbriferi vertice Pelii / formosus cecinit Pegasidum chorus.*"[10]

[7] Schmidt (1616), Benedictus (1620), Porto (although loquacious on this passage: Francisci Porti Cretensis commentarii in Pindari Olympia etc., n.p. (Genevae?) 1583, 122), J. Duchemin, Pindare, poète et prophète (Paris 1955) 24, E. Thummer, Die isthmischen Gedichte (Heidelberg 1968–69) 1.63, 116, 153, G. Méautis, Pindare le dorien (Neuchâtel 1962) 292. Donaldson (1841) is completely silent on N. 5.22.

[8] R. Rauchenstein, N. Schw. Mus. 3 (1863) 244, 248, R. Reitzenstein, Hermes 35 (1900) 82, Wilamowitz, Sitzungsber. Berlin 1909, 812ff., Pindaros (Berlin 1922) 174, J. Kaiser (above, n. 4), 48f., C. R. Robert, Die griechische Heldensage (in L. Preller, Gr. Mythologie 2.1) (Berlin 1920[4]) 70–71, n. 5.

[9] T. Mommsen, Pindaros, zur Geschichte des Dichters und der Parteikämpfe seiner Zeit (Kiel 1845) 46 n. 153 (but see Dissen, below, n. 24), F. Mezger, Pindars Siegeslieder (Leipzig 1880) 336, W. Schadewaldt, Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikion (Halle 1928) 281 n. 1, K. Fehr, Die Mythen bei Pindar (Zürich 1936) 48 n. 61. L. Schmidt, Pindar's Leben und Dichtung (Bonn 1862) 127 should perhaps be added to this list although he does not express a clear opinion on this issue. This also goes for H. Gundert, Pindar und sein Dichterberuf (Frankfurt a. M. 1935) and M. Bernard, Pindars Denken in Bildern (Pfullingen 1963); both Gundert (41, 124 n. 187; cf. 48) and Bernard (24, 74 n. 30) incorrectly take πρόφρων to refer to Pindar as part of the *Sieg-Lied* pattern. But πρόφρων, used by Pindar seven times in our corpus, always refers to a god, hero, or mythical person. In his recent study of N. 5 (Hermes 102 [1974] 397–411) Ch. Segal quotes 22 without commenting on καὶ κείνοις but sees a reference in ἄειδε to Pindar's own ἀοιδά (404); on 405 he suggests that πρόφρων . . . χορός is echoed by εὔφρονες ἴλαι in 38 and thinks that "this vindication of the *logos* extends directly to the poet and his praise of the victor . . .", and on 410 we hear that "The poet . . . can bestow *logoi* or *hymnoi* which are analogous to the Muses' song for Peleus." The most recent advocate of Mommsen's interpretation seems to be Stoneman (below, n. 11, 195).

[10] Nemea Pindari latino carmine reddita per Nicolaum Sudorium inquisitionum praesidem (Lutetiae 1582). In his commentary Le Sueur remains silent on *solus* (his translation is best

In his 1890 edition of the *Nemean* odes Bury remains silent about καί but takes κεῖνοι to refer to the eagles in 21, interpreting them in turn as symbols of the Aeacids since αἰετός resembles Αἰακός (which is perhaps taking Pindar's pun on Αἴας and αἰετός in I. 6.53 a bit too far).[11] The only other "eagle" interpretation I know of is that of Lonicer in the 16th century: "*Sed et ultra mare aquilae feruntur, quibus cum et pulcherrimus Musarum chorus prope Pelium haud imprudenter canit.*" This is explained, "*Aquilas et Musarum chorum una cum ipso Apolline circa Pelium canere adserit, in gratiam Pytheae . . .*", which makes this odd interpretation (singing eagles!) not very unlike Le Sueur's: they are both in some way supposed to refer to Pytheas' celebration.[12]

In his 1868 translation Paley presented a more viable alternative by pointing to the contrast between the sad fate of Phocus and the almost celestial bliss of Peleus. This interpretation gained wider favour when Farnell adopted it in his commentary (2.276): "'even to those heroes' (in spite of their exile and misfortune)."[13] Certainly there is an explicit contrast between the two episodes, but καὶ κείνοις is not part of it; if it were it would show Pindar in a very confused state, retracting in 22 the statement which he made in 19–21. Pindar may sometimes dwell on the inauspicious features of a myth, but when he says that he will start anew

found in the 1697 West–Welsted Oxford edition of Pindar). The Danish Royal Library owns a copy of Morel's 1558 Greek edition of Pindar heavily annotated by at least four early hands; one of them has added "nec (?) solus" under κἀκείνοις.

[11] This line too has frequently been misinterpreted (most recently by R. Stoneman in Class. Quart. NS 26 (1976) 188ff.; in his view κεῖνοι = αἰετοί = the addressee) but the scholia point to the correct explanation: leaving the unfortunate Phocus episode Pindar, like an eagle (as usual!), swoops over the boundless sea of myth to choose whatever subject he pleases (cf. P. 10.53–54, N. 3.26–27, and Page PMG 947a).

[12] Pindari poetae vetustissimi . . . Olympia etc. per Ioan. Lonicerum latinitate donata . . . (Tiguri 1560); I have not seen the 1535 and 1543 editions, but the original edition of 1528 contains no commentary, and the translation is slightly different (*prudenter* instead of *haud imprudenter*). Benedictus (below, n. 15) correctly dismissed both Lonicer and Aretius (below, n. 14), but Marin adopted Lonicer's eagle interpretation in his Les œuvres de Pindare etc. (Paris 1617) 320–21.

[13] In his 1972 translation G. S. Conway seems to favour this interpretation, translating καί as "yet". In his 1964 book on Pindar M. Bowra refers to this passage a couple of times but does not commit himself as regards καί (cf. his 1969 Penguin translation), although on 301 he does seem to favour the contrast interpretation. In a fairly recent study, The Structure of Pindar's *Nemean* 5 (Class. Philol. 66 [1971] 169ff.), J. Stern promises a discussion of "the meaning which it (*sc.* N. 5) apparently intends to convey" but despite his discussion of the passage he has nothing to say about the significance of καί; to judge from his emphasis on "the tonal contrast" between the two episodes (169) and his statement that Pindar only appears to turn to new themes in 19ff. (172) he too seems to favour the Paley–Farnell interpretation.

(cf. above, n. 3) and deliver praise he does so unconditionally and without looking back over his shoulder.[14]

If we are to understand this passage correctly we must try to view it as Pindar's audience did. To us the marriage of Peleus and Thetis is the occasion on which the "Apple of Discord" was thrown, the first in a chain of events which was to culminate in the Trojan war, but to Pindar's audience it had quite another significance. In 19 Pindar mentions three subjects of praise but in fact singles out only one of them, ὄλβος, as the theme for the central myth.[15] When Peleus was given Thetis as his wife the gods bestowed on him an honour beyond the hope of any mortal man; Poseidon became his γαμβρός (37) and he himself γαμβρὸς θεῶν (I. 6.25).[16] Moreover, the gods graced his wedding with their own presence, bringing many precious gifts, dining at his table, and predicting a glorious future for his family (see below). Peleus, a mere mortal, heard the Muses sing and Apollo play the lyre in his honour. In short, the good fortune that befell Peleus came to symbolise an almost unattainable bliss: his wedding is a favourite theme with Greek and Latin authors throughout antiquity. We can find it already in Homer and Hesiod, and Pindar himself returned to it in N. 4.65–69, "the ultimate Cadiz of Pindar's song", to quote Finley's words:[17]

[14] Other more far-fetched suggestions have won little or no support. In his Commentarii absolutissimi in Pindari Olympia etc., n. p. (Genevae?) 1587, Aretius suggests that "*Aeacidas ab amore in bonas Musas laudat*"; here the stress is on προφρων: since the Muses are dear to the Aeacids it is only natural that the Muses reciprocate by singing at Peleus' wedding. A similar view was also taken by Lonicer (above, n. 12) and by Neumann (Neander) in his Aristologia Pindarica graecolatina (Basileae 1556) 294–95. Yet another solution is suggested by Melanchthon's translation "*Libenter autem et ad Pelium montem canit chorus Musarum*" (Pindari Thebani lyricorum veterum principis Olympia etc. [Basileae 1558] 91). This may not be totally off the mark if it is meant to refer to a similar performance given by the Muses at another wedding; if so, Melanchthon may have been the first to suggest the correct explanation (see below). In her dissertation Pindar als geschichtschreibender Dichter (Tübingen 1967) 172, E. Wüst thinks that "καί gehört, nach Pindars freierer Handhabung der Wortstellung, zum Verbum."

[15] The first to appreciate the importance of ὄλβος was Benedictus in his edition of 1620, followed by L. Dissen (below, n. 24, 395) and F. Heimsoeth (Rhein. Mus. 5 (1847), 24–25); cf. Bundy (above, n. 3), 67.

[16] γαμβρός in N. 5.37 will only make sense as a proleptic predicative *pace* Farnell 2.277 *ad* 34.

[17] J. H. Finley, Pindar and Aeschylus (Cambridge, Mass. 1955) 106. For descriptions, brief or extensive, of the wedding of Peleus and Thetis see *Il.* 18.84–85, 24.60–63, schol. *Il.* 16.140, *Scutum* 201–06, Hes. fr. 211 (M–W), *Cypria* fr 2 (Kinkel), E. *IA* 707, 1036–79, A. fr. 350 (N) (= Pl. R. 2.383B), X. *Cyn.* 1.8, Isoc. *Evag.* 16, A. R. 4.805ff., Apollod. 3.168–70, Luc. *DMar.* 7(5), Men. Rh. 265, Q.S. 3.98ff., 4.50–54, 131–43, 5.73–79,

ἔγαμεν ὑψιθρόνων μίαν Νηρεΐδων.
66 εἶδεν δ' εὔκυκλον ἕδραν,
τὰν οὐρανοῦ βασιλῆες πόντου τ' ἐφεζόμενοι
68 δῶρα καὶ κράτος ἐξέφαναν ἐγ γένος αὐτῷ.
Γαδείρων τὸ πρὸς ζόφον οὐ περατόν·

It is perhaps difficult for modern man to experience what Pindar's audience must have felt when they heard the poet's description of Peleus' great blessings. Finley, one of the very few to have recognised these feelings, stresses that "No symbol is more central to the odes than that which follows of Peleus' attainment of the sea nymph Thetis" and he speaks of "the ineffable presence of the gods at the wedding, the sound of the ultimate music of Apollo and the Muses, the flash of gold, Pindar's most constant single mark for the divine."[18]

Coluth. 17–40, Tz. *ad Lyc.* 178. Sophocles seems to have adopted an earlier and different version of the marriage, ἄφθογγοι γάμοι; see schol. Pi. N. 3.35 (60), Pauly-Wissowa RE 19.1.285, and the appendix in Frazer's Loeb edition of Apollodorus. Latin authors: Cat. 64.298ff. (no Apollo and no Muses but Parcae), Stat. *Ach.* 1.193, 2.56, Hyginus 92.1, Dict. Cret. 6.7, Claud. (pref. to *Epithal. Hon.*), Sid. Ap. 10.1ff., 14.26ff. This motif also recurs in modern fiction; for example, in "The Guardian Scholar" (in Greece Untrodden, [Athens 1964]), A. J. B. Wace even makes his scholar-hero find the marriage certificate with all the gods as witnesses (not to speak of Achilles' letters home from school on Scyrus!). For modern scholarship see Pauly-Wissowa RE 19.1.284–302 (Lesky), W. H. Roscher, *Lex. Myth.* 3.1837–39 (*s. v.* Peleus), 5.787–88, 796 (*s. v.* Thetis), W. Mannhardt, Antike Wald- und Feldkulte (Berlin 1877) 51, M. A. Grant, Folktale and Hero-Tale Motifs in the Odes of Pindar (Lawrence 1967) 69–70, 91, 127 n. 50; for epithalamic topology see references in Reitzenstein (above, n. 8), 90ff. The best known representation in art is perhaps that on the François vase (cf. Roscher, 5.789–90); for a comprehensive list see B. Graef in Jb. dt. arch. Inst. 1 (1886), 200ff.

[18] Finley (above, n. 17), 48; cf. 58, 106, 208. Speaking of the symbolic value of song in his book on Pindar (1964) Bowra dwells on the "celestial rapture" and the "god-given and god-sustained gift of song", this song which "transcends time and place" (39), and he describes the celestial song in N. 5.22–25 as "the prototype of all high songs"; "Pindar knew that such occasions occur very seldom in the history of men, but he believed that even his own age shared something of their exaltation and grandeur, when gods and heroes were invisibly present" (40), and on 394 he observes that "Pindar sees a light shed by the gods on human success and happiness . . .". "Another characteristic of Pindar's treatment of early mythological times is his representation of a close relationship between gods and men, not so much in epiphanies or erotic adventures, as in exchange of hospitality on almost equal terms" (Grant, above, n. 17, 69). No wonder that to Pindar Peleus was a greater hero than Achilles (see Kaiser, above, n. 4, 44. n. 2). Ovid (*Met.* 11.217ff., cf. 266–68) speaks of Peleus' happy relationship with the gods, and this is also the point which Landor seems to stress in the conversation between Epicurus, Leontion, and Ternissa in his Imaginary Conversations of Greeks and Romans (London 1853) 271.

When Pindar refers to Peleus' marriage as an example of the supreme good fortune of the Aeacids he states that "also to them did the Muses sing." The question we must next ask is: on what other person did the Muses bestow this celestial reward? The answer is simple and was certainly known to Pindar's audience: the Muses also sang at the wedding of Cadmus and Harmonia. Cadmus, like Peleus a mortal man, married a goddess, the daughter of Ares and Aphrodite. Like Peleus Cadmus heard the Muses sing and Apollo play the lyre at his wedding – the theme of their song has been preserved by Theognis and other Greek authors[19] – and like Peleus Cadmus entertained the immortal gods at his table and received their numerous gifts. No wonder, then, that Peleus and Cadmus became the two outstanding models of blessings almost unattainable by men; and in Greek literature where it is a well established theme, the wedding of Cadmus is often described in the same terms as that of Peleus:[20]

> Τὸν δὲ γάμον τοῦτον πρῶτον δαῖσαι θεούς, καὶ Δήμητραν μὲν Ἰασίωνος ἐρασθεῖσαν τὸν καρπὸν τοῦ σίτου δωρήσασθαι, Ἑρμῆν δὲ λύραν, Ἀθηνᾶν δὲ τὸν διαβεβοημένον ὅρμον καὶ πέπλον καὶ αὐλούς, Ἠλέκτραν δὲ τὰ τῆς μεγάλης καλουμένης μητρὸς τῶν θεῶν ἱερὰ μετὰ κυμβάλων καὶ τυμπάνων καὶ τῶν ὀργιαζόντων· καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα μὲν κιθαρίσαι, τὰς δὲ Μούσας αὐλῆσαι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους θεοὺς εὐφημοῦντας συναυξῆσαι τὸν γάμον. (Diodorus Siculus 5.49)[21]

Still, if we need decisive proof that Pindar's καὶ κείνοις contains an allusion to Cadmus' blissful wedding we shall only have to turn to what he says in P. 3, probably composed a decade or so later than N. 5, in the celebrated

[19] Thgn. 15–18, E. *Ph.* 814, *Ba.* 881, 901, Pl. *Ly.* 216c.

[20] Pi. fr. 29, (30?), 32, *Dith.* 2.27f., E. *Ph.* 822 (cf. schol. 638), Hellanic. FGrHist 4 F 51 (= schol. *Il.* 2.494), Apollod. 3.25, Paus. 9.12.3 (cf. 3.18.12), Nonnus 5.100–20, 8.231–34. In *Met.* 3.131ff. Ovid stresses Cadmus' bliss in obtaining Ares and Aphrodite as parents of his bride. See also Roscher, *Lex. Myth.* 1.1830, 2.826, 831–32, Robert (above, n. 8), 101, 110 n. 1; for a list of marriages between mortals and gods in Pindar see Grant (above, n. 17), 162. The basic similarities in the marriages of Peleus and Cadmus were already noted by M. Neumann (Neander) in his Opus aureum et scholasticum (Lipsiae 1577) 239–40. Another famous mythological marriage was that of Ceyx (*Scutum* 476, Hes. fr. 263–68 (M–W), Bacch. fr. 4.21ff., Pl. *Smp.* 174b. [cf. Bury *ad loc.*], Ath. 5.178).

[21] Whoever may have been Diodorus' source we can at least establish that his πρῶτον is not contradicted by Pindar's καὶ κείνοις. Lesky (Pauly-Wissowa RE 19.1.299) maintains that we cannot decide the priority, whereas Wilamowitz (Pindaros 178) thought that Cadmus' wedding was copied from that of Peleus. Neither scholar seems to have considered Pindar's καὶ κείνοις and Diodorus' πρῶτον, two passages which tell us what the Greeks thought of this matter. Contrary to Lesky and Wilamowitz both Kaiser (above, n. 4, 36 n. 1) and Robert (above, n. 8, 70 n. 5 and 101) agree with Pindar and Diodorus.

passage once chosen by Matthew Arnold to demonstrate that "the grand style in simplicity is inimitable" (in "On Translating Homer"):

αἰὼν δ' ἀσφαλής
οὐκ ἔγεντ' οὔτ' Αἰακίδᾳ παρὰ Πηλεῖ
οὔτε παρ' ἀντιθέῳ Κάδμῳ· λέγονται μὰν βροτῶν
ὄλβον ὑπέρτατον οἳ σχεῖν, οἵτε καὶ χρυσαμπύκων
μελπομενᾶν ἐν ὄρει Μοισᾶν καὶ ἐν ἑπταπύλοις
ἄϊον Θήβαις, ὁπόθ' Ἁρμονίαν γᾶμεν βοῶπιν,
ὁ δὲ Νηρέος εὐβούλου Θέτιν παῖδα κλυτάν,
καὶ θεοὶ δαίσαντο παρ' ἀμφοτέροις,
καὶ Κρόνου παῖδας βασιλῆας ἴδον χρυ-
σέαις ἐν ἕδραις, ἔδνα τε
δέξαντο· (P. 3.86–95)

Again we encounter the same scene as in N. 5.22–25 and N. 4.65–68, and here Pindar spells out a lesson to be learned: neither Peleus nor Cadmus enjoyed an αἰὼν ἀσφαλής although they were more favoured by the gods than any other mortal man (βροτῶν / ὄλβον ὑπέρτατον οἳ σχεῖν).[22] And this is not the only passage to demonstrate that to Pindar Peleus and Cadmus represented supreme happiness; we shall find them linked together again, namely in Pindar's description of the island of the blessed and its inhabitants: Πηλεύς τε καὶ Κάδμος ἐν τοῖσιν ἀλέγονται (O. 2.78).[23]

To my mind there can be no doubt that καὶ κείνοις alludes to Cadmus' wedding. Pindar's own audience is unlikely to have missed the point since it calls for only an elementary knowledge of Greek mythology. Nevertheless this passage has been (and still is) almost universally misinterpreted. In fact, I have only been able to find three scholars who have correctly understood the meaning of Pindar's words: Dissen, followed by Fennell

[22] For the supreme good fortune of Peleus and Cadmus see Finley (above, n. 17), 48, 61, 91–92, 131–32; Finley correctly points to the symbolic value of the gold, the divine music, and the calm Olympian presences at these two weddings. The idea of mortals offering hospitality to the gods is particularly imbued with symbolic value in Pindar (P. 3.93 θεοὶ δαίσαντο παρ' ἀμφοτέροις, cf. N. 4.66–68); in O. 1 he states that Tantalus was uniquely honoured by the gods who dined at his table (37–39, 54–55). The alternative is to dine with the gods (N. 1.72); the gods may be present only spiritually at the feast as in O. 3.39–40 and I. 2.39.

[23] For Peleus and Cadmus in the island of the blessed see E. Rohde, Psyche (Tübingen 1907) 2.369 n. 2, and M. Ninck, Die Bedeutung des Wassers im Kult und Leben der Alten (Leipzig 1921) 125.

and Cerrato. They share a common fate, perhaps, of being rarely consulted by 20th century Pindarists – to our loss.[24]

[24] Dissen, despised (often with good reason) by later Pindarists, was the first to publish the correct explanation in his commentary to the *Nemeans* in Boeckh's edition (Leipzig 1821, 2.2.397), which he repeated in his own edition (Gotha 1830, 419). The three words "ut olim Cadmo" were sufficient to make his point (but in the *corrigenda* on 861 in Boeckh's edition he widens the scope and sees a reference not only to Cadmus' wedding but also to the actual celebration in Pytheas' honour, a view which he seems to have abandoned in his 1830 commentary). Ch. A. M. Fennell (The Nemean and Isthmian Odes [Cambridge 1883]) and L. Cerrato (Le odi [Torino 1934] 2nd. ed.) both depended on Dissen's commentary. It is surprising though that Farnell, who saw the link between N. 5.22 and P. 3.86ff., did not appreciate the reference hidden in καὶ κείνοις (2.276); the same is also true of Neumann (above, notes 14 and 20) and Heimsoeth (above, n. 15). In his discussion of N. 5.22ff. Wilamowitz (above, n. 8) does not comment on καὶ κείνοις, nor does he seem to be aware of the relationship between this passage and P. 3.86ff. (Pindaros 178). Bowra acknowledges this relationship but does not clearly state his opinion on καὶ κείνοις (above, n. 13). This also applies to Finley (above, notes 17–18), but his profound understanding of Pindaric poetry and his frequent linking of Peleus and Cadmus suggest that the allusion in καὶ κείνοις was obvious to him. I should perhaps add that I have not been able to see every extant commentary on Pindar; some of them are little known and hard to come by. In addition, many scholars are very vague about καὶ κείνοις. In fact, Dissen may not have been the first to suggest the correct explanation, since in his brief commentary (Pindari carmina et fragmenta [Göttingen 1773; 1798; Leipzig 1817]; cf. Huntingford 1814 and 1821) Heyne translates "etiam illis" and gives a reference to P. 3.86ff. See also Melanchthon's translation, above, n. 14.

FREDERICK T. GRIFFITHS

Poetry as *Pharmakon* in Theocritus' *Idyll* 2

"There is no other *pharmakon* for love, Nicias, neither unguent nor salve, but only the Muses," declares Theocritus (*Idyll* 11.1–2) as he introduces the lament of the amorous Cyclops for the uncooperative Galatea.[1] By its end Polyphemus will pronounce himself cured, though the reader may have his doubts. At least, as Theocritus observes to his medical friend, the poor creature fared better than if he had spent gold on doctors (80–81). Now, the cathartic powers of verse have surely received more earnest testimonials, especially when song is not only the cure, but even more conspicuously the major symptom and clearly a contributing cause of Polyphemus' amorous distraction.[2] Nicias (Σ *arg.*) seems to have caught this irony in replying that it is often love that makes πολλοὺς . . . τὸ πρὶν ἀμούσους into poets in the first place. The duplicity of song in both fostering and dispelling erotic affliction similarly moved Callimachus (Ep. 46 Pf.) to call Polyphemus' helpful discovery an ἐπῳδή, a beguilement or enchantment. Like λιμός, which he also recommends for love, it is a disease that can also serve as a remedy. Long before this Hellenistic fascination with homeopathic aesthetics, Helen in the *Odyssey* (4.230) commanded psychotropic *pharmaka* equally capable of better effects and worse.

What we see in *Idyll* 11, then, is a weak sort of wit befuddling itself with erotic commonplaces (19–71), then singing itself out of them as well (72–79). The poem adds little to our knowledge of the inner life of monsters; it does, however, say quite a bit about bad style and in particular about the barbarous tastelessness of some conventions of erotic poetry. Cyclopean verse, from meter to metaphor, has all the delicacy of Cyclopean hospitality and serves best to demonstrate how well certain

[1] Direct translation is quoted from A. S. F. Gow, Theocritus[2] (Cambridge 1952), vol. 1.

[2] On the century-long debate about this apparent contradiction, see especially H. Erbse, Dichtkunst und Medizin in Theokrits 11. Idyll, Mus. Helv. 22 (1965) 232–36; and, most recently, A. Barigazzi, Una presunta aporia nel c. 11 di Teocrito, Hermes 103 (1975) 179–88.

types of conceits (e.g. "would that I were a _____") fit in the man-eating jaws of a Polyphemus (54–55): "Alack that my mother bore me not with gills, that so I might have dived down to thee and kissed thy hand." It may generally be observed of poetry in the *Idylls* that it is a drug curing few problems that it has not in the first instance created.

With this thought in mind, we might consider a somewhat overlooked side of an acknowledged masterpiece, Theocritus' *Pharmaceutria*, in which a fledgling sorceress attempts to cast a spell over her faithless lover with *pharmaka* of a typically contradictory sort, some to attract him and, for vengeance, some to destroy him. The only *pharmakon* of real potency, however, turns out to be the catharsis of song itself as it operates on the singer: by the end Simaetha has found the strength to endure her πόθος (164). So much has been evident to many of the poem's admirers, who have generally ranked it next to the third book of Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica* as a triumph of psychological portraiture.[3] However, the other and more baleful side of the poetic *pharmakon*, that is, song as beguilement, enters the discussion almost not at all, nor does the possibility that *Idyll* 2 may address questions of taste as much as of personality. Yet newly emergent sensuality and a callow youth have led Simaetha nowhere that her taste for the glamorous illusions of poetry would not have predisposed her to go. Her progress toward self-recognition may be as much a matter of style as of emotion.

In all of the urban *Idylls*, the boundaries between social classes are marked by important distinctions of style. The Syracusan émigrées of *Idyll* 15 put on not only their best clothes to visit Arsinoe's Adonis festival, but also their most pretentious, often Homeric diction.[4] Equally comic is the Aeschinas of *Idyll* 14, who has aspired to elegance in giving country symposia, disastrously, and now memorializes lost love with the moustache, dishevelment, and tragic posturing that are the official "symptoms of love" in erotic verse.[5] He seeks a *pharmakon* for his distraction, which his clear-sighted friend Thyonicus suggests a man like Aeschinas might find in mercenary service for Ptolemy. Simaetha, for her part, rising from an urban milieu so low that the boundaries of slave and free are blurred, has

[3] Earlier work on Idyll 2 is surveyed by P. Henkel, Zu Theokrit, Id. II. VV. 38–42 (28–32), Serta Philologica Aenipontana, ed. R. Muth (Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft 7–8 [1962] 191–214. See most recently C. Segal, Simaetha and the Iynx (Theocritus, Idyll II), Quad. Urbin. di Cult. class. 15 (1973) 32–43.

[4] See R. Garson, An Aspect of Theocritean Humor, Class. Philol. 68 (1973) 296.

[5] Analyzed by J. Stern, Theocritus' Idyll 14, Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 16 (1975) 51–58.

aspired to a love with Delphis, one of the dandies of the palaestra, and to a lofty poetic style, which also sometimes eludes her. Like Aeschinas, she must learn to divest herself of affectation.

Simaetha knew the etiquette of sophisticated affairs well enough to get it half right. At the Artemis festival she first saw Delphis and at once contracted what are *almost* the correct symptoms (82):

χὠς ἴδον, ὡς ἐμάνην, ὥς μοι πυρὶ θυμὸς ἰάφθη.

Love at first sight, however, is properly the man's business, and Delphis when summoned had to make a point of pretending that it had already struck him. Consumed with passion, Simaetha next offered her Thestylis the kind of ambiguous instructions, heroically phrased, which invite ancillary connivance (95): "Find me some remedy for this sore complaint." But almost at once she abbreviated the erotic scenario by issuing to Delphis the frankest sort of invitation and thereby cheated both maid and seducer of the corrupting influence that is traditionally theirs. Even in reciprocating, Delphis took pains to insist that it was he who was taking the initiative and to act as if Simaetha was yet to be won over by his sweet words. He talked of the feminine resistance that adds savor to this sport (127–28), but Simaetha, missing the hint, offered none then nor three and four times a day thereafter. The interlude, of course, could not last. But, having failed to anticipate the actual duration of such liaisons, Simaetha has resisted admitting the obvious meaning of Delphis' eleven-day absence and is spurred to action on this evening only by a direct report of his toasting another love. Tonight she will bind him with spells and tomorrow confront him openly at the palaestra. One shudders to contemplate how Delphis in the presence of his elegant companions would react to the intrusion into the man's world not just of a woman, but of such as Simaetha. Her uncertain sense of style has also affected how she hears and uses the language of these sophisticated circles. When Delphis first addressed her ὦ γύναι (132), she naively assumed that he meant *his* wife (41); he obviously meant someone else's (137–38). Like Delphis, but much less gracefully, she affects a heightened diction, as for example when she describes her reaction to his first visit (106–10): she turned chiller than snow, perspired in the way that dew falls, whimpered like a sleeping baby, and grew stiff as a doll. At the start of that series, Simaetha is projecting herself into the world of Sappho or Apollonius Rhodius' Medea. But her abrupt descent to babies and dolls makes a poignant, though hardly noble reflection of her actual circumstances and disappointed hopes. Her diction is permeated with epic

and tragic usages, rather falteringly sustained, and sometimes with ill-controlled embellishments. She quotes herself almost as if she were a Homeric heroine (95–102): 'εἰ δ' ἄγε, θεστυλί . . .' ὣς ἐφάμαν. The message she was then despatching to Delphis lacks any claim to such dignity (101): Ἰσμαίθα τυ καλεῖ. She is, then, someone who has overreached herself. Though Delphis and Homer escape her grasp in very different sorts of ways, they reflect related failures of judgment.

Simaetha is not alone in her problem. The despairing lovers who dominate another eleven of the twenty-two authentic Idylls almost all show some sort of literary posturing. The goatherd of *Idyll* 3, for instance, imports a sophisticated urban convention, the παρακλαυσίθυρον, to his beloved's habitation, which, being a cave, cannot resist him with the requisite closed door. Theocritus at other times parodies and deflates the excesses of erotic poetry by pairing a dreamy-eyed lover with an *irrisor amoris,* as we have already seen in *Idyll* 14. The ardent young Bucaeus' hymn to the Pierian Muses in praise of charming Bombyca (with feet like knuckle-bones and a voice like a poppy) is answered in *Idyll* 10 by the staunch Milon's work song to Demeter, which far better fits the job of harvesting that lies before them. The mixture of the higher sort of style and the lower sort of setting characterizes *Idyll* 2 no less, though not to humorous effect. Nor do we feel the same sense of ironic detachment from Simaetha as from the other vain lovers. The crucial difference seems to be the degree of honesty with which she can finally confront her circumstances. She needs no wise counsellor or *irrisor amoris*; her own more practical side can ultimately fulfill those functions. It was, of course, her businesslike directness that led her to take some gauche shortcuts in following the protocols of love. But this same resourceful sense of self-preservation, necessary to someone making her way in the world alone, keeps her, nearly alone of heroines in such extremity, from pondering suicide.

As Simaetha approaches step by step to candid self-recognition she employs literary forms ranging from magic incantation to unstructured remembrance which successively demonstrate the various functions that words can serve. In her opening Incantation (17–63), they are used instrumentally, conveying not information, but a power that can bind and destroy. Their real effect, however, is to blind the user. For, having decided to act, to alter the situation rather than analyze it, Simaetha postpones accepting the painful certainty of Delphis' abandonment and the complicated problem of what she can now afford to feel about him. Instead

she directs potent spells toward both revenge and restitution without resolving the contradictoriness of her impulses. Against potential rivals she invokes the exemplum of ἐυπλοκάμω Ἀριάδνας (46; from the Homeric καλλιπλοκάμῳ Ἀριάδνῃ *Iliad* 18.592) without grasping how perfectly the parallel already fits herself. And her initial prayer for drugs no less potent than those of "Circe or Medea or golden-haired Perimede" (15–16) in itself reflects that half measure of cultivation that leads her to dabble so incautiously in black magic, as well as in sophisticated poetry and love. Perimede, it seems, may be but another name, here misremembered, for Medea (see Gow *ad loc*). In any case, these women are the most inauspicious sort of precedent to invoke. Though Simaetha hopes for a lasting union, she has failed to realize that the wheel, the ἴυγξ, which she spins to draw Delphis back, is, as Charles Segal has pointed out, a notorious symbol of seduction, betrayal, and ephemeral love. But having decided to act and being in the process of manipulating powerful words, Simaetha does not let herself be encumbered by uncertainties of motive or information.

When the maid has departed to deposit baleful tokens on Delphis' threshold, Simaetha changes her refrain from incantatory ("My magic wheel, draw to my house the man I love.") to something more oracular in tone ("Mark [φράζεο], Lady Moon, whence came my love.") and turns to a recital of her history. This Monody (64–135) aims not to conjure helpful deities, but to evoke past experience; its language is less instrumental than expressive. It is blame, not spells that she now projects on Delphis. Yet in her quest for self-justification Simaetha has not yet admitted the need for a new understanding of the situation. A new sense, however, inevitably emerges from her recollections: Delphis now walks through well-remembered scenes as a hypocrite (ὥστοργος 112). As she approaches the central troubling memory of the seduction, the increasing speed and urgency of her recitation finally break out of the restraining formality of the refrain, and Simaetha proceeds from song to unstructured Soliloquy (136–62). The narrative as it returns to the present time seems to bring Simaetha the painful certainty about Delphis' faithlessness that she has for eleven days avoided. Where in the Incantation she sought to change Delphis and in the Monody to inculpate him, here at last she strives only to recognize his motives clearly. No more is heard of the glamorous love poetry which masked an ugly situation nor of the foolish project of venturing into the palaestra to upbraid him. Forthrightness triumphs on all fronts: the Moon, having been ceremoniously invoked at the start as a

great deity (10–11), becomes a witness ("Mark, Lady Moon . . ."), then a confidante, addressed almost casually: φίλα . . . Σελάνα (142). Having devoted so much energy to ritual correctness at the outset, Simaetha ends by refusing to waste words on the matter (142). The turning point in the poem is her verbatim rehearsal of the lovely, perfidious words which Delphis first used to beguile her, his ἐπῳδή, as it were. Repeating, now with disbelief, these "fleurs de rhétorique galante" (Legrand) allows Simaetha not only to exorcise the spell cast over her by Delphis, but to recognize her own susceptibility to such words (ἐγὼ . . . ἁ ταχυπειθής 138), as well as the honesty of her less elegant friends (154) and the necessity now for her to abandon the false and dangerous style that she has been absorbing from Delphis.[6] Throughout the poem, then, emotional clarity develops only in conjunction with verbal directness.

This linkage of issues raises some central questions about the symbolic nature of language and, in particular, about how emotions are shaped by patterns of analogy. The concrete sorts of connections operative in the sympathetic magic of the Incantation, for example, find exact correspondences in the metaphors of the Monody. Fire is initially a tangible means of manipulating the object of the spell (24–26): "As the bay-leaves crackle loud in the fire . . . so may the flesh of Delphis waste in the flame." By a different sort of analogy, fire is translated into the realm of metaphor in the Monody ("my hapless heart was aflame" 82). However, both of these forms of analogy promise a kind of help for the enflamed soul which they do not in fact provide: the one nurtures false hopes, while the latter simply glamorizes suffering. It is quite a different – and curative – step when Simaetha in the Soliloquy, despite all her touching need for euphemism (143), finally confronts the stark fact of the physical warmth of sexual contact (140–41). In the Soliloquy the memories that have now been extricated from the realm of dreams and poems are handled without literary embellishment. Spells, refrains, and even metaphors give way to the rehearsal of fact.

Most of the systems of imagery in the poem develop in a way similar to that of fire. In the Incantation, surrounding nature is perceived as communicating important messages from the gods: the howling dogs

[6] Simaetha's rhetoric apes that of Delphis not only in such things as fire imagery (D.: 131–34; S.: 40 and 82), epic flourishes (D.: 133–34; S.: 147–48), and the invocation of many gods at once (D.: 117, 120, 121, 130, 133, and 134; S.: 7, 10, 12, 33, and 55), but even, it would seem, in her unusual use of a split vocative expression (142) where he had split an oath (118).

announce Hecate's arrival (35–36). Likewise nature's concrete presence serves the process of self-definition (38–39): "Still is the sea, the breezes still; yet not still the torment in my breast." In the Monody that external nature has been translated into metaphor, as Simaetha describes the symptoms of love (106–7): "Chiller I turned than snow from head to foot, and from my brow, like damp dews, started the sweat." The Soliloquy lacks such images. Its landscape is the soul, which is not interpreted through metaphors, natural or otherwise.

Simaetha ends, as she began, with a summary of her plight (3–7 and 157–58): it has been eleven days since she has seen Delphis; his mind must be elsewhere. Yet her phrasing has changed in an important way. At the outset, she is essentially just stringing together the lovely formulae of the tormented lover. Delphis is still "my cruel sweet lover" (3-Cholmeley). Such are the painful, but beautiful vagaries of Love (6–7):

ἦ ῥά οἱ ἀλλᾷ
ᾤχετ' ἔχων ὅ τ' Ἔρως ταχινὰς φρένας ἄ τ' Ἀφροδίτα.

Simaetha's ornate phrasing effectively veils the one fatal possibility: that Delphis means not to torment, but simply to replace her. This, in perfectly candid terms, is her single thought at the end (158):

ἦ ῥ' οὐκ ἄλλο τι τερπνὸν ἔχει, ἁμῶν δὲ λέλασται;

Simaetha's hopes, though not altogether abandoned, are much attentuated and her vindictiveness comparatively hardened by the end. Above all she realizes that she must continue to bear her πόθος (once love [143], now longing [164]) as she has borne it till now. In the last four lines she rises again to the tone of hymn, but with far better control than previously. She looks for a third time out into the world of nature, not as before for signs of assent from the gods or for analogies to describe the self, but for consolation in the beautiful and orderly movements of the night sky. At the outset it was the jeunesse dorée that she found "dazzling": Delphis was λιπαρόχρων (102); even the palaestra was λιπαρᾶς (51).[7] But where Delphis' breast shone bright as the moon (79), now Simaetha reverses the comparison in bidding adieu to Σελαναία λιπαρόχροε (codd. 165; λιπαρόθρονε pap. Ant.). Though Simaetha is venturing again into somewhat heightened poetic usages, she is no longer applying them to her own

[7] On the subjective use of the word here, see G. Fabiano, Fluctuation in Theocritus' Style, Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 12 (1971) 523.

experiences. She is, rather, finding momentary release by projecting her sensuality into a removed aesthetic realm.

Now at the last she happens upon an image which justly and constructively figures her inner state and new sense of resignation: in the serenity of εὐκάλοιο . . . Νυκτὸς (166). The analogy with nature holds, ironically, because for the first time she is not self-consciously applying it to herself. Similarly, it is her act of setting herself apart in her adieu to Lady Moon and the other spirits of nature that restores her harmony with nature. Out of the deflated hopes for the magic ritual, a *pharmakon* has in fact worked – not to bind Delphis, but to release Simaetha. And her words have exorcised no spell that such words did not in the first instance cast. Repeating and rejecting Delphis' ἐπῳδή is as crucial to her *pharmakon* as is burning the fringe of his cloak. To be sure, her passions are as real and strong as those of any of the traditional heroines. Yet it would be wrong to assume that these emotions have been simplified in being reduced to the mundane realities of a suburban Medea. For here we have a heroine consciously emulating literary heroines (among them the original Medea), one that does not just join her ancestor Helen among the ἀνθρώποισι . . . ἀοίδιμοι ἐσσομένοισι (*Iliad* 6.358), but also serves as a reflection of that audience for poetry. In reading *Idyll* 2 we should, therefore, always keep in mind how often the simple "life" of the *Idylls* turns out, on closer examination, to be that much less simple phenomenon of life imitating art.

MICHAEL W. HASLAM

O suitably-attired-in-leather-boots

Interpolations in Greek tragedy

I. Interpolation

Bernard Knox knows as well as anyone that the texts of the tragedies that have come down to us have not come down unaltered in the course of time, and that one result of all that has happened to them is this: along with the authentic verses are transmitted inauthentic ones. Just how many, and which they are, not he nor I nor anyone will ever know. But the more we can learn of the history of the text, the better will be our guesses.

The medieval manuscripts themselves give ample evidence of the ability of extraneous verses to insinuate themselves into the text. I take two instances at random.[1] According to the manuscripts known as N and O, Sophocles' *Ajax* ends with the two verses

> ὁ κλεινὸς Αἴας τῶν Ἀχιλλείων ὅπλων
> χόλῳ βαρυνθεὶς Ἕκτορος θνήσκει ξίφει

which the rest of the manuscripts are without. In Aeschylus' *Persae* one manuscript (Nd) offers the sequence of verses (253f.)

> ὤμοι, κακὸν μὲν πρῶτον ἀγγέλλειν κακά,
> στέργει γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄγγελον κακῶν ἐπῶν·
> ὅμως δ' ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἀναπτύξαι πάθος

while in other manuscripts the second of these is written in the margin; the same verse is found in the manuscripts of Sophocles' *Antigone* as v. 277. When manuscripts are at variance with one another we know absolutely that something is amiss in at least part of the tradition, and in such cases as the above, despite my perhaps perversely noncomittal statements of the

[1] The information for each is drawn from R. D. Dawe's collations. Poorly attested interpolations tend not to be reported in the critical editions (cf. e.g. Eur. *Or.* 108a, *Phoen.* 1380a, 1450a), whereas better attested ones are usually left in the text (bracketed or not); the procedure is somewhat arbitrary.

facts, interpolation is obvious.[2] In the *Ajax* a summatory couplet, irreproachable in itself, composed by someone whose motives we cannot hope to recover (originally to accompany a picture, perhaps?), has been attached to the end of the play,[3] and in the *Persae* a cross-reference to a line from the *Antigone* (for evidently it was as the equivalent of a note 'cf. Soph. *Ant.* 277' that the verse was first written in the margin) has been incorporated into the text. Both diagnosis and cure are as simple as can be. But what if our only manuscripts of Sophocles were N and O? or if our only manuscript of Aeschylus was Nd, and the *Antigone* not extant? The question is not entirely fatuous, for while those particular conditions do not obtain, analogous ones do.

When an interpolation is unevenly attested in the medieval manuscripts, that is to say it has not succeeded in infiltrating the entire tradition. But what if it *has* so succeeded? That is the problem we have to confront. Sometimes the difficulty is slight. When the manuscripts of the *Ajax*, along with several testimonia, give as successive lines (554f.) ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν γὰρ μηδὲν ἥδιστος βίος and τὸ μὴ φρονεῖν γὰρ κάρτ' ἀνώδυνον κακόν, it is fairly obvious that only one of them can be in place, and the absence of one of them from a quotation in Stobaeus tells us which in fact it is. In the manuscripts of Euripides' *Phoenissae* Creon's decree about the corpse of Polynices runs as follows (give or take a few *vv. ll.*):

> ὃς ἂν νεκρὸν τόνδ' ἢ καταστέφων ἁλῷ
> ἢ γῇ καλύπτων, θάνατον ἀνταλλάξεται.
> ἐᾶν δ' ἄκλαυτον, ἄταφον, οἰωνοῖς βοράν.

The last line is from Creon's decree as reported in Sophocles' *Antigone*, and has got into the text of the *Phoenissae* without even being brought into any grammatical relation with its context; no-one quarrels with its expulsion. But we cannot rely on always having such an easy time of it, much as we might wish it. It is sometimes said that interpolations tend to betray themselves – a doctrine which only shows how far man's capacity for faith surpasses his capacity for reason. It would be better said that interpolations that betray themselves betray themselves; any that don't, don't. The same loose thinking informs, and invalidates, a much-cited article which set out

[2] I use the term 'interpolation' to refer simply to the incorporation of alien matter into the text, without necessarily implying such intention on anyone's part. Cf. K. J. Dover, Illinois Class. Stud. 2 (1977) 136ff.

[3] I do not mean to imply the authenticity of the verses transmitted as the ending by the rest of the manuscripts. Even Jebb balked at 1417.

'to establish criteria by which the genuineness of such lines [i.e. lines occurring more than once within a single play] can be appraised.' One of its author's preliminary statements is, "When there is no evidence in MSS or scholia that would lead one to suspect a repeated verse, and when the context is in no way disturbed by the line, it is natural to assume that the line is genuine."[4] A comfortable attitude, no doubt, but an irresponsible one.

It is indeed fortunate that we are not quite confined to the medieval manuscripts for textual witnesses. Of the avenues of access to the text in antiquity the medieval manuscripts constitute certainly the broadest, but there are also scholia, citations, and actual remnants of ancient manuscripts, and while these other sources are available only for parts of the extant tragic corpus, we should seize with both hands the opportunity they offer; for they allow us, albeit in lamentably inadequate measure, to compare the text given by the medieval manuscripts with the text as it was current in antiquity. And one of the features of variance that we discover is this: there are lines in the medieval manuscripts which were not present in manuscripts in antiquity. Of the verses which the scholia expressly tell us were present in only some copies of the text (that is the text in about the first century A.D., perhaps, or somewhat earlier), all but one are in all our medieval manuscripts; but some of them are manifestly spurious, others are arguably so, and none is manifestly genuine, so that the natural supposition is that all of them are interpolations.[5] And there is an implication, that is all but impossible to resist: there must be *further* interpolations in the medieval manuscripts, on which we have no such scholiastic information. And the truth of this is borne out by the absence of certain verses from papyrus texts. Several such verses in the *Phoenissae*, as revealed by fragments of ancient manuscripts of that play, I have treated in Class. Quart. 26 (1976) 4–10, where I have termed them 'minus-verses' and argued that they are all of them interpolations in the tradition.[6] The extreme popularity of the *Phoenissae* throughout antiquity means both that we are unusually well off (that is, less badly off than usual) for evidence for the text and that interpolations may be unusually numerous (for in textual transmission it is the

[4] P. W. Harsh, Hermes 72 (1937) 436, 437. He goes on, 'It then remains to discover the artistic purpose, if any, . . .' Needless to say, the artistic purpose is duly discovered.

[5] For an excellent recent discussion see M. D. Reeve, Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 13 (1972) 252–55. Many if not all of these interpolations will be post-Alexandrian in origin, and few, I believe, histrionic.

[6] I could have added the absence from the 3rd-cent. B.C. P.Stras. inv. WG 307 not only of 1737–end but of 1372 (Σφιγγὸς ἀναφέρεις ὄνειδος).

rolling stone that gathers moss), but even our meagre evidence for other plays shows the same phenomenon, as the following instances will illustrate.

(1) Euripides *Bacchae* 1088ff. (messenger-speech):

ὃ δ' αὖθις ἐπεκέλευσεν· ὡς δ' ἐγνώρισαν
σαφῆ κελευσμὸν Βακχίου Κάδμου κόραι
ἦξαν πελείας ὠκύτητ' οὐχ ἥσσονες
ποδῶν ἔχουσαι συντόνοις δραμήμασι,
μήτηρ Ἀγαύη σύγγονοί θ' ὁμόσποροι
πᾶσαί τε βάκχαι· κτλ.

P. Oxy. XIX 2223, a manuscript of the 1st or 2nd cent. A. D., passes directly from 1090 to 1093. We have here not one but two interpolations. The papyrus' text is rightly defended by Dodds, q. v. Prior to the accession of the papyrus most editors had preferred to emend 1091 rather than to delete it, and 1092 was unsuspected.[7]

(2) *Andromache* 5ff. (soliloquy by Andromache). Except for a *v. l.* οὔτις (obviously secondary) in 6, the medieval manuscripts have

ζηλωτὸς ἔν γε τῷ πρὶν Ἀνδρομάχῃ χρόνῳ,
νῦν δ', εἴ τις ἄλλη, δυστυχεστάτη γυνή
ἐμοῦ πέφυκεν ἢ γενήσεταί ποτε,
ἥτις πόσιν μὲν Ἕκτορ' ἐξ Ἀχιλλέως
θανόντ' ἐσεῖδον, κτλ.

But P. Oxy. III 449, of the 3rd cent., is without v. 7. That the verse is an interpolation was in this case plain enough even before the evidence of the papyrus. Not only is the transmitted text nonsensical with v. 7, but there is a scholium *ad loc.* saying that "the actors" added it, misunderstanding δ' εἴ τις as δὴ τίς (and therefore also changing δυστυχεστάτη to the comparative? – the scholium does not seem to say quite what it should here). Whether or not we choose to believe the scholiast's explanation, the fact of interpolation is as clear as the cause of it (difficulty with the elliptical idiom εἴ τις ἄλλη) – abnormally clear, since the original version of the line whose corruption led to the interpolation has managed to survive the incorporation of the extra verse into the text.[8]

[7] Soph. *OT* 267f. (like Eur. *Phoen.* 291f. and *Andr.* 1075, for both of which there is external evidence) is no less spurious, I believe.

[8] Cf. M. D. Reeve, *art. cit.* (n. 5) 261, and K. J. Dover, *art. cit.* (n. 2) 150. R. Hamilton, Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 15 (1974) 398, finds it possible to say, 'It looks, then, as if v. 7

(3) *Medea* 1296ff. (Jason of Medea):

δεῖ γάρ νιν ἤτοι γῆς γε κρυφθῆναι κάτω,
ἢ πτηνὸν ἆραι σῶμ' ἐς αἰθέρος βάθος,
εἰ μὴ τυράννων δώμασιν δώσει δίκην·
πέποιθ' ἀποκτείνασα κοιράνους χθονὸς
ἀθῷος αὐτὴ τῶνδε φεύξεσθαι δόμων;
ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ αὐτῆς φροντίδ' ὡς τέκνων ἔχω· κτλ.

So all the medieval manuscripts. But a manuscript of the 2nd cent., P. Har. 38, is lacking 1300, an 'omission' (question-begging term!) which would undoubtedly have been attributed to scribal negligence if we did not happen to have a scholium offering as a paraphrase of 1296–99 δεῖ αὐτὴν ἢ καταταρταρωθῆναι ἢ ἀναπτῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πέποιθε μὴ δώσειν δίκην, which clearly implies the reading δώσειν δίκην | πέποιθ' κτλ. in 1298f.; and the papyrus, which in 1298 is broken off at δωμασι[, no doubt had δώσειν δίκην likewise. This is the text I think we should read. Once δώσειν became δώσει, πέποιθε was left stranded, and 1300 was concocted to supply a construction for it.[9]

Defenders of all these verses are to be found, but if internal evidence is not sufficient to condemn them, historical considerations weigh more heavily against them than has been generally allowed. Once the status of verses attested only unevenly (if at all) in antiquity is considered in the light of what we know of the history of the text, to suppose that they are original is to fly in the face of transmissional probability. I will not repeat the arguments here, but will simply reaffirm that in any tradition that does not

was in the text to begin with and that textual corruption led to the questioning of it.' (It is not clear what he believes the original text to have been.)

[9] εἰ μὴ . . . δώσειν πέποιθε (it hardly matters which verb μή is taken with) seems no more awkward than εἰ μὴ . . . δώσει. It is impossible to be quite sure about this; but if the absence of 1300 is a case of deliberate omission (as everyone seems to believe it is) it is as such unique, and those who believe in the line's authenticity would do better to attribute its omission to accident (homoeomeson αυτη? but the vertical alignment is not good), with consequent 'emendation' of δώσει to δώσειν *sensus causa*. But it is as well to remember that there is no evidence that the verse was in existence prior to its postulated omission. The rest of the scholia here are useless. There is a B-scholium ἀντὶ τοῦ φεύξεται ἀτιμώρητος· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει. The first part of this has been taken as implying a version of 1300 with φεύξεται; not necessarily; and even if so, that could represent a conflation of the original text (with δώσειν) with the interpolated. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει is taken by Schwartz as a gloss on 1301, but it is probably a note of textual discrepancy (cf. the frequently found annotation οὕτως ἦν, *'sic'*, in verification of a *lectio* checked by collation); whether it refers to φεύξεται or to the entire verse there is now no way of telling.

descend through a single line, cumulative acquisition is more to be expected than sustained loss.[10] The practice of collation, abundantly exemplified by the papyri, served both to rectify omissions and to spread additions.[11]

Aristophanes of Byzantium is credited with uncovering the interpolated φιλέοντι δὲ Μοῖσαι at Pind. *Ol.* 2.27, having observed the failure of responsion between strophe and antistrophe.[12] When an editor of a dramatic text is thus forced to acknowledge that his manuscripts are corrupt, and to attempt rectification, he has a choice: he can postulate an interpolation, or a lacuna. Here is how the OCT presents Eur. *Andr.* 1204–8 ~ 1217–21 and *Bac.* 519–22 ~ 537–41.

Πη.	ὦ φίλος,	Πη.	ἀμπτάμενα
	δόμον ἔλιπες ἔρημον,		φροῦδα πάντα, κεῖται
	ὤμοι μοι, ταλαίπωρον ἐμὲ		. . . . .
	γέροντ' ἄπαιδα νοσφίσας.		κόμπων μεταρσίων πρόσω.
Χο. –	. . . .	–	οἵαν οἵαν ὀργὰν
	Ἀχελῴου θύγατερ,		ἀναφαίνει χθόνιον
	πότνι' εὐπάρθενε Δίρκα,		γένος ἐκφύς τε δράκοντός
	σὺ γὰρ ἐν σαῖς ποτε παγαῖς		ποτε Πενθεύς, ὃν Ἐχίων
	τὸ Διὸς βρέφος ἔλαβες,		ἐφύτευσε χθόνιος,

That the choice of diagnosis, loss rather than accretion, is in these cases wrong is surely beyond question. As an editor Murray (unlike Jebb) was not especially reluctant to admit that the transmitted text is interpolated, yet he found the idea of stigmatising ὤμοι μοι ταλαίπωρον ἐμέ (an actor laying on the pathos) or οἵαν οἵαν ὀργάν (non-histrionic, to provide object for ἀναφαίνει after taking γένος as nominative? for doubled οἵαν cf. *Hec.* 175, same man?) so repugnant that he preferred to postulate deficiency in passages which, to put it no stronger, show no sign of being deficient.

[10] And, it may be added, than any kind of displacement. This goes not only for translocation (cf. M. D. Reeve, Gr. Rom & Byz. Stud. 14 [1973] 149 n. 9) but for extrusion of original verses by extraneous. Thus a suggestion such as Dawe's on Soph. *Aj.* 554b ('cave ne . . . 554b [an interpolated verse present in all the mss.] genuinum versum extruserit') or Harsh's on Eur. *Bac.* 716 (*art. cit.* [n. 4] 446 n. 3) is inherently unlikely.

[11] See Illinois Class. Stud. 3 (1978) 66 for the transmissionally different status of lacunae and interpolations. For the effective non-differentiation of scholiastic from diorthotic matter (which leads inevitably to textual assimilation of non-textual material) see K. J. Dover, *art. cit.* (n. 2) 139ff.

[12] Note that it was nonetheless left in the text, until Triclinius finally expelled it. Cf. n. 15.

Similarly, I think, at Sophocles' *Electra* 1243 ~ 1264. After the recognition Electra goes into lyric raptures, while Orestes, ineffectually damping, sticks to his stolid iambics. When in the antistrophe she still refuses to shut up, ἐπεί σε νῦν ἀφράστως | ἀέλπτως τ' ἐσεῖδον, Orestes answers (not crushingly, but not sympathetically either) τότ' εἶδες, εὖτε θεοί μ' ἐπώτρυναν μολεῖν (1264), which only moves his sister to yet higher transports of joy: ἔφρασας ὑπερτέραν | τᾶς πάρος ἔτι χάριτος, εἴ σε θεὸς ἐπόρισεν κτλ. It would have occurred to no-one to postulate a lacuna after Orestes' trimeter[13] were it not for the fact that at the corresponding point in the strophe he has two lines, not one:

ὅρα γε μὲν δὴ κἀν γυναιξὶν ὡς Ἄρης
ἔνεστιν· εὖ δ' ἔξοισθα πειραθεῖσά που. (1243f.)

Triclinius deleted the latter of these, while modern editors choose instead to put dots in the antistrophe. But was not Triclinius right? The duologue runs perfectly without the verse,[14] while at the same time the motive for its interpolation is obvious (cf. how expressions ending ἀλλ' ὅμως invariably attract a completing verse).

In ordinary tragic dialogue we do not have the control that responsion so conveniently provides, and detection of corruption usually has to proceed from less objective clues. A clear-cut choice, however, is offered when a verse is not attested by all the medieval manuscripts. Most often it is inadvertent omission that is responsible, in which case a mechanical explanation usually presents itself,[15] but occasionally we have to reckon with an interpolation that has not wholly permeated the tradition. Verses attested as poorly as the two lines superadded at the end of the *Ajax* in N and O fool nobody, but most interpolations, with the advantage no doubt of an earlier start, have infiltrated more widely – but not always as widely as *Aj.* 554b. At 811 (to stay with the *Ajax*) Tecmessa urges χωρῶμεν,

[13] 'Da der Gedanke vollständig ist, sind alle Ergänzungsversuche vergeblich', remarks Kaibel; yet he, like Kamerbeek and Dawe and so many others, does not question the assumption of loss.

[14] Jebb asserts that εὖ δ' ἔξοισθα κτλ. is necessary to trigger Electra's memory of her father's murder; as if 1243 were not enough for that. It is surely much better that she interrupt than that she should have to patiently await the completion of Orestes' laborious allusion before giving vent to her anguished cry of ὀτοτοτοῖ τοτοῖ.

[15] Homoeoteleuton or the like. Exceptions are few and far between, but naturally exist: notably Soph. *Ant.* 1167 (homoeomeson? 16 litt. ΧΟΝΗΓΟΥ, 17 litt. ΚΟΝΕΙΒΟΥ) and *OT* 800 (if genuine). I insist on 'inadvertent': deliberate deletion was not practised; *athetesis* (which did not effect removal) was available for verses considered spurious.

ἐγκονῶμεν, οὐχ ἕδρας ἀκμή, and the chorus respond (813) χωρεῖν ἕτοιμος, κτλ. Intervening in most of the manuscripts is a verse which appears in a curious variety of forms as the last line of Tecmessa's speech; the Parisinus, however, cod. A, is without it. The best and most recent text of the *Ajax*, R. D. Dawe's 1975 Teubner, prints this line as σώιζειν θέλοντες ἄνδρα γ' ὃς σπεύδηι θανεῖν (a form in which no manuscript presents it) and signals no doubt as to its authenticity. Yet more than one scholar has suspected it of being an interpolation; and if it is (as seems most unreasonable to doubt), its absence from A may be due not to omission but to sincere tradition.[16]

A failure to recognize interpolation in such favourable circumstances as all these does not inspire confidence that it will be recognized when they are less so. And the more we reflect on the acquisitive tendencies of the text and on the late and partial nature of even our most ancient sources, the gloomier the outlook becomes.

II. Extrapolation

If we assume the authenticity of every verse which we have no positive reason to doubt, we shall naturally entertain a high opinion of the purity of the text.[17] But the assumption would certainly be a false one. It should not take anyone very long to arrive at this point; a belief that every verse that is not demonstrably spurious is genuine is irrational, and bound to be mistaken. But how to respond to a situation in which we know there are spurious verses masquerading as genuine, but have no direct evidence as to which ones they may be? We can hardly pretend it does not matter. Many of them will be trivial enough, to be sure, but even a single line can make a material difference to the interpretation of the drama (at *Phoen.* 781 Eteocles lays claim to justice – but the line is spurious: to Eteocles justice is an irrelevance, and the added verse seriously muddies the moral issues

[16] Contrast e.g. *Aj.* 836, whose omission in A is attributable to homoeomeson, δ'ὁρώ(σας) beneath δ' ἀρω(γοὺς). While in this vicinity I take the opportunity of restricting my suspicion of 856–58 (Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 16 [1975] 165 n. 53) to 857: motivated by desire for verb, and διφρευτήν influenced by διφρηλατῶν 845. I believe the speech ends at 864.

[17] "If we assume the truth of every ingredient [of Thucydides' statements] which we have no positive reason to doubt, we shall naturally entertain a high opinion of Thucydides' accuracy," K. J. Dover, Greece and Rome, New Surveys in the Classics, No. 7 (Oxford 1973) 4.

Euripides is exploring) and even when it does not, is bound to affect the play as poetry. We could adopt an attitude of enlightened despair. That might be considered unassailable as a critical posture, but while certainly blanket suspicion is better than blanket faith, we do aspire to discrimination. But can we regard ourselves as licensed to damn whatever verses we may decide we do not like the look of? More respectably formulated, this is the course which we are in fact obliged to follow – if we can rescue it from the charge of arbitrariness.

With the *initium* of Euripides' *Phoenissae* (and of Sophocles' *Electra*) I have dealt at length elsewhere,[18] and if I refer to it again here it is in the cause of progress. The new evidence shows definitively that the transmitted vv. 1–2 are a spurious addition to the original opening, the transmitted v. 3. But before that evidence turned up a scholium had already given scholars cause to ask whether or not the shorter opening might be the original one, and favour had been unanimously accorded the longer opening, which was held to be characteristically Euripidean. The misjudgment may fairly be said to be symptomatic. We have to acknowledge not just that critical judgment is fallible, but that it has been biased. Caught in the circle that willy-nilly entraps the textual critic – for it is the texts themselves that supply the criteria by which we criticise them[19] – scholars have consistently mistaken a padded Euripides for Euripides *au naturel* (and may we not say the same of Sophocles?); their Stilgefühl has been perverted. We must revise our critical criteria accordingly. While in the end we will still depend on our Stilgefühl, we must bring it into truer alignment with the objective evidence that must inform it. It may or may not be fair to say that without the evidence of the papyri and the scholia suspicion of some of the verses which they reveal as spurious would have been unjustified,[20] but *with* that evidence, we are entitled, indeed obliged, to *extend* our suspicion to comparable verses elsewhere; we must extrapolate.

The epistemological problem remains deterrently large. Controls are so hard to come by, and no one who openmindedly applies himself to the

[18] Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 16 (1975) 149–74.

[19] This theoretically compromises Nauck's 'untrügliches Mittel', 'um zu lernen, was ein griechischer Tragiker schreiben konnte und was nicht', though no exception can be taken to his prescription, viz. 'anhaltendes und eindringliches Studium überhaupt der griechischen Poesie und speziell der griechischen Tragödie' (cf. G. Jachmann, Nachr. Göttingen, Phil.-hist. Kl., N. F. 1 [1934–36] 212); which jibes with Jebb's appeal to 'competent and sympathetic readers' (*OT* ed.^{3}, 1893, lix).

[20] Suspicion, surely not; but suspicion assured enough to act on, maybe.

text of the tragedians will underestimate the frailty of our subjective criteria. Still, some attempt to grasp the nettle must be made. What follows is a gesture, a feeble and pusillanimous one perhaps, towards that end. An obvious subject for scrutiny comprises apostrophes, which we know were liable to prefatory expansion; and I offer here, with a minimum of individual comment, a few Euripidean apostrophes which I venture to say there is no good reason to suppose Euripides ever wrote.

Medea 764 (Medea) [ὦ Ζεῦ Δίκη τε Ζηνὸς Ἡλίου τε φῶς,]
νῦν καλλίνικοι τῶν ἐμῶν ἐχθρῶν, φίλαι,
γενησόμεσθα κεἰς ὁδὸν βεβήκαμεν.

φίλαι clinches. Ἡλίου τε φῶς comes from 752 ('patch-work': cf. [785]/940/[943]). The triumphant initial νῦν is reminiscent of νῦν χρὴ μεθύσθην.

Medea 1121 (θεράπων) [ὦ δεινὸν ἔργον παρανόμως εἰργασμένη]
Μήδεια φεῦγε φεῦγε, κτλ.
παρανόμως τ' εἰργασμένον *v. l.*

Wretched (παρανόμως, forsooth), and dissipates the urgency.[21]

Hecuba 953 (Polymestor) [ὦ φίλτατ' ἀνδρῶν Πρίαμε, φιλτάτη δὲ σύ,]
Ἑκάβη, δακρύω σ' εἰσορῶν πόλιν τε σὴν
τήν τ' ἀρτίως θανοῦσαν ἔκγονον σέθεν.

Priam?! Imaginative, but hardly Euripidean. (Contrast *Hel.* 1220.)

Supplices 1034 (Iphis) [ὦ δυστάλαινα, δυστάλας δ' ἐγὼ γέρων,]?
ἥκω διπλοῦν πένθημ' ὁμαιμόνων ἔχων, κτλ.
δυστάλαιναι, δὶς τάλας Markland

Orestes 71 (Helen) [ὦ παῖ Κλυταιμνήστρας τε κἀγαμέμνονος]
παρθένε μακρὸν δὴ μῆκος Ἠλέκτρα χρόνου,[22]
πῶς ὦ τάλαινα σύ τε κασίγνητός τε σός κτλ.

Orestes 852 (Ἄγγελος) [ὦ τλῆμον, ὦ δύστηνε τοῦ στρατηλάτου]
Ἀγαμέμνονος παῖ, πότνι' Ἠλέκτρα, λόγους
ἄκουσον οὕς σοι δυστυχεῖς ἥκω φέρων.

Cf. Soph. *El. init.*

[21] B and O are without the verse: sincere tradition?

[22] In the indirect tradition 72 is quoted without 71 (Plut. *de ira cohib.* 454d, Et. Mag. s.v. Ἠλέκτρα), but this may be no more than negative evidence against 71. Cf. [663].

SYLWESTER DWORACKI

Atossa's Absence in the Final Scene of the Persae of Aeschylus

After the departure of Darius, the Queen hurries away to the palace for she wants to meet her son with new robes before he returns to the capital. However, Xerxes appears alone and in rags. The problem of Atossa's[1] absence in this scene of the Persae of Aeschylus is differently treated by various philologists; among others it is discussed by H. D. Broadhead (The Persae of Aeschylus [Cambridge 1960]). I mention here some of the views discussed by him. Already in the XIXth century some scholars (mainly H. Weil, followed by editors and translators) tried to solve the problem by transferring lines 527–31 (some of his followers take into account only lines 529–31) after line 851. This change should give, as Weil thought, a proper connection between the scene with Darius' ghost and the final scene. Other philologists who did not accept the change were of the opinion that Aeschylus did not introduce Atossa in the final scene because of technical reasons. And thus according to R. C. Flickinger (The Greek Theater and its Drama [Chicago 1930]) the playwright wanted the parts of Atossa and Xerxes, equally valued, to be played by the protagonist. On the contrary, W. S. Teuffel (p. 11) thinks that both parts were played by the deuteragonist. This sort of argument cannot be considered seriously in the case of the great playwright.

Broadhead himself (XXXIX, n. 1) takes the side of Wilamowitz (Aischylos. Interpretationen 46) according to whom there was no place for Atossa in the wholly lyric scene; above all she would not allow the despairing tone of it[2]. Let us mention also the strange view of N. Wecklein (Aeschyli fabulae [Berlin 1885] XIIf.). According to him Aeschylus could not show the tragic hero in rags, so Xerxes came in robes given him by his

[1] The name Atossa occurs in manuscripts in the list of persons, therefore some philologists do not use it; in this article it is used for practical reasons.

[2] Wilamowitz' view has been repeated and widened by B. Alexanderson, Darius in the Persians, Eranos 65 (1967) 6ff.

mother, but she herself remained behind due to exhaustion or came in the train of Xerxes as a mute.

After Broadhead's work Weil was criticized by R. D. Dawe[3]. According to him, the lines 529–31 together with lines 849–51 constitute a kind of brace, and at the same time they raise the state of tension and prepare for the appearance of Xerxes. They also bring together the mother and the son who do not meet in scenic action.

One of the latest books on Aeschylus is a monograph by O. Taplin[4]. The author goes beyond the frame of his book given in the subtitle and provides us with a penetrating and inspiring attempt at a new reading of Aeschylus. As to the absence of Atossa, he (92ff., and 119ff.) takes the view of Wilamowitz. Nevertheless, he would willingly transfer the lines 529–31 after line 851. However, Taplin is, as far as I know, the first who tries to explain how that conceivable change, which – as we see – makes the interpretation of the text more difficult, could have happened. And so, he suggests that the copyist while copying from sheets or tables could mistake the ending lines of the two acts. This suggestion is made very cautiously, for he is conscious that the matter is not so simple; however, he stresses the advantage of the change more than once. In fact, had lines 529–31 been preserved in manuscripts after line 851, nobody would have tried to change their order. Seeing, however, that the text we have from tradition serves the dramatic purpose well, it seems to me that the change of the order of lines though tempting is unnecessary and groundless, the more so because some changes in the text itself are needed (see Taplin 97). I also assume that the absence of Atossa in the final scene is the result of a conscious idea of Aeschylus, and not of a lack of art, nor of technical difficulties. This point must be firmly emphasized, for the Persae is the oldest preserved Greek play, and at the same time a fully developed work of art.

Now, let me bring forward my own view on Atossa's absence in the final scene of the Persae. I agree that one can speak of slight awkwardness in the elimination of the Queen (see Taplin 120), or of a non-typical elimination of a person which is unknown in other tragedies. I also agree that Atossa could not have participated in the final scene for it would have been inconsistent with dramatic assumptions. But we know all this for we look at the problem in the light of the final scene. Atossa leaves the stage

[3] The Collation and Investigation of Manuscripts of Aeschylus (Cambridge 1964) 309.

[4] The Stagecraft of Aeschylus. The Dramatic Use of Exits and Entrances in Greek Tragedy (Oxford 1977).

with a clear purpose. At that moment the audience does not know if she achieves it, so they can expect her return. It is only when Xerxes appears that the playwright's plan becomes apparent. Thus, if Atossa's absence is explained mainly with the help of this plan, we lose sight of her dramatic person, and we treat her almost as a messenger who leaves the stage having delivered his last words. Therefore, in my conviction, which I have arrived at after having analysed the content of the play, the absence of Atossa first of all indicates the inefficiency of her effort to ensure such a return for Xerxes which despite the present situation would be proper for her son and the ruler; that inefficiency becomes particularly clear when Xerxes comes alone, and in rags. Next, this situation gives the Chorus the courage to criticize him openly; timid symptoms of that criticism can be seen already before the news of the defeat is announced. The problem so formulated calls for a detailed analysis of the role of Atossa as well as of that of the Chorus.

At the beginning of the parodos the Elders, who form the Chorus of the play, speak of their care for the country. This function has been given to them by Xerxes on the account of their age. They are regularly called πιστά. However, that is all they say of themselves, and further lines show their anxiety about the results of the military expedition. The Persian army in human terms is invincible, unless a god sets a trap. The Chorus fears that the scream of despair caused by the defeat might be heard in the capital. The Elders worry about the soldiers, about their parents, and about their wives. First of all, however, they want to know if Xerxes is the winner, or the Greeks.

Thus, in the parodos the Elders introduce themselves as loyal to the King, and also, if not above all, as anxious about the whole society in the face of possible disaster. They understand not only the possibility of disaster, they also timidly suggest that it might be caused by the bridge spanning the Hellespont. Though the Elders do not say explicitly that the bridge must have been done at Xerxes' order still the mention of Hellespont, and shortly after it the remark of the trap of the god, is the first indication that the Elders are able to think critically of their King.

They also call Xerxes the θούριος ruler of Asia (line 73). But it is a common epithet of 'dashing', 'impetous' warriors (Broadhead, *ad loc.*). He is also called indirectly a god, when the Elders greet the Queen as θεοῦ μήτηρ (line 157), but with a significant remark: if the fortune of the Persian army has not been changed yet. Surely then Xerxes would not deserve the title θεός.

Atossa also comes with anxiety about the fate of the army, aroused by nightmares and ill omens. But above all she is concerned for her son who, in her dream, tore his robes. At the same time, she declares that if her son returns as the victor, he will be widely admired; but if he does not succeed, nobody will call him to account for the defeat, and he will stay in power. Thus the Queen turns back to the term θεός ambiguously used, or she guesses instinctively the feelings of the Elders, and therefore she wants to take precautions against any criticism of her son in case of a disaster.

It is remarkable that the Elders pass over Atossa's words in silence, neither do they try to remove her fears. They only suggest that she ask the gods to avert the possible misfortune, and that she bring a sacrifice for Darius' ghost. Lastly they express the hope that everything will finish well; they say what the Queen expects to hear.

The Chorus responds impetuously to the news of disaster. They do not ask the messenger any questions, and they only comment upon his words, while Atossa keeps silent for a long while[5]. When she finally breaks the silence she explains her behaviour as a result of the vastness of the disaster. But from this moment she takes the initiative on the stage. She reminds her listeners that men should submit to the decrees of gods, and then she asks the messenger about the size of defeat. But above all she wants to know the fate of her son, yet she does not ask the question directly because of her pose of dignity and restraint. When she hears that Xerxes is alive she can remain in this pose. Therefore, despite manifesting the pain she asks the messenger definite questions and allows him to answer them with full particulars. Thus she behaves unlike the Chorus, for the Elders break several times into the messenger's report which only now takes the form of a factual narration[6].

After the messenger's departure Atossa looks soberly at the present situation. She reminds the Chorus of the false interpretation of her dream.

[5] On her silence see Broadhead, comm. ad 290ff., and Taplin 86f.

[6] This scene is an example of a skilful connection between the dramatic technique and action; according to the technique of Aeschylus the person who appears for the first time turns usually to the chorus and not to the actor (See Taplin 86f.). The playwright creates lyric effects with the help of the chorus, and therefore the choruses are given characteristics which make that effects fully achieved. The Elders in the Persae are particularly concerned about the lot of the nation, hence they respond impetuously to the news of defeat. Of course, such news is very proper for creating lyric effects. At the same time, the Elders are given a try and they fail, for they are carried away by their feelings. Only the Queen knows how to keep cool, and she will talk with the messenger. So, for the present the Chorus is removed from the action between the two actors, and we do not hear of it again before the messenger leaves.

Nevertheless she will take their advise and will make a sacrifice to the gods. She also asks the Elders for a warm reception of her son in case he returns during her temporary absence. Thus, she thinks that Xerxes will come soon since the messenger has arrived. But we may also find a subjective explanation: Atossa shows the natural anxiety of a mother to see her son immediately, and only then will she be sure of his safe return. This brings her to believe that Xerxes will appear soon. Obviously, Atossa would like to be the first person who will meet her son in the capital, but the necessity of sacrifice may prevent her from this. Consequently, it is possible that the Elders will meet him first, and Atossa is not quite sure of their reaction. Therefore she asks them for warm-heartedness.

The Chorus itself confirms her apprehension in the next stasimon. The Elders do not refer to the words of the Queen at all. They turn to Zeus who hit the superb Persian army, and plunged the country in mourning. The strongest accent of the song is, however, the statement that Xerxes himself, whose name is repeated anaphorically three times, led the army to disaster[7]. For the sake of contrast, they remember the reign of Darius. Finally, they state that numerous nations of Asia have refused obedience to Persia.

Atossa returns without a chariot, however she still has her royal dignity. She asks the Chorus to call the ghost of Darius, while she herself will make a sacrifice. The Chorus responds immediately with the song which takes the form of a hymn in honour of Darius.

Darius' ghost, as had the messenger before, turns first to the Chorus. However, the Elders do not dare to look up (again a good excuse for removing the Chorus from the dialogue between two actors). Therefore the remaining conversation goes on between Darius and Atossa. The Elders find the courage to speak when Darius turns to them directly again, and recalls the time of his common and happy reign. Once again he turns to Atossa and orders her to go and meet their son with new robes and replace those torn in despair.

The Elders have blamed Xerxes a while ago, but now they keep silent in the presence of Darius, though they might feel encouraged by his words. They express indirectly their attitude towards Xerxes by honouring

[7] Broadhead, comm. ad 550–3, asserts that "up to this point the Chorus' references to Xerxes have been respectful, and even adultory; now they openly charge him with the destruction of fleet and army . . .". So he does not see any criticism in the early statements of the Chorus that have been discussed above.

slavishly the former ruler. Next Atossa takes care of her son, trying to excuse him before Darius and the Chorus. But she is mainly concerned with the news of his rags, for it confirms her dream and the words of the messenger. Hence after Darius' departure she goes for new robes for her son. She ends with the words addressed indirectly also to the Chorus:

οὐ γὰρ τὰ φίλτατ' ἐν κακοῖς προδώσομεν (851).

As a matter of fact, she may be sure that she will meet her son, since the order has been given by the ghost who *eo ipso* stands beyond human reality[8].

In the next stasimon as in the previous one, the Elders refer neither to Atossa's words and behaviour, nor to the news of Xerxes' robes. They recall again Darius reign and his military triumph in Greece, and finally they turn back to Xerxes and his defeat. However, the Chorus does not announce his arrival.

Xerxes appears in rags, lamenting. His knees bent at the sight of the Elders, he does not turn to them directly[9], and only the Elders start the dialogue. They greet Xerxes as the King of a great army, whose men, however, the god swept away. There is nothing of the tribute owed to a King in this greeting, neither have we any indication that the Elders prostrate themselves, as they did at the sight of Atossa, and, what they strongly emphasize, at the ghost of Darius. Now something opposite happens, for it is the King who bends his knees. Atossa was anxious that his return not increase his pain, and that was also the wish of Darius, but the Elders tell Xerxes that by way of greeting he gets their mournful song. Xerxes himself submits to the Elders and even stimulates them to cry. It results in a lyric dialogue in which the Chorus insistently asks about many notables, whereas Xerxes answers that they have perished. After that roll-call of the dead, if we can say so, the King indicates his personal misery: the torn finery, and the empty quiver. He also complains of the lack of a train (line 1036), and therefore he asks the Elders to accompany him home (line 1038). From this moment up to the end of the play Xerxes takes the lead in the action. He orders the Chorus to repeat rhythmically the mournful lamentations, then to beat their breasts, to tear their hair and beards,

[8] One could ask how Darius knows about the torn robes, having heard nothing about the defeat. Was then the prophecy (739ff.) so detailed? But such questions are rather out of place.

[9] I accept that Xerxes comes alone, and without train and chariot; the latter is accepted by Broadhead, comm. ad 1000–1. Taplin (121) expresses his view explicitly: "Xerxes was, in my opinion, in tattered finery, on foot, and by himself".

and to tear their vestments. The Elders fulfill these orders obediently, and lamenting leave the stage together with Xerxes.

Atossa has lost her race with time and is absent in the crucial point of action, although she has been involved in all the events preceding Xerxes' appearance. Being his mother she is anxious about his fate, and then she has to experience the news of his defeat. As a character in the play, she is conspicuous by her royal dignity, by her ability to overcome unguarded moments, and by taking the initiative when the Elders lose their heads. Finally, Atossa has her clear aim: she is anxious to ensure a proper return for Xerxes, and therefore she goes to meet him with new robes and words of comfort. The motif of Xerxes' robes recurs several times in the play, therefore his appearance in rags is very impressive. Thus, despite his mother's efforts, and, so to say, for tragic irony, Xerxes is alone, anyway. Moreover, he once again goes through the bitterness of defeat; he must also excuse himself and listen to the charges. Thus, in his own defeat, we see also the defeat of his mother. She will experience it soon but the audience does not see it, for the playwright leaves it to their imagination. Now, Xerxes is the most important figure: desperate, in rags, broken as many heroes in Greek Tragedy, and charged by the Chorus.

The Chorus oversteps the bounds of Xerxes' misfortune; the Elders assume towards him an attitude quite opposite to that expected by the Queen. In fact, Xerxes' behaviour encourages them to charge him with the total disaster of the Persian army. However, the Elders are expected to bring him consolation, the more so because they see their King in rags which means that Atossa has not managed to meet him. In spite of this, they take the opportunity to tell him the words of painful truth. The Elders have charged him already in plain words, but it was in stasimon and thereby without witnesses. So far, they have not had the courage to criticize Xerxes in the presence of Atossa and Darius, though the latter judged his son's conduct very severely. In such situations the Chorus in the Persae does not have the courage of the chorus in the Agamemnon, and rather prefers to keep silent. Therefore, when the words of charge are aimed at the author of disaster, their impact must have been particularly strong for the Athenian audiences. We may even say that they participate in a kind of trial in which the author of their recent sufferings is judged. However, that trial is not only meant to give the spectators the satisfaction of seeing the broken enemy, but also to induce them to reflection on human fate.

Had Aeschylus not introduced the Queen to the Persae, the final scene might have had the same course of events. Thus one could say that her

absence in it is of no particular importance. However, as I have tried to show, the point is that the playwright creates the situation in which Atossa's absence in the final scene adds more dramatic value; in other words, Atossa plays her role in it by means of her absence.

MARSH H. MCCALL

A Problem of Attribution at Aeschylus *Supplices* 1055: Stephanus' Source

At *Supplices* 1055 all modern editions print σὺ δὲ θέλγοις ἂν ἄθελκτον, and assign the verse variously to the chorus of Danaids, to a Danaid hemichorus, or to a chorus of maidservants.[1] The *app. crit.* to this verse of the two latest Oxford texts, Murray's second ed. (1955) and Page (1972), read respectively: θέλγειο *M*: *corr. Stephanus* and θέλγοιο Stephanus: -γειο *M*. The reliable *app.* of Weir Smyth's Loeb is similar: θέλγειο ἀνάθελκτον: *Stephanus*. Italie's *Index Aeschyleus* has as its first entry for θέλγω: Su 1055 θέλγοιο (Steph., -ειο M) ἂν ἄθελκτον. The emending hand of Stephanus seems apparent and uncomplicated.

Inspection of further apparatuses, however, produces a different picture. Tucker's *app.* reads, somewhat mysteriously: θέλγειο ἀναθέλκτον *M*. *Veterem correctionem commemorat Stephanus*; Friis Johansen's is more explicit: θέλγοιο ἂν ἄθελκτον *ut variam sed reiciendam lectionem affert Steph.*: θέλγειο (θέλειο *E*) ἀνάθελκτον *ME*; and Wecklein's *app.*, as often, is the most direct and informative of all: "γρ. θέλγοιο ἂν ἄθελκτον *quod non placet*" *Stephanus*: θέλγειο ἀνάθελκτον *M*. It now seems that Stephanus is *not* to receive credit for the emendation θέλγοιο and the orthographical correction ἂν ἄθελκτον.

At this point, given the divergence of editors' reports, one is compelled to inspect Stephanus (Henri Estienne) himself, who in 1557 printed in Geneva the edition of Aeschylus by Victorius (Piero Vettori). At the end of the edition he included about fifty pages of his own work, consisting of a series of comments on Aeschylean meters, a general address to the reader, a series of *observationes* on the poetic text, and a series of *observationes* on the scholia. The thirty-page section of *observationes* on the poetic text contains two pages on the *Supplices*. Stephanus comments on thirty-eight

[1] On the number of choruses in the play, see recently M. McCall, The Secondary Choruses in Aeschylus' *Supplices*, California Stud. in class. Ant. 9 (1976) 117–31; for a different view, O. Taplin, The Stagecraft of Aeschylus (Oxford 1977) 230–8.

words or phrases. As with his somewhat more copious comments on the other Aeschylean plays, so in the *Supplices* virtually all his *observationes* consist either of his own suggested emendations (introduced by such phrases as *omnino crediderim legendum, puto legendum, legendum mihi videtur*) or his reports of variant readings, that is variants on what is printed in Victorius' text. These number twenty-eight in all for the *Supplices*, and Stephanus' standard method of presentation is simply to give Victorius' reading as his lemma, then to state the variant with a prefatory $\bar{\gamma}\bar{\rho}^{\alpha\iota}$ (= γράφεται). Thus for v. 266 his *observatio* reads: Χρανθεῖσ' ἀνῆκε γαῖα μήνη καὶ δάκη $\bar{\gamma}\bar{\rho}^{\alpha\iota}$ μηνεῖται ἄκη. In three cases Stephanus introduces his report of the variant(s) not with $\bar{\gamma}\bar{\rho}^{\alpha\iota}$ but with a Latin phrase: *legitur et* (v. 23), *reperitur et* (v. 124), *in nonnullis exemplaribus* (v. 758). In most cases – eighteen out of the twenty-eight – he goes beyond mere reporting of the variant to make some comment. Such is the case, though with just the briefest of comments, for the entry to v. 1055, and Wecklein's report turns out to be close to exact: Σὺ δὲ θέλοισ ἂν ἀθέλητον $\bar{\gamma}\bar{\rho}^{\alpha\iota}$ Σὺ δὲ θέλγοισ ἂν ἄθελκτον. *quod non placet.* The variant, then, is stated not to be of Stephanus' own making but to have been culled from a source, a source which in this instance he proceeds immediately to disavow.

What were the sources which Stephanus, and for that matter Victorius, could draw upon for variant readings in the *Supplices*? Two categories present themselves: (1) earlier editions, (2) manuscript sources. Each category can be described with apparent exactness for the *Supplices*. Three printed editions preceded that of Victorius/Stephanus: Asulanus' Aldine (1518), Robortello (1552), and Turnebus (1552).[2] Precisely six manuscript sources exist for the poetic text of the *Supplices* (there are another four mss. which contain just the scholia): M (Laur. 32.9) and five apographa of M: Ma (S. Marc. 222), Mb (Bon. 2271), Mc (Guelf. 88), Me (Par. 2886), and Md or E (Scur. T. I. 15).[3] Scholia would form a third source, but none exists to v. 1055. Even this severely circumscribed list of sources is, in fact, too large for Victorius/Stephanus since there is no reason to think that in the *Supplices* more of the extant sources were consulted than the ms. M, the editions of Robortello and Turnebus, and perhaps to a limited degree

[2] The 1555 Latin translation by Sanravius is not an edition; it contains no Greek text and thus is not a possible source for variant readings.

[3] Details of description and dating may be found conveniently in A. Turyn, The Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Aeschylus (New York 1943) 17–26, and in H. Friis Johansen's edition of the *Supplices* (København 1970) 11–28.

the Aldine edition. But, assuming for the moment that *all* extant sources *were* consulted, one can assemble the following versions of v. 1055. M, Ma, Mb, and Robortello read σὺ δὲ θέλγεισ ἀνάθελκτον. Mc and Asulanus read σὺ δὲ θέλεισ ἀναθέλητον. Me and Md(E) read σὺ δὲ θέλεισ ἀνάθελκτον. Turnebus and, as already seen, Victorius read σὺ δὲ θέλοισ ἂν ἀθέλητον. There is, suddenly, an impasse. On what basis has Stephanus entered at v. 1055 a γράφεται variant that is attested in not a single one of his sources?

Three possible solutions require attention. The first is the most obvious: we simply no longer know of at least one additional ms. of the *Supplices* which Stephanus did know and which he used as his source at least on this single occasion. 'Additional, now lost, ms. source' is a phrase which can solve a multitude of textual problems; it represents an approach firmly in favor today when few manuscript traditions are being analyzed as simple; and it is a solution which is indeed properly invoked in a great many cases. I do not think, however, that it can be invoked for the *Supplices*, and thus for Stephanus' γράφεται variant. It is my conviction that there existed in 1557 exactly the same number of mss. of the *Supplices* as now exist. While absolute proof of this is impossible, strong, and in my view totally sufficient, negative proof can be adduced. There are three other cases in which modern scholars have fallaciously hypothesized the necessary existence in the middle of the sixteenth century of now lost mss. of the *Supplices*. The best known is H. Friis Johansen's assertion[4] that a *gemellus* of M was made at the same time as M (c. 1000), that the *gemellus* still existed in the sixteenth century, and that it served as the source for the Escorial ms. of the *Supplices*, Md(E), which was written in the 1540's. Friis Johansen's thesis, though not accepted in Page's OCT of Aeschylus, has commanded general approval in reviews and other notices.[5] There is, nevertheless, massive and overwhelming evidence against it: to cite just one piece of evidence, there are more than forty instances in which errors in E can have arisen only from the particular and misleading appearance of the corresponding letters in M.[6] The traditional view of the Escorial ms., that it is a copy of M and M alone, is a certainty.

[4] Presented both in the introduction to his edition (see previous note) and in an important preliminary article, Codex Scurialensis T. I. 15 and the Transmission of Aeschylus' *Suppliants*, Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 9 (1968) 359–83.

[5] See, e.g., A. Lesky, Die Tragische Dichtung[3] (Göttingen 1972) 76, n. 17; R. D. Dawe, Gnomon 44 (1972) 121–3; A. F. Garvie, Class. Rev. 23 (1973) 21–2.

[6] M. McCall, The Manuscripts and Scholia of Aeschylus' *Supplices* (forthcoming).

Again, Ole Smith has conjectured as the main source of Robortello's edition of the *Supplices* scholia an apograph, now lost, of one of the extant mss. of the scholia, Mi (Par. 2070).[7] This supposedly lost apograph is, however, none other than a perfectly healthy surviving apograph of Mi, namely Ml (Vat. 1464).[8]

The third conjecture of a lost ms. of the *Supplices* is related to the second. Smith's thesis stipulates further that Robortello not only had a lost principal source for his edition of the scholia but a second source, similarly now lost, containing the poetic text as well as scholia of the *Supplices* (Ml contains just scholia).[9] Robortello did indeed make use of a second source for his scholia. However, it is not lost, not unknown, but is another of the extant apographa of M, namely Ma (S. Marc. 222), and this ms. can also be shown, on the basis of scores of correspondences in error, to be the principal source for Robortello's edition of the poetic text of the *Supplices*, which heretofore has been thought equally unidentifiable.[10] In sum, there is simply no reason to believe that any scribe or editor in the 1540's and 1550's was able to make use of a ms. of the *Supplices* that no longer exists. This first possible avenue of search for the source of Stephanus' γράφεται variant must be abandoned.

A second possibility needs less discussion. Written sources were not the only recourse for a sixteenth-century editor, since scholars of the day promulgated in their lectures emendations and conjectures which were remembered or orally transmitted, and subsequently used by editors. One particular instance of this might be thought to be of help here. Stephanus admired immensely and turned frequently to the 'oral' conjectures of Io. Auratus (Jean Dorat), a renowned scholar/lecturer who committed hardly any of his scholarship to print.[11] Perhaps θέλγοισ has been recorded by Stephanus – in this case with disapproval – from one of Auratus' lectures. The possibility must be dismissed immediately. Not only

[7] O. L. Smith, Random Remarks on the Scholia to Aeschylus' *Supplices*, Class. & Med. 28 (1967 [1970]) 75–85; Arsenios and Parisinus Graecus 2070, Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 12 (1971) 101–11.

[8] M. McCall, The Principal Source of Robortello's Edition of Scholia to Aeschylus' *Supplices*, Bull. of the Inst. of class. Stud. 22 (1975) 125–46.

[9] In the above article I expressed agreement with this second part of Smith's argument, but it was a mistake to do so.

[10] M. McCall, The Principal Source of Robortello's Edition of Aeschylus' *Supplices* (forthcoming); see M. Dopchie, L'humanisme italien et l'Agamemnon d'Eschyle, Bull. de l'Inst. hist. belge de Rome 37 (1966) 99–108, for some helpful comments on the problem.

[11] See R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship, vol. 3 (Oxford 1976) 102–7, for an eloquent presentation, with bibliography, of Auratus' career and influence.

does the prefatory γράφεται indicate beyond question that Stephanus refers to a *written* source but, in addition, when Auratus is used he is identified by name, and effusively. In Stephanus' edition of Greek 'epic' poets,[12] he comments on Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo* 31 with a long note which begins: *Quoties huius versus recordor, toties Ioannis Aurati recorder necesse est, qui cum in restituendis multis aliis poetarum locis sagacitatem suam ostendit, tum vero in hoc vel maximam. . . .* Again, his comment on [Theocritus] Εἰς νεκρὸν Ἄδωνιν 32 runs: *Nullum vidi cui non suspecta esset vox* κατεσίναζε, *cum qua ne versus quidem staret: sed qui emendaret, vidi adhuc neminem.* Audivi [my emphasis] *aliquando coniecturam quam ab Ioanne Aurato (doctissimo viro et in restituendis poetarum locis felicissimo) profectam esse puto,* Καί μευ σίναζε κραιτήρ, *de qua iudicent alii.* Stephanus clearly classifies an oral source as exactly that.

One is forced back to Stephanus' known, extant written sources. This is where the answer is to be found, and its discovery will bring a final surprise to the search. Of Stephanus' twenty-eight γράφεται variants, an immediate twenty-three are clearly reports of what is written in either M or Robortello or Turnebus. The remaining five turn out to be very close to, but not quite identical with, the reading of M (and three of the five cases are equally close to Robortello who reads in these cases precisely what M reads, but see below). They are: (1) v. 8, γρ φυλαξάνορα. M reads φυλαξάνοραν (also Robortello). (2) v. 296, γρ παλαγμάτων. M reads παλλαγμάτων (Robortello reads παλλακισμάτων). (3) v. 444, γρ γεμίζω. M reads γε μείζω (also Robortello). (4) v. 885, γρ βρετίοσα. γρ καὶ βρότιοσ. γρ καὶ βρέτειοσ. Turnebus reads βρετίοσα, M reads βροτιοσα, Robortello reads βρέτειοσ. (5) v. 1055 (as we have seen), γρ Σὺ δὲ θέλγοισ ἂν ἄθελκτον. M reads σὺ δὲ θέλγεισ ἀνάθελκτον (also Robortello).

What has occurred is a series of simple miscopyings. It is for this reason, quite aside from the fact that for two of the cases Robortello's reading is not relevant, that we should think of Stephanus' use of M rather than of Robortello. An editor is of course far more likely to miscopy a manuscript than another printed edition. The miscopyings will have proceeded as follows (in each case it will be seen that M's actual appearance abetted, in varying degrees, the error). (1) v. 8, Stephanus drops M's final letter, an error made easy by the way M looks: -ορ ων. (2) v. 296, Stephanus drops a λ, not hard to do when confronted by M's πα/\/q-.[13] (3) v. 444, Stephanus

[12] H. Stephanus, Poetae Graeci principes heroici carminis, et alii nonnulli (Geneva 1566).

[13] An alternative here could be that Stephanus consults the part of Robortello's preface

just turns M's γεμίζω into γεμίζω; ἐμπλήσασ further on in the verse and γεμίζοντοσ in M's scholium to the verse probably cause the misreading. (4) v. 885, Stephanus adds an accent, but again drops M's final letter, which looks like -ποσ, and prints βρότιοσ. (5) v. 1055, Stephanus again miscopies M's -ει- ligature, this time as -οι-. M looks like -γφσ ὰν ἀθ-, and Stephanus' 'erroneous' optative is almost guaranteed by his corresponding, at first presumably mental, articulation of M's ἀν ἀθ- as ἂν ἄθ-.

An amusing vignette has been added to the history of scholarship. Apparatuses like those of the OCTs turn out to be right after all. θέλγοισ *is*, in a sense, to be attributed plainly and simply to Stephanus, though for reasons which eluded Murray, Page, and others. Stephanus should have entered as his γράφεται variant M's θέλγεισ, but instead misread the ligature and the following word, and thereby created the true Aeschylean phrase, repudiating it even as he created it. Despite the disavowal, restoration of the correct reading at *Supplices* 1055 can be credited only to the lucky Stephanus.[14]

which contains a list of emendations made by him or by his friend Sophianus. There is an entry for v. 296 which reads: Rob. ἦρασ ταῦτα παλαγμάτων. παλλακισμάτων.

[14] A draft of this paper was improved by the criticisms and suggestions of K. R. Bradley, M. Griffith, and V. Stafford.

JØRGEN MEJER

Recognizing what when and why?

The Recognition Scene in Aeschylus' Choephori.

Modern scholarship generally seems embarrassed by the recognition scene in Aeschylus' *Choephori.* Either the scene is briskly mentioned and further discussion is avoided, or it is accepted that the recognition is utterly unrealistic, naive or what not.[1] Though it is not always directly expressed, the main reason for such a view seems to be the assumption that Euripides' version of the recognition in his *Electra* 509–84 is a severe criticism, if not an outright parody, of Aeschylus. Though Euripides' criticism may have been caused, not so much by the socalled absurdities of the Aeschylean version, as by the tragicomical character of his own play,[2] and though it cannot be ruled out that the parody is directed equally against Aeschylus *and* Stesichorus, there is little reason to deny that Euripides intended his version of this episode to be critical as well as comical. Yet, it may still pay to examine once more the points he is criticizing and their basis in Aeschylus' play. The more so since it is often overlooked that Sophocles' use of the signs of recognition in his *Electra* 871–939 is meaningless unless

[1] Cf. e.g. J. Ferguson, A Companion to Greek Tragedy (Austin 1972) 92; H. D. F. Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama (London 1956) 43 does not discuss the scene, though there is some discussion in his Greek Tragedy (London 1961³) 80ff. H. Lloyd Jones, Some Alleged Interpolations in Aeschylus' *Choephori* and Euripides' *Electra*, Class. Quart. NS 11, 171–84, does not discuss the purpose of the recognition scene in his otherwise excellent article, a definitive rejection of E. Fraenkel and others who have suggested that both the Aeschylean and the Euripidean recognition scenes suffer from interpolations. The present paper will not discuss the question of authenticity though it will, I hope, make a few contributions towards accepting the text as transmitted. Since a transposition of 201–04 to after 211 in the *Choe.* is of no importance to my argument, it will be sufficient here to refer to the latest discussion of the problem, O. Taplin, The Stage of Aeschylus (Oxford 1977) 337–38. – The most recent discussion of the Euripidean episode, G. W. Bond, Euripides' parody of Aeschylus, Hermathena 118 (1974) 1–14, has little bearing upon the scene in the *Choe.*

[2] Cf. B. M. W. Knox, Euripidean Comedy, in: The Rarer Action (New Brunswick 1971) 70–74.

he accepted at least part of the Aeschylean version as being possible and realistic – thus, Euripides' view was not unchallenged in his own time.[3]

Euripides' criticism of the lock as a sign of recognition (524–31) consists in Electra's objections that Orestes would never come bake secretly and that the similarity of the lock to Electra's hair is without significance. Now, Aeschylus seems to have anticipated both points: the chorus suggests that Orestes must have come back in secret and Electra doesn't object, 177–78, and as to the similarity, Electra does point to it twice, but obviously the main argument for assuming that the lock belonged to Orestes is that no one else possibly could have placed it on Agamemnon's grave, 172 and 183–200. Aeschylus, however, raises yet another objection, which was left out by Euripides, *viz.* that Orestes might have had someone else bring the lock from his exile.[4] Thus, Aeschylus seems to have been even more aware of the factual problems connected with the lock than Euripides. The reason why Electra in the end turns it down as evidence for Orestes' return is clearly connected with the emotional conversions Aeschylus has Electra go through.

Euripides' criticism of the footprints is as insignificant as that of the lock: the idea that the ground is too hard to receive imprints is his own invention and does not apply to Aeschylus – Euripides hints as much in 535 – and that the feet of brother and sister could not be of equal size is not a conclusive argument. In any case, Aeschylus must have anticipated objections to this sign since he has Electra mention not only Orestes' footprint but also Pylades': it is only in comparison with the other set of prints that Electra can find the similarity, whether of size or of other features, significant (though it is obvious to the spectators that Orestes and Pylades went to Agamemnon's grave together, there is no other reason why Aeschylus should have had Pylades come into the action at this point).[5]

[3] Cf. Fr. Solmsen, Electra and Orestes, Three Recognitions in Greek Tragedy, Med. Nederl. Akad. van Wet. (Amsterdam 1967) 22–24.

[4] Cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Das Opfer am Grabe (Berlin 1896) *ad loc.*

[5] Electra is not all 'disconcerted by the presence of footprints that are unlike hers . . .' – this is Lloyd Jones' paraphrase (*l. c.* in note 1, 173) of Conington's and others' view. The καὶ γάρ in 207 belongs to the class γάρ I (2) in Denniston's Greek Particles (Oxford 1954²) 108–09. The asyndeton in 209 is to be compared with the examples in Kühner-Gerth (Hannover 1890–1904) 2. 345 ε) – thus Verrall *ad locum* is right. Consequently, there is no need for a lacuna before or after 208. Wilamowitz in his 1896 edition followed Robert in eliminating 208: they argued that 207 must be taken to mean 2 imprints of 1 pair of feet, while 208 is a stupid addition by someone who took 207 to refer to imprints from 2 different persons. In his *ed. maior* of Aeschylus from 1914 Wilamowitz has given up this

Since Orestes steps forward right after Electra has mentioned this sign, there is no way of telling its force. If Aeschylus had been interested in creating a naturalistic drama it must have been as obvious to him as it is to us that Orestes – assuming that similar feet can be taken to indicate identical descent – could have proved his identity by comparing his feet to Electra, as he does with the lock in 229–30. But Aeschylus wanted yet another sign, the garment, which is, perhaps, even more severely criticized by Euripides than the first two signs (*El.* 539–44). When the old man suggests that she might recognize Orestes from the garment he was wearing when he was saved from death, Electra objects 1) that she was still young at the time, so young in fact that she did not weave (542), and 2) that Orestes, then a boy, could not still be wearing the same πέπλος (543–44). Apart from the fact that there is no indication that the garment mentioned in Aeschylus (231) was a πέπλος (a mantle would be more likely, cf. *Il.* 3. 125ff.),[6] Aeschylus stresses the *pattern* as the sign of recognition.

The last point of criticism is important, however, since it more clearly seems to provide an explanation why Euripides despite all the provisions made by Aeschylus misinterpreted the scene in the *Choe.* and made fun of his predecessor. Both Euripides and Sophocles assume that there was a considerable span of years between the rescue of Orestes by Electra and the old man, and his return to Argos: both authors stress the long sufferings of Electra and leave time enough for Clytaimnestra and Aegisthos to have children, cf. Eur. *El.* 1ff. and Soph. *El.* 185ff., 257ff., 585ff. There is not the slightest indication of this in Aeschylus. On the contrary, Aeschylus has Orestes recognize Electra the moment he sees her, 16–18, while in Euripides (*El.* 107ff.) and Sophocles (*El.* 1174ff.)[7] Orestes needs some information before he can recognize her. In the prologue to the *Choe.*, Orestes' dedication of the first lock of hair seems to be meant as a thanksgiving for growing up and reaching the age of ἔφηβος: since he dedicates it to the river Inachos it seems less likely that he had left Argos 11 or 12 years

idea and reverted to Hermann's lacuna. The dual forms in 207, however, are very emphatic and unless the text is accepted as transmitted, the elimination of 208 is perhaps a Gordian solution; the explanations of 207 and 209 remain the same.

[6] There is no reason to accept the suggestion of the *scholium ad locum*, that it is a παιδικὸν σπάργανον. Though Euripides *Ion* 1419 (cf. 1491) mentions signs of inexperienced weaving, the strokes of the batten in *Choe.* 232 need not signify more than the specific fabric of the garment, as in *Od.* 6. 105ff., cf. 234–35.

[7] Orestes' immediate assumption that the cry at 78–81 comes from Electra does not mean that he recognizes her, cf. Kaibel on 77–85.

old and lived abroad for a long period of time.[8] Nowhere in the *Choe.* is it indicated that Orestes was very young when he left Argos, nor that his leaving Argos was subsequent to the murder of Agamemnon. This is consistent with Clytaimnestra's statement in *Ag.* 877 that Orestes had been sent away to Strophius before Agamemnon's return. Though one may doubt her motives, there is no reason to doubt the facts which appear to be decisively different from Euripides' and Sophocles' versions (Eur. *El.* 14ff., 416; Soph. *El.* 601ff., 1130ff.). In fact, there are more signs that Aeschylus perceived the period from the murder of Agamemnon to the return of Orestes differently from his two successors as well as from his contemporary Pindar (cf. *Pyth.* 11. 17ff.): the question of Electra's marriage, which is so dominant in the two *Electras*, is not at all brought up by her in the *Choe.* In Sophocles (282ff.) Clytaimnestra has instituted a feast for Agamemnon of which there is no sign in Aeschylus, and while the Aeschylean Orestes disguised as a messenger wants to report to Orestes' *parents* (861) – assuming, apparently, that it is still possible *not* to know about Agamemnon's death – Sophocles has him call on Clytaimnestra *and* Aigisthus (666–67). Thus, there is strong evidence that Aeschylus did not consider the period between the two events nearly as long as the two later poets (or Homer, for that matter, cf. *Od.* 3. 305–06), at least did not stress it at all. Hereby, of course, the credibility of the three signs of recognition (*likeness* of hair and feet, *continued* use of the same garment) is enhanced.

There is, however, little point in trying to make out more exactly the period of time between the murder of Agamemnon and the return of Orestes in Aeschylus: while the other two tragedians are concerned with the personal aspects of the Orestes story and thus need a considerable amount of time to account for the sufferings of the two children, Aeschylus of course concentrates on the problems of family, revenge, and pollution and can move much more quickly through cosmic time.[9]

[8] The purpose, however, of offering a πλόκαμος θρεπτήριος is not quite clear. It was customary for young men to offer a lock of hair when reaching manhood, cf. Hesychius *s. v.* οἰνιστήρια, Athen. 494f, Theophr. *Char.* 21. 3 and Plut. *Thes.* 5. 1. (The hair offer at the Apaturia is disputable evidence since scholars disagree as to when the dedication occured, cf. L. Deubner, Attische Feste (Berlin 1932) 233–34, as against Busolt-Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde (München 1926) 960–61.) *Choe.* 6–7 is actually quoted by the scholiast to Pindar *Pyth.* 4. 145 as evidence for long hair of youth, along with *Il.* 23. 144. The latter quotation, as is clear from the context, has nothing to do with reaching manhood, but with the safe return of Achilleus; Pausanias 1. 37, 2 is another example of this custom. It is possible to interpret Orestes' sacrifice as due to his safe return though θρεπτήριος seems to support the former interpretation.

[9] Whatever the length of the dramatic/cosmic time, the actual intermission between the *Ag.*

It is the peculiar Aeschylean view of the story of the house of Atreus that is the real reason for this use of the recognition scene. He was no more obliged than the other two to follow 'the tradition' as embodied in e.g. Stesichorus' *Oresteia*, and since his Orestes identifies Electra immediately and Electra's attitude to him is evident from the exchange of words between Electra and the chorus (84–163), the recognition scene in the *Choe.* is totally superfluous unless it serves some other purpose. It should also be noticed that the Aeschylean Orestes reveals his identity as soon as he steps into the action again (212ff.) – that it takes 5 lines before he mentions his name is not due to his hesitations but to Electra's refusal to accept the situation. Fr. Solmsen has recently argued that the real function of this scene in the *Choe.* is to reveal something about Electra's psychology: "a patient analysis of what happens in this episode shows that after Electra's fervent prayer (vv. 124–51) her emotional condition has passed from the belief that the prayer had been answered through the stages and degrees of lessened confidence until she finds herself in the tantalizing uncertainty expressed in the lines (vv. 202f.) where she speaks of herself as 'stormtossed like sailors'. We may not in Aeschylus' other plays find an episode that in point of uncanny psychological perception could be compared with the emotional developments just studied."[10] But in a play which is not otherwise much concerned with psychological aspects it would be remarkable and bad poetic economy to have an episode the purpose of which is only psychological – and indeed there is more to the recognition scene than just psychology. Its main purpose, it seems to me, is to serve as a symbolical as well as real identification of the *family*.

The sequence of signs is not coincidental: while the first two signs are conventional signs of recognition of kinship,[11] the first raising the possibility of Orestes' presence, the second assuring it, the garment is neither the most indisputable nor the most convincing proof of Orestes' identity. But it serves as a unifying link between brother and sister, and the fact that the garment is a work of Electra's own hand is emphasized (231). This is in sharp contrast to what happens to Clytaimnestra's claim later in the play

and the *Choe.* is short – and this is dramatically important, cf. Taplin (*l.c.* in note 1) 333–34.

[10] Solmsen (*l.c.* in note 3) 7. It appears from the context that Solmsen himself is slightly uneasy about this 'uncanny psychological perception'. Though Solmsen's fine study is one of the very few modern discussions that attempts to make sense of the recognition scene it perhaps not uncharacteristic that his discussion of the purpose and function of the Aeschylean episode is by far the shortest of the three episodes he discusses.

[11] Cf. the reff. in Denniston's note to Eur. *El.* 520–84.

(896–98), that she took care of Orestes as a baby. There are no other indications elsewhere in this play that she has ever done anything for Orestes – and her claim here has already been disproved by the old nurse, 750ff. Surely, the garment is an emotional climax in the recognition and serves to tie Electra and Orestes together in a very special way. This singular relationship is also the subject of Electra's remark following the display of the garment, 235ff. Orestes is emphatically connected with his *father's* house twice, and then, alluding to the Iliad 6. 249f., Electra says that Orestes is to be her father, mother, and sister, besides being her brother and the only one to show her reverence.[12] The reference to Iphigeneia, the cruelly sacrificed sister, has puzzled some commentators since she is not otherwise mentioned in this play. The main reason for her appearance here is no doubt that she is/was part of the family. Orestes is a substitute for the two dead members of the family – and for their mother who, though still alive, is hereby removed from the family *qua* family. Her separation from the others is stressed in the next few lines when Orestes compares himself and Electra to the eagle's (= Agamemnon's) brood but represents Clytaimnestra as a viper. No doubt this image is a reflection of the spectacular and gloomy image in the beginning of the *Agam.* (109ff.), but poignancy is added to the image when it is also interpreted in terms of the family structure. This may cast light on the remarkable adjective ὁμόπτερος in 173 indicating the likeness of Orestes' hair to Electra's (cf. also the metaphor in 228).[13] That Orestes later in the play is represented by a viper is no argument against this interpretation since the latter expression only is indicative of the problematic role Orestes has been given in the sequence of events.

The function of the recognition scene as identifying the members of (and re-creating) the family also clearly points towards the final argument for the acquittal of Orestes in the *Eumenides*: however little we may like it, the priority of man over wife and mother and the restriction of blood relationship to the males is the basis for this decision by Athena, and the recognition scene is one way of preparing this view.[14]

[12] According to the interpretation here given there is no need to change the μόνος, 244, to μόνον, as done by e.g. Wilamowitz and Page.

[13] On the bird simile, cf. A. Lebeck, The Oresteia, A Study in Language and Structure (Cambridge 1971) 8–16 and R. Fagles and W. B. Stanford, Aeschylus The Oresteia (Penguin 1977) 69–70 and 309. On the serpent simile, cf. W. Whallon, The Serpent at the Breast, Trans. & Proc. of the American philol. Assoc. 89 (1958) 271–75. Clytaimnestra never seems to be associated with birds in the trilogy.

[14] Cf. M. Gagarin, Aeschylean Drama (Los Angeles 1976) 87–105. Notice also the emphatic σπέρματος 236 (cf. 204) and ὁμοσπόου 242.

If the above observations are correct, the recognition scene in the *Choephori* is far from embarrassing or dramatically weak. Each step has a point and is well tied up with the rest of the trilogy. Euripides' criticism is not due to a more naturalistic development of drama in the course of time, witness the *Electra* by Sophocles, but was caused by his misunderstanding or neglect of Aeschylus' concept of time in the *Oresteia*, and of the purpose of the trilogy as a whole.

OLIVER TAPLIN

Yielding to Forethought: Sophocles' Ajax

Bernard Knox's essay on the *Ajax* of Sophocles[1] is so well argued and so much the best recent contribution in English that his interpretation is in danger of becoming an orthodoxy. He would, I hope, be the first to agree that a standard doctrine on such an inexhaustible masterpiece would be a disturbing sign of decadent or stagnant times. I am about to propose a different way of relating Ajax's speech at lines 646–92 to the play as a whole; but I should make it clear at once that my position is confessedly far from invulnerable. For the moment I can see no way either to strengthen it or to combine it with our honorand's interpretation, and I offer it with all its imperfections in the hope that he and others may find the juxtaposition stimulating.

The foundation stone of Knox's argument is that Ajax must always be immutable, unapproachable, pitiless. Ajax seems to deny this himself in the so-called *Trugrede:* Knox evades the contradiction by claiming that Ajax's application of the sublime insights of the speech to himself are sarcastic and contemptuous. But working through Sophocles for indubitable instances of sarcasm one usually finds tell-tale indicators of tone, the verbal equivalents of inverted commas.[2] Far from this, Ajax applies his generalisations to

[1] Harvard Stud. in class. Philol. 65 (1961) 1–37: for all the differences it will be clear how much I owe to this outstanding essay. Fortunately constraints of space prevent me from compiling a list of all the works on *Ajax* since Welcker: D. A. Hester promises an article ('The Heroic Distemper'! See Proc. of the Cambridge philol. Soc. n. s. 23 (1977) 49 n. 38): this will no doubt contain an exhaustive bibliography. Some of the points in this essay are duplicated in a simplified form in my Greek Tragedy in Action (London and Berkeley 1978). I am most grateful to Mrs. P. Easterling and Mr. C. W. Macleod for their patient advice. They should not be taken to agree with my thesis (to put it mildly!).

[2] E.g. γε (J. D. Denniston, Greek Particles [Oxford 1954²] 128–9) or γέ τοι (Denniston 550f.), ἦ που . . . (Denniston 286), τὸ σόν . . . etc. (cf. Bruhn Anhang § 80), and certain uses of optatives and interrogatives. There is a useful catalogue of such passages in Schmid (and Stählin) Geschichte der griech. Literatur (München 1934) I. 2 492 n. 1. Admittedly far from all have a γε or similar marker, but the bitterness is quite clear from the context. In *Ajax* it is precisely this which is at issue.

himself in particular with a series of strong connectives, particularly κἀγὼ γάρ (650), τοιγάρ (666), ἡμεῖς δὲ ... ἐπίσταμαι γάρ (677–8). Another objection to this supposed tone of contempt is that, if it is so unmistakable, then how is it that the chorus and Tecmessa are misled by the speech? For even if Knox is right that all but the last few lines are spoken with no awareness of their presence,[3] they none the less hear it all. He also points to certain turns of phrase which he regards as intolerable in the mouth of a wholehearted Ajax; but this of course depends on a preconceived notion of the wholehearted Ajax. I shall argue for a rather different Ajax, and suggest how most, at least, of these phrases are congruent with him without recourse to sarcasm. In the last resort Knox depends on intuitive claims about Ajax's true, deep self, e.g. "the terms ... are rejected by his deepest instincts" (15), "the passion deep inside him" (16), "the sarcastic contempt of these lines is unmistakable" (17), "Ajax, with fierce sarcasm, rejects" (25).[4] And the detection of this tone rests in turn on the assumption that a Sophoclean hero must at all costs be unyielding.

The full argument for this is set out in masterly style in the first two chapters of *The Heroic Temper*, where the Sophoclean hero is characterized with a wealth of evidence as uncompromising, rigid, isolated and so forth. This may be true of Philoctetes or Oedipus,[5] but can there never in any way be any exceptions? We may turn to Homer rather than Sophocles at this point, since (to put it very roughly) *Ajax* deals with the Iliadic tension between humanity and 'the heroic code'. Achilles is the great tragic model (cf. *Heroic Temper* 50ff.). In the final book Achilles yields and pities and shares his deepest sentiments with the king of his enemies, the father of Hector. It is Hector who never flinches from his heroic calling despite the

[3] Knox 12–13. But I cannot see how the speech is any more a soliloquy than many others in Greek tragedy which include passages without vocatives. I suspect that, as often, it is a mistake to ask too precisely 'Who is this addressed to?'

[4] As in so much of the best modern criticism Reinhardt's book has been a vital inspiration. I quote from p. 24 of the new translation by Hazel and David Harvey (Oxford 1979 = p. 32–3 in the 3rd. ed., Frankfurt 1947) "... Ajax ... recognizes the world, but he refuses to fit into it, to submit to its ordinances, to follow the rule 'Know thyself'. Rather he sees in the world something alien and contrary to his nature, in which he could participate only if he were no longer Ajax ... in the words of Ajax a discord can be heard underneath the noble praise of the order of the world, an undertone of revulsion, almost of scorn of that wisdom which is the wisdom of this world ...".

[5] In *OC* at least. The ending of *OT* shows Oedipus – in my view – forced to yield to Creon; he cannot keep his former κράτος (see 1522–3) and has to stay in Thebes, separated from his daughters, instead of going at once into the exile he demands. And Philoctetes does yield in the end, of course.

contrary pleas of his dependants, above all at 22.25–130.[6] Achilles is repeatedly accused of being unyielding in book 9, yet he makes concessions to Phoenix and Ajax; he is called pitiless by Patroclus in book 16 (21ff.), yet he sends him out with the Myrmidons. He certainly is ruthless when he takes to the field in 20–22, but, as he explains so sublimely to Lycaon at 21.99–113, he is not his usual self. And this makes his yielding in book 24 all the more great. Apollo (39–54) and Hecuba (201–8) suppose that Achilles is impervious to αἰδώς and ἔλεος; but, rather, as Zeus says, οὔτε γάρ ἐστ' ἄφρων οὔτ' ἄσκοπος οὔτ' ἀλιτήμων, | ἀλλὰ μάλ' ἐνδυκέως ἱκέτεω πεφιδήσεται ἀνδρός (157–8). And when Priam comes, he feels for him, οἰκτίρων πολιόν τε κάρη πολιόν τε γένειον (516, as Hector did not, see 22.58ff., esp. 74).[7] The Iliadic Achilles is the heroic model, and he is at his greatest when he gives way and feels pity, even for his enemy. Oedipus in *OC* does not – and that is what makes *OC* such a distressing tragedy – but that does not mean that Ajax may not.

I am fully convinced (cf. Knox 12) that the speech at 646ff. must not be written off as wholly or even primarily a dramatic device to have Ajax by himself: that view does a philistine injustice to the magnificent poetry. But I also feel that this very poetry rebuffs the notion that Ajax's applications of it to himself are sarcastic; rather he should be presenting himself as a great exemplar of these universal truths. His new vision of the workings of change should explain how he really has come to pity his dependants and to yield before τιμαί. At the same time I am also fully convinced (cf. Knox 10–11) that throughout his speech Ajax still intends to kill himself. Not only is this proved by the event, it is the whole point of the scene from 333 to 595 – the lyric presentation of his ἀτιμία (348–429), the reasoned rhesis (430–80), the farewell to his son and bequest of his shield (545–95). There can be no doubt that Ajax is bent on suicide. But then it follows that when Ajax tells us about pity and change and yielding, we, the audience, know that he is *not* talking about his intention to kill himself. Tecmessa and the chorus, in their blindness, think that he is, since that is in the circumstances their chief preoccupation; but the audience should not share this error. We should know that he is thinking on a larger scale. So if Ajax is not talking about his intention to kill himself, what is he talking about? That is the enigma Sophocles poses in the *Trugrede*.[8]

[6] See especially W. Schadewaldt, Von Homers Welt und Werk[4] (Stuttgart 1965) 298ff., cf. R. Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad (Chicago 1975) passim esp. Ch. 4.

[7] See W. Burkert, Zum altgriechischen Mitleidsbegriff (Erlangen 1955) esp. 90–107.

[8] Cf. Knox p.1 'enigmatic lines', Jebb xxxv 'the kind of pleasure which is felt in guessing

Let us at this point step back and ask what would have been the consequences for Ajax and his dependants if he had *not* committed suicide, as Tecmessa and the chorus so fervently hope. Sophocles does not labour this question,[9] but he none the less subtly works in the answers. Ajax would have been stoned to death by the soldiery (see lines 227–30, 254, 408f., 440): he would have died utterly ἄτιμος, a προδότης, and as such his corpse would have been forbidden burial and his descendants rendered ἄτιμοι.[10] Ajax's dependants foresee perils enough following Ajax's suicide: if he had been stoned as a προδότης their lot would scarcely have been happier. Teucer foresees exile (1006ff.) and was even threatened with stoning also (721ff.). Tecmessa is liable to the fate of Andromache (see 393, 485ff., 944ff., cf. 201ff., 803ff., 876); the boy Eurysakes is also threatened with slavery, if not an end more like that of Astyanax (cf. 949ff., 988ff., 1175ff.). The chorus of loyal Salaminians may at best slink home in disgrace (245–50 cf. 137ff., 201ff., 1215f.); they may never get home (900ff.) and even be stoned with Ajax (251–5). None of these fears is fulfilled. Instead Ajax's deserved τιμή is restored, symbolised by his burial in an ἀείμνηστος τάφος (1166f.); and his dependants, who all take part in the funeral procession which ends the play, gain, through Ajax's rehabilitation, their σωτηρία. They benefit from his suicide: if he had not killed himself the result for them would have been disaster.[11]

Up until line 595 Ajax sees his death in solely self-regarding terms as the least of evils for a εὐγενής[12]. Alienated from the gods, he sees his death as a dark obliteration, a permanent conclusion. He is fixed on this, abrupt and unapproachable; it is not his ἦθος to change (594–5). This is the Ajax of Knox's interpretation. Yet when he re-emerges at 646 he says, in effect, that a new understanding of the workings of time has changed him. Just as the

a riddle' (mistakenly stigmatized as 'a banal and melancholy idea' at Yale class. Stud. 25 [1977] 55).

[9] Does *OT* raise the question of what would have been the consequences if Oedipus had stopped looking for the truth, as he is repeatedly begged to do? Is ignorance bliss (cf. *Trach* 459)? Aeschylus and Euripides argue the question at *Frogs* 1182–94!

[10] Cf. A. R. W. Harrison, The Law of Athens II (Oxford 1971) 59, and see esp. the decree on Antiphon and others preserved in Plut. *Mor* 833e–f. Attic law on προδοσία is not often given due consideration in discussion of *Antigone*; but see D. A. Hester Mnem 4. Ser. 24 (1971) 19–21 and 55.

[11] This fits with the reciprocity of protection later in the play: the survivors defend the corpse and the corpse protects them (see esp. 1171ff.).

[12] It is true that he makes provisions for his son (560ff.); but (quite apart from our doubts about Teucer's ability to protect the boy) Ajax sees him only as a continuation of himself.

general δεινός ὅρκος has a particular application to his oath to the Atreidai (cf. Knox 14–15), so περισκελεῖς φρένες alludes to his intractability in the previous scene, especially in its closing lines (κἀγὼ γάρ, ὃς τὰ δείν' ἐκαρτέρουν τότε . . . 'just now').[13] Now, assume, as proposed, that he is genuine in this and not sarcastic, and assume, as agreed, that he is not talking about his immutable determination to kill himself, I can only suggest that when he talks about himself we are to take him to be talking about the time *after his death*. He sees, that is – and this is my greatest departure from Knox – that his name and presence will not cease to exist the moment that he dies; that his corpse and his τιμή and his power to help or neglect his dependants, all at present at such a low ebb, will, instead of ending with his death, continue and indeed revive. He realises that the see-saw of human affairs, so memorably expressed by Athena at 131–2, may tip even after death, and that, since he is now down at his lowest, he can only go up. This is what he explicitly says in the last words of the speech – καὶ τάχ' ἂν μ' ἴσως | πύθοισθε, κεἰ νῦν δυστυχῶ, σεσωμένον. His hearers take him to mean the σωτηρία of staying alive, but he means both the σωτηρία of death and of the rehabilitation consequent on it.[14] This gives the speech vital links – literal and not only thematic – with the last 400 lines of the play.

I am not, of course, suggesting that Ajax foresees with any precision what will happen after his death. Though there may be no man ἢ προνούστερος | ἢ δρᾶν ἀμείνων . . . τὰ καίρια (Athena at 119–20), he is no seer.[15] I am suggesting rather that he understands in principle, as he did not before, that not even death will exempt him from the forces of time and change; and furthermore that he accepts that change, previously repulsive to him, may benefit him and those he cares for. These irresistible forces will enhance his heroic stature. His acceptance of this supplants his defiance, and he dies a greater man for the insight.

Let me briefly survey the speech in this light. (i) Ajax feels pity at the prospect of deserting his wife and child (652f.). The suicide remains fixed; but his attitude to it has softened, and he now sees that it will be the best thing for his wife and child as well. (ii) He will in future yield to the gods (666f. – τὸ λοιπόν continues after his death). Previously he assumed that

[13] Cf. ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ ἀρτίως (678). There is no need to reconstruct a separate scene with Tecmessa inside the tent, contra E. Fraenkel MH 24 (1967) 79f.

[14] M. Wigodsky Hermes 90 (1962) 154–8 comes close to this view.

[15] It is worth noting that Sophocles avoids any explicit reference to Odysseus in Ajax's last two speeches.

the gods hated him implacably (see 399f., 425f., 589f.): now he will see fit to spend most of his death speech in prayers, prayers which will be largely fulfilled before the end of the play. (iii) He will give way also to the Atreidai for they are rulers (667f.). Ajax's rehabilitation will actually depend on the permission of Agamemnon. To give way is not necessarily to forgive (the audience should not share the error of the chorus at 714f.). In the event Ajax's suicide will give Agamemnon yet another opportunity to behave hybristically on his way to his bad end (see esp. Teucer at 1385–92, cf. 853ff.[16]). (iv) For everything, however tough, gives way to τιμαί (669ff.). Not only does Ajax give way to superior forces by his death and its aftermath, but also Odysseus, and thence the other Greeks, give due acknowledgement to Ajax's τιμή.[17] (v) So Ajax will learn to σωφρονεῖν (677). σωφροσύνη is a positive virtue which takes will power; it is not the Greek for compromise or time-serving. By learning to σωφρονεῖν Ajax is learning not to be the kind of self-obsessed, inflexible fanatic which Knox insists that he must remain. And we do not forget Athena's words (132f.) τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας θεοὶ φιλοῦσι. (vi) Ajax sees at last that the shifts of friendship and enmity work both ways (678–83); the changes are not exclusively in the wrong direction, as they have been in his recent past. Odysseus will, of course, prove to be a φίλος after Ajax's death (see esp. 1377; 1399); and perhaps we are meant to notice how the enemy land of Troy provides him with an honourable tomb, and how the sword of Hector kills him cleanly.[18] (vii) Ajax must go ὅποι πορευτέον, and Tecmessa and the Salaminians must stay behind; but if all goes as he hopes then τάχ' ἄν μ' ἴσως πύθοισθε, κεἰ νῦν δυστυχῶ, σεσωμένον (684–92).

I have attempted to offer an account of the speech which has Ajax still intending to kill himself and yet also has him speaking wholeheartedly without deceit or sarcasm. He really has changed his attitude – though, of course, it makes no difference to his actions – he really does acknowledge that he, like everything else, must yield to time and change – even after death. This is insight without compromise, humanity without weakness. And he is a greater man for learning to pity and to σωφρονεῖν, just as Achilles is at the end of the *Iliad*. They are better, more admirable, than the inflexible Knoxian hero, more admirable perhaps and less repellent than

[16] No doubt 841–2 are seriously corrupt; but we should not be too quick to throw the lines out since a reference to Agamemnon's bad end would be apposite.

[17] Note also how in all the instances in 670–6 the drearer gives way to the more beneficial and bright; cf. M. Sicherl Yale class. Stud. 25 (1977) 87–8.

[18] Cf. my Greek Tragedy in Action 85–8.

Oedipus in *OC* who resists αἰδώς and ἔλεος and dooms his son, and with him his beloved Antigone.

I warned, however, that my interpretation was not flawless. What of ἐθηλύνθην in 651? It is hard not to admit a note of irony; but if it is conceded that Ajax's whole attitude to feminine sentiment has changed since the previous scene, then it might be maintained that this word, so much at odds with his previous stance, brings out the point. Even more problematic, at first sight, is μαθησόμεσθα δ' Ἀτρείδας σεβειν (667). 'Venerate' is too strong; it would cry out to be spoken sarcastically (cf. scholiast *ad loc.*). 'Revere' cannot be squared with the curses of the death speech; nor after his death is such a strong subjection called for to meet the necessity of Agamemnon's accession to the burial. All Ajax needs to say, on my interpretation of the speech, is that he will learn to 'heed' or 'give their due'; and nothing stronger than this is indicated by the ὑπεικτέον ... ὑπείκει of 668ff. On further consideration, however, we find that σέβειν may have a weaker, less awesome meaning when applied to worldly objects and rulers, and that instances are scattered throughout tragedy where 'be subject to' or 'pay due respect' is quite as strong a sense as the word will bear.[19] So Ajax's words *could* be taken at surface value without irony.

These unsettled problems need not prevent me from facing, finally, two traditional questions about the speech. First, if Ajax means what he says about yielding and means all along to kill himself, then why is so much of the speech ambiguous, so ambiguous that Tecmessa and the chorus quite mistake his intentions? I suggest that in order to show a long term insight into time and change Sophocles contrasts this with their short-sightedness. They can see no further than the immediate question of whether Ajax will kill himself – little good though it will do them if he does not. Ajax is leading the audience to look further, beyond his death; and it will not be until the end of the play that they see the full scope of his vision. The ambiguity – apart from its obvious dramaturgic utility[20] – serves to point

[19] The point of Soph. *Ant* 744–5 seems to hinge on the two levels of σέβειν: Haemon counters Creon's "wordly" use of the word with its more awesome religious sense. See also *Ant* 166, 730; Eur. *Andr* 914, 964, *Hkld* 25, *Her* 726; for comparable instances see Aesch. *Pers* 166, *Agam* 258, Aesch *Prom* 937; Soph. *OT* 700; Eur. *Med* 156, *El* 994. I am indebted to David Bain for making me aware of this weaker "mundane" sense of σέβειν. Before he pointed out I had been overwhelmed by LSJ and by Fraenkel's note on *Agam* 1612; and I had even considering emendation (but had come up with nothing more plausible than Ἀτρείδας ἐᾶν or Ἀτρειδῶν μέλειν or κλύειν).

[20] Much though I still admire Tycho von Wilamowitz's book it will be clear how fundamentally I depart from his inorganic, paratactic view of Sophocles.

up the extent of Ajax's insight: τίς προνούστερος? Moreover the speech is meant to be enigmatic, both because it would be bad drama for Ajax to foresee the future precisely, and because Sophocles wants to lead his audience into the recognition of the truth by means of the rest of the play. Again and again in the final scenes the mind is cast back to these vividly memorable and almost mantic lines, as we see them confirmed and exemplified by events.[21]

And second, does Ajax mean to deceive Tecmessa and the chorus? Achilles 'hates as the gates of Hades that man who hides one thing in his heart and says another' (*Iliad* 9. 312–3). Achilles may well have Odysseus and Agamemnon in mind,[22] but not Ajax. The Ajax of the *Iliad* and of Sophocles alike would surely be at one in this with Achilles (cf. Knox 11–12). I have argued that Ajax means all that he says, and that it is profoundly true, and is confirmed by the remainder of the play. Tecmessa and the chorus in their blindness mistake his meaning, but he does not positively deceive them. I suspect that critics have made too much of Tecmessa's response at 807–8 (ἔγνωκα γὰρ δὴ φωτὸς ἠπατημένη | καὶ τῆς παλαιᾶς χάριτος ἐκβεβλημένη, cf. the chorus at 909–14). She thinks she has been tricked, but that is because she does not see the significance of what Ajax has said about time and change. She does not see that the process goes on beyond his death.

Compared with Knox's interpretation mine may seem bland and even sentimental. But I do believe that in an important sense *Ajax* has a 'happy' ending, that σωτηρία is achieved by the characters we care about (in a way that it is not in *OC*, nor indeed in *OT* or *Ant* or *Trach*). Ajax is the most Iliadic of Greek tragedies, and it has affinities with the last book of the *Iliad*. Both Achilles and Ajax reach a profound consciousness of the human condition, of just how all things must yield and all men must suffer. Through their tragedies they both become ἀοίδιμοι ἐσσομένοισι; and they win their immortality ultimately, not so much for their great strength and deeds, as for their insight into life and death.

[21] Compare A. Lebeck, The Oresteia (Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington 1971).

[22] Achilles' overt reference is to his own reply to Odysseus, but we are surely meant to notice that Odysseus has just omitted after 299 four lines of Agamemnon's message (9. 158–61). Homer adds a brilliant touch when Achilles scorns Agamemnon with that very provocative word – βασιλεύτερος (392) – which Odysseus had omitted.

Pietro Pucci

On the 'Eye' and the 'Phallos' and Other Permutabilities, in *Oedipus Rex*

The tragic irony in the *Oedipus Rex* emerges in several forms, most often in the form of an ambiguity, when the expression (the "signifier") allows the audience to detect a different meaning ("signified") from that which is intended by the character. The texture of the language of this play is endlessly rich in suggesting such ambiguities; we all know the signifier Οἰδίπους that, besides denotating the name of the hero, unravels a rich and suggestive set of connections with signifieds as οἰδέω, οἶδα and πούς.[1] Yet the analysis of these inner echoes by which the language plays simultaneously at several, often contradictory, levels has not been exhaustive, especially as concerns rhetorical figures. My purpose here is to analyze three different figures of style and to show one suggestive and significant instance for each of them.

I begin with an example of hypallage, a figure of extraordinary significance because it takes for granted the permutability of the "signifieds."

At lines 1369ff. Oedipus tries to explain why he blinded himself and argues that in Hell he would have been unable to stand the sight of this father and mother while now he would not be able to look at his children. He makes this last point by means of a rhetorical question:

> Ἀλλ' ἡ τέκνων δῆτ' ὄψις ἦν ἐφίμερος,
> βλαστοῦσ' ὅπως ἔβλαστε, προσλεύσσειν ἐμοί;.
>
> ("Or was the sight of my children – being born as they have been born – a desired sight for me?)

This translation disregards the hypallage by which the phrase "being born as they have been born" is in reality referred to the ὄψις ("the sight"),

[1] See B. Knox, Oedipus at Thebes (New Haven 1957) 182ff. and n. 69 p. 268. The quotations are from the text of A. Dain and the translations are mine.

instead of the children. This odd wording then gives the following sense: "or was the sight of my children – which was born as it has been born – a desired sight for me?"

The verb βλαστάνω literally means "sprouting" of plants, and this meaning could be adopted here too, as the children are metaphorically "buds" or "sprouts." Yet Oedipus does not simply refer to their birth, to their coming to life; he points at the *way* of that birth (ὅπως ἔβλαστε) and he implies therefore his incestuous insemination of Jokaste from whom the children were born. As ὄψις, sight [of the children] becomes the subject of "was born" and of "the *way* it was born," it remains entangled with the sexual process. As a consequence, the incestuous conception of the children and Oedipus' "sight" or view of this incestuous conception and birth are made permutable by the hypallage.

The strangeness of this wording has indeed invited scholars to change the text (see Kamerbeek's commentary), but no editor – as far as I know – has accepted any correction. The hypallage then remains as a tenuous textual evidence for the underlying symbolic relationship between sight and the sexual act. This symbolic relationship is well known in antiquity, for instance in the equation of phallos and eye as W. Deonna, Le symbolisme de l'oeil (Paris 1965) 68ff. has shown.

Of course, this relationship has been emphasized by Freud in many instances and in particular in his interpretation of Oedipus' self-blinding as castration. But we do not need here to broach a discourse which would be difficult and long, because Freud also offered a different interpretation of Oedipus' self-blinding.

My second stylistical device is the 'anagram'. It is not the place here to underline the importance of this device, which attracted so deeply the fascinated attention of De Saussure. As Oedipus narrates to Jokaste his encounter with Laius on the famous crossroads, Oedipus' language becomes suggestive in sounds that refer to Οἰδίπους and to the words πατήρ, πατρός, etc. Notice ὁδοιπορῶν (801) and ὁ πρέσβυς (which is ambiguous at the level of the meaning, see *Phil.* 665), πρός (805), ἐκτρέποντα (806) that contains πατερ(α) and the sound "κτενο" (κτείνων?). More precisely in 807–8:

> . . . . καί μ' ὁ πρέσβυς ὡς ὁρᾷ,
> ὄχον παραστείχοντα

("and when the old man sees me passing by the chariot")

the word παραστείχοντα is a perfect anagram of πατέρα ἴσχοντα "keeping back the father." The "signified" of the anagram implies that as Laius keeps back Oedipus, so does the son.

Pure chance? Yes, if by "chance" we imply that the anagram did emerge *by itself*, with Sophocles not looking here for such an anagram. Many of them, however, in various forms, constellate the text (δεινό(ν) . . . ὄνειδ(ος), 1035, etc.) and make sense in the text by creating all sorts of emphases through the sounds; it is at this level that they are subtracted from the mere irrationality of chance and become part of the rules of the game that control the text. To emphasize such a festive aspect of the text (game, play, "jeu") is not particularly unsuitable to the place and the occasion of a "Festschrift."

My final rhetorical figure is the chiasmus. This rhetorical device has a tremendous force in general since its word order disrupts the parallelism that is constructed in accordance with its signifieds. As a consequence the chiasmus implies parallelism – and perhaps harmony – together with their reversal and their disjunction. In the *Oedipus Rex* we find chiasmus after chiasmus with an astonishing frequency, often with loaded significance. As an example, I quote 300–301:

> Ὦ πάντα νωμῶν Τειρεσία, διδακτά τε
> ἄρρητά τ' οὐράνιά τε καὶ χθονοστιβῆ

> ("O you Teiresias who observes everything, the teachable and the unfathomable and the heavenly and the earthly . . .")

Notice how the coordination unites tightly the four neuter adjectives: the signifieds for "human" ("teachable" and "earthly") and for "divine" ("unfathomable" and "heavenly") form an antithesis and an impressive block that is termed everything (πάντα). Yet the word order of the chiasmus disjoints and disrupts forever such a unity since the word order breaks the antithetical parallelism by putting the couple "unfathomable"/"heavenly" in the central position (β, β) and the couple "teachable"/"earthly" at the extreme, outward positions (α, β, β, α). The word order forces the divine and the unfathomable to be sandwiched between the teachable and "that which treads the earth," in a sequence that disjoints the antithesis. The divine and the unfathomable are in a standing by themselves surrounded by the human world. The disjunction between the two realms suggests that the divine world does not run parallel and analogous – at a higher level, for

instance – to the human one and that therefore the word of Teiresias belongs to either one or to the other, but not harmoniously to both.

As the lines belong to Oedipus they characterize also Oedipus. The chiastic disjunction of the antithetical parallelism puts the "teachable" and "that which treads the earth" at the beginning and at the end of the series. Such a beginning and end correspond to a certain deployment of the play, especially if one thinks of Oedipus' initial faith in his *techne* and of his fatal wanderings (rescue in his childhood, flight from Corinth, coming to Thebes) in order to escape a fatal "word" and to make himself invulnerable to that word.

By contrast, the chiastic sequence of the antithesis unites the divine and the unfathomable into a *contiguous* entity that is marked by speechlessness and immobility as contiguous qualities. The heavenly things have feet on air and do not walk (865–66), and are unrepeatable! How then is the word of Teiresias to be trusted as divine? How the word of Sophocles?

Such perfect chiasmuses are frequent and I mark here some memorable ones, 727, 933, 995–996.

These three notes have the purpose of showing the fecundity of a reading that both enlarges the surface of the text and opens up its texture. These effects question the traditional notion of the text, and indicate a different sense and perception of it.

MICHAEL C. STOKES

Sophocles, *Electra* 1087; Text and Context

Pearson's text of the stanza containing 1087 runs as follows:

οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ζῶν
κακῶς εὔκλειαν αἰσχῦναι θέλει
νώνυμος, ὦ παῖ παῖ,
ὡς καὶ σὺ πάγκλαυτον αἰ-
ῶνα κοινὸν εἵλου,
τὸ μὴ καλὸν καθοπλίσα-
σα δύο φέρειν ⟨ἐν⟩ ἑνὶ λόγῳ,
σοφά τ' ἀρίστα τε παῖς κεκλῆσθαι.

Editors have found only two basic ways out of the problems of καθοπλίσασα; misinterpretation on the lines of the Laurentian scholiast's καταπολεμήσασα or rejection of the MSS reading. Jebb indeed produced an argument to counter the objections from usage to the scholium[1]; but his argument contained but three parallels for the supposed variation in usage: one from Plutarch (Hellenistic prose!), one from a grammarian's citation, and only one fully Sophoclean. The last is "καταργυρόω is properly 'to (*sic*) plate with silver,' but Sophocles has ventured upon κατηργυρωμένος (Ant. 1077) in the sense of 'won by a bribe.'" This last parallel is not precisely parallel in the semantic development involved. Further reasons for rejecting such a semantic sleight-of-hand will emerge below.

It is not to the point to rehearse here the long list of emendations of καθοπλίσασα. I cannot start better than by quoting on them H. Lloyd-Jones, "καθοπλίσασα is unlikely to be wrong. It is an unusual word, and one not likely to have come in by a corruption; and though it does not occur elsewhere in tragedy, ἐξοπλίζειν is found at Aesch. *Supp.* 99, 683, 702."[2] Unfortunately, however, this argument failed to convince either

[1] Sophocles, Electra (ed. of 1894) 218f.
[2] Class. Quart. N.S. 4 (1954) 95.

J. C. Kamerbeek or R. D. Dawe.[3] Professor Lloyd-Jones himself proposed with finest ingenuity to emend τὸ μὴ καλόν to ἄκος καλόν. But before seeking a remedy so fine and yet so desperate (it reduced Kamerbeek to simple disbelief), and even before accepting J. H. Kells' less bold τὰ μὴ καλ' οὐ,[4] we may wish to look harder at the whole context.

First, within the ode itself. There are parallelisms of word and thought between one stanza and another which help to explain the MSS text of 1087. One notices at 1060f., 1081, and 1095 the clearly deliberate use of various parts of βλαστεῖν.[5] There is a verbal link, if not one of thought, between ἐπ' ἴσας τελοῦμεν (1062) and ἐξισοῦται (1072f.).[6] The conjunction of birds and men in the first stanza makes ἀηδών appropriate at 1077, not less because of the mythical metamorphosis mentioned at 107 and 147. The lightning of Zeus at 1063 foreshadows the climactic reference to Zeus at 1097. As the nightingale is πάνδυρτος (1077), so Electra, previously compared to the nightingale, chose a life πάγκλαυτον (1085). At 1081 no-one could be as εὔπατρις as Electra; at 1097 she wins the prize for piety toward the father-god Zeus in obedience to the greatest of laws, clearly those binding parents and children – though one hopes the audience did not recall Zeus' behaviour to *his* father. The end of the third stanza verbally foreshadows the end of the fourth: φέρειν (1088) ~ φερομέναν (1096), ἀρίστα (1089) ~ ἄριστα (1097). These points are important for us; there is in the MSS text a parallel between on the one hand the negative τὸ μὴ καλόν and the following positive expressions and on the other hand the negative οὐκ ἐν ἐσθλᾷ and the positive expressions of 1093ff. In view of all the other verbal parallels within this ode this one is much more likely to be deliberate than accidental, and to be due to

[3] J. C. Kamerbeek, The Plays of Sophocles, Commentaries V (The Electra) (Leiden 1974) 147 and R. D. Dawe, Sophocles, Tragoediae I (Leipzig 1975).

[4] Sophocles Electra, ed. J. H. Kells (Cambridge, England 1973). This suggestion received criticism from Lloyd-Jones in his review, Class. Rev. N.S. 25 (1975) 11: "οὐ before καθοπλίσασα gives a flat effect" – a criticism perhaps subjective, but I agree with it.

[5] βλαστεῖν is rightly called "a thematic word in this stasimon" by Kamerbeek at Mnemosyne 4. Ser. 25 (1972) 37.

[6] Editors normally nowadays think of φιλοτασίῳ διαίτᾳ at 1073f. as instrumental dative, "by friendly arbitration" or the like. This may be right; but the lines would be more pointed if τὰ δὲ πρὸς τέκνων διπλῆ φύλοπις οὐκέτ' ἐξισοῦται φιλοτασίῳ διαίτᾳ said something more like ". . . and on the part of his children their twofold strife is no longer equal to a loving mode of life (sc. that of parents and children as exemplified by the birds)". This would not only lend point to the repetition ἐπ' ἴσας . . . ἐξισοῦται, and successfully link the two stanzas; it would give a perfectly natural sense to the dative. But this suggestion is hardly provable and not to be pressed.

Sophocles than to a scribe. One should therefore emend τὸ μὴ καλόν only with the greatest reluctance.

The wider context in which the ode is set should cause reluctance also to do away with the morpheme -οπλ-. G. M. Kirkwood once drew attention to Sophocles' habit of reinforcing a scene by repetition of motifs from it in the chorus.[7] Our ode is a good example, and deserves analysis in the light of this technique, especially in view of τοιοῦτον θράσος . . . ὁπλίζῃ addressed at 995f. by Chrysothemis to Electra.

The chorus show at once their intention to comment on the previous scene. The description of the birds as φρονιμωτάτους (1058) is immediately relevant to Chrysothemis' last speech.[8] If, she says to Electra, you think you are wise, then be wise like this. Indeed throughout the scene Chrysothemis lays claim to wisdom and rebukes Electra for the lack of it. She claims it by implication at 890; at 992f. she accuses Electra of φρενῶν κακῶν; at 1038 and 1048 similar accusations are implicit. Electra (941) disclaims such unwisdom as to expect to raise the dead. Is Chrysothemis wholly right? Is Electra wholly without wisdom in her difference with her? With whatever degree of awareness the chorus imply negative answers to both questions. Why, they ask, do we not, like the wise birds, look after our parents and children?[9] For the dead Agamemnon the point is to remind him of his responsibilities to his living children. But the chorus mention a reciprocal relationship: the daughters would also be wise to imitate the birds in caring for their parent. The human situation is complicated by the mother's murder of the father; but Electra has refrained from suggesting directly the murder of Clytaemnestra, and the lesson from the birds is surely applied at 1066ff. to Agamemnon's obligation to help his children. The birds are wise to acknowledge, the human beings of the play would be foolish to ignore, the claims and responsibilities of parenthood. An alert audience could scarcely miss the echo of the repeated φρον- of 1056 in the φρον- of 1058.

This clue deserves following up; other ideas may be common to dialogue and chorus. At 945, for example, Electra says that without toil (πόνου . . . χωρίς) nothing succeeds; Chrysothemis agrees by implication. But she

[7] A Study of Sophoclean Drama (Ithaca, N. Y. 1958/71) 201ff. (stressing contrast more than reinforcement).

[8] Kaibel in his Leipzig commentary of 1896 already observed this.

[9] That both parents and children are reciprocally involved is the acceptable thesis of Kells (above n. 4) 180. C. P. Segal at Trans. Amer. philol. Assoc. 97 (1966) 488 well speaks on ἀφ' ὧν τε βλάστωσιν 1060f., of an "unstated but terrible ambiguity."

refuses at 992ff. Electra's urging at 986–7 συμπόνει πατρί, σύγκαμν' ἀδελφῷ. In this context should be read the chorus' remarks at 1063–5, printed above. The meaning of ἀπόνητος in two of its three appearances in the Lexicon is 'without toil', and here alone does it receive the gloss "without suffering" usually adopted here. Who is "not for long without trouble"? We mortals?[10] A nominal sentence in which the verb, if expressed, would be in the first person plural would be unusual, though by no means impossible. Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra?[11] But if the chorus are so sure of impending punishment for the guilty pair, then the force of the next lines is weakened, though not destroyed. An obvious third alternative is "the birds", adopting the sense "without toil" rather than "without suffering". The birds are masculine plural, and spoken of in the third person: and between the duties of parenthood and of childhood they do not spend a long time in their lives without toil. They thus pay attention to heavenly Themis and Zeus' lightning, the more naturally since they dwell between earth and sky. They toil, as Electra will, and Chrysothemis will not, for their parents, and as Agamemnon has not, for their offspring. If 1063–5 are on the subject of birds rather than of mortals, the presence of βροτοῖσι in 1066 has (whatever it means precisely) more point than otherwise, as drawing attention to the change of topic. Admittedly ἀλλ' has to be interpreted as ushering in a weaker antithesis than usual, but not impossibly so.[12] On this rendering ἀπόνητοι will refer back to the πόνος implicit at 945 and 986, and lead into the chorus' denunciation of Agamemnon for – as is clearly implied – doing nothing about the sorrows of his children. The chorus cite Zeus and Themis, whose child in (e.g.) Hesiod is Justice[13]; it is not Electra but Chrysothemis who says at 1042 ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἔνθα χὴ δίκη βλάβην φέρει. The chorus are not entirely against Electra; indeed they are in certain respects on her side.

They are still with Electra at 1074, after a summary of the previous scene and a rebuke to Agamemnon for allowing it. At 1074 Electra is 'betrayed' and 'alone'. Betrayed by her father and now yet more lonely in that Chrysothemis has rejected her plan for a combined attack on Aegisthus. Electra must act alone, in whatever she does, as she said at 1019 even more strongly than at 950. The motif is common in Sophocles, not least in the

[10] E.g. Jebb and Kamerbeek in his commentary (above n. 3).

[11] E.g. the Scholiast.

[12] See J. D. Denniston, Greek Particles[2] (Oxford 1954) 7 § (3) ii. The antithesis intended may lie between us men (supplied from τελοῦμεν at 1062) and the birds.

[13] See Kamerbeek (above n. 3) ad loc.

Electra[14]; but the fact remains of its reiteration here. Apparently less significant repetitions in the same choral sentence are δειλαία and στενάχουσι (cf. 849 and 874). Apart from Electra's terrible resolve the situation is now much the same as before Chrysothemis' joyful entry, and the similarity of vocabulary is not surprising. But nevertheless the profusion of repeated words ideas and roots cannot be ignored. The rest of the chorus' sentence picks up two important themes from the preceding scene. The first is that of forethought; Electra, they say, takes no thought for her probably ensuing death: they themselves praise forethought at 990f. and 1015f., whereas Chrysothemis lays claim to it at 1036, on Electra's behalf. Electra is there liable, if she proceeds, to fare ill, and says that she does not wish to live on Chrysothemis' principles. Forethought for Electra's death was clearly implicit in this. The chorus here are taking Chrysothemis' side against Electra's extreme attitude and proposal. The chorus' second point, Electra's readiness to die, if only she can slay the two murderers (if διδύμαν ἑλοῦσ' Ἐρινύν means that)[15], is of double interest. First, Electra has spoken only of killing Aegisthus. Either the chorus jump to a conclusion neither sister has mentioned, or the vagueness of both ἑλοῦσ' and Ἐρινύν is meant by Sophocles or by the chorus in character to match Electra's reticence. Secondly readiness to die on this condition is not only implicit in Electra's own previous words, but corresponds to Chrysothemis' warnings. Who, asks Chrysothemis at 1001, plotting ἄνδρα . . . ἑλεῖν (observe the last word) will escape without ἄτη? Chrysothemis fears that to plot thus is to court inglorious death (1006); Electra in reply implies that she has no wish to live on Chrysothemis' terms. The chorus are again summarising the previous scene and pulling its threads together: they are not unambivalently supporting Electra's latest stand.

The last question of this stanza leads into the next, which picks up the first part of εὔπατρις by ἀγαθῶν at 1082 and εὔκλειαν at 1083. The pun in εὔπατρις is an old story; the audience hears Electra to be not just of noble birth but good to her father. This double meaning is also not new to them; Electra's lament at 859 for lack of ἐλπίδων . . . κοινοτόκων εὐπατρίδων τε has, as Kaibel thought[16], the same ambiguity. With or without ambiguity, the word εὔπατρις at 1081 is repeated by the chorus

[14] See B. M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper (Berkeley 1964) 32f. It gives me special pleasure to cite Mr. Knox' excellent book in this context.

[15] So e.g. Kells ad loc., rightly, despite Kaibel's note on 1078.

[16] See his note on 854.

from Electra at 859. The word probably limits, rather than amplifies Electra's excellence; it says only that she is of good birth and a good daughter.

Deferring the rest of the third stanza, we turn to the fourth and last. In its first sentence the chorus express Electra's relative helplessness by asserting her inferiority (ὑπόχειρ 1092) χεροῖν (Dawe, MSS χερί or χειρί) πλούτῳ τε. At 960 Electra depicted for Chrysothemis their life deprived πλούτου πατρῴου and at 998 Chrysothemis warned Electra that her strength is less than her enemies' χερί. Trifles; but the number of such trifles in this ode is significant, and there is more to come. Μοίρᾳ μὲν οὐκ ἐν ἐσθλᾷ βεβῶσαν echoes 979 and (more importantly) Chrysothemis' last words before exit (1056f.). The chorus end by contrasting with Electra's parlous state her obedience to the greatest of *laws* and her *piety* toward Zeus. Electra has declined (1043) to live by Chrysothemis' *laws*, which prefer safety to Justice (as usual linked with Zeus). Further, at 968 Electra starts her picture of glory to be won with renown for *piety* toward father and brother.[17] Again the chorus conflate motifs from earlier in the play and specially from the previous scene.

Back at the start of the third stanza we find the same technique. "None of the good is willing by living badly to shame good repute so as to be nameless." Noblesse oblige, and Electra had emphasized something similar at 989: "to live shamefully is shameful to those born noble." Αἰσχρός is common; but Electra's αἰσχρὸν αἰσχρῶς at speech-end is memorable. Even the chorus' ζῶν κακῶς finds pre-echoes in ζῆν (1043) and κακῆς (1047), both associated with Chrysothemis' reluctance to follow Electra's plan, a subject surely fresh in the chorus' mind.

Fortified with this analysis of one of the most repetitive choruses in Sophocles, we return to 1087. We noted the echo by the MSS reading καθοπλίσασα of Chrysothemis' τοιοῦτον θράσος . . . ὁπλίζῃ (995f.). The evidence is now that such repetition from dialogue or from other earlier parts of the play not only is a Sophoclean practice but features largely in this ode. It would now be doubly rash to suppose the entirely characteristic echo καθοπλίσασα the mistake of a scribe.

We have then to interpret the MSS text. But nothing so far solves the difficulties which have led to emendation. What do the chorus mean? What indeed are they talking about? The end of the previous stanza found them

[17] See on this motif A. A. Long, Language and Thought in Sophocles (London 1968) 151f. (and 152 with n. 15 is good also on forethought).

speaking of Electra's readiness to risk her own life to end that of Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra. This alludes clearly, if guardedly, to Electra's proposal of murder to Chrysothemis. We have seen that verbal allusions to that scene continue to dominate the chorus' language. It seems worth adopting the working hypothesis that the third stanza is throughout concerned with Electra's single proposal (note the aorist εἵλου), rather than with the life of mourning Electra chose long ago and still maintains. In retort to Electra's words of 989 the chorus perhaps suggest at 1082–4 that, though her conduct deserves to be called εὔπατρις, she should beware of staining her good repute with a crime bound to end with her inglorious extinction. They say no good person will wish to do that, and turn from general to particular at 1085. Such a stain was Electra's choice of the preceding scene, which would have made her life one of nothing but grief. On this interpretation Electra has not this time chosen a life of mourning under the description 'life of mourning', but that is what her choice amounts to. Κοινόν in 1086 can now be given a force lacking on most interpretations. Rather than "in common with Agamemnon", for which no convincing parallel is cited[18], or "as a partner", on which view it is otiose[19], it could then mean "in common with Chrysothemis" – for what Electra chose was to do a deed with her sister which would have brought both of them to a desperate condition. The chorus have thus warned against shameful conduct, suggested that Electra's recent conduct might be viewed in that light, and proceed explicitly to describe her actions in terms of what is not fine, τὸ μὴ καλόν.

In view of the repetitiveness now established for this stasimon, it is reasonable to look for help in understanding the last three lines of the stanza to the passages being echoed, in particular 995f. There Chrysothemis, disapproving of Electra's murder proposal, says Electra is arming herself with recklessness, or arming her own recklessness. The middle ὁπλίζῃ could, I think, have either force, though the Lexicon cites no Classical passage other than this for the former. The active voice of καθοπλίσασα at 1087 is no bar to the comparison of the two passages if the

[18] Kells (above n. 4) 182f. on 1058f. and 1087ff. I do not see what Kells has in mind when he writes of "a *life* (my italics) of mourning in common with Agamemnon"; Agamemnon's life is over. See also Jebb, and Paley (Sophocles vol. II [London 1880]).

[19] Despite Kamerbeek's (above n. 3) persuasive advocacy ad loc. Madvig, cited by Paley (above n. 18) wished to emend κοινόν to κλεινόν, an indication of the unconvincing nature of interpretations known to him. Hermann's interpretation of πάγκλαυτον αἰῶνα κοινόν as equivalent to θάνατον, taking κοινόν as "common to all," is far-fetched.

latter sense be given to the middle voice of 996. Euripides uses ὁπλίζεσθαι χέρα and ὁπλίζειν χέρα at *Or.* 926 and *Alc.* 35 respectively with no obvious difference of meaning. To "arm such recklessness" is very like "arming evil". The chorus too thus disapproves on moral grounds of Electra's plan. This rendering at least makes sense of the negative μὴ in τὸ μὴ καλόν.[20]

Indeed in essence, but without the supporting argument from Sophocles' habits of repetition, Whitelaw proposed something like it long ago.[21] It has suffered rejection from successive editors[22] on the grounds that if τὸ μὴ καλόν refers to the planned murder, the chorus cannot praise it at 1089 (σοφά τ' ἀρίστα τε) without contradicting their remarks at 1015f., urging Electra to accept Chrysothemis' arguments against the crime and extolling the benefits of the forethought and wisdom (νοῦ σοφοῦ at 1016) lacking in Electra's plan. But the contradictions between σοφά τ' ἀρίστα τε παῖς and *either* τὸ μὴ καλόν as applied to the murder scheme *or* the lack of wisdom implied at 1015f. disappear if we read 1089 with a different emphasis. The chorus say at 1089 that Electra's plan will result in her being called a wise and very good *child* (obviously of her father). They could (and in my opinion do) think also that her character and actions are one-sided, too extreme to warrant unreserved approval. They say in effect that she is arming evil ("what is shameful") on her father's behalf, that she is a good child but (as an inciter of murder) a bad woman. With her laments the chorus sympathize – up to a point; with her plan for murder they do not, any more than Chrysothemis does. Of course they support Orestes later; but men may kill where women may not. Such a double standard is seen already in Electra's vision of triumph οὕνεκ' ἀνδρείας at 983 and Chrysothemis' rejection at 997, γυνὴ μέν, οὐδ' ἀνήρ ἔφυς. Electra's plan lacks wisdom in the most general sense of the word; but that does not exclude its wisdom as far as her relations with Agamemnon are concerned. Electra, like the wise birds, succours her father; but she goes too far, and falls into shame. She is indeed εὔπατρις; but that is the limit of her goodness. To arm evil in the shape of a murder plot does not exclude, and in this context would imply, a repute as a good daughter of her father. Kamerbeek's objection to Whitelaw[23], that the chorus is no Odysseus as the latter appears at *Phil.* 119, misfires: for there "wise" and "good" are

[20] Clearest on the problem of this negative is Kamerbeek (above n. 3) ad loc.
[21] In his Translation, p. 437 (1st ed. London 1883; I have not seen the edition of 1894).
[22] See Jebb (above n. 1) 219 and Kamerbeek (above n. 3) on 1089.
[23] Kamerbeek (above n. 3) on 1089.

not qualified and limited as they are in our chorus by the word "child". That word makes all the difference.

This interpretation gives its full force to the metaphor of arming, as at 996 so at 1087. Electra plans to take arms; she arms such boldness, she arms evil. In giving the metaphor full appropriateness the interpretation defends the MSS text also against any tampering with the preverb in καθοπλίσασα. There is no need for Nauck's ὑπεροπλίσασα, revived and ingeniously defended by S. Bernardete[24], nor for Kells' insertion of a negative. These conjectures would weaken the repetition of -οπλ- from 996 to 1087 by making the context and/or general sense of the verb quite different in the choral passage. If ὑπερ- were transmitted, this would not be decisive against it; but ὑπερ- is not transmitted; καθοπλίσασα is, and it is a pity to spoil it. But the appropriateness of the metaphor does not disguise the skill with which Sophocles, while allowing the chorus just enough scope to make their meaning clear, has made them refrain from being too explicit about the planned murder. There is perhaps (see above) a similar delicacy at 1080f.; and if so Chrysothemis is just as delicate (or timid, or even mealy-mouthed?) in the preceding episode.

If this way of taking the MSS text is right, and τὸ μὴ καλόν has a sense we should call moral, a new question arises about the final stanza. That is whether the μοῖρα οὐκ ἐσθλά in which Electra there walks is a lack of material prosperity or a morally wrong action. The question is a genuine one; the two sisters distinguish moral from prudential considerations at 1042. A purely moral interpretation of ἐσθλᾷ in 1094 might be hard to sustain. It would, I think, accord ill with μοίρᾳ, a word perhaps less adapted to character than to situation. It would go ill also with the phrases echoed by βεβῶσαν (1095) at 1056f. and 979, both concerned with material circumstances. We must accept that, though some moral overtones may be heard at 1094, they are not the loudest tones of the passage. Accordingly, the movement from negative to positive, which appears in both stanzas, is not quite in step with the other movement shared between them, from the material situation to a moral judgment. But the two stanzas end nevertheless still in strikingly similar thoughts: in each a particular sphere of morals, that of relation between father and daughter, is singled out as one in which Electra excels superlatively, and ἄριστα ~ ἀρίστα. No good reason here for rejecting the argument from symmetry in favour of the MSS τὸ μὴ καλόν.

[24] Rhein. Mus. 104 (1961) 96, without reference to Nauck, whom Dawe (above n. 3) credits with this suggestion.

This whole approach does not stand or fall by the question whether the play's ancient audiences could be expected to detect echoes of the kind here worked out. The point at issue is not the audience's reaction but the dramatist's practice. Sophocles may have meant the verbal repetitions of this chorus in the *Electra* to recall to a receptive audience each prior occurrence of word or idea with a consciously recognised echo; or he may have meant only to reinforce by repetition notions he thought the audience would at best grasp subconsciously if not so reinforced; indeed he may have thought of different parts of his audience picking up the characters' words differently and with different degrees of awareness. That does not matter here. The fact stands, that it was Sophocles' practice to repeat words and motifs from dialogue to chorus, or vice versa, and within a chorus. Critics of the poet's text need to take this practice into account like any other aspect of his language.

CHRISTIAN WOLFF

A Note on Lions and Sophocles, *Philoctetes* 1436

When Heracles comes to conclude this play, he restores Philoctetes to a heroic destiny, which is also the way of history and the will of Zeus (1415, cf. 989f., 1466–8); and he assures the hero that this restoration will include the healing of his wound. He comes also to confirm a bond of friendship between the older hero and the young Neoptolemos who is just entering on a heroic career, a confirmation which takes the form of pairing the two as warriors, probably on the model of hoplites.[1] He then addresses the younger man as follows:

> οὔτε γὰρ σὺ τοῦδ' ἄτερ σθένεις
> ἑλεῖν τὸ Τροίας πεδίον οὔθ' οὗτος σέθεν·
> ἀλλ' ὡς λέοντε συννόμω φυλάσσετον
> οὗτος σὲ καὶ σὺ τόνδ'.
>
> Neither you without this man have the strength to capture the plain of Troy, nor he without you: but like a pair of lions roaming together keep watch, he over you and you over him. (1434–7)

The comparison is unusual for Sophocles – the only simile in the play and one of just two lion comparisons in all his surviving text; and a double chiastic arrangement of personal and deictic pronouns frames it strikingly. It is tempting to think that the simile, insofar as it evokes the world of

[1] P. Vidal-Naquet, Le 'Philoctète' de Sophocle et l'éphébie, in J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet, Mythe et tragédie en grèce ancienne (Paris 1977) 161–180, esp. 177–9. Of recent work on *Philoctetes* I have also found valuable P. E. Easterling, Philoctetes and Modern Criticism, Illinois class. Stud. 3 (1978) 27–39; C. Fuqua, Studies in the Use of Myth in Sophocles' 'Philoctetes' and the 'Orestes' of Euripides, Traditio 32 (1976) 29–95; P. W. Rose, Sophocles' Philoctetes and the Teachings of the Sophists, Harvard Stud. in class. Philol. 80 (1976) 49–105; C. Segal, Divino e umano nel Filottete di Sofocle, Quad. Urbin. di Cult. class. 23 (1976) 67–89, and Philoctetes and the Imperishable Piety, Hermes 105 (1977) 133–158. I agree with Vidal-Naquet, 166, n. 24, that the best "étude d'ensemble" is B. M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1964) 117–142.

heroic epic, may be consonant simply with a positive, heroic resolution to this attractive and elusive play. But the simile, I think, has further implications, and carries some of the burden of the play's tragic contradictions. To see this, it will be helpful to recall the associations of lion comparisons both in Homer and tragedy.[2]

Usually, in the *Iliad*,[3] lions represent warriors at the moments of their ἀριστεία, their individual heroic action. Both are powerful, fast, driven, relentless, and courageous – even to the point of self-destruction.[4] The lions of the similes are also often depicted as famished, predatory and savage. Two similes show lions in protective roles. Ajax, standing over the body of Patroklos, is like a lion over his young (17.133ff.). Achilles, mourning his failure to save Patroklos, is like a lion who has returned too late to his lair and found his cubs stolen (18.318ff.). It may be that a combined memory of these similes underlies Sophocles' only other lion comparison: Tecmessa, at *Ajax* 986f., is compared to a lioness whose cubs, once their father is dead, must not be prey to his enemies. Three times there are similes, as in *Philoctetes*, of lions in pairs. They describe two young brothers from Argos, killed by Aeneas (5.554ff.); the two Ajaxes carrying off the body of a Trojan warrior to strip and behead it (13.198ff.); and Odysseus and Diomedes setting out at night for the Trojan camp, "through carnage, corpses, armor and black blood" (10.297f., cf. 485f.). (We might raise the question here of whether an audience at the play would have recalled any particular one of these twin lion similes – associated with victims, exceptional savagery and the devious exploits of Philoctetes' bitterest enemies.)

In the *Odyssey*, the lion similes (seven altogether), like the hero of this epic, follow on patterns in the *Iliad*, but extend them and shift emphases. Odysseus is compared to a lion who will come home to his lair and destroy those who were foolish enough to have intruded there (4.335ff. = 17.125ff.), and he emerges from the slaughter of the suitors like a lion covered all over with blood (22.402ff.; 23.48; cf. *Iliad* 17.541f.). The lion here represents both a protector of his household and an avenging figure. Elsewhere the

[2] For a useful and compact account of the lion throughout Greek culture, see Der kleine Pauly 3 (Stuttgart 1969) 704–6. The remarks on lion symbolism by G. W. Dyson, Class. Quart. 23 (1929) 186–195, are incomplete and sometimes misleading; on the sense of the lion dream relating to Pericles (Hdt. 6.131), cf. C. W. Fornara, Herodotus (Oxford 1971) 53f.

[3] Cf. H. Fränkel, Die homerischen Gleichnisse (Göttingen 1921) 59ff.

[4] *Iliad* 12.46 = 16.753; cf. 12.305f.; 20.172f.

lion simile is extended into new territory – to mark, with humorous incongruity, a juxtaposition of wild – the seemingly savage Odysseus – and civilized – Nausicaa and her companions (6.130ff.); to associate Penelope, the hero's wife at the disrupted center of their household, with heroic resistance (4.791f.); and, when Polyphemos eats up, like a lion, all there is of two of Odysseus' men (9.292f.), to show a monster, beyond the pale of humanity, become a distorting mirror of the heroic image.[5]

The lion comparisons represent characteristics of warriors, as fighters, protectors, and avengers. The latter appears first in the *Odyssey*, together with a more various use of the comparison, even, with the Cyclops, to the point of undermining its heroic sense; an explicit disparity between savage nature and human society is beginning to emerge (cf. already the unusual context of the lion simile at *Iliad* 24.39–45 and 572, off the battlefield). In *Philoctetes* the simile, linked to fighting at Troy, evokes the world of the *Iliad*. Yet the play has a number of Odyssean elements as well, notably the island setting, apart from human society, so beautifully recalled as the heroes leave the stage, after the lion simile.[6]

In tragedy the main uses of the lion image are in relation to vengeance. Once Cassandra's oracular language describes Agamemnon as a "noble lion," a kingly figure contrasted to the betraying lioness, Clytaemnestra (*Ag.* 1258f.). But, as Bernard Knox has shown,[7] extending from the lion cub parable at *Agamemnon* 717ff., a network of associations traces a blood legacy of crime and vengeance throughout the *Oresteia*. The Greek army has burst into Troy, a "ravening lion" which "laps its fill of kingly blood" (*Ag.* 827f.): so reports the king who brings the avenging bloodshed home with him. Then – and here is the first lion pair in tragedy – "there came to the house of Agamemnon a double lion, a double Ares" (*Cho.* 937f.), Orestes and Pylades, and probably, recalling still the preceding pattern of vengeance, Clytaemnestra and Aigisthos (cf. *Ag.* 1224, 1259). At last in *Eumenides*, Apollo's virulent attack on the Furies concludes that their likes "should inhabit the cave of a blood-gulping lion" (193). As avengers the

[5] Cf. W. Nestle, Hermes 77 (1942) 64f.

[6] Cf., on the feeling for the island at the end of the play, Knox (above n. 1) 141. On the Odyssean component, particularly in the figure of Neoptolemos, see Fuqua (above n. 1) 49ff. The pull away from Troy towards a Greek homeland (478ff., 515ff., 663ff., 941, 1213ff., 1367ff., 1399ff.) is also notable, as well as the ambivalent sense of the word νόστος in the play's last line.

[7] The Lion in the House, Class. Philol. 47 (1957) 17–25.

Furies are appropriately lionlike;[8] further, Apollo would relegate them apart from divine and human company to a region like Polyphemos's.[9]

The twin lions of *Philoctetes* are called συννόμω. The epithet stresses their partnership and feeding together, "seeking their prey on the same ground" (Jebb *ad loc.*). Vidal-Naquet[10] suggests that σύννομος may refer to "compagnonnage militaire," and cites *Septem* 354. But the context there is noteworthy. The scout describes the invading Seven, murderously determined, blazing with courage, "like lions with Ares in their eyes" (52f.). Seen from within the city, like the lion within the house, the warrior figure on an epic scale looks dangerous and frightening. The chorus of women imagine vividly their city captured: "Ares breathes down in frenzy, destroyer of the people, defiler of piety" (343f.), and "there is plundering, blood-kin of rampage; pillager meets and deals with pillager; and the empty-handed calls on the empty-handed, wishing to have a partner – ξύννομον, all lusting neither for less nor an equal share" (351–5). Again, the general context is vengeance, the vengeance of the Erinys in Laios' house, which makes problematic the warrior's code (cf. esp. 683–5, 698–701, 716f.).

Similar associations, though characteristically extended and modified, are found in Euripides' use of the lion image. Heracles and Orestes, heroes in their madness – whose courageous spirit has gone too far, turned in on their own houses while attempting to carry out retribution – are compared to lions (*HF* 1210f., *IT* 297). In *Phoenissae* Eteokles and Polyneices are a warrior pair, like twin wild animals (1297) and lions who inhabit dens (ἐναύλους, 1573, cf. *Phil.* 33, 158); but rather than share a den they are fighting to the death for its possession. The chorus in *Electra*, recalling the enormity of Clytaemnestra's crime, compare her to a mountain lioness, which describes her ferocity and suggests vengeance for Iphigenia (1160–2). A wronged Medea glares like a lioness who has just given birth (*Medea* 187f.), then shifts from protector to the avenger whom Jason calls "a lioness, not a woman" (1342f.), a description she accepts, precisely because of her claim to have achieved vengeance (1351–8). To the vindictive bacchantes Pentheus is a monster, born "not from the blood of women" but "from a lioness" (*Ba.* 989f.; cf. *Iliad* 16.33–5). When Poly-

[8] Both are bloodthirsty; "blood-gulping," αἱματορρόφος, is an epithet of τίσις in Sophocles fr. 743P (and cf. Pearson's note).

[9] Like Polyphemos, they are given a kind of pastoral association: Apollo calls them "a flock without a shepherd" (196f).

[10] (Above n. 1) 179, n. 23.

phemos in the *Odyssey* is compared to a lion, the animal's ferocity is isolated, and represents simply inhumanity and wild nature. In tragedy, where the context includes revenge and the society of the polis, the lion image both has a kind of justification and points to the problematic character of revenge. In *Suppliants* the image seems used straightforwardly: Athena foretells the revenge to be taken for their fathers by the Epigonoi when they grow up, lion cubs into lions (1222f.). Nevertheless, the combination of motifs here – the coming of age of warriors (1214, 1219) and the bitterness of hereditary vengeance (1222, cf. *Heracl.* 1006, lion cubs) – is unsetttling; and revenge will entail sacking a city (1214, 1223), though that is divinely sanctioned (1226).

Returning to *Philoctetes,* we may say that the two heroes are appropriately joined in the lion simile, as courageous and fierce warriors who will sack Troy and win spoils (cf. 1428, 1431). They will be protective of one another, like the lion of his family. And in destroying Troy and killing Paris "who was responsible for these evils" (1426), they will, like the lion, be agents of revenge, divinely sanctioned (1415). Does the simile imply anything more?

The lion's association with violence may recall the violence which originally came so naturally to Neoptolemos (90f.), and which Philoctetes was not shy of, ready to use his bow (1229ff., cf. 1403ff.) or when, in his eagerness to leave the island, he compares himself to pirates preparing for theft and violent plunder (643f.). The pairing of lions elsewhere, both in epic and tragedy, suggests their most brutal aspect. Here it at least stresses the isolation of the two men; just before the appearance of Heracles, they had imagined themselves as two alone against the whole Greek army (1401ff., cf. 1226ff., 1242ff.; cf. *Iliad* 16.97–100; Eur. *IA* 533ff., 1268ff.). The image of the lion, the wild animal, recalls Philoctetes' life as a "wild man," living alone in his cave on the desolate island with his savage wound, predator and prey of the island's wild animals (cf. 955ff., 1146ff.).[11] When he refuses the persuasion and advice of his proven friend, a refusal of a cure for his wound and of return to human society, Neoptolemos calls him "savage" (σὺ δ' ἠγρίωσαι 1321). The lion simile, appearing in the context of release from his savage state, suggests a transformation of savagery, and a redirection of it; in some form it remains. If the associations of the lion are

[11] On wildness, ἀγριότης, see Segal, "Divino e umano . . ." (above n. 1) 72ff.; cf. also Easterling (above n. 1) 37, and Vidal-Naquet (above n. 1) 168–171. Note also that in the territory of Troy the all-nourishing Mountain Mother is accompanied by "bull-killing lions" (391–401).

confined to the context of epic, we could say that the implications of the simile go no further. But *Philoctetes* is a tragedy, and they cannot be thus confined. Following closely on the lion simile is Heracles' warning to the two warriors: "keep this in mind when you destroy the land (of Troy), observe piety – εὐσέβεια – towards what concerns the gods; for all else is accounted secondary by father Zeus: piety dies not with mortals; neither among the living nor among the dead does it perish" (1440–4). It may be that this undying piety supplements or qualifies the heroic "immortal glory" won by Heracles and its human counterpart, the fame promised Philoctetes (1420, 1422). At any rate, these lines pull us back into a tragic frame of reference. Not only do they suggest the notorious impiety of Neoptolemos at the capture of Troy, but they evoke as well the more general Aeschylean associations of victorious warriors with inevitable impiety.[12]

Though the end of the play represents transformation and release, some tragic tension and ambivalence remain, elements of which converge at the lion simile, notably: the heroic warrior code, which involves Philoctetes' stubborn, self punishing integrity as well as an unrelenting hatred of his enemies; and the conflict of this code with the demands of a political life which involves duplicity and manipulation, δόλος and λόγοι. Proverbially a man should be a lion in battle and a fox at home (Aristophanes, *Peace* 1189).[13] But the demarcation of home from battlefield, inside from outside, is not so easily drawn. In the years just before the time of the play's production in 409, the internal political life of Athens must have seemed more than ever a kind of battle. Conversely, the army abroad functioned also as a political entity, in Sicily, for example (cf. Thuc. 7.77.4–5), and in 411 at Samos (Thuc. 8.76; cf. 8.81; cf. *Phil.* 386f., *Ajax* 1073).[14] At such times the foxes like Odysseus will have had important functions. In

[12] The Sophoclean sense of this piety is well worked out by Segal, "Philoctetes and the Imperishable Piety" (above n. 1). It need not, however, exclude the more traditional, and problematic sense suggested above.

[13] For lion and fox as complementary, balancing strength with cunning, cf. Pindar, *O.* 11.19–21; *I.* 4.45–8; cf. fr. 237 Snell³. With regard to the fall of Troy, Sophocles has allowed us to forget that the walls of the city were broached not by the onslaught of lions but by the Odyssean ruse of the wooden horse.

[14] C. Mossé, Le rôle politique des armées . . ., in J.-P. Vernant, ed., Problèmes de la guerre en grèce ancienne (Paris 1968) 221–9. For political readings of the play, cf. M. H. Jameson, Class. Philol. 51 (1956) 217–227; W. M. Calder III, Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 12 (1971) 153–174, and in E. C. Welskopf, ed., Hellenische Poleis (Berlin 1973) III 1382–8. It is also worth noting the recent interest in the Philoctetes drama shown by the left-wing Greek poet Yannis Ritsos (1965) and the East German playwright Heiner Müller (1958).

Philoctetes Sophocles shows political life in its worst light, harsh and indifferent to human suffering – and then ignominiously defeated by aristocratic nobility and the warrior's heroic self-determination. He does this, in part, by making his heroes lions, both joined and isolated as a pair, courageous and potentially dangerous.

For some this ambivalence may have been unbearable, or a distracting deception. In 408, a year after the production of *Philoctetes*, Euripides presented his *Orestes*, strikingly different and yet curiously related.[15] We see again on the stage an aristocratic pair, one afflicted, the other supporting him (cf. 800ff.). They too are described in the epic manner, "Greek lions, a twin pair" (1401, cf. 1459); and follow tragic precedent: "they came into the house" (cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 937), to wreak vengeance (1397ff.). But the description comes from a fear-crazed Phrygian slave, with bizarre and incongruous effect. Furthermore, the lion comparison is part of a set of images associating Orestes with wildness,[16] which culminates with Menelaos' words, "I have come at the news of terrible deeds by twin lions – I cannot call these two 'men'" (1554f.). Orestes and Pylades have become caricatures of aristocratic heroes; heroic wildness is no more than a crazed inhumanity. Any tragic idealization of what a lion represents is undercut. Three years later, Aristophanes in *Frogs* uses the image again. His Aeschylus firmly advises: "above all do not raise a lion in the city, for once he's raised, you will have to serve his ways" (1431b–1432; cf. Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 16.2, cf. 2.2).

[15] Cf. P. N. Boulter, The Theme of ἀγρία in Euripides' Orestes, Phoenix 16 (1962) 102–106, and, extensively, Fuqua (above n. 1).

[16] P. N. Boulter (above n. 15).

CHARLES P. SEGAL

Solar Imagery and Tragic Heroism in Euripides' *Hippolytus*

Bernard Knox's essay, "The *Hippolytus* of Euripides," published over a quarter century ago and several times reprinted, remains fundamental for understanding the relation of imagery to dramatic structure and meaning in that play.[1] Following some of the paths opened by Knox, the present effort is a modest ἀντίδωρον for his important contributions to the interpretation of Greek tragedy.

Two large spatial movements dominate the *Hippolytus:* first, a horizontal movement between the enclosed house of Phaedra's love-sickness and death and the forest or shore where Hippolytus hunts, rides, and meets his end; second a vertical movement between sky and earth, the light of the upper air and the darkness of Hades. This latter is the principal concern of this paper.

As Kenneth Reckford has recently observed, there are a number of parallels between Hippolytus and Phaethon, the latter the subject of a tragedy possibly not far in date from our play.[2] Phaethon crashes to his death from a high place in the sky and lands in the remote western river, the Eridanus. There his sisters, changed into poplar trees, are frozen into the perpetual gesture of their mourning as their tears, changed into amber, drip forever into the stream (738–42).

Phaethon is one of a number of mythical young men who take flight to celestial heights to avoid the loss of innocence and to transcend participa-

[1] Bernard M. W. Knox, The Hippolytus of Euripides, Yale class. Stud. 13 (1952) 3–31; reprinted in E. Segal, ed., Euripides, A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1968) 90–114 (footnotes omitted); transl., Der 'Hippolytos' von Euripides in E.-R. Schwinge, ed., Euripides, Wege der Forschung 89 (Darmstadt 1968) 238–74. References to this article henceforth are both to Yale class. Stud. and the reprint in Erich Segal's collection.

[2] K. J. Reckford, Phaethon, Hippolytus, and Aphrodite, Trans. Amer. philol. Assoc. 103 (1972) 405–32, especially 414–27. For the myth see also U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Phaethon, Hermes 18 (1883) 396–434; J. Diggle, ed., Euripides, Phaethon (Cambridge 1970) 3–32.

tion in the mortal cycle of maturity, procreation, and death. The myth of Phaethon's death, as Reckford suggests, is relevant for Hippolytus too as a "son of Dawn who cannot endure through marriage into maturity."[3] Over against Phaethon and Hippolytus, however, stand other mortals involved disastrously with the sky and its deities. In persuading Phaedra to yield to love, the nurse adduces the example of Cephalus and Eos in 454–56. The old poets, she says, tell of how "Eos of the beautiful radiance snatched Cephalus away to the gods because of love." According to Hesiod (*Theog.* 984–91) Cephalus and Eos are the parents of Phaethon. Yet, the nurse explains, divinities who yield to love for mortals "dwell in the heavens even so" (456f.). The nurse does not mention the fate of the mortal Cephalus, but we may recall another of Dawn's lovers, Tithonus, in the Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite* (218–38).[4] Just before Eos and Cephalus the nurse cites the example of Semele and Zeus (454), where the mortal partner's unhappy fate is told in the next ode (559–62). These gods, for all their passion, "still dwell in the heavens"; yet just that skyward aspiration for mortals – Cephalus, Semele, Phaethon, and also Hippolytus – destroys those who would live their lives in too close an association with divinity.

Behind Hippolytus there stand also figures like Bellerophon in Pindar and Pentheus in the *Bacchae*.[5] In both cases a godlike reaching toward the heavens ends in a calamitous crash to earth. The use of such mythic paradigms to the main action is one of Euripides' constant dramatic techniques.[6] In this play the paradigm of Phaethon and its female counterpart, Semele, and the solar imagery in general enlarge the significance of Hippolytus' tragedy to cosmic dimensions; they also inspire some of Euripides' finest poetry.

The scenes just before and just after the ode which includes Phaethon's doom densely pair sky and earth. As Knox has noted, Hippolytus' very first words in the play are an address to "mother earth and the unfolding

[3] Reckford (above, note 2) 427.

[4] For these myths in relation to Phaethon see G. Nagy, Phaethon, Sappho's Phaon, and the White Rock of Leukas, Harvard Stud. in class. Philol. 77 (1973) 137–77, especially 156–72. Diggle (above, note 2) 4 and 12–15 is dubious about Hesiod's referring to our Phaethon in *Theog.* 984–91; but the passage may still have provided a basis for *Euripides'* association of Cephalus and Eos with Phaethon: see also Reckford (above, note 2) 427 with note 23.

[5] Pindar, *Ol.* 10.84–92; *Pyth.* 10.27; *Isth.* 7.43–7; Eur., *Ba.* 1095–1113.

[6] E. g. M. Kubo, The Norm of Myth: Euripides' Electra, Harvard Stud. 71 (1967) 15–31; Froma I. Zeitlin, The Argive Festival of Hera and Euripides' Electra, Trans. Amer. philol. Assoc. 101 (1970) 645–69; also Reckford (above, note 2) 425.

(rays) of the sun" (601): ὦ γαῖα μῆτερ ἡλίου τ' ἀναπτυχαί.[7] This cry comes in response to Phaedra's "hidden secrets" that are now so disastrously "revealed" (τὰ κρυπτὰ γὰρ πέφηνε, 593). Calling upon Zeus in righteous horror, Hippolytus asks why he brought women forth "to the light of the sun" as a bane for men (ἐς φῶς ἡλίου, 617). As a result of her "concealment" (cf. 712) and the chorus' promise to "show none of her evils to the light" (ἐς φάος, 714), she will draw Hippolytus after her into the darkness of death (cf. 816, 829).

Just before the strange wave which blots out the light of heaven (1206–9), Hippolytus "unfolds" (ἀναπτύξας, 1190) his hands in another prayer to Zeus, asking that his father understand how much he dishonors his son "whether he is dead or sees the light of the sun" (1190–93). If the first prayers reflect Hippolytus' skyward movement away from the biological processes of sex and procreation associated with women (cf. 618–24) toward "purity" of body and soul (cf. 655), this second prayer, followed by the "chthonic rumblings as if of *Zeus'* thunder" (1201), complicates that purity. It interweaves purity with its apparent opposite and plunges us into the darkness, literal as well as figurative, of Hippolytus' death. Here the moral and intellectual lucidity of the Olympian world-order seems totally obscured (cf. also 1103–1110). The hidden landscape (1205–9) is the cosmic projection of the moral darkness now breaking upon the hero and his companions.

Echoing Hippolytus' indignant cry to earth and sun in 601, Phaedra cries out "O earth and light" (ἰὼ γᾶ καὶ φῶς, 672) just before setting into motion her destructive plan of "concealment" (712–14, *supra;* cf. 674, κρύψω). Her last words in the play are a promise to teach Hippolytus "not to be raised so high (ὑψηλός, 730) at my woes" and to teach him *sophrosyne* by making him "share in (her) disease" of love (729–31). "High," ὑψηλός, is perhaps in our minds in the chorus' wishful hope to fly like a bird over the sea. They would soar over the wave of the Adriatic and the water of Eridanus where the Heliades drip their amber tears in lament for Phaethon (738–41). The chorus means this description of Phaethon for themselves, but it has an ominous meaning not only for Phaedra,[8] but also for Hippo-

[7] Knox 12 = 98. W. S. Barrett, ed., Euripides, Hippolytos (Oxford 1964) suggests, ad 601, that the cry is connected with his wish to escape the polluting effect of Phaedra's desire.

[8] See Reckford (above, note 2) 414; C. P. Segal, The Tragedy of the Hippolytus: The Waters of Ocean and the Untouched Meadow, Harvard Stud. 70 (1965) 133–35; H. Parry, The Second Stasimon of Euripides' Hippolytus (732–775), Trans. Amer. philol. Assoc. 97 (1966) 320–23, who, however, restricts the ode too much in viewing it as a reflection of Phaedra's death-wish primarily.

lytus, the Phaethon-like youthful hero. His death, in fact, comes from the "wave" and "shore" over which the chorus would "fly" (κῦμα, ἀκτή, 736f.; οἶδμα, 739; cf. 1199, 1207f.). He too will be lamented by the "tears of maidens" (κόραι, 740f.; cf. 1425–7). "There is grief here still," Barrett remarks of these lyrics, "but a grief remote and turned to beauty by the spell of legend."[9] For Hippolytus, however, this unreality will become grim fact. The tears of maidens will not be those of remote, metamorphosed girls, but of the young women of his native land as they intertwine his death with the passion of Phaedra in a celebratory ritual that offers an ironical compensation for the pain of his death.[10]

The chief characters' cry to earth and light at critical moments in this pivotal scene spreads to Theseus too. At the news of Phaedra's death he calls out for the darkness below the earth (836f.). He has lost, he thinks, the best of all women "whom the light of the sun and the starry flashing of the night beholds" (849–51):

> . . . γυναικῶν ἀρίστα θ' ὁπόσας ὁρᾷ
> φέγγος ἀελίου
> τε καὶ νυκτὸς ἀστερωπὸν σέλας.

Early in the play the nurse had warned how easily mortals are deceived in their mad love for what "shines on the earth" and in their uncertainty about "the things beneath the earth" (191–97). In his foolish love, Theseus takes Phaedra as this delusive bright light in the darkness. Later Hippolytus' companions will claim that he is truly "the brightest star" (φανερώτατον ἀστέρα, 1122). As his Phaethon-like hopes for this celestial brilliance and quasi-divine purity are shattered in the cruel death that comes from the "wave that reaches to the heavens" (κῦμ' οὐρανῷ στηρίζον, 1207), Hippolytus is entirely engulfed by the power of night. Carried broken in body, he laments (1386–88):

> εἴθε με κοι-
> μάσειε τὸν δυσδαίμον' Αἰ-
> δου μέλαινα νύκτερός τ' ἀνάγκα.

Night here is not the star-lit heavens of Theseus' deluded vision of Phaedra's virtue in 849–51, but the night of the underworld, total and unrelieved, "the black nocturnal necessity of Hades."

[9] Barrett (above, note 7) ad loc.

[10] For the ironies of this ritual see C. Segal, Pentheus and Hippolytus on the Couch and on the Grid: Psychoanalytic and Structuralist Readings of Greek Tragedy, Class. World 72 (1978–9) 138f.

At the peripety Hippolytus, doomed as an exile who will wander nameless and citiless over the earth (1028f.), has no place at all on "either sea or earth" (1030f.):

> καὶ μήτε πόντος μήτε γῆ δέξαιτό μου
> σάρκας θανόντος, εἰ κακὸς πέφυκ' ἀνήρ.

Twice more he repeats the last half line, εἰ κακὸς πέφυκ' ἀνήρ, in prayers to assert his innocence (1075, 1191). The second echo, reported by the messenger as he tells of the fulfilment of Theseus' curses, is particularly significant (1190–93):

> καὶ πρῶτα μὲν θεοῖς εἶπ' ἀναπτύξας χέρας,
> Ζεῦ, μηκέτ' εἴην, εἰ κακὸς πέφυκ' ἀνήρ·
> αἴσθοιτο δ' ἡμᾶς ὡς ἀτιμάζει πατὴρ
> ἤτοι θανόντας ἢ φάος δεδορκότας.

At 601, in the righteous indignation of his outraged "purity," Hippolytus had invoked the "unfolding rays of the sun" (ἡλίου ἀναπτυχαί). Later, accused of a shameful impurity (cf. μίασμα, 946), he "unfolds his hands" to the gods to show that he "is not base" (1191; cf. 1031). The unfolding of hidden truth or interior reality to the light of day is a leitmotif of the play. Theseus wishes for a "clear proof" to distinguish friends from foes (925–31, τεκμήριον σαφές τι, 925f.). Hippolytus believes that Theseus' arguments against him (καλοὶ λόγοι 984) would prove less cogent should one "unfold" them (διαπτύξειε, 985). But when he "unfolds" his hands in prayer to Zeus above in 1190, what is opened to the light does not necessarily carry the clarity of truth. In the obscure workings of divinity and nature in this play, the elements of sea, earth, and sky do not vindicate his claims of innocence, but rather conspire in his destruction.

Praised as the "brightest star of Athena" (1122) as he leaves the stage, Hippolytus perishes when something from the earth (χθόνιος, 1201) strikes and obliterates the sky (1205–9). The physical details of his crash reinforce this fall from high to low. He is initially high up on the vehicle with his companions "below the chariot" (ὑφ' ἅρματος, 1195) and "falls" (πίπτει) in a way which leaves little life in his body (1246f.). The bull hurled forth from the sea totally confuses the relation between high and low. It "tripped up" the horses, (ἔσφηλε, 1232), a word implying their fall.[11] It also causes

[11] See e.g. *Iliad* 23.719; Soph., *El.* 415f.; Eur., *Ba.* 744; Aristoph., *Ran.* 735f.; Thucyd. 1.140.1. On the importance of the verb in general in the play see Knox 25–6 = 109–111.

them to "rear back" (ἀνεχαίτισεν, 1232). This verb, referring to throwing a rider, is used in the *Bacchae* of Pentheus' fall from the high places of the fir tree down to the earth (*Bacchae*, 1072). Hippolytus' crash sends the wheels and axles that should run smoothly on the ground "leaping upward" (ἄνω ἐπῄδων, 1234f.). The confused spatial relations of horse, rider, and chariot image the overturning of Hippolytus' world. With the appearance of the bull, symbol of his own repressed sexual and animal instincts, he loses control over his horses. He simultaneously loses his moral and social position, both literally and metaphorically, as a bright star in the sky (1121f.).

The ode on Eros which follows closely upon this passage is the culminating inversion of Hippolytus' aspirations to something like divine purity. Initially he invoked his goddess as "heavenly" (οὐρανία, 59), and his companions regarded her as inhabiting Zeus' palace "in the great heavens" (μέγαν κατ' οὐρανόν, 66). Now the sky belongs to her antagonists, Kypris and Eros. The latter's triumphant flight over land and sea is proclaimed in beautiful lyrics which repeat words for flying or wings four times in ten lines (1270, 1271, 1272, 1275). The celestial divinity soaring in the sky's radiance is neither the "most brilliant star of Athena" of the third stasimon (1121f.) nor the young Phaethon of the second (738–40). Instead, the winged Eros of this ode harks back to the destructive Eros of the first stasimon (525–64). "No missile of fire or of stars," the chorus there sang, "is superior to that of Aphrodite which Eros, Zeus' son, hurls from his hands" (530–34). The word for "superior" in 530, ὑπέρτερον, continues the metaphor of height which runs throughout the play. As Poseidon's chthonic roar and sea-sprung bull blot out the light of the sky, so Eros now replaces Hippolytus-Phaethon as the "shining star" in the sky. Eros' flight too is not that of the modest bee, as 564 suggested,[12] but a flight of far wider reach, taking in all of nature and men too (1272–80).

The interrelation between the two odes on the power of Eros is another link between Phaedra and Hippolytus. Phaedra's doom too appears under the imagery of a winged creature which falls from the sky to the earth (cf. 752–60, 828f.). In the first stasimon her situation has a parallel in the disastrous love of Semele for Zeus, which results in the former's death through "fiery lightning" (βροντᾷ ἀμφιπύρῳ, 559). Smoke attends the parallel doom of Iole in the previous strophe (551), and smoke and fire also play a role in Hippolytus' tragedy (cf. 954, 1223).

[12] On the recurrence of the bee in 77 and 562f. see Knox 28 = 111f.

Phaedra and Hippolytus are also linked through the interlocking, though contrasting, paradigms of Phaethon and Semele, both mortals destroyed by contact with the celestial fire of divinity. The bull's "roar from the earth" which sends Hippolytus' chariot crashing in a fall from celestial and stellar splendor (cf. 1201ff., 1121f., *supra*) is compared to the "thunder of Zeus" (βροντὴ Διός, 1201); and Zeus' "fiery thunder" also destroyed Semele (559). The destructive force of celestial fire has still another connection with Phaedra's calamity. Cursing the nurse for revealing the secret of her love, she cries out (683f.), "May my ancestor Zeus uproot you utterly, smiting you with his fire" (οὐτάσας πυρί).[13] Throughout the play Phaedra's ancestry has sinister associations with dangerous erotic passion (337–41), where a bull also plays a role (338). The connection of love which destroys the woman, fire, and Zeus in 683f. may also recall Semele. By the fourth stasimon the universal power of Eros has engulfed both Phaedra and Hippolytus, and he has asserted himself in the sky and over "all that the blazing sun beholds" (1279).[14]

In persuading Phaedra to surrender, the Nurse argued from Aphrodite's presence "in the aether, in the surge of the sea" (447f.). Her rationalizing expediency about Aphrodite, however, like Teiresias' sophistic explanations of Dionysus in the *Bacchae*, grossly miscalculates the elemental power of divinity. The second ode on Eros reveals the truth of that power's cosmic dimensions and the ambiguity of his indifferent beauty and destructive violence.

The entrance of Artemis at 1283 stands in diametrical opposition to the praise of her enemy in this ode. The ode had exalted Eros in his celestial power, "the dapple-winged god" who "soars" above the earth and sea on "swiftest wing" (1270–73). Returning us to the sufferings which Eros has caused on earth, Artemis, speaking probably from the height of the *theologeion*,[15] uses language which suggests a fall from high to low, from heavens to Hades, but now applies that imagery to Theseus. "Persuaded as to things unclear" by the "false words" of Phaedra, Theseus now has "a clear ruin." Why then, the goddess asks, does he not "hide (his) body in tartarous gulfs beneath the earth" or "take wing upward and leave this life" (1287–93). Theseus, like Hippolytus, is now involved in a confusion of height and depths, left with no place on earth to go. At the same time the

[13] The force of οὐτάσας in 684 is noted by Barrett (above, note 7) *ad loc.*: "an epic verb, used very occasionally in tragedy."

[14] Reading αἰθόμενος in 1279, with Barrett ad loc.

[15] For the staging of Artemis' entrance and speech see Barrett ad 1283.

collocation ἀφανῆ φανερά̃ν in 1289, just before the contrast of lower and upper realms, recalls that blindness of human loves for what may be below the earth (191–197), which Theseus' own combination of heavenly light and darkness illustrated at a critical juncture (848–51, and *supra*).

The appearance of Hippolytus, laid low on his litter before his goddess who speaks from on high, unable even to "raise up" his head or body without help (cf. 1361, 1445), both pathetically completes and visually enacts his fall from high to low. Standing "above" all in σωφροσύνη, he says, he plunges headlong down to Hades clear before him (1365–67):

> ὅδ' ὁ σωφροσύνῃ πάντας ὑπερσχὼν
> προῦπτον ἐς Ἅιδην στείχω κατ' ἄκρας
> ὀλέσας βίοτον.

The "black nocturnal necessity of Hades," as we noted earlier, is now ready to engulf him, and he longs for it as rest from pain (1386–88).

Praised by his goddess for that "nobility of spirit" which has destroyed him (τὸ δ' εὐγενές σε τῶν φρενῶν ἀπώλεσεν, 1390), he makes his last skyward movement as he lies in the grip of Hades and its darkness (1387f.). He calls upon the "divine breath" of Artemis' perfumed scent. Even in his present sufferings this makes him "lightened in body" (1391f.):

> ὦ θεῖον ὀδμῆς πνεῦμα· καὶ γὰρ ἐν κακοῖς
> ὢν ἠσθόμην σου κἀνεκουφίσθην δέμας.

The word πνεῦμα has associations with the celestial regions of the aether (one need only think of Euripides' contemporary, Diogenes of Apollonia);[16] and the prefix ἀνα- in ἀνεκουφίσθην also marks an upward movement toward air and lightness. Artemis, however, in the austere coolness of her divine nature, can express sympathy (1394), but not let a tear fall "down from her eyes" (1396). The best she can do is to assure him that not even when he is "below earth's darkness" (οὐδὲ γῆς ὑπὸ ζόφον, 1416) will Aphrodite's acts be unavenged (1416–19). Her verb here, κατασκήψουσι (1418), again suggests downward movement. Mortals may aspire upward, but all the acts of the gods hurl them back down again to earth. Yet if her words convey the hopeless tragedy of mortal aspiration, they also confirm that distance between mortality and divinity in which men must find the terms of their humanity.[17]

[16] E.g. Diogenes of Apollonia, Diels-Kranz VS⁶ 64 A 16–17 and B 6. See also Eurip. *Helen* 867 and frag. 982 Nauck²; Empedocles, Diels-Kranz VS⁶ 31 B 84.4 and 111.5; Aristoph., Nub. 225–36.

[17] Knox 30 = 113.

Artemis promises commemoration in the songs of girls who will lament Hippolytus' death (1424ff.). We recall the girls' tears for the fallen Phaethon in the "Escape Ode," where fantasied flight over the sea soon meets the tragic reality of Phaedra's suspension in the noose of her suicide. The two chief protagonists are again drawn together, but there is a movement beyond mere parallelism. Hippolytus does not die, like Phaethon, drowned in darkness at the edge of the world, nor is the most significant mourning of his death to come from virgins about to enter marriage. His suffering will become a part of the rituals of his city; as Knox has eloquently shown, the most dramatically effective mourning is shown before our eyes in the grief of Theseus.[18] The tears that Artemis cannot shed (1396) finally seal the tragic humanity which the hero, fallen from his celestial aspirations, now acts out and accepts. Removed from the mythical model of a solar god on the one hand or a vegetation god in the sphere of the Great Mother on the other,[19] Hippolytus "plucks the greatest grief of tears" (1427) and leaves behind him "a common grief to all the citizens" in the rhythmic beating of tearful grief which is part of the enduring commemoration of the great (1463–66).[20]

This human offering of tears is all that a mortal can hope to attain. He relinquishes immortality on the one hand, but on the other hand gains a revered place in a society or community's memory. This movement toward long-lasting fame in the remembrance of tragic death is already foreshadowed in the "song of tears" with which Hippolytus makes his last journey: he comes to his companions on the shore "having the same song of tears" as they (ταὐτὸν δακρύων ἔχων μέλος, 1178). The metaphor of "plucking" this grieving of tears, as if it were a fruit, in 1427 links the tearful commemoration of the hero with those mortal processes of growth and decay from which Hippolytus nobly, but vainly, sought to remove himself in the virgin meadow of chastity, where only those who are σώφρονες by nature may "pluck" (δρέπεσθαι, 81). Phaedra, the chorus says, would "pluck the noble fame of σωφροσύνη" (431f.), but her effort

[18] Knox 31 = 114.

[19] For Hippolytus as fertility god and consort of the Great Mother see C. Robert, Die griechische Heldensage in Preller-Robert, Griechische Mythologie II.2[4] (Berlin 1921) 738f.; H. E. Barnes in Donald Sutherland and H. E. Barnes, Hippolytus in Drama and Myth (Nebraska 1960) 103–23; E. Neumann, The Origins and History of Consciousness, tr. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton, N.J. 1954) 91–93.

[20] For the significance of these lines in defining Hippolytus' "greatness" see C. Segal, Hippolytus 'The Great,' Ant. Class. 39 (1970) 519–21 and also Harvard Stud. 70.155f. (above, note 8).

is vitiated, and her (and Aphrodite's) victim "plucks" the fruit of a fame more deeply colored by grief and loss (1427, 1463–66) than either Hippolytus or the chorus in their rival and optimistic claims could know.

Here at the end Euripides is also calling attention to his play itself as the "song of tears" which Hippolytus receives, not in cult, but in art.[21] The work of the mortal poet parallels the goddess' gift of rites at Troezen as that ambiguous and qualified form of eternity which is open to mortals: it is only through their suffering that dead heroes are kept alive in the tearful memory of men.

In Phaethon's story, as in many myths of young men passing to adulthood (Telemachus, Ion, and Neoptolemus are familiar examples), finding the true father plays a major role. For Hippolytus, as perhaps also for Phaethon, recognition by one's father involves accepting the boundaries between mortality and divinity. His problematical status as an illegitimate son parallels Theseus' need for recognition by his divine father, Poseidon. Ironically that recognition comes through the fulfilment of the curse which destroys his son (1169f.):

> ὦ θεοὶ Πόσειδόν θ', ὡς ἄρ' ἦσθ' ἐμὸς πατὴρ
> ὀρθῶς, ἀκούσας τῶν ἐμῶν κατευγμάτων.[22]

Yet at the end of the play, when Theseus confronts the results of his curse and the effects of his all-too-human blindness, he appears as the son of an aged mortal, Aegeus. It is in terms of this mortal parentage that he is to take into his arms the shattered form of his own "child": "O child (τέκνον) of aged Aegeus," Artemis tells him, "take up your son (σὸν παῖδα) in your arms and draw him to you" (1431f.).

Hippolytus' farewell to his virgin goddess and surrogate mother in this scene (1437–41)[23] is the last step necessary for his movement to adult maturity. His farewell to Artemis and his forgiveness of Theseus come almost in the same breath (1440–42). He now recognizes and is recognized by his generative, biological father, the male role-model whose way of life

[21] See P. Pucci, Euripides: The Monument and the Sacrifice, Arethusa 10 (1977) 165–95, especially 184f. on Hipp.

[22] For these curses see C. Segal, Curse and Oath in Euripides' Hippolytus, Ramus 1 (1972) 165–80, especially 172ff.

[23] For the maternal figures in the play see A. V. Rankin, Euripides' Hippolytus: A Psychopathological Hero, Arethusa 7 (1974) 71–94; J. J. Smoot, Hippolytus as Narcissus: An Amplification, Arethusa 9 (1976) 37–51; idem, Literary Criticism on a Vase-Painting: A Clearer Picture of Euripides' Hippolytus' Comp. Lit. Stud. 13 (1976) 292–303.

he had implicitly rejected in preferring athletics to responsibilities in the *polis* (1012–20). That parent too is now himself defined not as the son of a god, but as the son of a mortal, subject to age and death (1431f.).

The motifs of sky and earth, mortality reaching toward divinity in the paradigms of Semele and Phaethon, show how Euripides' play both parallels and diverges from related mythic patterns. Phaethon, plunging from heaven to earth, finds commemoration in the tears of his mortal sisters, but loses a father. Hippolytus, losing a mother-figure of celestical purity, finds a father on earth and affirms in nobility of spirit (γενναιότης) that legitimacy from which he has all his life felt excluded.[24]

[24] For the question of Hippolytus' bastardy see especially 1082f., 1452, 1455, and also 309. Barrett (above, note 7) ad 1082f. understates its importance: see contra G. M. A. Grube, The Drama of Euripides (London 1941) 184; Smoot, Comp. Lit. Stud. 13.294–6 (above, note 23); C. Segal, Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 11 (1970) 106f.

David B. Robinson

Helen and Persephone, Sparta and Demeter

The 'Demeter Ode' in Euripides' *Helen*

'Greetings, Bernard!' It is a great pleasure to write these words with Bernard as addressee; more often one finds oneself reading them on offprints of which he is the generous sender. But it is not only his unfailingly stimulating writings for which I owe gratitude but – enormously so – for his warm welcome and genial friendship in Washington in 1966–7. He made the Center an inspiring and a pleasant place to live in and to work in.

Much of Bernard's recent work has been on late Euripides. I offer here some guesses about the famous Demeter lyric at *Helen* 1301–68. I must stress that I am doing little more than rearranging clues that seem at the moment to be lying on the table not quite in due order. If I achieve anything, credit will be largely due to the original discoverers of the clues.[1] I am only too aware of the risks of the enterprise.

Helen and Persephone

Coming to the Demeter ode, Paley asked "What has the legend of Demeter and Cora . . . to do with Menelaus and Helen?" Knowing that to talk of *embolima* was to evade the issue, Paley replied, "We can only say, that the circumstances bear some resemblance to the restoration of Helen to her husband."[2] So they must and so they do; but the crucial resemblance is one that Paley failed to point to; nor I think has anyone else pinned it down, though A. C. Pearson came very near it, and two more recent writers have tripped over it and left it lying. G. M. A. Grube voiced what had doubtless often been felt as a strong common-sense objection to Paley; "Demeter is the central character (of the ode), and no one can seriously

[1] Several former Junior Fellows have written about the *Helen*; among them I owe most to Christian Wolff (see below).

[2] Euripides, comm. F. A. Paley[2] (London 1874) Vol. II 204.

suggest that she symbolizes Menelaus."[3] In that he was right; the crucial resemblance lies elsewhere. Menelaus is not Demeter; but Helen is in a situation very like Persephone's.

Many recent writers have been easily led here by a speculation of M. P. Nilsson's. But although that points in the right direction, it may happen to be a false clue, and it does not in my view penetrate to the crux of the matter. Nilsson asserted that "the rape of Kore and the rape of Helen are in fact kindred, if we look away from the Helen of the epics and take her as the old goddess that she was; she is a vegetation goddess, just as Kore is."[4] Critics have believed that this possible kinship was enough to motivate this lyric. But (1) there is no evidence that any ancient author recognised such a kinship between Helen and Kore or between their rapes. (2) With great respect for Nilsson's frequent insights, this particular guess is not quite self-evidently compelling. (i) Are a tree-goddess and a corn-goddess to be straightforwardly identified? (ii) It is true that in some less familiar strata of their myths both Helen and Persephone were carried off by Theseus; but the myths of Theseus are often thought to be of late origin. (iii) The important rape of Kore is that by Pluto taking her to Hades (unlike Theseus who took her *from* Hades), and there are clear hints Pluto was taking the flowers and fertility away from the earth; whereas the mythical rapes of Helen never take her underground, and have no trace of any other motivation than that she was beautiful. Certainly Euripides in the *Helen* was looking away from Helen's usual story; but if he was adopting instead the traditional attitudes of Spartan sentiment about their goddess, surely the Spartan view evidently preferred that Helen should never have been raped at all. Equally, Athenian sentiment would surely have found it difficult to equate any of Helen's rapes with the sacred and honourable rape of their own Persephone. Reducing Nilsson's parallels to a minimum, both Helen and Persephone were (a) fertility goddesses and (b) raped; but even if this is enough to justify a modern scholar in assimilating their origins in earlier religion, it would probably have been difficult for an ancient writer – even for Euripides – to have envisaged their legends cut down to this bare minimum of analogy; least of all to assimilate the circumstances of their rapes.

[3] G. M. A. Grube, The Drama of Euripides (London 1941) 119.

[4] M. P. Nilsson, The Mycenaean Origins of Greek Mythology (Berkeley 1932) 75, 170–1; see also Gesch. der Griechischen Religion (München 1967) I[3] 475–6. This gave a lead to Miss C. P. Golann in Trans. Amer. philol. Assoc. 76 (1945) 31–46 and many subsequent writers, e.g. R. Lattimore, Story Patterns in Greek Tragedy (London 1964) 54.

No; for all that Euripides was addicted to syncretism in religion, as we see from the blending of Demeter and Cybele in this ode,[5] the crucial resemblance between Persephone's story and Helen's here is a matter of the situation in this play, and not something that would be discovered in the traditional stories. The 'rape of Helen' threatened at this moment is not one that figured (so far as we know) in her standard mythology; neither Paris nor Theseus is her ravisher here. The key figure here is Theoclymenus, whom Euripides probably invented for this play. It is Helen's threatened marriage to Theoclymenus which is here crucially analogous to Persephone's enforced marriage to Pluto.[6] Pluto detained Persephone, despite Demeter's revenge, one third of every year in Hades; Theoclymenus if he can will delay Helen the whole of every year in Egypt.

At this point in the play it is far from clear that Theoclymenus may not succeed. The immediately preceding scene has presented him for the first time on the stage, and its dialogue has been pervaded with attempts to deceive him; much may yet go wrong. In an earlier scene Theonoe had promised silence (not any more positive help); but this has yet to be tested when Theoclymenus goes into the palace to question her (at 1300: compare 1371); only in the next scene, at 1369–73, is Helen sure of Theonoe's silence, and even then she must still carefully address Theoclymenus as ὦ καινὸς ἡμῖν πόσις (1399); compare 1385–6, ὁ τοὺς ἐμοὺς γάμους ἑτοίμους ἐν χεροῖν ἔχειν δοκῶν.

It is true that the audience must grasp the analogy between Pluto and Theoclymenus in this ode in the face of a certain indirectness of presentation by Euripides; for as Grube observed, Demeter is the apparent central character of the ode. But Persephone is kept in view at 1306–7, 1312–4, 1322, 1327, 1342; and possibly in 1353–4 (see below). Pluto is not mentioned; but this story, of all stories, was well known, and Pluto's part indispensable to it. Persephone's eventual release from Hades on strict terms is not mentioned; but Euripides of course wishes to maintain suspense; no terms of release at present seem likely for Helen. Demeter's joy at receiving new toys at 1349–52 is rather obviously not the joy we are waiting to be

[5] On this syncretism, as on much else about this ode which I have no space to discuss, R. Kannicht's commentary (Heidelberg 1969) is admirable and indispensable.

[6] Both Furio Jesi, in Aegyptus 45 (1965) 56, and Christian Wolff, in Harvard Stud. in class. Philol. 77 (1973), 64 with n. 11, saw just this analogy between Pluto and Theoclymenus in their investigations of the Egypt of this play as a "place of the dead" (see below); but both, I think, failed to connect the analogy with this ode or to see it operating at this stage in the play.

told about, the hoped-for joy at Persephone's release; this *aposiopesis* is clearly deliberate on Euripides' part.

Help has in fact been given to the audience at several points to prompt them to identify Helen with Persephone and Theoclymenus with Pluto. Some of these promptings have been well noticed by previous writers;[7] I shall add a new one and repeat and elaborate on, or criticize, others. (1) The scenery of the play must depict a palace and a tomb (τόνδ' ἐς οἶκον, 46, and μνῆμα τόδε, 64); Helen spends most of her time at the tomb under its protection. (2) Teucer enters at 68, referring to τάδ' ἐρυμνὰ δώματα; but has he mistaken the tomb for the palace? and does he really mean ἐρεμνά? For Pyramids were as big as palaces, and his first guess is that these δώματα belong to Πλοῦτος (69), and for a moment there is probably meant to be a strong presumption that it is the underworld Πλοῦτος he must have in mind; for Πλοῦτος and Πλούτων are no more than variations in spelling, and it is the underworld which is the best-known "black palace" – μελαντειχέα δόμον Φερσέφονας.[8] I think this is not altogether too casual to give a lead, and (3) at 286 Helen says τοῖς πράγμασιν τέθνηκα and then at 294–6 she envisages γάμους ἑλομένη ... μετ' ἀνδρὸς οἰκεῖν βαρβάρου πρὸς πλουσίαν τράπεζαν ἵζουσα, which reinforces the same equation of Theoclymenus – Ploutos – Pluto[9], she herself, γάμους ἑλομένη, becoming Persephone.

Less direct in its support for this analogy, but keeping Persephone in our minds, is (4) Helen's appeal to Persephone at 167–8, through the Sirens – χθονὸς κόραι – painted on Proteus' tomb; is she making a Greek identification of some Egyptian bird? Of course, Helen is not there claiming to be Persephone, but she feels Persephone close. And (5) at 243–7, as often noted, Helen reports that she was carried to this ἄνολβος γαῖα while picking flowers. Miss A. M. Dale remarked dismissively, "the usual occupation of the abducted, like Persephone, Creusa (*Ion* 888), Europa"[10]; but Persephone will surely come to mind again here, since she *par excellence* went γαῖαν εἰς ἄνολβον.

[7] Jesi and Wolff – see above.

[8] Pindar, *Ol.* 14.20. Plato's explanation, τὸ δὲ Πλούτωνος (sc. ὄνομα) κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πλούτου δόσιν, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς γῆς κάτωθεν ἀνίεται ὁ πλοῦτος (*Cratylus* 403 a 3–5), is correct and was probably well understood by all Eleusinian initiates; and *vice versa* 'Wealth' is given the spelling Πλούτων at Soph. frr. 273, 283, Ar. *Plut.* 727. See N. J. Richardson, Hom. Hymn to Demeter (Oxford 1974) 320 n. 2., and C. Wolff, art. cit. 64.

[9] As Jesi saw.

[10] Comm. ad loc. (Oxford 1967). I must make the same acknowledgement to Miss Dale's work as to Kannicht's (above).

One more small prompting and a final important one. (6) Theoclymenus' name may deliberately echo the name Κλύμενος, "the Famous one", euphemistically used for Pluto at Hermione at least from the 6th c., and occasionally in Alexandrian literature with no reference to Hermione[11]; and Περικλύμενος is said to mean Pluto by Hesychius, and may already occur in 'Hesiod' *Ehoeae* fr. 136 (M.-W.). This might be something of a learned allusion. But (7) the whole audience cannot fail to see that Helen from her entry at 1186 is clothed in black.[12] Black was conventional for mourning, and therefore well known and understood as Demeter's clothing in Persephone's absence.[13] Indeed the opening introduction of the grieving Demeter at 1301–7 can hardly not exploit the audience's instinctive 'free associations' on seeing Helen in black. But these 'associations' are pushed further as soon as Persephone is mentioned in πόθῳ τᾶς ἀποιχομένας ἀρρήτου κούρας (1306–7); for Persephone too wore black in her character as Queen of Hades, *furvae regna Proserpinae*.[14]

To sum up these clues. The ἐρυμνὰ δώματα in an ἄνολβος γαῖα to which she was carried from flower-picking, and the black robes in which she now appears, are probably intended by Euripides to give the audience a strong lead towards interpreting the 'Demeter' ode as having close relevance to the immediate situation if Helen is equated with Persephone: the strongest point of relevance being that Theoclymenus/Pluto wishes to marry her.

It must not be denied that the first three stanzas of the ode tell a version of Demeter's story very much for its own sake, enjoying the colourful picture of the 'Mountain Mother''s lion chariot, and the noisy new toys presented to her, at the same time as recalling the familiar story of her grief and search for Persephone. But that the story-telling should seem more prominent than any hints of a moral or an analogy is usual in Greek lyric. This ode of course has among its other functions the undeniably frequent

[11] The point is Wolff's: cf. Lasus of Hermione, fr. 1, (Page PMG no. 702), Aristodicus *Anth. Pal.* 7.189 and Damagetus *Anth. Pal.* 7.9.

[12] As Wolff knew, but he failed to see what follows.

[13] Hom. *Hymn. Dem.* 42.

[14] Horace, *Odes* ii. 13.21. See Nisbet and Hubbard's Commentary ad loc. (Oxford 1978), 'everything about P. was 'sable', her dress in particular'; they quote perfectly adequate, though indirect, proof of Horace's meaning from Meleager *Anth. Pal.* 7.352, Aesch. *Cho.* 1049, Eur. *Alc.* 843; one could add that Pluto wears black in Claudian, Rapt. Pros. i 79, ii 275; so 'furvae' is not merely a transferred epithet. Aristophanes in Frogs 1331–7 satirized Euripides by introducing an apparition from Hades in 'corpse-black clothing', μελανονεκυείμονα; a black-clothed Helen here may have counted among Aristophanes' targets, and all the more so if she symbolised Persephone.

one of providing temporary distraction for an audience not yet to be released from suspense. Nevertheless Paley's initial move to search for the ode's relevance was sound, and the grasping of the analogy bearing on Helen's immediate fear of Theoclymenus should involve no great leap of thought at this moment in the play.

The analogy I think would come to the minds of at least some of Euripides' audience as early as the mention of τᾶς ἀποιχομένας ἀῤῥήτου κούρας at 1306–7. But it looks possible or even probable that rather more assistance may once have stood in the text. A. C. Pearson made the valuable suggestion that the corrupt lines 1353–4 narrated a crucial further detail of Persephone's story.[15] He read ὧν οὐ θέμις ⟨σ'⟩ οὐδ' ὁσία / 'γεύσω γᾶς ἐν θαλάμοις,[16] "you tasted what was not right for you in Hades' chambers" – the pomegranate seed. Though Pearson apparently did not see this, I would argue that an allusion to the trapping of Persephone in Hades is very much to the point here in establishing the analogy between her plight and Helen's.

It has usually been assumed (by Pearson no less than by others) that the subject of whatever verb is hidden by the incomprehensible ἐπύρωσας in 1354 must be the same person who is the subject of μῆνιν δ' ἔσχες . . . ὦ παῖ in 1356. But this need not be the case. The δέ after μῆνιν, and the vocative ὦ παῖ placed where it is, in fact tend to suggest that the singers are in μῆνιν δ' ἔσχες beginning a new address to a new addressee – who is unmistakeably Helen.[17] But if this is right, the subject of lines 1353–4 need not be Helen, and those lines should quite likely be treated as narrating a brief though crucial final turn of the Demeter and Persephone story of the first three stanzas.

Brief to the point of not containing any identification of the subject of the verb? Perhaps so, if the story is well-known. Need the verb still be in the second person? Perhaps not, if ἐπυρωσας represents a verb succeeded by γᾶς.[18] Other old emendations can be adapted to do as well as Pearson's; the most tempting combination is perhaps ὧν οὐ θέμις ⟨δ'⟩ οὐδ' ὁσία / 'κύρσε γᾶς ἐν θαλάμοις.[19] κυρεῖν is a favourite Euripidean

[15] Commentary (Cambridge 1903), on 11. 1353 sq.; again indispensable.

[16] Presumably thinking of an uncial confusion of Γ and Π.

[17] See Kannicht ad loc. Pearson got into a considerable difficulty by arguing that Persephone had violated a ritual rule of her mother's; did Demeter herself condemn Persephone to stay in Hades?

[18] γᾶς originated with Pflugk (1831).

[19] ἔκυρσας Musgrave, ἔκυρσε Pflugk (but Pflugk intended ἔκυρσ' ⟨ὁ⟩ γᾶς ἐν θαλάμοις to refer to Menelaus).

word; or almost equally tempting, perhaps stronger palaeographically, might be ἐπηύρετ' ἐν γᾶς θαλάμοις.[20] On these readings, ὧν οὐ θέμις would include the marriage as well as the pomegranate seed, which might suit the analogy with Helen more closely (she is offered no pomegranate: but remember πρὸς . . . τράπεζαν ἵζουσα from 295–6.)[21]

Can a tragic lyric allow the story told in the first three stanzas to overflow by two lines into the fourth? Pindar and choral lyric clearly made no attempt to place breaks in sense at the ends of stanzas, but tragedy usually seems stricter in this respect. Compare however Euripides' *Electra* 476–7, where the description of the designs on Achilles' shield is allowed to overflow by just two lines into an epode. In that case there seems to be no important point contained in the run-over lines. But here, if my suggestion is correct, an important point may be given some prominence by the isolation of 1353–4 from what precedes by the stanza break.

Sparta and Demeter

But a greater break in thought seems unmistakeably to occur between 1353–4 and 1355 sq. Miss Dale noted[22] the apparent distinction between what she described as a 'sin of commission' referred to in 1353–4, and a 'sin of omission' referred to in 1355 sq. On the reading of the passage here suggested these different 'sins' are laid at the door of different subjects, Persephone in 1353–4, and Helen in 1355 sq. The link, I believe, is simply that what Helen is said to have omitted to do still concerns the Great Mother. Persephone's disaster is left behind, except of course that the threat of marriage with Theoclymenus still hangs over Helen; but how and when has Helen omitted to worship Demeter? For there seems to be little room for doubt that she is charged with this.

It is common enough for the chorus to speculate on the possible errors by which a character in a tragedy has incurred divine wrath, and sometimes this speculation is entirely charitably meant. When the chorus at *Hippolytus* 145–7 wonder whether Phaedra is ill because she has neglected some ritual due to Artemis, they presumably think that Phaedra could be helped by

[20] ἐπηύρω (but with a different view of the passage) Hartung.

[21] A. Y. Campbell (Comm., Liverpool, 1950) substituted ἔβρωσας for Pearson's ἐγεύσω, and P. Vellacott translated this (Penguin, 1954). But they fall into the same trap as Pearson in 1355–7.

[22] on 1353ff.

having this omission repaired. In the *Helen* it has been thought inconceivable that any fault should be imputed to Helen, since the whole play is aimed at acquitting her of the crimes implied by the usual stories about her. But though Helen, unlike Phaedra, is not ill, she is still in a considerable difficulty, and the chorus take their chance to suggest a possible reason. I think Euripides is again interested in keeping up a degree of suspense; has Helen's omission got her into a predicament from which she will not escape? Later she does escape, so the chorus were evidently wrong; but just now, can she have lost her chance of return to Greece?

In an article published in 1909,[23] W. Scott did not claim to identify Helen's crime. But in suggesting that this ode was an aetiological account of the foundation of the worship of the Great Mother at Sparta, I think Scott may paradoxically have come very near the solution. I suspect Euripides may well have had 'the worship of the Great Mother at Sparta' in mind here; but the truth, I think, is just that Euripides knew that the Great Mother was *not* worshipped in Sparta, neither in Helen's day nor in 412 B.C. Helen's crime, he lets his chorus suggest, is to come from a city in which she did not worship Demeter because she could not. The suspense will not last long. The next ode has the chorus remembering many occasions of religious worship that Helen once engaged in at Sparta and will engage in again. But where Demeter has been mentioned, the chorus do not abstain from observing that Helen had not habitually worshipped her.

But is it true that the Spartans did not worship Demeter/Cybele? Evidence is slight, but it seems rather likely. Pausanias' reference (3.12.7) to a temple of the Great Mother at Sparta which τιμᾶται περισσῶς δή τι comes from a much later age, and nothing is known of this worship from the classical period. Herodotus (2.171) believed that the worship of Demeter at the Thesmophoria had disappeared from Sparta on the arrival of the Dorians. Scott quoted Virgil's "virginibus bacchata Lacaenis Taygeta" (*Georg.* 2.487); but Virgil was adapting *Odyssey* 6.102–110, τῇ δέ θ' ἅμα νύμφαι . . . ἀγρονόμοι παίζουσι, where the nymphs on Taygeta worship Artemis, not Demeter/Cybele, nor Dionysus, despite Virgil's word 'bacchata'. Nor is it likely that the worship of Demeter/Cybele reached Sparta by syncretism with Dionysiac ὀρειβασίαι; for again *pace* Scott's reading of Virgil, nothing is known to suggest that these took place in Sparta, and the drift of Plato's approving comments at *Laws* i 637

[23] Class. Quart. 9 (1909) 161–179.

suggests that the worship of Dionysus in Sparta, if any took place at all, was a strictly restrained occasion. In fact we hear so little about the worship of Demeter and Dionysus at Sparta by contrast with that of Zeus, Apollo, Artemis and Athena, or Helen and the Dioscuri, that comparatively little emphasis can have been placed on these divinities by the Spartans.[24] Euripides, I think, knew this, and is here hinting, rather teasingly, that Helen may have been brought to Egypt, and may have to stay in Egypt, because Sparta possessed orgiastic worship neither of Dionysus nor of Demeter/Cybele.

That this is the probable object of these lines sung by the chorus is confirmed, I think, precisely by their return to the subject of Spartan worship at 1465–75. By the time of the next ode in the play Euripides evidently wishes it to begin to seem more likely that Helen will get away from Theoclymenus and home to Sparta. There, the chorus foretell, she will be able to join in the rituals which Sparta famously *did* possess; those of the Leucippides (her sisters-in-law), of Athena Khalkioikos, and of Hyacinthus – the last involving νύχιος εὐφροσύνα (1465–70). That Helen, or later presumably a leader representing her, led joyful ritual dances at Sparta is known from the closing ode of Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, 1314–15, ἀγεῖται δ' ἁ Λήδας παῖς ἁγνὰ χοραγὸς εὐπρεπής. Indeed Aristophanes' ode compares the Spartan girls in their races and dances to worshippers of Dionysus; ᾥπερ Βακχᾶν θυρσαδδωᾶν καὶ παιδδωᾶν (1313–14). But Dionysus' own name is not invoked in the ode, unlike those of Apollo, Athena and the Dioscuri, so there is no suggestion that Dionysus was the named recipient of worship at Sparta. On the other hand Aristophanes' comparison may perhaps lead us in the direction of Euripides' singers' thoughts. If Helen returns to Sparta she will be able to participate in, or to lead, nocturnal rituals just as fervent and joyful as any of the Great Mother's; and so perhaps the threat envisaged earlier, that the Great Mother would detain her in Egypt because she had never worshipped

[24] This emerges clearly from S. Wide, Lakonische Kulte (Leipzig 1893). We hear of shrines of Demeter and of Dionysus scattered throughout Laconia, but we do not hear of a major festival in Sparta concerned with them. "Dagegen tritt diese Göttin (Demeter) in Sparta selbst im Kultus wenig hervor" (Wide 181), and "In Sparta selbst scheint Dionysos geringe Verehrung gehabt zu haben" (170). The 'Leucippides' apparently later had counterparts called 'Dionysiades' (Paus. 3. 13.7), but this sounds like syncretism. The secret worship of Dionysus by women at Brysiae (Paus. 3.20.3) was not necessarily orgiastic, and was not, as we have seen, the original referent of Virgil's 'bacchata Taygeta'. Nilsson in fact suggested (Griechische Feste (Stuttgart 1906) 297–8) that early dancing in honour of Artemis long held its ground against the encroachment of Dionysus-worship in Laconia.

her in Sparta, might come to nothing because Spartan piety in its own way matched anything the Great Mother or Dionysus himself could require.

What was certainly true, of course, was that Sparta did not have the kind of claim that the Athenians had to be proprietors of the most important cult of Demeter in all Greece, the Eleusinian mysteries. We know that this theoretical difficulty for pious Spartans had been recorded in mythology, since the story was told – by Athenians at least – that the Dioscuri themselves had been initiated at Eleusis (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.3.6., – a speech by Callias, – Farnell, Cults III [Oxford 1907] pl. 19). Perhaps Euripides is here giving an extra twist to this piece of Athenian chauvinism; Helen, because she was a Spartan, was not as safe as Athenians from the wrath of the Great Mother; though she could doubtless join her brothers on a journey to Eleusis if she once got back to Sparta.

The last three lines of the stanza are usually, not without some reason, despaired of as corrupt beyond repair. But in 1368 μορφᾷ μόνον ηὔχεις could well be perfectly sound as a teasing reproach to Helen, if such reproaches are in the chorus' mind; and σελάνα in 1367 invites us to find a link with παννυχίδες θεᾶς in 1365. Is the point perhaps that, when in other cities at the full moon the women and girls would have been worshipping Demeter, in Sparta Helen merely enjoyed seeing herself in her mirror by moonlight? Or perhaps better, did Helen in Sparta at the full moon take part in ceremonies that were largely, or even explicitly, beauty contests – which of course she won? We are not told for certain that there were καλλιστεῖα at Sparta as there were in Lesbos and Tenedos; but we might very well infer it from Alcman's *Partheneion* and Theocritus' *Epithalamium for Helen* (Idyll 18); and perhaps we might infer that the winner was always notionally identified with Helen in memory of the mythical past.[25] So perhaps Helen is here being teased by the chorus for participating when at home in a national ritual of a kind in which she could not help being at a special advantage.

If this is possible, emendation on a comparatively limited scale may be all that is required in 1366–7. Perhaps ἅμασιν should be ἅρμασιν of the moon's chariot (Heath and Hermann); and then perhaps ὑπέρβαλε is to be removed as a gloss on some rarer word. Dare one suggest

[25] I must refer here primarily to A. Griffiths, Alcman's Partheneion, Quad. Urbin. di Cult. class. 14 (1972) 7–30, and also to Sir Kenneth Dover, Greek Homosexuality (London 1978) 179–182, both of whom interpret Alcman fr. 1 as implying that beauty had been the criterion for selection of that chorus.

εὖτε δ' ἐν ἅρμασιν
πάμφαινε σελάνα,
μορφᾷ μόνον ηὔχεις?

Certainty is impossible; but little more is perhaps required than poetic expression for "when the moon was full, you gloried in your beauty". The verb παμφαίνειν is an epic word applied to armour and to stars: it is not found in tragedy, but Euripides has παμφαὴς ἀκτὶς Ἀελιόυ in lyrics at *Medea* 1251–2.

To recapitulate my guesses about the ode as a whole. Helen's black garments of pretended mourning at first suggest a song about the figure of the grieving Demeter; but her situation, that is to say the threat that she must marry Theoclymenus, much more strongly suggests the parallel of another black-robed figure, Persephone; and Persephone's error of tasting the pomegranate seed was perhaps mentioned in the corrupt lines 1353–4. The disaster to Persephone hints at the danger that Helen may not succeed in escaping from Egypt. Can she possibly have brought this fate upon herself by some sin of omission? But the Great Mother has just been mentioned, and Demeter/Cybele is herself a figure not worshipped in Sparta; the nights of the full moon are the occasion for a different celebration in Sparta, one very dear to Helen; if this is what we can assume is hinted in the corrupt 1366–8. So this stanza too continues the suggestion that Helen may perhaps not succeed in escaping from Egypt. But by the end of the next scene Menelaus has a ship at his command (1414–7), and greater hope is possible; so the next ode can forget the threats from Cybele in a picture of Helen's resumed acts of Spartan piety towards Athena and Apollo (1465–75). Helen and Menelaus finally obtain the happy ending we have hoped for: but a skilful playwright does not promise too much too soon.[26]

[26] A version of this paper was read to a seminar at Glasgow University in 1976. I am grateful for comments received then, and for various conversations with my colleague Dr. E. K. Borthwick. He and Dr. W. S. M. Nicoll have kindly read the final draft: as has Professor Michael Stokes of Durham.

WESLEY D. SMITH

Iphigenia in Love

I was fortunate to hear an early version of the paper which Bernard Knox later published in *Yale Classical Studies* in which he demonstrated convincingly that we need not distrust the opening of *Iphigenia at Aulis*.[1] As in medicine getting rid of a harmful or useless drug or remedy is at least as beneficial as discovering a new one, so in the study of literature getting rid of false or illusory questions and problems is at least as valuable as offering new solutions. Bernard's work has newly opened up the *Iphigenia* to our study and appreciation, and I gratefully take advantage of it. I will talk here about ways in which the play succeeds, for me, in exhibiting peculiarly Euripidean excellences, while ruefully admitting that there is no known cure for the problem of the ending, which I shall ignore. Even if *Iphigenia at Aulis* were complete and as it left the master's hand, it seems clear that it would not appeal to everyone. It has been much patronized and condescended to, from Aristotle, who used its heroine as an example of unnecessary inconsistency in character, to those who hold the common current view that it is not only not tragic in the proper sense, because Iphigenia is not killed in the end, but not quite serious either, because its characters lack stature, it is melodramatic, the chorus is an embarrassment, etc.

A defensive posture in criticism is self-defeating. Begging the reader to take something seriously or pleading that this or that stricture is surely overdone or ill-taken is itself depressing and destructive of the purpose of literary appreciation. On the other hand, one's views do not come from nowhere, and one does engage in dialogue with others who are studying the play. Hence one cannot pretend to oracular utterance of insights. I shall take a middle course here, complaining at wrong tendencies in the reading

[1] Bernard M. W. Knox, Euripides' Iphigenia in Aulide 1–163 (in that order). Yale Classical Studies 22 (1972) 239–261. The question is not closed, though, as Hans Strohm shows in his response, Anz. f. d. Altertumswiss. 27 (1974) 44–45.

of the play, using them as foils to my own, not trying to do justice (hence this apology) to those who have studied the play, but only to the play itself.[2]

I begin with the general structure of the action. The play, characteristically for Euripides, is slow in getting started. Its exposition continues through several false beginnings of action. Agamemnon, in the grip of emotion, exhibits his emotion and character and sends off the loyal slave. The chorus brings on stage apparently irrelevant charm and a feminine point of view. What are these proper ladies of Chalcis doing in an army camp unchaperoned? But no one remarks it, and they contribute their view of the men. The disputes between Agamemnon and Menelaus promise to move the action first in one direction, then the other, but finally return to their starting point at the entrance of Iphigenia and Clytemnestra (607). One could add that subsequent action, once it begins, is blunted: when Clytemnestra and Achilles learn the truth, their attempts to save Iphigenia are frustrated, most finally by the victim herself. From beginning to end the play engages the audience in attempts to head off the events and frustrate the myth. Finally, the audience is frustrated by the occurrence of the events it knew were coming.

If we are conscious that that is the play's strategy and structure, we can better understand what happens at the climax when Iphigenia finally frustrates the catharsis, or the fulfillment of form, or whatever we choose to call it. As my title suggests, Iphigenia has an irrational motive well known in Greek literature, well prepared by the play, thoroughly intelligible, but little appreciated in this instance as far as I can see: she is in love, and chooses to sacrifice herself for her intended husband. The action on stage, which provides the context in which she declares her desire to die, makes her motive clear enough. The words she uses deny it in large part – such is the modesty of maidens which the play makes much of. She speaks of foreign policy, of saving Greek girls from foreign rape, etc., mimicking the desperate words used by her father when for the only time

[2] To illustrate approaches to the play I shall cite these few studies by author: William Arrowsmith, ed., Iphigenia at Aulis, trans. by W. S. Merwin and G. E. Dimock, Jr. (New York 1978); E. M. Blaiklock, The Male Characters of Euripides, (Wellington 1952); Desmond Conacher, Euripidean Drama (Toronto and London 1967); Herman Funke, Aristoteles zu Euripides' Iphigeneia in Aulis. Hermes 92 (1964) 284–299; Albin Lesky, A History of Greek Literature, Trans. Willis and de Heer (New York 1966); Gudrun Mellert-Hoffman, Untersuchungen zur "Iphigenie in Aulis" des Euripides (Heidelberg 1969); Helmuth Vretska, Agamemnon in Euripides Iphigenie in Aulis, Wiener Studien 74 (1961) 18–39. I encountered Dimock's and Arrowsmith's discussions only as I was finishing this piece and found them refreshing, especially Dimock's.

he tried to justify what he was planning to do to her. Her purpose in her speech is to disarm Achilles who has, properly, committed himself to die for her if necessary. The revolt of his Myrmidons, along with the vileness of the rest of the Greeks, make it seem that dying will be necessary. At that point she announces her own decision not to resist, a decision which has been sentimentalized variously by many people. I wish that Aristotle had said whether or not he was strongly touched by her decision. I suspect that he was not, and I suspect, too, that Aristophanes ("I never put a woman in love in any of my plays," *Frogs* 1044) understood the scene. But modern interpreters seem to me frequently to apply wrong requirements to our reading: 1) that we admire the self-sacrificial gesture of Iphigenia because presumably Euripides and his contemporaries would have,[3] and 2) that we take the specious reasoning she offers as the genuine grounds for her decision. People's resentment at being invited to engage in such emotional contortions may account for their annoyance at the play. In any case, if one chooses to sentimentalize Iphigenia's decision, he should do it on his own, aware that there is a recent tradition of interpreting it that way, but that there are neither strong nor ancient grounds for it. It may be justified by argument from the text, if at all.

I proceed to some details that argue for my reading of the structure of the play. Agamemnon's agony and self-pity, shown at the opening, are brought into ridicule by stages. Early on, the old slave's response to Agamemnon's expressed envy of those who have no status or responsibility does strike home (28ff.), yet the leader's apparent victimization by circumstances is cause for considerable sympathy. His decision in the prologue to do the proper thing, to tell half the truth at least (and frustrate the myth) is calculated to produce our approval. But though Menelaus, because of his villainy, initially reinforces our notions of Agamemnon as victim, Menelaus proceeds to impeach in detail Agamemnon's version of how he got his generalship and how he decided to sacrifice his daughter (333–365). Agamemnon, in reply, apparently cannot assert that he did not canvas for the generalship nor deny that he willingly (ἑκών / οὐ βίᾳ, 360–361) decided to trick the family and kill Iphigenia. Those facts remain even after

[3] I take as an egregious form of the intentional fallacy the widely held view that Euripides changed his point of view about the Trojan expedition when Iphigenia switchered hers, and required that the audience do so too. Conacher, 264, e.g., and Lesky, 397, make this the cornerstone of their readings. Mellert-Hoffman's improvement, her argument that pan-Hellenism is prominent early in the play, cannot do away with the way in which the early part of the play treats the expedition against Troy.

he describes the fatuity and insanity of the whole expedition from which he now dissociates himself. They provide the context for the second scene between the brothers in which Agamemnon claims that he must go through with the sacrifice because he has donned the yoke of necessity, while Menelaus reverses his own position and urges Agamemnon not to do it. Agamemnon commences as he had in the scene with the old slave: he bewails his lot and praises the condition of the commoner who can weep freely and say anything he wishes, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐκβαλεῖν μὲν αἰδοῦμαι δάκρυ (451). His *aidos* enslaves him, so he says:

προστάτην δὲ τοῦ βίου
τὸν ὄγκον ἔχομεν τῷ τ' ὄχλῳ δουλεύομεν (449–50).

But Agamemnon only claims to be the slave of the mob because he cannot shed a tear in his extremity. Were he free, he could cry without restraint. Euripides is using his familiar ironic technique. The audience cannot help noting that Agamemnon should wish for freedom to do something else. When he adds that his big problem now is how to handle Clytemnestra, who has come unbidden, he establishes the premises for the following action. The audience is invited to view Agamemnon's new *sophismata* (note line 443) with awareness that he has entered this course for the wrong reasons, that his sense of shame is false and misdirected, and that he is in fact driven by the ambition Menelaus described earlier.[4] When he imagines his encounter with Clytemnestra, ποῖον ὄμμα συμβαλῶ; (455), he directs the audience's attention to the symbol which Euripides repeatedly uses to articulate the action. Agamemnon and Menelaus have had considerable trouble looking one another in the eyes, but sharing the ancestry of Tantalus, Atreus, and Pelops, they have managed to compose their brotherly differences (320–1, 354, 378–82, 473–80, 506–512). The eyes of Clytemnestra, Achilles, Iphigenia, and the innocent Orestes have yet to be faced (note 620, 644, 678, 743, 1125).

Achilles' innocence and *aidos*, presented as a contrast to Agamemnon's shamelessness, is certainly parodied to a degree (and one would not expect Euripides, particularly in his final period, to let anyone off entirely). The centaur's instruction has prevented Achilles from picking up wicked human ways. His embarrassment at speaking alone to a woman, reinforced when

[4] I am aware of trends of interpretation which see profound implications in the defeat of human designs ("some *daimon* did it") or their promotion, and which look for structure and significance there. Vretska is exemplary on this play (see esp. p. 32). Thorough discussion of that approach is impossible here.

Clytemnestra seems to be making advances, is extreme. Yet such purity and simplicity are what the situation needs. And readers of the *Iliad* who agree with Achilles that casual invasion of another's rights should be met with vigorous opposition will applaud his decision to do whatever is necessary, and will be intrigued by the notion of Achilles acting out his wrath already at Aulis (explicitly suggested at 930).

Euripides dangles before us this possibility of a new wrath of Achilles only to remove it again, first by complications of circumstance and character, and then by removal of the grounds for the wrath. In circumstance, Achilles ends up alone with Clytemnestra in opposition to the sacrifice of Iphigenia. He has no Patroclus, no Myrmidons, and finally no support from the stolen bride. In character, Achilles cannot readily focus his anger, cannot define the grounds of his irritation: he delivers a long speech to Clytemnestra in which he explores his emotions and reasoning in response to Agamemnon's use of him. When he reaches the close logic about just where Agamemnon's sin lies, he becomes defensive – it is not the girl, but the fact that he was used without consultation (We recall the *Iliad* where he will not fight for the girl but dares them to take something else from him, something not voted him by the army, *Iliad* I 298ff.). "It was his obligation to ask for my name, the snare for the child, (and it *was* the snare) since Clytemnestra was primarily convinced to give up her child because I was to be the husband." So I interpret 962–4, and I add here the more difficult 965–7:

> χρῆν δ' αὐτὸν αἰτεῖν τοὐμὸν ὄνομ' ἐμοῦ πάρα,
> θήραμα παιδός· ἡ Κλυταιμήστρα δ' ἐμοὶ
> μάλιστ' ἐπείσθη θυγατέρ' ἐκδοῦναι πόσει.
> ἔδωκά τἂν Ἕλλησιν, εἰ πρὸς Ἴλιον
> ἐν τῷδ' ἔκαμνε νόστος· οὐκ ἠρνούμεθ' ἄν
> τὸ κοινὸν αὔξειν ὧν μέτ' ἐστρατευόμην.

(In 965 Mss. L and P read ἔδωκε.) Is Achilles saying finally that if he had been consulted he would have let his name be used to trick Iphigenia, but that since he was not he will fight to the death to keep her untouched? That is a natural interpretation of his words, though we might find some vagueness. His lack of general principles certainly reduces Achilles' action to a struggle to define the slight to his honor, a Euripidean touch which prepares for the deflation of his mission.

The innocence of Clytemnestra and Iphigenia parallels the *aidos* of Achilles. And since they are the family betrayed, they bring into focus

Agamemnon's deviousness as he uses them. Euripides' sensitive characterization of the women, aside from pursuit of the traditional question of whether Iphigenia's change of mind is justified, has received surprisingly little attention. Iphigenia's first childish suppliant speech, which is epitomized in the pretty phrase τ' ἀπ' ἐμοῦ σοφά, δάκρυα παρέξω (1214–15) leads us to contrast her with Agamemnon, the man of *sophismata,* who doesn't know what to do with his eyes and who longs for the *dysgeneia* which permits people to cry (446). Iphigenia's childishness is preceded by Clytemnestra's exposition of the view of the mature woman who begins by telling the truth about the past:

> ἀνακαλύψω γὰρ λόγους
> κοὐκέτι παρῳδοῖς χρησόμεθ' αἰνίγμασιν (1146–7)

The details she reveals are apparently Euripides' invention. They characterize the men who have been in charge of Clytemnestra – her husband and her father: a girl, Clytemnestra, was violated, her beloved was killed, she was the object of negotiation among men. Her affection, her desires, her investment in the child at her breast were of no account. Her father Tyndareus, in knightly fashion, awarded her to her violater when he supplicated. From that time she adjusted, became again the loyal wife and mother. Now again her touching love and her standards of loyalty are of no account when men's negotiations take place. Readers, and there are many, who fail to see the relevance of this to Iphigenia's role, mistake the import of Iphigenia's acceptance of the man's decisions about her. And they miss also the deep power of the play which comes from its archetypal image of the betrayal of the girl child by the father, her devastation followed by some kind of recovery to adulthood. Critics have found charming Clytemnestra's threatening Agamemnon with the *Agamemnon.* That is indeed what she does in part: Aeschylus, too, was interested in the ways women are or can be violated, and in standards and responsibilities of leadership. But Euripides' Clytemnestra is doing more: his Clytemnestra imagines that after Iphigenia's death Agamemnon's remaining children will grow up to judge him properly. But her *Agamemnon* will never play. She hypothesizes: you kill her, you leave us home to think about you, and then on slight occasion we will give you the reception you have earned.

> ἐπεὶ βραχείας προφάσεως ἔδει μόνον
> ἐφ' ᾗ σ' ἐγὼ καὶ παῖδες αἱ λελειμμέναι (feminine)
> δεξόμεθα δέξιν ἣν σὲ δέξασθαι χρεών. (1180–3)

The reception he deserves (in *dexis*, a word Euripides seems to have coined for this line, one can see the right hand raised) is death, of course, but judgement as well. But following Clytemnestra's fantasy, the audience of this play sees Iphigenia herself, most father-loving of his children, find a way to submit when she cannot win, or rather find a way to call submission victory, and then beg her mother not to be angry at her father.

Euripides thus juxtaposes women's with men's world and psychology. The psychology of both is fitted to their disparate circumstances. Achilles for a time gives promise of transcending his circumstances, i.e. of defining a heroic *arete*. The climax of Iphigenia's pathetic suppliance prepares for her subsequent submission and defeat: κακῶς ζῆν κρεῖσσον ἢ καλῶς θανεῖν (1252) is not in the end a permissable point of view, whatever specific content one gives the adverbs. In responding to her suppliance, Agamemnon pits his politician's rationalizations against her simplicity: he kills her not because he wants to, but because the army makes him do it; some Aphrodite makes them do it; if they are frustrated they will sack Argos and kill the family; hence she is a surrogate. The army's motive, he says, is to stop the intolerable barbarian violation of Greek women (1266), and his climax expresses his own agreement: "Greece's freedom rests with you and me, and an end to barbarians' violent spoliation of Greek wives" (1274–5). The whole preceding drama has prepared the audience for the proper reception of Agamemnon's concern for Greek womanhood and his abnegation of responsibility. (Euripides' invention of the violation of Clytemnestra and the murder of her first family is thus quite intelligible.) Clytemnestra and Iphigenia both reject his reasoning, as they should. "My father betrayed and deserted me," says Iphigenia (1312). When she later changes she is not turned around by Agamemnon but by Achilles, whose conversation she overhears after a gush of maidenly shyness at his entrance.[5] He does not say that she should change her mind, but that the army is coming and that he will resist, at the likely cost of his own life. His armor bearers enter, probably he begins to arm in heroic fashion and so is literally

[5] Blaiklock 120 considers as one of her possible motives "does she, in a sudden surge of girlish love for Achilles, decide to die that he may be safe, and cover, like her father, an inner motive with words of patriotic sacrifice?" He considers the play inconclusive. Funke reasserts Aristotle's view.

[6] All discussions of momentary external constraints (Persians, Spartans, rival vegetable sellers, or other) that might make Euripides write an (ineffective because discredited by the play) appeal to patriotism seem to me to be misdirected, circular arguments, false historicism. First we must establish that such an appeal was written. Describing the putative constraints which caused Euripides to write as he did is easy after that.

disarmed by Iphigenia as she steps forward for her second, her "heroic" speech. It is too late in the play for the audience to be taken in by her appeal to ravishment of Helen and by her statement that Greek freedom requires the expedition.[6] The audience will ask, "Why is she doing this?" They will see, and the staging will help them see, that she is saving Achilles and dying with what dignity she can. Each person in the audience would have produced his own response to the statement, "This man should not fight all the Greeks for one woman, nor die. For one man to see the light is better than for a thousand women" (1394). I suspect that they said "There goes Euripides again," and that they took Clytemnestra's view of the sacrifice. Some might, of course, have said "her death might be futile . . . but this does not diminish the significance of the freedom she asserts,"[7] or "This is garbage."

We can say, in sum, that in his treatment of plot and characters Euripides does something more interesting than to present the kinds of people who would have done the kinds of things the mythos implies, saying what is appropriate to the situation. Euripides' question, "How could it happen?" is impatient, incredulous. His characters are from a larger world than the *mythos* of the play – from contemporary Greece and from other *mythoi* – hence they strain to escape from the *mythos* of the sacrifice at Aulis, but in the end they succumb. It is an approach to tragedy that is not congenial, not even intelligible to everyone. But fate has kindly left us the *Iphigeneia*, prologue virtually intact but end mutilated, so that we can continue practicing how to appreciate it.

[7] Arrowsmith, p. xi. The appeal to Euripides' habitual use of young, self-sacrificing heroes and heroines requires establishing in the context of each play the import of each sacrifice. They seem various to me.

Bernd Seidensticker

Sacrificial Ritual in the *Bacchae*

The importance of ritual elements in the Bacchae has been stressed by many critics and is hardly astonishing in a play about the god Dionysos and his cult. In the following brief considerations I will confine myself to the pattern of sacrificial ritual which seems to lie beneath the dramatic action in the second half of the play.[1]

In the introduction to his masterly commentary of the Bacchae Dodds states: "There are features in his (i.e. Pentheus') story as the play presents it which look like traditional elements derived from ritual and are not easily accounted for on any other hypothesis." He then refers to the enchanting and bedevilling of Pentheus, the dressing, the perch on the sacred fir-tree, the pelting, and, finally, Agaue's delusion that she carries the head of a bull or lion, and her invitation to a banquet at the end.[2] Other details can be added.

The observation of numerous ritual elements in the second half of the Bacchae suggests several questions, of which the most important ones are: 1. Is there any significant connection between the various details? and 2. Why did Euripides incorporate so many ritual elements into the Bacchae? Dodds' cautious reserve in using the rich ritual material of the Bacchae for the interpretation of the play may be seen as a reaction against the so-called Cambridge-school which tended to read too much ritual into Greek drama.[3] But it may also indicate that he felt that without an answer

[1] Other important aspects of the interrelation between ritual myth, and tragedy, which could be or have been discussed with special reference to the Bacchae cannot be taken up here; besides the literature quoted in n. 2 and n. 3 the reader is referred to J. P. Guépin, The Tragic Paradox (Amsterdam 1968); and to J. Kott, The Eating of the Gods (New York 1974); still of interest A. G. Bather, The Problem of the Bacchae, Journ. of Hell. Stud. 14 (1894) 244–63.

[2] E. R. Dodds, Euripides Bacchae (Oxford 1960²) XXV–XXVIII.

[3] J. E. Harrison, Themis, A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion (Cambridge 1927²); G. Murray, in: J. E. Harrison, Themis, 341ff.; id. Aeschylus (Oxford 1940) 4ff.; id. Euripides and his Age (Oxford 1955²); for comedy cf. F. M. Cornford, The Origins of Attic Comedy (New York 1961 [ed. Th. H. Gaster]).

to these questions the mere enumeration of ritual elements remained unsatisfactory. It seems to me, however, that the recent studies of Burkert[4] have opened the way for a new attempt at a satisfying solution. In his article on "Greek Tragedy and Sacrificial Ritual" Burkert argued, quite convincingly in my opinion, that tragedy originated in the context of ritual sacrifice. "The τραγῳδοί are originally a troop of masked men who have to perform the sacrifice of the τράγος which falls due in spring" and "τραγῳδία emancipated itself from the τράγος, and yet the essence of the sacrifice still pervades tragedy even in its maturity. In Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides there still stands in the background, if not in the center, the pattern of the sacrifice, the ritual slaying, θύειν."[5]

As examples Burkert chooses Aeschylus' Agamemnon, Sophocles' Trachiniae, and Euripides' Medea. No play, however, shows a deeper connection between the ritual of sacrifice and tragedy than the Bacchae. It can be shown that the dramatic action of the last 600 lines constantly evokes the sacrificial killing. In the following summary I will follow the individual steps of the ritual as analysed by Meuli in his fundamental study "Griechische Opferbräuche"[6] and implemented by Burkert in the quoted article and in the first chapter of his book "Homo Necans".[7] Step by step I will point out the corresponding scenes in the Bacchae. Since I am interested in the basic pattern, minor details will be passed over.

1. First the victim is adorned for the festival; garlands, fillets, and other kinds of ornaments[8] indicate that he is now sacred property. In the Bacchae this preparatory step is, of course, represented by the dressing of Pentheus.[9] Dodds has pointed to the significant irony of ἀνατίθημι in line 934: ἰδού,

[4] W. Burkert, Greek Tragedy and Sacrificial Ritual, Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 7 (1966) 87–121 (henceforth Burkert, GRBS); id. Homo Necans. Interpretationen altgriechischer Opferriten und Mythen (Berlin 1972; henceforth Burkert, Homo Necans); id. Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche (Stuttgart 1977) 99ff. (henceforth Burkert, Griechische Religion).

[5] Burkert, GRBS 115, 116.

[6] K. Meuli, Griechische Opferbräuche, in: Phyllobolia, Festschrift für P. von der Mühll (Basel 1946) 185–288 = Ges. Schriften (Basel 1975) II 907–1021.

[7] The interpretation of many details of the ritual is controversial; for further literature on the subject the reader is referred to Burkert, GRBS 102 n. 34, and Homo Necans 9 n. 2.

[8] Cf. e.g. Hom. Od. 3,432ff., where the horns of the bull are gilded, or the sacrifice to Dionysos ἀνθρωποροραίστης on Tenedos, where the calf wore the cothurni of the god to whom it was sacrificed (Aelian, nat. anim. 12,34).

[9] This, of course, is not to say that the dressing and the "toilet-scene" (Dodds) do not have other important functions, and the same is true for the following motifs and scenes; for the toilet-scene see my 'Comic Elements in the Bacchae', Amer. Journ. of Philol. 99 (1978) 303–20.

σὺ κόσμει· σοὶ γὰρ ἀνακείμεσθα δή. 'To you I am made over now' "will suggest that the king is now in some sense 'dedicated'."[10] There can be little doubt that it is the god himself who is sacrificed in his representative or substitute, e.g. a goat or a bull. No visualization of this crucial aspect of the sacrifice could therefore be more effective than the dressing. For we have to remember that after the dressing Pentheus very much resembles his divine cousin, the god who prepares him for the sacrifice.[11]

2. Then the victim is led along in a πομπή, a procession, be it ever so little. Euripides' words at the beginning of the messenger's report leave no doubt that he wants to evoke the impression of a ritual procession:

> Αγ. ἐπεὶ θεράπνας τῆσδε Θηβαίας χθονὸς
> λιπόντες ἐξέβημεν Ἀσωποῦ ῥοάς,
> λέπας Κιθαιρώνειον εἰσεβάλλομεν
> Πενθεύς τε κἀγώ—δεσπότῃ γὰρ εἰπόμην—
> ξένος θ' ὃς ἡμῖν πομπὸς ἦν θεωρίας. (1043–47).

They are leaving the profane, the limits of the polis, and move towards the sacred, a grassy glen in Mount Kithairon,[12] where the participants in the ritual, the Bacchants are already waiting. Dionysos himself is the πομπὸς θεωρίας. Already in line 965 he characterized himself as πομπὸς σωτήριος.[13]

It is important that the sacrificial animal should not be dragged along, but should press forward voluntarily. This is a sign that it is led along by the god willingly.[14] Pentheus' enthusiastic wish to go to Mount Kithairon gains a deeper meaning when we see it as part of the underlying sacrificial pattern. Pentheus is led willingly, and indeed by the god himself.[15]

[10] Dodds ad 934.

[11] The sudden transformation of the θεομάχος into an alter Dionysos and the twin-like similarity of the god and his victim must have made a striking visual impression.

[12] The destination of the procession is the old sacred place with the sacrificial stone or altar, smeared with blood (Burkert, Homo Necans 10f.; Griechische Religion 101 (95 n. 51a); here it is Mount Cithaeron, the same 'sacred place', where Actaeon was torn to pieces by his own dogs (1291).

[13] Both θεωρία and σωτήριος have religious connotations; cf. J. Roux, Euripide, Les Bacchantes (Paris 1970) ad 963–65, 1046f.

[14] Cf. Burkert, GRBS 106f.; Homo Necans 10f. with testimonia and literature; Guépin (*supra* n 1) 100ff.; the famous carpetscene in Aesch. Ag. has the same ritual connotations; for Euripides' voluntary human victims cf. J. Schmitt, Freiwilliger Opfertod bei Euripides (Giessen 1921).

[15] Cf. Ba. 920 (819, 1080) and the cult-title Dionysos Katēgemōn; Pentheus' willingness is repeatedly stressed (810–816; 829f.; 912f.); for a detailed interpretation of the crucial

3. When the procession reaches the traditional sacred place everything is made ready for the sacrifice. So it is in the Bacchae:

> ἦν δ' ἄγκος ἀμφίκρημνον, ὕδασι διάβροχον,
> πεύκαισι συσκιάζον, ἔνθα μαινάδες
> καθῆντ' ἔχουσαι χεῖρας ἐν τερπνοῖς πόνοις.
> αἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν θύρσον ἐκλελοιπότα
> κισσῷ κομήτην αὖθις ἐξανέστεφον,
> αἱ δ', ἐκλιποῦσαι ποικίλ' ὡς πῶλοι ζυγά,
> βακχεῖον ἀντέκλαζον ἀλλήλαις μέλος. (1051–57)

The Bacchants are waiting, busy with holy preparations (1053) and chanting holy songs (1057).[16]

4. Now the animal is brought to or put on the altar, and it is interesting to note that again a sign of acquiescence on the part of the victim is important. "The animal," according to Burkert, "was supposed to express its consent by bowing its head."[17] Pentheus himself asks to climb the ἐλάτη, the fir-tree, sacred to Dionysos,[18] which here serves as the altar (1058–62). The request is granted; the god accepts the sacrifice, puts him on top of the altar, and disappears (1063ff.).[19]

The sacrifice proper can begin. Burkert: "There is a prayer (a), a moment of silence and concentration (b); then all participants throw the οὐλαὶ (the barley) 'forward' at the victim and the altar." (c)[20] The sacrifice in the Bacchae follows this pattern precisely.

a) The god himself speaks the prayer:

> ἐκ δ' αἰθέρος φωνή τις, ὡς μὲν εἰκάσαι
> Διόνυσος, ἀνεβόησεν· Ὦ νεάνιδες,

scene 810ff. see E. R. Schwinge, Die Verwendung der Stichomythie in den Dramen des Euripides (Heidelberg 1968) 377ff.

[16] Some details of the normal preparations for the sacrifice (Burkert, GRBS 107; Homo Necans 11) are 'missing' in the Bacchae or exchanged for others (e.g. water and barley are not carried around the altar); for the cathartic washing before the procession and immediately before the sacrifice cf. 765ff.; the fact that the women have left home and their matrimonial duties may have reminded the audience of the occasional postulate of sexual abstinence before the sacrifice.

[17] Burkert, GRBS 107.

[18] For Dionysos as 'Lord of the Trees' cf. Nilsson, Geschichte der griechischen Religion (München 1967³) 584f. (572 n. 5); for the special importance of the ἐλάτη cf. 109f., 684, 1061, 1098; and Dodds ad 109f.

[19] There can be little doubt that the perching of Pentheus has a ritual origin; cf. Dodds ad 1058–75 and 109f.; Bather, supra n. 1, 251f.

[20] Burkert, GRBS 107 (a, b, c, my addition).

ἄγω τὸν ὑμᾶς κἀμὲ τἀμά τ' ὄργια
γέλων τιθέμενον· ἀλλὰ τιμωρεῖσθέ νιν. (1078–81)[21]

b) Then there is a sudden silence:

σίγησε δ' αἰθήρ, σῖγα δ' ὕλιμος νάπη
φύλλ' εἶχε, θηρῶν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἤκουσας βοήν. (1084f.)

and a brief moment of concentration:

αἳ δ' ὡσὶν ἠχὴν οὐ σαφῶς δεδεγμέναι
ἔστησαν ὀρθαὶ καὶ διήνεγκαν κόρας. (1086f.)

c) Then the Bacchants come rushing towards the altar-tree and throw – not barley, but – stones, branches, and thyrsoi at the victim.

διὰ δὲ χειμάρρου νάπης
ἀγμῶν τ' ἐπήδων θεοῦ πνοαῖσιν ἐμμανεῖς.
ὡς δ' εἶδον ἐλάτῃ δεσπότην ἐφήμενον,
πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοῦ χερμάδας κραταιβόλους
ἔρριπτον, ἀντίπυργον ἐπιβᾶσαι πέτραν,
ὄζοισί τ' ἐλατίνοισιν ἠκοντίζετο.
ἄλλαι δὲ θύρσους ἵεσαν δι' αἰθέρος
Πενθέως, στόχον δύστηνον· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἤνυτον. (1093–1100)[22]

The much discussed throwing of the barley at the beginning of the sacrifice has been explained by Burkert as "primeval gesture of aggression: lapida-

[21] The prayer has been interpreted by Nilsson, supra n. 19, as call to the god to participate; but cf. Burkert, Homo Necans 11, and A. W. Adkins, Εὔχομαι, Εὐχωλή, and Εὖχος in Homer, Class. Quart. 19 (1969) 20–33. Here it is answered by the light-epiphany of the god (1082f.); cf. Dodds ad 1082f. (and 594f.).

[22] The killing of Pentheus takes the form of a hunt. Pentheus the hunter (1020, cf. 226, 239, 434f., 436, 452) has turned into the prey (848, 988ff., 1021, 1102, 1108, 1142ff., 1169ff., 1241). The bacchants are called the quick hounds of Lyssa (977). When Dionysos summons them, they come running towards the tree, surround it, take aim at Pentheus with various missiles, and finally bring down the "animal" (1108) and kill it. Agaue then returns with her gory hunting-trophy and in the first part of the exodos she and the chorus praise the hunt and Dionysos, the great hunter (1190ff.); for the importance of hunting-imagery throughout the Bacchae cf. Dodds, passim, Winnington-Ingram, Euripides and Dionysos (Cambridge 1948) cf. index s. v. hunt; and recently W. C. Scott, Two Suns over Thebes, Trans. Amer. philol. Assoc. (105) 1975, 337ff. (334–39). Orphism identified Dionysos with the old hunting-god Zagreus (Pauly-Wissowa RE 5,1 Sp. 1014, Kern; Etym. Magn. 406, 49; cf. Eur. F 472 N²). In this context the hunt has strong ritualistic connotations. Sacrifice-rituals often appear as ritualized hunt. The evidence is widespread throughout the ancient world; often only the details remind us of what may be the oldest form of blood-sacrifice, when man still was a hunter (cf. Meuli, supra n. 6, passim; Burkert, Homo Necans 20ff., 53f.).

tion, transformed into something harmless, as in the φυλλοβολία. Indeed, instead of the barley, leaves can be used, and at least in one instance, stones."[23] Stones are used in the Bacchae, stones and the sacred fir-branches and thyrsoi. The point is that everybody, not only the priest, takes part in the killing and thus everyone is guilty and innocent at the same time.

6. The preparations are complete. The participants have formed the sacred circle around the victim (cf. Ba. 1106). The priest steps forward and starts the sacrifice. Again the language Euripides has chosen, leaves no doubt that he wants his audience to see the killing of Pentheus as sacrifice, however perverted it may be:

> πρώτη δὲ μήτηρ ἦρξεν ἱερέα φόνου
> καὶ προσπίτνει νιν· (1114f.).

Agaue is called ἱερέα (1114) and the words πρώτη and ἦρξεν recall the technical term for the beginning of the sacrifice: ἄρχεσθαι, κατάρχεσθαι.[24]

7. "Now the fatal stroke follows. At this moment the women scream, ὀλολύζουσιν . . .; this marks the emotional climax of the θυσία."[25] The cry is probably supposed to drown the death-rattle of the victim.[26] The parallel in the Bacchae is again obvious. Agaue, the priestess deals the first blow, the two sisters assist, and the yelling of the other Bacchants drowns Pentheus' last cry:

> ἦν δὲ πᾶσ' ὁμοῦ βοή,
> ὃ μὲν στενάζων ὅσον ἐτύγχαν' ἐμπνέων,
> αἱ δ' ἠλάλαζον. (1131–33)[27]

[23] Burkert, GRBS 107f.; the explanation of the οὐλοχύται is highly controversial; for testimonia and a brief survey of other interpretations the reader is referred to Burkert.

[24] The cutting of a few hairs from the victim's forehead, the seemingly harmless last delay of the sacrifice (cf. e.g. Hom. Od. 3,446, 14,422; Eur. Alc. 74–76 (Dale ad loc.); El. 811f.; Nilsson, supra n. 19, 142; Burkert, GRBS 108) is missing in the Bacchae, unless we want to see a slight indication of it in the fact that Pentheus rips the mitra and – if he wears a wig (this has been doubted by Roux, supra n. 13, ad 831 and 1115–18; but cf. Dodds ad 831–33) – the wig from his head and throws it away (1115ff.).

[25] Burkert, GRBS 108.

[26] Cf. Burkert, Homo Necans 12, and, slightly different, Griechische Religion 102; but see Nilsson, supra n. 19, 150; "Es ist doch wohl nur ein unmittelbarer Ausbruch des Gefühls in einer nervenerregenden Situation nach Frauenart".

[27] Euripides uses ἀλαλάζω instead of ὀλολύζω, which seems to have been the 'vox propria' in the sacrificial context; whereas ἀλαλάζει is defined by Hesychius as: ἐπινικίως ἠχεῖ (cf. ἀλαλαγμος: ἐπινίκιος ὕμνος). But difference between the two parallel onomatopoetic words (to yell ὀλολοί resp. ἀλαλαί cf. ἐλελίζειν and Latin ululare) is slight (cf. C. V. Valckenaer, Euripides tragoedia Phoenissae [1824] ad 337). In Euripides the joyous cry of

8. Then the dead animal is dismembered (a), parts are burnt, the internal organs, the σπλάγχνα, are eaten, and finally the rest is prepared for the main meal (b) which forms the quite secular ending of the sacrifice. In the Bacchae the dividing of the animal (a) has the form of the primeval dionysiac tearing, the σπαραγμός (1125ff., 1209f., 1219–21); and when Agaue, after a short choral ode (1153ff.), appears with the head of Pentheus, she invites the chorus to a feast (b): μέτεχέ νυν θοίνας (1184). The theme is taken up again in line 1242 when she urges her father Kadmos to invite his friends to a meal: κάλει φίλους ἐς δαῖτα.

In line 1246f. Kadmos, in his ironic answer to the horrible request of Agaue, uses words which clearly show that he (and Euripides) understands the destruction of Pentheus as a sacrifice:

> καλὸν τὸ θῦμα καταβαλοῦσα δαίμοσιν
> ἐπὶ δαῖτα Θήβας τάσδε κἀμὲ παρακαλεῖς.[28]

9. Often the skull of the sacrified bull or goat was preserved and set up in a conspicuous place as lasting evidence of the sacred act.[29] In the Bacchae Agaue returns with the head of Pentheus which she takes for the head of an animal, a young bull or lion, and wants to nail it to the place front as a witness of her deed:

> φέρω δ' ἐν ὠλέναισιν, ὡς ὁρᾷς, τάδε
> λαβοῦσα τἀριστεῖα, σοῖσι πρὸς δόμοις
> ὡς ἀγκρεμασθῇ· σὺ δέ, πάτερ, δέξαι χεροῖν· (1238–40).[30]

10. Finally, in some cases the feeling of guilt, which in the sacrifice is so closely connected with the feeling of exaltation, finds a telling expression in the punishment or mock-punishment of the priest who killed the victim.[31]

ἀλαλαί may be raised in the orgiastic cult of the Great Mother (Hel. 1344?; 1352) and by Dionysos himself (Ba. 593; cf. Cycl. 65) and in HF 981 Herakles ἠλάλαξεν when he "sacrifices" (922ff.) his children (cf. Soph. F 543 R = 491 N²). Euripides may have preferred ἀλαλάζειν to ὀλολύζειν because it fits the situation of the hunt and is so close to ὀλολύζειν that the connotation of sacrifice cannot be missed.

[28] καταβάλλειν: cf. Hesych: καταβολή = θυσία; Eur. Or. 1603; Isocr. 2,20; Dodds ad 1246f.; for another sacrificial term cf. 858: κατασφαγείς.

[29] Theophr. Char. 21,7; cf. Dodds ad 1214; Nilsson, the Minoan-Mycenian Religion and its survival in Greek Religion (Lund 1950²) 232ff.; Meuli, supra n. 6, 233ff.; Burkert, HomoNecans 20ff. (testimonia and literature); for further examples in folk-customs see Bather, supra n. 4, 257f.

[30] Cf. 1212ff.; for the dedication of human skulls cf. e.g. IT 74f.

[31] Meuli, supra n. 6, 228ff., and esp. 275f.–281; Burkert, GRBS 109.

At the Buphonia in Athens[32] e. g. the priest, immediately after the sacrifice, throws away the axe and flees, and the sacrificial meal is followed by a trial in which finally the knife is pronounced guilty and thrown into the sea. In other places the priest is expelled. In the Bacchae Agaue the priestess is told by Dionysos to leave Thebes immediately.[33] The exile can be explained as the regular punishment for murder. In the context of the sacrifice-pattern, however, it gets and additional ritualistic meaning.[34]

Our first question has found an answer. As the analysis has shown, there is indeed a significant connection between the various ritual elements which scholars have pointed out in the second half of the Bacchae. From the dressing-scene[35] to the exodos each step in the dramatic action corresponds to an important step in the sacrificial ritual. In all probability Euripides, to make this possible, passed over or changed another version of the myth which involved a fight between an armed Pentheus and the maenads.[36] The remarkable completeness of the pattern and the fact that Euripides repeatedly uses religious terminology which evokes the sacrifice leave little doubt that these correspondences are not accidental, nor only due to the traditional quality of the myth, as Dodds seems to believe, but that Euripides deliberately and constantly calls upon the audience to see and understand the dramatic and emotional climax of his tragedy as sacrifice.

If this answer to the first question is correct, then the second question becomes more urgent. Why did Euripides perform the systematic incorporation of these ritual elements?

Burkert's considerations about the origin of tragedy seem to offer a possible answer. Accepting the ancient explanation of the term τραγῳδία as "song for the goat", "song at the sacrifice of the goat",[37] he argues, as I mentioned above, that tragedy originated and developed within the context

[32] For the Buphonia cf. Deubner, Attische Feste (Berlin 1932) 158ff.; Nilsson, supra n. 19, 152ff.; Meuli, supra n. 6, 275f.

[33] Cf. pap. fr. 2b Dodds Appendix, p. 243; Chr. Pat. 1674.

[34] The deus-ex-machina-scene also fits into the pattern. For although in the normal sacrifice the god, of course, does not actually appear, the epiphany can be seen as the ultimate goal of the sacred action.

[35] As mentioned above, the preceding scene, in which Dionysos 'persuades' an eager Pentheus to go alone and dressed as a maenad, is the necessary dramatic preparation and has in itself strong ritualistic connotations (willingness of the victim); sacrificial imagery (full of tragic irony) with reference to the impending sacrifice on Mount Cithaeron for the first time in lines 794 and 796.

[36] Cf. Aesch. Eum. 25f.; unfortunately the literary and archaeological evidence is meagre.

[37] Burkert, GRBS 89–102; but cf. A. Lesky, Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen (Göttingen 1972[3]) 32 and 47.

of the ritual killing of the goat (τράγος), and in the attempt to "explain the seeming triviality and pointlessness of the etymology"[38] he points to the fundamental importance of blood-sacrifice for early society. Defining with Meuli sanguinary sacrifice as "ritual killing", he understands sacrifice as social precaution and means to overcome the terrible threat of intraspecific aggression. As a shared emotional experience sacrifice unites and binds together the group, the tribe, the polis, the society. It centers around destruction of life, but secures the continuity of life. Horror and the feeling of guilt and remorse therefore mingle with exaltation and joy.[39]

If we conceive sacrifice as ritualized killing and accept Burkert's hypothesis about the primordial genetic connection between sacrifice and tragedy, we can understand tragedy as the aesthetic ritual originating from the sacrificial ritual, accompanying or even imitating and gradually replacing sacrifice and its social functions.[40]

The complete correspondence between the second half of the Bacchae and the ritual pattern of sacrifice seems to suggest the possibility that this is what Euripides thought also. All his life the author has been a ποιητὴς σοφός,[41] a creative theorist and restless innovator of tragedy and its theatrical, formal, and intellectual traditions. When he, at the end of his life and in a biographical situation[42] which must have stimulated a critical review of his life and work, writes a play about Dionysos, the god to whom tragedy owes its origin and continuing existence, we except an implicit commentary on the essence and function of the poetic medium through which he expressed himself for more than half a century. And indeed: the Bacchae, with good reason, can be called a tragedy about tragedy – and that in a double sense: 1. Presenting his dramatic version of the myth Euripides continuously reminds his audience that they are watching a

[38] Burkert, GRBS 102.

[39] Burkert, GRBS 106, 109; Homo Necans 45ff., 51.

[40] Thus the tremendous importance of sacrifice and sacrificial imagery in 5th century tragedy makes good sense; cf. Burkert, GRBS 109ff.; Guépin, supra n. 1, passim (cf. the impressive list of sacrificial victims in Greek tragedy, pp. 1–5); and especially the detailed studies of F. Zeitlin, The Motif of Corrupted Sacrifice in Aeschylus' Oresteia, Trans. Amer. philol. Assoc. 96 (1965) 463–508; Postscript to Sacrificial Imagery in the Oresteia, *ib.* 97 (1966) 645–653; The Argive Festival of Hera and Euripides' Electra, *ib.* 101, (1970) 645–669. For the Athenian audience not only the bull-sacrifice at the beginning of the festival but also the altar in the middle of the orchestra (for the θυμέλη cf. Burkert, GRBS 101f.; and Guépin, supra n. 1, 16–18) will have been a vivid reminder of the close connection of sacrifice and tragedy. "The memory of sacrifice stands in the center of the Dionysiac performance" (Burkert 102).

[41] R. P. Winnington-Ingram, Euripides, Ποιητὴς σοφός, Arethusa 2 (1969) 127–42.

[42] The self-chosen 'exile' in Macedon.

theater performance, an aesthetic ritual. There is e.g. the god transforming himself into an 'actor'; the double chorus, one representing the other on stage; the dressing of Pentheus; and Agaue running on stage with the mask (head) of Pentheus.[43] 2. By evoking the sacrifice-pattern behind the dramatic action Euripides points out the essence of tragedy as ritualized sacrifice. Even at the final stage of its development, in the sophisticated aesthetic constructs of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, tragedy has preserved its basic function. Once a year it unites the polis in the shared emotional experience of killing: destructive and affirmative at the same time, horrible and exalting, creating ἔλεος and φόβος, but at the same time providing κάθαρσις, the cleansing relief of the same tragic emotions.

[43] As J. Corelis told me, this aspect of the Bacchae has been discussed for the first time by H. Foley (unpubl. Stanford-dissertation) and will find a detailed treatment by himself in the next future.

KENNETH J. RECKFORD

"Let Them Eat Cakes" – Three Food Notes to Aristophanes' *Peace*

I

As the Greek farmers in Aristophanes' *Peace* return to a natural, happy way of living, they could say of Peace what Demetrius says of his old and new love, Helena:

> . . . But, like a sickness, did I loathe this food;
> But, as in health, come to my natural taste,
> Now do I wish it, love it, long for it,
> And will for evermore be true to it.[1]

Only after they remember with erotic and nostalgic passion their former *diaita* in the peaceable countryside, will people understand how badly they were deceived amid the confusion of war. Hence Hermes' account comes late. With godlike authority, he makes the usual Aristophanic points: that the flame of war was fanned by private interests; that war escalated of its own momentum; and that the country folk, hungry and confused, were cheated by politicians into rejecting peace overtures and 'worrying' rich allies whom these same politicians blackmailed (641–3):

> Εἶτ' ἂν ὑμεῖς τοῦτον ὥσπερ κυνίδι' ἐσπαράττετε·
> ἡ πόλις γὰρ ὠχριῶσα κἀν φόβῳ καθημένη,
> ἅττα διαβάλοι τις αὐτῇ, ταῦτ' ἂν ἥδιστ' ἤσθιεν.

The play on διαβάλοι suggests that the politicians fed the people with slanders, as you throw food to dogs (creatures fierce with hunger, but also recalling the weak, starving puppies to which the Megarians were compared earlier).[2] It is a fine comic idea. It is also more appalling than critics have realized.

The point is, that the Athenians were fed regularly on a lot of crap. Hermes' lines should recall the business of kneading shit-cakes in the

[1] Shakespeare, Midsummer Night's Dream IV, 1, 172–5.

[2] See *Peace* 24–25 (pigs, dogs as scavengers) and 481–3 (the Megarian puppies weak with starvation); *cf. Knights* 629–30 for a diet of slanders making people pale and sick.

Prologue, where the fastidious dung-beetle will not just shove in anything he finds, like an ordinary scavenging pig *or dog*, but insists that it be high-grade and mashed, like a lady insisting on nice round barley-cakes. All this is good dirty fun. It relaxes the audience, restoring them to the feces- and mud-pie pleasures of early childhood. But it also indicates a certain confusion between eating and excreting – a useful combination for piloting dung-beetles, but still a confusion from which people of taste had best emerge.

The Athenians were confusing peace with dung when they 'threw her out with pitchfork screams'. But that was not their fault. The demagogues fuddled their wits, especially the Tanner (too horrible to be named) who always 'mixed' and 'stirred everything up'. Earlier, in the Prologue, a budding literary critic in the audience tried to guess the symbolic relevance of the dung-beetle (43–48). 'I think, the riddle's aimed at Cleon. The point must be, he's eating shit in Hades!' The joke scores extra points, against Cleon – and against literary critics. It suggests that Cleon gets his offal but just desserts among the famous sinners in Hell. It also pays a tribute of sorts to his colossal vulgarity, his muckraking power, his sheer 'shit-eating' shamelessness.[3] Cleon was horrible, but he was *impressively* horrible. And the Ionian's guess was not far off. As it turns out, Cleon kept the sick Athenians on what was, in another sense, his own natural diet.

Not that we should undervalue dung. It has great potential for farmers and for comic poets. After all, that dirty dung-beetle out of Aesop carries Trygaeus where nobler, more tragic steeds cannot bear their hero-riders; and the relaxation of the crude prologue fuels the larger catharsis, the recovery of good humor and comic perspective, that *The Peace* offers its audience. Hence it is fully appropriate that the dung-beetle should be translated to Olympus, to draw Zeus' chariot with the lightning, and to sup delicately on Ganymede's – *ambrosia*. The dirty joke recalls the Prologue ('He says he wants it *mashed*!'). It also has a certain charm, suggesting as it does a

[3] The normal insult appears in *Plutus* 706, where Asclepius is called a σκατοφάγος. The motif is elaborated in *Plut.* 302–6, where Circe persuades Odysseus' followers as wild boars (a play on κάπρος/κόπρος) to eat shit-cakes that she personally shapes for them. All this seems aimed at the courtesan Lais and her client Philonidas, who allegedly had a taste for this perversion. Contrast the improved eating habits of the poor young gigolo (1004–05), now happily released from the need, which to be sure was less drastic, to 'eat' the old woman's 'lentil soup' – just plain ordinary cunnilingus.
Note also that at *Knights* 1399, the Paphlagonian (Cleon) will make sausages by 'mixing dog-do with donkey-do'.

dung-beetle's version of milk and honey in paradise. The creature's reception on Olympus is a high tribute to our lower selves, not unlike the mystical ascent of Eliot's Hippopotamus. In a different way, Trygaeus reminds us of comedy's bottom line when he proclaims that nothing, not even a lamb's wool *thôrax* as joint stool, is too good for his *prôktos*.[4]

No: one must not be ungrateful for fundamental blessings. But one may be grateful to emerge from the monstrously perverted world of dung-eating, dogs, and demagogues – in short, Cleon's world – into a realm of good food and drink, good sights and sounds and smells, peace and country matters and sex and sport and holiday, all rightly and joyfully confused. Whitman includes the movement 'from the dung cakes of the opening line to the wedding cakes of the last' among the significant reversals of the play's imagery.[5] It helps also to think that in moving toward peace, Athens is showing, and rediscovering, better taste.

II

As part of the ritual establishment of Peace, Trygaeus prays to the goddess not to tease the Greeks, but rather to release them from wars and rumbles, to stop their overly clever mutual suspicions, and to 'mix us Hellenes back together in a good juice of friendship, as at first, and make our spirits milder with a forgiving temper' (996–9):

μεῖξον δ' ἡμᾶς τοὺς Ἕλληνας
πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
φιλίας χυλῷ καὶ συγγνώμῃ
τινὶ πραοτέρᾳ κέρασον τὸν νοῦν·

Platnauer has explained the conceit nicely. It refers to a theory of humors: "Trygaeus here prays that all men may be, as it were, recompounded; this time with a larger mixture of the juices of friendliness and mercy, qualities

[4] Lines 1236–37; Compare *Plutus* 817–8: one aspect of the new wealth abounding in Chremylus' house is that 'we wipe ourselves, no longer with stones, but with garlic cloves for sheer luxury' (a play on σκοροδίοις/σκῶρ). Rabelais refines this honest concern in Ch. 13 of his *Gargantua*; see esp. p. 46, 1955 Pleiade edition):

> Mais, concluent, je dys et maintiens qu'il n'y a tel torchecul que d'un oyzon bien dumeté, pourveu qu'on luy tienne la teste entre les jambes. Et m'en croyez sus mon honneur. Car vous sentez au trou du cul une volupté mirifique. . . .

[5] C. H. Whitman, Aristophanes and the Comic Hero (Cambridge, Mass. 1964) 110; see also J. Henderson, The Maculate Muse (New Haven and London 1975) 63, on the play's movement away from scatology towards a happy natural sexuality.

in which they are deficient." But it is not enough to appreciate the witty conceit (which also implies the mixing of nonviolent winebowls); we must also regard the image with the more literal vision of a child or a comic poet.[6] If we do this, we arrive at the great question of good cooking skills *versus* bad.

There is, most obviously, a contrast between Peace's delicate blending and stirring of ingredients and the way in which War prepared to pound up the Greek cities in his mixed salad. In that earlier scene (236–288), each nationality was identified by pun or association with some product: Prasian leeks, Megarian garlic (very strong: it makes you cry), Sicilian cheese, Attic honey. The satire is effective. Trygaeus remains calm enough until his 'dear' honey is involved. References to those great pestles of war, Cleon and Brasidas, now happily unavailable, build on Aristophanes' earlier comic idea of Cleon as the monstrous pestle or soup-ladle that kept everything stirred up for private gain.[7] But still more, the scene of the great bogeyman War with (as I think) his gigantic mortar and other culinary props transforms Greek politics and war into that early childhood world of fairy tale or folktale in which orally fixated ogres, witches, and goblins are always trying to cook people and eat them.[8] The point is that *everybody* is vicitimized by War and his crazy salad. Cleon himself was only, in the end, a tool of War. But Peace's cooking is gentle and delicate by comparison; and so, in a different way, is Trygaeus' conduct of the ritual sacrifice and feast, in which he is thoroughly in charge (as against being a helpless victim), and in which a sheep may be sacrificed and eaten without bloodshed: a tribute to Peace – and a convenience for the producer!

Trygaeus' prayer also involves the potent motif of *magic cooking*. The cooking of some person in a magic cauldron, so that he attains rejuvenation,

[6] The child's vision is admirably caught by M. Sendak, In The Night Kitchen (1970). Mickey falls into the Night Kitchen, where three giant bakers try to use him as milk for their Mickey-cake; but he eludes them, ingeniously kneads a dough airplane, and gets milk from the Milky Way. They get their cake after all; *he* gets his triumph.

[7] See *Knights* 973–984 and the discussion by H.-J. Newiger, Metapher und Allegorie (München 1957) 114. Newiger compares *Ach.* 978–87, where War is portrayed as a drunken, disruptive boor.

[8] Some scholars, sensing anticlimax in lines 240–1, have suggested that War actually appeared as a ridiculous little man: thus H. Steiger, Die Groteske und die Burleske bei Aristophanes, Philologus 89 (1934) 179, and O. Seel, Aristophanes (Stuttgart 1960) 39–40. I still prefer the fairy tale bogeyman who is very dangerous but can be foiled, who counterbalances the colossal (statue of) Peace, and whose mortar and foodstuffs were surely huge, funny props: compare the personified Cheesegrater & Co. in the dog's trial in *The Wasps*.

has close affinities for Aristophanes both with techniques of behavioral modification, especially through rhetoric, and with the comic poet's own Dionysian power of transforming human nature by putting people in a good humor. In *The Knights*, which is full of grotesque and perverted images of cooking and eating, the Sausageseller must first beat the Paphlagonian (Cleon) at his own low game; but then, promoted as it were from butcher's apprentice to Magic Cook, he boils old Demos back into his oldtime vigor, intelligence, and glory.[9] It is a fairy tale solution, very satisfying albeit quite unreal. But Trygaeus' prayer comes even closer to *Wasps* 875–884, where Bdelycleon prays to Apollo Agyieus that his new therapy may prove successful in transforming Philocleon's bitter disposition. "Make his vinegar- and oak-tough temper to cease. Mix in a little honey in his heart-y, as in condensed wine, so that he will be gentle to people . . ." To mix a metaphor: even the old wasp's temper is to be sweetened by the bee's honey.

The sausage seller, later known as Agoracritos, succeeded with his magic cooking (though ironies remain); Bdelycleon's new rite failed in the end to reform his father.[10] By contrast, in *The Peace* the saving transformations simply ensue upon the goddess's return. Recover Peace, Aristophanes seems to say; and all else follows, including rejuvenation of the heart and a new gentleness of mind and spirit for everybody (346f.). The cooking skills of Peace are careful, right-hearted, and altogether satisfactory.

III

As he goes inside to prepare for his wedding, Trygaeus invites the chorus to pitch into their food manfully, and the coryphaeus responds by echoing his appeal (1311–15):

ΧΟ. Ἡμῖν μελήσει ταῦτά γ'· εὖ ποεῖς δὲ καὶ σὺ φράζων.
Ἀλλ', ὦ πρὸ τοῦ πεινῶντες, ἐμβάλλεσθε τῶν λαγῴων·
ὡς οὐχὶ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν
πλακοῦσιν ἔστιν ἐντυχεῖν πλανωμένοις ἐρήμοις.
Πρὸς ταῦτα βρύκετ' ἤ τάχ' ὑμῖν φημι μεταμελήσειν.

[9] See F. M. Cornford, The Origin of Attic Comedy (Cambridge 1934) 87–90, on the rejuvenation of Demos in *The Knights*, and 164–5 on the Cook generally. H. Dohm, Mageiros (München 1964) 30–66, also discusses the importance of this figure in Old Comedy (as later, in New), not least in his ancient sacrificial role; see esp. 37–55 on sacrificial ritual and cooking in *The Peace* and *The Birds*.

[10] See K. J. Reckford, Catharsis and Dream-interpretation in Aristophanes' *Wasps*, Trans. Amer. philol. Assoc. 107 (1977) 282–312.

It is not clear whether the chorus are being urged to eat fine rolls and hare's meat stew that have already been brought out and set on tables, or whether these are stage props, or whether we should imagine the entire feast to be going on indoors, or whether there is an inside joke, a reference to the forthcoming dinner to be given by the *choregus* for the *choreutai.*[11] The point remains, that they should grasp the good things offered them while they can. But this warning applies still more, over the heads of the chorus, to the audience, whose urgent business it is to grasp the *kairos* (as they failed so wretchedly to do on previous occasions): to achieve peace, and thereby to regain all the good things that peace provides.[12]

The mouth-watering words for good meats and rolls and pastries keep the point concrete and sensual; at the same time, there is a teasing unreality about these *plakountes,* flat, layered cheesecakes with honey poured over them, wandering around to meet one in the streets. "I wandered lonely as a cheesecake"? This is comic fantasy; it belongs with the other Schlaraffenland pictures of rivers flowing with soup or wine, or of roast thrushes flying toward your mouth, eager to be eaten, each on its individual piece of hot buttered toast.[13] So too with these cheesecakes. They are always special for Aristophanes (together with hare's meat stew and Copaic eels); they are a delicacy, a shield, and a victor's prize in *The Acharnians,* and an emblem of massive peculation in *The Knights*; but here, πλανωμένοις ἐρήμοις puts them into the fairy-tale world where all desires are automatically and prodigiously gratified. 'It isn't everyday,' we are reminded: not everyday that you can enjoy the abundant riches of peacetime – nor everyday that you

[11] For various possibilities of staging and interpretation, see the notes of Van Leeuwen (1906), Coulon–Van Daele (1958), and Platnauer (1964); also P. Händel, Formen und Darstellungsweisen in der aristophanischen Komödie (Heidelberg 1963) 160, and M. Landfester, Handlungsverlauf und Komik in den frühen Komödien des Aristophanes (Berlin, New York 1977) 181–4.

[12] For the urgency of grasping the *kairos,* see Peace 943f. (the winds of fortune may change), and *passim.*

[13] In a fragment from Telecleides' *Amphiktyones,* 'there was a great warcry of cheesecakes as they jostled for place around the jawbone.' On this delicacy generally, see the etymological and gustatory remarks of G. Herzog-Hauser, Pauly-Wissowa RE 20 (1950) 1894–97, s.v. *Placenta.* (Aristophanes would have enjoyed the possible connection with *placere* but he would indignantly have rejected Horace's statement, *Ep.* I. 10.11, *pane egeo iam mellitis potiore placentis.*) For a picture of an early comic scene in which a master and mistress eat cakes from a tray and a slave steals a large *plakous,* see A. D. Trendall and T. B. L. Webster, Illustrations of Greek Drama (London 1971), IV, 18 and pages 132–4. For modern culinary instructions based on Cato's recipe, see now Jon and Julia Solomon, Ancient Roman Feasts and Recipes Adapted for Modern Cooking (Miami 1977) 131. I haven't attempted it myself.

can enjoy the even more abundant riches of fantasy and the comic stage. So enjoy them while and as you may.

Upon reflection, we find a remarkable amount of teasing about food in the second half of *The Peace*. The gluttonous brothers Morychos and Melanthios are twice ridiculed: first in the parabasis song, and then in the prayer to Peace, just after the request for gentle mixing cited earlier: the agora is to be full of all good things, all delicacies from Megara and Boeotia (long and sorely missed), and many gluttons including Morychos are to crowd around and push and shove for them, but Melanthios will come too late and will lament, in bad tragic fashion, for his long lost Eel who 'perished, perished on her bed – of beets!' Later, Hierocles the fraudulent oracle-monger is tantalized by the roast thrushes, hot from the fire, and the special sheep's parts he feels entitled to but can't somehow get hold of. It is a farcical scene, and one that recalls the 'starving Heracles' bit that Aristophanes, being a sophisticated playwright, of course renounced. But not only are pests and imposters teased. The spectators too are offered a great deal of food that they never get to eat. Perhaps this is to whet their appetite for peace. Perhaps it is apotropaic, a way of diverting the god's envy from the blessings of peace that Aristophanes and Athens really hope to recover. But the comic teasing is also a gentle reminder to the spectators to be sceptical even in the midst of hope, for real life is never (alas!) quite the same as life portrayed on the comic stage, in the transforming theatre of Dionysus.

I would suggest, then, that lines 1357–59 at the play's end convey a double vision:

> Ὦ χαίρετε χαίρετ' ἄν-
> δρες· κἂν ξυνέπησθέ μοι,
> πλακοῦντας ἔδεσθε.

The invitation (whether given by the coryphaeus or, more likely, by Trygaeus as he revels off toward the countryside with his new bride) is addressed to the chorus, whose cast party is now close at hand; but again, it is also intended for the spectators, who are invited to join in the festive exodos, at least in spirit. If they join the poet (just as, in the play, the chorus of farmers joined Trygaeus) in celebrating and working for the good things of peace, then they may really 'eat cheesecakes': that is the whole point of good politics, and it is a great improvement over eating shitty slanders and being beaten up by War in his formidable mortar. But the invitation to eat cheesecakes is teasing too, since it echoes that other

call, 'It isn't everyday you can run into cheesecakes walking down the street.' With well mixed feelings of joyful hope and sceptical awareness, we are dismissed, together with the dancing chorus, back into ordinary life.[14]

[14] This essay comes by way of thanks to Professor and Mrs. Knox for an exceptionally fine dinner, in addition to all the good sherry, swordfish, and other scholarly sustenance which I have consumed through the years at the Hellenic Center, and which has given me a good stomach to my work.

GREGORY M. SIFAKIS

Boy Actors in New Comedy

Yeeres he numbred scarse thirteene
When Fates turn'd cruell,
Yet three fill'd Zodiackes had he beene
The stages jewell.

(From Ben Jonson's Epigramm 120 on the death of child actor Salomon Pavy.)

The purpose of this paper is to propose an interpretation of the child-size figures shown in Hellenistic and Roman mosaics representing scenes from plays of Menander.

Unlike Euripides and Aristophanes, Menander and, we must assume, other New Comedy poets, gave no parts to children in their plays – babies excepted, of course. Yet the presence of children on the Hellenistic comic stage is strongly suggested by the recently discovered mosaics with scenes from Menander's plays in Mytilene.[1] The Mytilene mosaics themselves are dated ca. A.D. 275 on various grounds (coins found on the mosaic floor, mosaic inscriptions, and style in general) but confirm the theatrical character of the two exquisite mosaic pieces by Dioskourides in Naples (from Pompeii) dating from the late second century B.C.[2] The Dioskourides mosaics are considered to derive from early Hellenistic originals – and they both show children among the characters they represent. We now have five mosaic pictures, illustrating scenes from three Menander plays, in which children seem to be included among the performers.[3]

[1] See MMMM; all the Menander mosaics are reproduced in color on pls. 2–8; here pls. 1, 3, 5.

[2] Museo Nazionale, nos. 9985 and 9987; MINC, NM 1–2 (with bibliography); color reproductions in A. Maiuri, Roman Painting (Genève 1953) 95ff., MMMM, pls. 5–6, B. Maiuri, Le Musée National, Naples (Novara 1959) 117, 119 (very good); here pls. 2, 4.

[3] Another mosaic in Mytilene, illustrating the *Leukadia* (MMMM, no. P3, pl. 7), also shows a child-size figure, but because of the coarseness of the mosaic it is not clear whether the little figure stands on a pedestal (a statue?) or simply at a short distance

The plays in question are the *Synaristosai*, the *Theophoroumene* and the *Epitrepontes*. All three are represented among the ten mosaic panels decorating the floor of the *triclinium* of the "Maison du Ménandre" in Mytilene. The *Synaristosai* and most likely the *Theophoroumene* are also illustrated by the two mosaics of Dioskourides. The subjects of the *triclinium* panels in Mytilene are identified by inscriptions giving the titles of the plays, the part (or act) of play illustrated in each case, and the names of the main characters shown, who are always three.

Synaristosai. The same scene from the first act is represented by both the Dioskourides and the Mytilene (T6) mosaics (pls. 1–2) and, if we are to judge from Plautus' adaptation, the *Cistellaria*, it is the opening scene of the play. The old woman Philainis (simply *lena* in Plautus' play) and her daughter Pythias (renamed Gymnasium by Plautus), a mature hetaira, are having breakfast at the house of Plangon (Selenium in the *Cistellaria*). In both the Dioskourides and the Mytilene pictures the hostess Plangon is seated in the middle, between her visitors. In Mytilene the old woman is on the left and Pythias on the right. In the composition of Dioskourides the position of the two visitors is reversed. The women have a round, three-legged table in front of them; the *lena* holds a wine-cup. In both mosaics the women wear masks with clearly delineated (and exaggerated) features.[4]

A fourth person of very small stature is included in the scene. It is a child standing near Philainis, at the extreme right of the Dioskourides picture; the head of the same person is just visible behind the high back of Philainis's chair in the Mytilene mosaic. In both cases the face of the child barely reaches the shoulder of the seated old woman and is clearly maskless. In the Pompeii mosaic the child wears a long chiton and himation, like the three women. As a character in the play the child is a female slave, whose sex is confirmed by fr. 385 (Körte), in which old Philainis complains of the girl's haste in removing the wine and the table, a few moments after the scene depicted in the mosaics. As a performer, on the other hand, the child must be a boy, dressed as a girl though wearing no mask.

Theophoroumene. In the Mytilene mosaic (T8, here pl. 3) two young men, Lysias and Kleinias, flank Parmenon, a slave who occupies the

behind the other figures. As the whole picture is difficult to interpret it was left out of the following discussion.

[4] It is quite astonishing that people continued to doubt the theatrical character of the Pompeii mosaic until a few years ago (see MMMM 43, n. 4, for references) although F. Marx had correctly and exactly identified its subject already in 1930 (Rhein. Mus. 79, 197ff.) and Webster restated Marx's interpretation in 1956 (GTP 23).

middle of the picture. Lysias, on the left, raises his right leg in a dancing figure while striking a pair of cymbals. On the right, Kleinias is standing still, holding a small, round object with his right hand (another cymbal?), while his left hand seems to rest on the shoulder of a boy. The boy is maskless, wears a short, dark-colored chiton and a blue-green himation, and holds "dans la main gauche une sorte de bâtonnet jaune vif très légèrement recourbé" (MMMM, p. 47) – perhaps a flute or another musical instrument sketchily rendered. The inscription identifies the scene as belonging to the second act of the play.

The Mytilene mosaic recalls the other Pompeii mosaic of Dioskourides (pl. 4) although the correspondence here is not as close as in the *Synaristosai*. Two young men are shown in stage costume (they wear masks, tunics and himatia over tights), dancing and playing the cymbals and tambourine respectively. The tambourine player is on the right, the cymbals player in the middle, and behind him is a flute-girl, elaborately dressed in long chiton and himation, and masked. Behind her, at the extreme left, a boy is standing. He is clearly maskless, wears a short tunic and holds an object that looks like a horn.

In view of the Mytilene *Synaristosai* that parallels closely but does not reproduce exactly the Dioskourides *Synaristosai* and of the fact that costumes and masks in Mytilene suggest that the mosaics reflect contemporary productions also and do not simply repeat earlier pictorial models,[5] I am convinced that Webster and Handley are right in suggesting that the Mytilene *Theophoroumene* and the Dioskourides mosaic with musicians show successive scenes of the same play.[6]

Unfortunately, the fragments of Menander's text, discussed in connection with the pictures by Handley in a very perceptive article (quoted in n. 6), throw no light on the child figures of the two mosaics. Webster (see n. 6) interpreted the Mytilene child as a flute-girl (to correspond with the flute-girl of Dioskourides) but I think Kahil and Ginouvès are right in taking the small figure for a boy (MMMM, p. 47).

Epitrepontes. The Mytilene mosaic (T7, here pl. 5) depicts the crucial scene of the arbitration from the second act. Smikrines is in the middle, the slave Syros (wrongly named so instead of Daos) is on the left, and the charcoal-maker is on the right. Next to him, at the extreme right, a tiny, maskless figure is standing, holding a baby. This figure obviously

[5] On the possible sources of the mosaics see MMMM 102ff.

[6] Webster, MINC, ix, and under YM 2, A8 (p. 300); E. W. Handley, Notes on the *Theophoroumene* of Menander, Bull. of the Inst. of class. Stud. 16 (1969) 90.

represents the wife of Syriskos, the charcoal-maker, and is dressed very much like the boy in the *Theophoroumene* panel, in short, dark-colored chiton and blue himation.

Another, fragmentary, mosaic of the first century B.C. in Naples shows a tallish, maskless boy with a leading slave, whose mask is perhaps early Hellenistic in type (Webster), in a scene that may have represented the discovery of a baby.[7] Also, some wall paintings from Pompeii, dating from the first century A.D., include small maskless figures in both comic and tragic scenes (which cannot be referred to specific plays).[8] Of special interest is a comic scene that shows three maskless youths with a soldier slave and a leading slave (pl. 6).[9] What is remarkable about them, as well as about the boy in the Naples mosaic, is that they are considerably taller than the usual maskless figures of the other monuments. I shall take up this point again later.

The main points to be noted here in regard to the pictures described or mentioned above are as follows:

All short, maskless figures in our representations must be dramatic characters, important to the scenes represented by the mosaics, or they would not be included in the pictures. By "important" I mean characters whose roles (presence and stage business, though not necessarily lines to speak) are written into the text and are indispensable to the performance of a particular scene.

The Mytilene mosaics show three main figures who (in most cases, so far as we can tell) are speaking characters in the respective plays. The small figures are always supplementary from the pictorial point of view, and doubtless they must be so from the dramatic point of view also. The fact that they have neither masks nor names concurs to suggest that they are minor (though important, as defined above) non-speaking characters. Such characters are addressed to and spoken of by the main characters but they may not speak themselves at all. The wife of the charcoal-burner in the *Epitrepontes* (Mytilene, T7), the only instance in which we have the complete text of the scene represented, is indeed such a character.

The small figures in the *Theophoroumene* pictures could be slave boys or boy musicians. The female slave attending on the *Synaristosai* is called ἡ βάρβαρος, which suggests a grown up woman rather than a girl. How-

[7] Mus. Naz. no. 6146; MINC, IM 3; BHT², fig. 401.

[8] See Webster, GTP 122–4; BHT², fig. 770 = PCF¹, fig. 100.

[9] MINC, NP 13; BHT² 99, fig. 371; PCF¹ 202, fig. 98; here pl. 6. The two seated men on either side of the comic scene seem to belong to different panels.

ever, if the small actor in the two mosaics could be regarded as impersonating a slave-girl the tiny actor in the *Epitrepontes* mosaic does impersonate an adult woman.

It is obvious that we are faced with a remarkable convention: small, maskless figures that look like boy actors may represent adult, non-speaking characters. The question is whether this convention is a pictorial or a dramatic one.

This distinction is not always clearly made and as a result interpretations oscillate between regarding the small figures as boy actors or as adults whose size has been reduced by painters and mosaicists. Doubtless, Webster was on the right track in supposing, with reference to Pompeian paintings and the Dioskourides mosaics, that "boys who wanted to act may have been allowed to 'walk on'".[10] Furthermore, Handley has suggested that minor parts could be played by young people.[11] (He means minor speaking parts also, a view with which I heartily concur, see at n. 21 below.) And yet he thinks that "small size in representations of dramatic figures is not necessarily an indication of childhood (or dwarfdom)" and considers the wife of the charcoal-burner in the Mytilene *Epitrepontes* mosaic as shown at much reduced scale (but rightly rejects Del Corno's assumption that the small figure in the Mytilene *Theophoroumene* represents the character of the title-role "in view of the small scale and marginal position of the figure").[12] Kahil and Ginouvès seem to favor boy actors and yet interpret the little figure in the *Epitrepontes* mosaic as follows: "il s'agit d'une femme, personnage secondaire et muet et donc représenté, *par convention*, plus petit" (italics mine).[13]

Conventions are artistic rules or traditional practices that make sense only when regarded in context, as parts of a whole. The convention stated above, in the penultimate paragraph, would make sense in the context of the mosaic compositions only if we assume that the designers wanted to make a sharp distinction between the speaking and the non-speaking characters of the plays they chose to illustrate. But would it be in their interest as pictorial artists, and realists at that (to the extent all Hellenistic and Roman artists were), to deliberately alter the appearance of some of their subjects in order to make a point that would be significant only from a dramatic point of view? It seems to me far more likely that the artists

[10] GTP 122.
[11] The *Dyskolos* of Menander 30.
[12] Bull. of the Inst. of class. Stud. 16 (1969) 90 and n. 10.
[13] The quotation is from MMMM 45, but cf. 41, n. 13, and 104.

drew what they saw (no matter whether they might occasionally "idealize" children by showing them very small) and that boy actors were indeed employed by Hellenistic theatre troupes.

In order to make sense of our convention in the context of New Comedy theatre production we have to face up to two difficulties, (a) the presence of children among the performers of a type of drama that as far as we know had no child roles, and (b) their lack of masks.

We know from inscriptions that the three-actor rule was valid in Hellenistic times.[14] We also know that during the same period theatre artists were organized in professional guilds, in which actors were registered as *tragoidoi* and *komoidoi*, on the one hand, tragic *synagonistai* and comic *synagonistai*, on the other.[15] This can only mean that in dramatic contests only the former entered the competitions, while the latter were supporting actors by professional definition and were *a priori* excluded from being considered for the prizes. In view of this fact the three-actor rule should be understood not so much as a technical, external restriction regarding the number of performers who were allowed to speak as a fundamentally aesthetic principle, according to which the distribution of the parts of a play and its performance on the whole were organized around a master actor who "acted the play"[16] (I deliberately use the word master to prevent comparison with modern film stars, who may conceivably not be masters of their art) and two secondary actors who "co-acted for him".[17] This arrangement corresponded with the three-cornered, as it were, composition

[14] SIG³ 424 (268–265 B.C.); Sifakis, Studies in the Hist. of Hellenistic Drama (London 1967) 74. It ought perhaps to be added here that the validity of the three-actor rule in Menander is still a matter of dispute mainly because it presupposes that certain parts would have to be split and played by different actors. For a thorough examination of the distribution of parts in Menander's longer fragments see N. C. Hourmouziades, Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 14 (1973) 179–188 (with references to earlier bibliography).

[15] For the *synagonistai* see SIG³ 690, 711 L; OGIS 51 (= PCF² 310); Michel 1014 (= PCF² 316), 1016B; Suppl. epigr. Graec. XIII 586 (= PCF² 311); Fouilles de Delphes, III 2,48–49; Mnemosyne, N.S. 47 (1919) 252ff.; see also PCF² 129, 287f., 291, 293, 297f.

[16] The regular complement of the verb ὑποκρίνεσθαι is τραγῳδία, κωμῳδία, δρᾶμα, or the title of a play, in the accusative; e.g. Dem. 19, 246–7; τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δρᾶμα οὐδεπώποτ' οὔτε Θεόδωρος οὔτ' Ἀριστόδημος ὑπεκρίναντο, οἷς οὗτος τὰ τρίτα λέγων διετέλεσεν, ἀλλὰ Μόλων ἠγωνίζετο καὶ εἴ δή τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν ὑποκριτῶν. Ἀντιγόνην δὲ Σοφοκλέους πολλάκις μὲν Θεόδωρος, πολλάκις δ' Ἀριστόδημος ὑποκέκριται; Plut. *Pelop.* 29. 9: τραγῳδόν ποτε θεώμενος Εὐριπίδου Τρῳάδας ὑποκρινόμενον etc.; see also Arist. *Rhet.* 1403ᵇ23, Plut. *Dem.* 28.33, Diod. 13. 97. 6; cf. IG II² 2319–23, Le Bas–Waddington III. 91. Notice the same syntax of the verb ἀγωνίζεσθαι in the passage of Demosthenes quoted above and cf. IG XII 7 226.

[17] Cf. n. 15 on *synagonistai*; see specially SIG³ 711 L, 33–34: κωμῳδούς etc. καὶ τοὺς συναγωνιξαμένους τούτοις etc., 36–37: τραγῳδοὺς δέ etc. καὶ τοὺς τούτοις συναγωνι-

of so many crucial dramatic scenes in both tragedy and comedy,[18] and is reflected by the Mytilene mosaics and several other monuments with comic scenes, in which three masked actors are represented.[19] Moreover, the audience (or, in any case, the judges) were aware of the fact that the main performers were three and of their distinction into one principal and two secondary.[20]

In addition to the three main actors, who handled the speaking parts, more performers were needed for the mute roles – though it seems to me that there was nothing to prevent the latter from taking occasionally small speaking parts also, provided these parts fell outside the tripartite scenes.[21] We have no idea regarding the status of these performers but we may assume that since all actors had a professional status well defined on the basis of specialty (tragic, comic) and seniority (protagonists, synagonists) the auxiliary performers of the non-speaking parts must have belonged to a separate category. I suggest that this category, which, although quite large as the requirements of both classical and Hellenistic plays for extras show, has left no trace in our sources, was that of apprentices – young men, adolescents like those shown in the Pompeii painting reproduced on pl. 6, and boys, who aspired to becoming professional actors. It might be recalled in this connection that the chorus in New Comedy is often referred to as μειράκια (Men. *Perik.* 261) or μειρακύλλια (Men. *Epitr.* 169) by the actors, which is perhaps an indication that the New Comedy chorusmen were also drawn from the class of apprentices.[22]

ξαμένους. For the syntax τὰ τρίτα λέγειν τινί see the passage of Demosthenes quoted in n. 16; cf. τριταγωνιστεῖν τινι, [Plut.] *Vit. X Orat.* 840a.

[18] See e.g. Men. *Dysk.* 255ff. (Gorgias, Daos, Sostratos), 691ff. (Sostratos, Knemon, Gorgias), 821ff. (Sostratos, Kallippides, Gorgias), 909ff. (Getas, Knemon, Sikon). The middle character of these triads was impersonated by the same actor, doubtless the protagonist.

[19] E.g. the paintings from the "House of the Comedian" in Delos, late 2nd cent. B.C., MINC, DP 1–3 (p. 295); painting showing Men. *Perik.* at Ephesos, MINC, ZP 1 (p. 304), MMMM, pl. 27/3; mosaic at Sousse, Tunisia, MINC, FM 4 (179, 310), MMMM, pl. 28/2; mosaic in Patras, MMMM, pl. 28/1.

[20] Certain visual cues might have been used to facilitate that distinction, e.g. movements and positions on the stage; cf. Pollux 4.124, on the use of the three doors by the three actors respectively.

[21] E.g. Simiche and Knemon's daughter in Men. *Dysk.*, cf. Handley, The *Dysk.* of Men., 30. In fact, there is some evidence, albeit scanty, that extras did occasionally speak (see PCF² 137).

[22] The three stages of professional development of Hellenistic actors proposed here (apprentice, synagonist, protagonist) correspond closely with the three classes of Elizabethan actors, viz. apprentices, hired men, masters. This division is but a variation of the general division of all professions organized into trade guilds in medieval and pre-

Theatrical professions – like other arts and crafts in ancient Greece – were traditional and remained so throughout antiquity. It is well known that in all traditional arts and professions there is no formal schooling; new members of all professions that require technical artistry learn by actual practice and they begin to learn very early in life, under the guidance of a master. Very often traditions and skills are handed down from father to son and in many cases run through several generations.

We know of many actors in Hellenistic times who had either a father-and-son or a master-and-pupil relationship. In some cases we have evidence for actors making up whole "dynasties", to borrow the term used by M. Bonaria with reference to pantomimes in Roman times.[23] We also know of boy actors who had achieved the status of protagonists, tragedians and comedians, and won victories at various festivals in Roman imperial times – although we do not know whether they were members of boy companies performing complete plays (like the boy companies of the Elizabethan theatre[24]), members of regular companies playing adult roles, or virtuosi who gave solo performances, some sort of acting recitals, in various cities.[25]

If the above considerations are sufficient to explain the presence of boy performers in the Menander mosaics I would like now to attempt to justify their lack of masks.

It has long been recognized that ancient theatre production was strictly stylized – in correspondence with typical plots and character types. The actors played *to* the audience (witness the frequent addresses to it in comedy) and not just in front of it, a fact also suggested by the Mytilene mosaics, which show the three actors always in frontal view. The audience

industrial Europe (apprentices, journeymen, masters). See T. W. Baldwin, The Organization and Personnel of the Shakespearean Company [Princeton, N. J. 1927 (repr. New York 1961)] and R. David, Shakespeare and the Players in P. Alexander (ed.), Studies in Shakespeare, British Academy Lectures (London 1964).

[23] Bonaria, Dinastie di pantomimi latini, Maia 11 (1959) 224–42. For some related Greek theatre artists see J. B. O'Connor, Chapters in the Hist. of Actors and Acting in Ancient Greece (Chicago 1908), nos. 64, 457; 141; 198, 342; 275–278; 312; 331, 432, 435.

[24] See E. K. Chambers, The Elizabethan Stage (Oxford 1923) vol. 2, 8ff.; A. Leggatt in The Revels History of Drama in English, vol. 3 (London 1975) 95–117, 479–482; M. Shapiro, Children of the Revels (New York 1977). See also the contributions of W. R. Gair, L. Lecocq, and J. Jacquot in J. Jacquot (ed.), Dramaturgie et société: Rapports entre l'œuvre théâtrale, son interprétation et son public aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles (Paris 1968) 655ff., 675ff., 729ff.

[25] On boy actors in Roman times see E. J. Jory, Bull. of the Inst. of class. Stud. 14 (1967) 84ff.

was aware of the invariable number of performers – one principal actor, two supporting ones – who carried the weight of the performance. These three actors were the *performers* of the play, the rest being assistants to them, not *hypokritai* strictly speaking. The theatrical status of the latter fluctuated between that of stage hands and non-speaking characters, and we should assume that they were distinguished from the three regular performers by certain visual cues.

In the production of Old Comedy, which was even more stylized and conventional than that of New Comedy, assistants were freely called upon by the actors to bring things often from an "unspecified indoors" (Dover[26]) or remove them from the scene. When an actor says: "Someone bring me so and so . . .",[27] we should not expect the person who comes and goes to be identified as a character of the play; he is just an assistant, a stage hand, but the limits here are fluid and when he is called by a slave name he is automatically drawn into the circle of the play and granted, momentarily, the status of mute character.[28]

Also in New Comedy, the main actors may attribute the status of mute character to an assistant by addressing him by name (e.g. Men. *Dysk.* 430, 432) or by paying (and drawing) attention to him, as for instance when the Cook in Men. *Aspis* 222ff. abuses his slave boy who carries away some of his utensils; but should we expect the latter, or the group of captives who come with Daos at the beginning of the same play carrying Kleostratos's loot, or the slaves who carry Demeas's luggage in Men. *Samia* (96–105), to have the appearance of regular actors? Would they have masks with open mouths just for their brief and silent appearance? Most of these mute persons are not characterized by the text, have no *ethos,* but the masks would automatically transform them into specific character types. Would that not cause confusion with regard to regular roles and the stratification of performers that ought to be apparent in the performance?

Although the gallery of New Comedy mask types we know from Pollux (4. 143ff.) seems to presuppose only speaking characters I am not trying to suggest that all non-speaking persons were always maskless. Besides, masks with closed mouths are not inconceivable. On the other hand,

[26] Aristophanic Comedy (Berkeley 1972) 22.

[27] E.g. Ar. *Ach.* 805, 1067; *Nu.* 1297, 1490; *Vesp.* 529; *Av.* 1579, 1693; *Thesm.* 238; *Ran.* 871.

[28] E.g. Ar. *Nu.* 1485, *Av.* 656–7, *Eccl.* 867–8. In *Pax* 730, the several stage hands, who remove the ropes and tools used by the chorus to pull the cave open, are somewhat integrated into the action by being called ἀκόλουθοι, "[our] attendants", by the chorus.

maskless assistants moving in and out of the periphery of the play are perfectly possible in a kind of performance that was frankly presented to the audience and given under the sun, in theatres without curtain. Boys in particular, who would be clearly differentiated from the three regular actors by their small size, should be specially suitable for the double function of theatre assistants – stage hands and mutes. This duplicity, or ambiguity, of their function is the key to explain the rise of the convention that enabled them to assume temporarily the status of adult non-speaking characters.

To sum up the argument of this paper: Greek actors, like practitioners of other traditional arts and crafts, began their apprenticeship very early in life. During the considerable time they spent as apprentices, and before attaining the rank of professional actors, they were employed as assistants, stage hands and/or extras. As mute persons they might or might not wear masks, depending on the degree of their involvement in the world of the play and the ensuing characterization of their roles. This was possible because the boundary separating stage hands and mutes was fluid in a production organized around one principal actor (competing for the acting prize) and two supporting ones. The mosaics reviewed above show auxiliaries in addition to the three regular performers of each play. With the exception of the flute-girl in Dioskourides' *Theophoroumene*, they are best understood as maskless boys representing a female slave (*Synaristosai*), a street-musician (?) (*Theophoroumene*), and the wife of Syriskos in the *Epitrepontes*. They are maskless because the roles they play are characterless, although their sex is suggested by dress or dress details (length of chiton and/or himation). The woman in the *Epitrepontes*, who has bothered scholars in particular, is not really different from the others for she is entirely devoid of ethos and her stage business is minimal. If the basic assumptions of this paper are correct she could hardly wear any of the masks known to us.

ABBREVIATIONS. In addition to the usual abbreviations of Greek authors, epigraphical publications, and journals, the following abbreviations are also used: BHT^2 = M. Bieber, The History of Greek and Roman Theater (Princeton ^{2}1961); GTP = T. B. L. Webster, Greek Theatre Production (London 1956, ^{2}1970); MINC = T. B. L. Webster, Monuments Illustrating New Comedy, (Bull. of the Inst. of class. Stud. Suppl. 24, ^{2}1969); MMMM = S. Charitonidis, L. Kahil, and R. Ginouvès, Les Mosaïques de la Maison du Ménandre à Mytilène (Antike Kunst 6. Beiheft, 1970); PCF^1 or PCF^2 = A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, The Dramatic Festivals of Athens (Oxford 1953), 2nd ed. revised by J. Gould and D. M. Lewis (Oxford 1968).

RICHMOND LATTIMORE

Optatives of Consent and Refusal

I. Consent

Sophocles, *Antig.* 1105–8

Κρ. οἴμοι· μόλις μέν, καρδίας δ' ἐξίσταμαι
τὸ δρᾶν· ἀνάγκῃ δ'οὐχὶ δυσμαχητέον.
Χο. δρᾶ νυν τάδ' ἐλθὼν μηδ' ἐπ' ἄλλοισιν τρέπε.
Κρ. ὧδ' ὡς ἔχω στείχοιμ' ἄν·

Creon gives in to pressure. The question is, why does he use the optative here, and does it have any particular significance?[1] Let us consider some parallels.

Sophocles, *Oed. Tyr.* 91–5

Κρ. εἰ τῶνδε χρήζεις πλησιαζόντων κλύειν,
ἕτοιμος εἰπεῖν, εἴτε καὶ στείχειν ἔσω.
Οι. ἐς πάντας αὔδα. τῶνδε γὰρ πλέον φέρω
τὸ πένθος ἢ καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς πέρι.
Κρ. λέγοιμ' ἂν οἷ' ἤκουσα τοῦ θεοῦ πάρα.

Creon has offered Oedipus an alternative with the implicit suggestion that he should *not* announce his news publicly. The reply of Oedipus is emphatic: tell it to all. Creon consents.[2]

[1] "Expresses a fixed resolve", Jebb (R. C. Jebb, Sophocles, Antigone, 3d ed. [Cambridge 1900]). All references are, unless otherwise noted, to commentary on lines quoted in the text. See also W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Conditional Sentence in Attic Greek, Amer. Journ. of Philol. 76 (1955) 1–17. Pritchett describes the optative with ἄν as "one that is most frequently used to indicate *moral certainty*". Pritchett accepts Jebb's translations here and for *Oed. Col.* 45 and *Ajax* 88.

[2] "A deferential form", Jebb (Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus, 3d ed. [Cambridge 1893]). "An unassuming way of expressing one's willingness to deliver his message, corresponding with the mild (and more common) from of imperative λέγοις ἄν and the like", Kamerbeek (J. C. Kamerbeck, The Plays of Sophocles, part 4, The Oedipus Tyrannus [Leiden 1967]).

Euripides, *Hecuba* 1127–32

> Ἀγ. οὗτος, τί πάσχεις; Πλ. πρὸς θεῶν σε λίσσομαι,
> μέθες μ' ἐφεῖναι τῇδε μαργῶσαν χέρα.
> Αγ. ἴσχ'. ἐκβαλὼν δὲ καρδίας τὸ βάρβαρον
> λέγ' ὡς ἀκούσας σοῦ τε τῆσδέ τ'ἐν μέρει
> κρίνω δικαίως ἀνθ' ὅτου πάσχεις τάδε.
> Πλ. λέγοιμ' ἄν.

The blinded Polymestor, realizing that Hecuba is near, would lay violent hands on her. Agamemnon restrains him and orders him to *speak* first so that she can reply and he can judge between them. Polymestor yields.

Euripides, *Iph. Taur.* 808–11

> Ιφ. τί φῄς; ἔχεις τι τῶνδέ μοι τεκμήριον;
> Ορ. ἔχω· πατρῴων ἐκ δόμων τι πυνθάνου.
> Ιφ. οὐκοῦν λέγειν μὲν χρὴ σέ, μανθάνειν δ' ἐμέ.
> Ορ. λέγοιμ' ἄν, ἀκοῇ πρῶτον Ἠλέκτρας τάδε.

The opposition of wills is not intense, but the sequence is clear. Orestes says, ask me something about our father's house. She replies, no, you talk, I'll listen. Orestes' reply amounts to very well then, first I'll tell you.

Euripides, *Electra* 300–2

> Ελ. λέγοιμ' ἄν, εἰ χρή – χρὴ δὲ πρὸς φίλον λέγειν –
> τύχας βαρείας τὰς ἐμὰς κἀμοῦ πατρός.
> ἐπεὶ δὲ κινεῖς μῦθον.

Here there has been no opposition, but Electra's λέγοιμ' ἄν answers Orestes' λέξον above (292) and the urging of the chorus, and this is further made clear in ἐπεὶ δὲ κινεῖς μῦθον.

Euripides, *Bacch.* 835–46

> Δι. Θύρσον γε χειρὶ καὶ νεβροῦ στικτὸν δέρας.
> Πε. οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην θῆλυν ἐνδῦναι στολήν.
> Δι. ἀλλ' αἷμα θήσεις συμβαλὼν βάκχαις μάχην.
> Πε. ὀρθῶς· μολεῖν χρὴ πρῶτον εἰς κατασκοπήν.
> Δι. σοφώτερον γοῦν ἢ κακοῖς θηρᾶν κακά.
> Πε. καὶ πῶς δι' ἄστεως εἶμι Καδμείους λαθών;
> Δι. ὁδοὺς ἐρήμους ἶμεν· ἐγὼ δ' ἡγήσομαι.

Πε. πᾶν κρεῖσσον ὥστε μὴ 'γγελλᾶν βάκχας ἐμοί.
ἐλθόντ' ἐς οἴκους . . . ἂν δοκῇ βουλεύσομαι.
Δι. ἔξεστι· πάντῃ τό γ' ἐμὸν εὐτρεπὲς πάρα.
Πε. στείχοιμ' ἄν· ἢ γὰρ ὅπλ' ἔχων πορεύσομαι
ἢ τοῖσι σοῖσι πείσομαι βουλεύμασιν.

The pressure is on Pentheus to disguise himself as a woman, a course he first rejects through an optative of refusal (see below). The final στείχοιμ' ἄν does not specifically accept the disguise but does retract the absolute refusal;[3] and of course he will disguise himself. It is Dionysus who is getting his way.

Euripides, *Bacch.* 515

Δι. στείχοιμ' ἄν·

Nominally, at least, this signifies obedience to an order.

Euripides, *Ion* 668

Ιω. στείχοιμ' ἄν·

Ion has elaborately presented his case against going to Athens and assuming the position of heir to the throne. Plainly, he does not wish to go. Xuthus, Ion's supposed father, has not bothered to answer the arguments, but has simply overruled him. Ion gives in.

Sophocles, *Ajax* 87–8

Αθ. σίγα νυν ἑστὼς καὶ μέν' ὡς κυρεῖς ἔχων.
Οδ. μένοιμ' ἄν· ἤθελον δ'ἂν ἐκτὸς ὢν τυχεῖν.

Athene gives the orders, and Odysseus, much against his will, obeys.[4]

The above passages, it will be noted, all occur in the extant tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides. They also have one other factor in common. In every case, the use of the optative with ἄν signifies that the speaker, whatever his own inclinations, is consenting to a course which somebody else desires. If then we ask again why, in our first instance, Creon uses this

[3] "I think I will go in", Dodds (E. R. Dodds, The Bacchae [Oxford 1944]).

[4] "What he *must* do", Jebb (Sophocles, Ajax [Cambridge 1896]). Stanford (W. B. Stanford, Sophocles, Ajax [London and New York 1963]). "In our present passage an idea of yielding reluctantly", Kamerbeek (The Plays of Sophocles, part 1, The Ajax [Leiden 1963]). Excellent, but Kamerbeek mysteriously compares Oed. Tyr. 343.

form, the answer is simple. He uses it because he is consenting to a course which he has been resisting since the beginning of the play.

Euripides, *Electra* 668–70

Ηλ. σὸν ἔργον ἤδη· πρόσθεν εἴληχας φόνου.
Ορ. στείχοιμ' ἄν, εἴ τις ἡγεμὼν γίνοιθ' ὁδοῦ.
Πρ. καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ πέμποιμ' ἂν οὐκ ἀκουσίως.

Do we have here one more case of the optative of consent for which I have been arguing? Certainly, the πέμποιμ' ἄν of the Presbys is not such an optative; but what of Orestes' στείχοιμ' ἄν? It is, for one thing, the apodosis of an expressed condition rather than an independent potential optative; but coming before its protasis it gives the latter, possibly, some aspect of an afterthought or qualification. As for Orestes, he is now ready to go and carry out the murder of Aegisthus. He has said or implied that this was his intention, both before his recognition by Electra (89, 100, 222) and after it (582, 599, 614, 646). But it is also a fact that he has stayed at the edge of Argive territory, not only because Electra is there, but also so as to be able to slip away over the border in case of recognition (94–7). It is further true that he passes up every opportunity to reveal his identity to Electra. In fact, he never does identify himself; he is identified by the Presbys.

Thus, when, after prolonged stichomythy with the *Presbys*, Electra turns to Orestes with σὸν ἔργον ἤδη, he does appear to be, not initiating action, but accepting a course willed on him by others; and in the context of our other instances, I would call this an optative of consent.

II. Refusal

Sophocles, *Oed. Tyr.* 341–4

Τε. ἥξει γὰρ αὐτά, κἂν ἐγὼ σιγῇ στέγω.
Οι. οὐκοῦν ἃ γ' ἥξει καὶ σὲ χρὴ λέγειν ἐμοί.
Τε. οὐκ ἂν πέρα φράσαιμι. πρὸς τάδ', εἰ θέλεις,
θυμοῦ δι' ὀργῆς ἥτις ἀγριωτάτη.

The optative with οὐκ ἄν can be a mirror image of the optative of consent, as here, signifying unqualified refusal to obey an oder, or to consent to the will of someone else.[5]

[5] "The courteous formula, just because it is such, here expresses a fixed resolve", Jebb (*op. cit.* in note 2).

Euripides, *Phoen.* 925–6

Κρ. σίγα· πόλει δὲ τούσδε μὴ λέξῃς λόγους.
Τε. ἀδικεῖν κελεύεις μ'· οὐ σιωπήσαιμεν ἄν.

I take the sense to be the same, although κελεύεις μ' means "you are asking me to" rather than "you are ordering me to". At least, the answer is to an imperative, and the answer is "I refuse to" rather than "I could not".

Euripides, *Heraclidae* 342–4

Δη. εἰσὶν γὰρ οἵ σου, κἂν ἐγὼ θυραῖος ὤν,
μέριμναν ἕξουσ'. ἀλλ' ἴθ' ἐς δόμους, γέρον.
Ιο. οὐκ ἂν λίποιμι βωμόν.

Though the order is courteous, the sense of "I refuse" is plain.

Aristophanes, *Ran.* 830

Ευ. οὐκ ἄν μεθείμην τοῦ θρόνου, μὴ νουθέτει.[6]

Some kind of order or request is definitely implied. The optative of refusal, unlike the optative of consent, occurs in comedy as well as tragedy.

Aristophanes, *Lys.* 124–9

Λυ. ἀφεκτέα τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡμῖν τοῦ πέους.
τί μοι μεταστρέφεσθε; ποῖ βαδίζετε;
αὖται τί μοιμυᾶτε κἀνανεύετε;
τί χρὼς τέτραπται; τί δάκρυον κατείβεται;
ποιήστετ' ἢ οὐ ποιήσετ'; ἢ τί μέλλετε;
Μυ. οὐκ αὖ ποιήσαιμ', ἀλλ' ὁ πόλεμος ἑρπέτω.

A resulution, propounded by Lysistrata, does not accord with the will of Myrrhine, who will have none of it. "I could not" would make sense, but "I refuse to" or "I won't" is clearly better.

Euripides, *Heraclidae* 547

Μα. οὐκ ἂν θάνοιμι τῇ τύχῃ λαχοῦσ' ἐγώ.

[6] "I will not give up the throne", Goodwin, § 235 (W. W. Goodwin, Syntaxes of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb [Boston 1890]). So, too, Stanford (Aristophanes, The Frogs [London and New York 1963]).

The glorious gesture of Macaria would be ruined if the virgin sacrifice were degraded into a lottery and she indignantly rejects the suggestion.

Euripides, *Medea* 616–8

> Μη. οὔτ' ἂν ξένοισι τοῖσι σοῖς χρησαίμεθ' ἄν,
> οὔτ' ἄν τι δεξαίμεσθα, μηδ' ἡμῖν δίδου·
> κακοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς δῶρ' ὄνησιν οὐκ ἔχει.

Medea, in refusing Jason's well-meant (or hypocritical) offer would use the most emphatic form available. She uses the optative with negative, twice.

Euripides, *Alc.* 1110–4

> Αδ. κομίζετ', εἰ χρὴ τήνδε δέξασθαι δόμοις.
> Ηρ. οὐκ ἂν μεθείην τὴν γυναῖκα προσπόλοις.[7]
> Αδ. σὺ δ' αὐτὸς αὐτὴν εἴσαγ', εἰ βούλη, δόμοις.
> Ηρ. ἐς σὰς μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε θήσομαι χέρας.
> Αδ. οὐκ ἂν θίγοιμι· δῶμα δ' εἰσελθεῖν πάρα.

This is a clash of wills in which each man resists the other.

Aristophanes, *Ran.* 134–5

> Δι. ἀλλ' ἀπολέσαιμ' ἂν ἐγκεφάλου θρίω δύο.
> οὐκ ἂν βαδίσαιμι τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην . . .

Here is a pure potential optative followed by an optative of refusal. The first amounts to "that would mean knocking my brains out"; the second, "I refuse to go that way".

Similar optatives of refusal are to be found at Aristophanes, *Ran.* 1222; *Nub.* 119 (between two potential optatives with ἄν); *Nub.* 1467; *Ach.* 1055; *Pax.* 321, 378; *Eccles.* 1011; Menander, *Dysc.* 611.[8]

The optative of refusal can occur as a simple statement rather than as an answer to any kind of pressure (except perhaps by implication).

[7] "I would rather not", Dale (A. M. Dale, Euripides, Alcestis [Oxford 1954]).

[8] Σω. οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτρέψαιμί σοι
ἄλλως ποῆσαι.
"I won't take no for an answer", that is, a polite insistence on an invitation, Handley (E. W. Handley, The Dyskolos of Menander [London 1965]).

Aristophanes, *Ach.* 403

Δι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπέλθοιμ', ἀλλὰ κόψω τὴν θύραν.[9]

Sophocles, *Oed. Col.* 45

Οι. ὡς οὐχ ἕδρας γε τῆσδ' ἂν ἐξέλθοιμ' ἔτι.[10]

Sophocles, *Antig.* 69–70

Αν. οὔτ' ἂν κελεύσαιμ' οὔτ' ἄν, εἰ θέλοις ἔτι
πράσσειν, ἐμοῦ γ' ἂν ἡδέως δρῴης μέτα.

Here Ismene has not been asking Antigone to go on trying to persuade her. The refusal, "I refuse to go on arguing with you" is the expression of a mood rather than part of a logical sequence.

I would note also the negative optative, already quoted in its context, Euripides, *Bacch.* 836

Πε. οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην θῆλυν ἐνδῦναι στολήν.

"I refuse to be able to" is neither exactly English nor perfect sense. "I could never be able to", or simply "I could not", is better.[11] But what the statement amounts to is an optative of refusal in an exchange which, as we have seen, will end with an optative of consent.

Aeschylus, *Eum.* 227–8

Χο. τιμὰς σὺ μὴ ξύντεμνε τὰς ἐμὰς λόγῳ.
Απ. οὐδ' ἂν δεχοίμην ὥστ' ἔχειν τιμὰς σέθεν.

I have not found in Aeschylus any clear cases of the optative of consent[12] or refusal. This seems to me to be the apodosis of a (suppressed) less vivid condition, but the idea of refusal seems to anticipate the independent optatives of refusal in Sophocles, Euripides, and comedy.

[9] "With a negative, the potential optative may have the force of a strong assertion", Smyth § 1826 b (H. W. Smyth, Greek Grammar [New York 1920]).

[10] "Calmly expresses a fixed resolve", Jebb (Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 3d ed. [Cambridge 1900]).

[11] So, too, Menander, *Epitr.* 499. "Notice how οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην, like the English 'I could not', means 'I would not think of', Gomme-Sandbach (A. W. Gomme and F. H. Sandbach, Menander: A Commentary [Oxford 1973]). See also Menander, *Dysc.* 145; *Mis.* 208.

[12] *Suppl.* 924 expresses defiant determination rather than yielding consent; which is also not meant in, e.g., *Septem* 375, 472, 568.

As to the question, why these optatives of consent and refusal appear (so far as I have observed) exclusively in drama, I can only guess. In their nature and placing they are almost formulaic and, as formulaic, belong in the rhetoric of certain genres. They seem to be definitely a function of dramatic discourse, and to express the conflict of wills which is so essential a part of both tragedy and comedy. As to why the optative of consent is confined to tragedy, I can only say that it appears to be the more subtle idiom; while the more frequent optative of refusal may well have been something used in everyday speech.[13]

[13] The extreme paucity of the foregoing notes is due to my failure to find any extensive study of dramatic optatives as related groups.

THEODORA HADZISTELIOU PRICE

Hero Cult in the 'Age of Homer' and Earlier

A few years ago I tackled the first half of the problem, the hero-cult in Homer's time[1]. I showed that according to both the present archaeological data and the internal evidence from the epics it is now clear that the hero-cult was well established in Homer's time; Homer knew very well about its practices, monuments, king-heroes, ancestral γενάρχαι, the hero-god Herakles, the eponymos Ilos, etc; he was even aware of the extreme elevation and honoring like gods, already in their lifetime, of certain very elect human beings such as the warrior-priest of Zeus Idaios (*Il.* 16.604f.). He knew about the importance and greatness of the tomb of a hero, such as that of Aipytos in the Catalogue of Ships, *Il.* 2.603–4.

Recently some new specific factors and Farnell's old hypothesis have been reexamined by some scholars[2] and have been brought to attention in connection with the hero-cult in the age of Homer and the establishment of it: a) the importance of the break in continuity in tomb-types for the establishment of heroic cults in tombs, b) the hypothesis that these cults arose under the influence of epic poetry, supposing 'Homer' wrote in 750 B.C., c) the importance of continuity of people, i.e. Achaeans, instead of 'new-comer' Dorians, in the areas of flourishing of the hero-cults, e.g. Attica, d) the emergence of cities and temples in the 8th century B.C. and the explanation of the hero-cult in tombs as a practice by families of independent peasantry. There is nothing completely new in these things of course. Already Farnell and others more recently[3] expanded on them, following the data available then.

[1] Hero-cult and Homer, Historia 22 (1973) 129–44; much of my research on these cults was conducted in the Center of Hellenic Studies; for all facilities and encouragement I am most grateful, especially to Prof. B. M. W. Knox.

[2] J. N. Coldstream, Hero-cults in the Age of Homer, Journ. of Hell. Stud. 96 (1976) 8–17; A. M. Snodgrass, Rise of the Greek State (Inaug. lecture, Cambridge 1977).

[3] For bibl. see Price (*supra*, n. 1); I. Pini, Beiträge zur Minoischen Gräberkunde (Wiesbaden 1968); B. C. Dietrich, The Origins of Greek Religion (Berlin 1974) 281.

The two first arguments are shaky due to the partiality of evidence, both the considered and the further available; the third one is annihilated by recent findings on the coexistence of the Dorians under the Achaeans before the 'Dark Ages'[4]. Coldstream sometimes confused hero-cult with simple grave-tending and included finds from the 6th century B.C., and even later, which have nothing to do with the 'Age of Homer' and the influence of the epic in the rise of the hero-cult. Some of them even belong to the Hellenistic revival of the Homeric hero-cult to which Alexander the Great proudly adhered, sacrificing to the tomb of Achilles (Plut. *Alex.* 15.9ff.). Moreover, some of the heroes or heroines are not even 'Homeric'; some of the earliest instances of hero-cult are not in tombs (Akademos), and besides, from the finds of votive offerings in tombs there is no inscription that would identify a Homeric hero. The only surviving one from the Grave Circle A of Mycenae mentions only a 'Hero'[5]. Maybe the spreading of the Homeric epics made the Greeks more sensitive to the hero-cult, but certainly it was nothing new or rare before, nor were the various mythological stories and other saga, for that matter. Also, even if Homer wrote in 750 B.C., surely the spreading would take twenty years or so – but the finds in tombs etc. start much earlier. There are many more factors involved. There are often coincidences of finds playing up the evidence. For instance, from the Late Geometric onwards we have not only more hero-cult sites but also more temple sites. But nobody suggested that the cult of the gods was strengthened by any epics[6]. The lack of finds in Thessaly may be partly due to much less excavation there than in Attica and the Peloponnese. In Rhodes also[7] there is change in the tomb-type and size; but why is there no evidence for hero worship in the tombs there? In Achaia? Many of the instances quoted in Coldstream's lists are mere caring for the dead, propitiation and reverence after accidental disturbance of a tomb for one reason or another[8]. Many deposits contain vases of one period, therefore how can one talk about instituted continual cult? In cases like that in Thorikos there is continuity but the deposit is from the seventh to the fifth centuries, there-

[4] B. C. Dietrich, The Dorian Hyakinthia: A survival from the Bronze Age, Kadmos 14 (1975) 133–39; J. Chadwick, Who were the Dorians? Parola del Passato 166 (1976) 103–17, esp. 116f.

[5] G. E. Mylonas, Mycenae and the Mycenaean Age (Princeton 1966) 176ff. L. H. Jeffery, The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece (Oxford 1961) 174, no. 6, pl. 31.

[6] Snodgrass, *op. cit.*, for the emergence of the polis and temples in the 8th century B.C.

[7] Coldstream, *op. cit.*, 13.

[8] op. cit. 10ff.

fore quite posthumous to Homer and the rise of the cult. It is possible that a larger, more imposing tomb caused more reverence to the intruder than a small one would have done; he may have considered the deceased as important, powerful. But a deposit or even enclosure of a certain period constitutes no establishment of cult. The fourth of the factors mentioned above, Snodgrass' interpretation as family-cult by independent peasantry, is much more plausible.

Discussion of the 'Homeric' Geometric cults was made in my previous article[9]. Let us examine now the available archaeological indications for the Protogeometric period. Vague and tantalizing as these may be, they must be scrutinized rather than dismissed easily since they are our only hope for the decipherment of Protogeometric practices.

1. Asine, Grave 5.[10] A terracotta cow-head, animal bones and three submycenaean or protogeometric vases were found in a niche in the dromos of this Mycenaean tomb. Mylonas' supposition that this was a child's burial and the bones were dissolved because they were small is not very convincing since the burned animal bones survived. The fact that the niche was blocked does not prove that it was a grave.

2. Mycenaean tomb under the temple of Ares, Athenian Agora.[11] Two deposits of lekythoi from the early and later 5th century B.C. have been interpreted as ways of showing veneration and/or piety during accidental discovery of the tomb. Protogeometric and Classical sherds were found here inside the chamber, close to skull VI and slightly lower, but were reported as a result of more casual intrusion. Even if one suspected that these intrusions were not casual but intentional, even then the isolated case of protogeometric vases would point to a similar expression of piety upon the encounter of a tomb, as in the Classical instances, rather than to a cult.

3. Cave of Odysseus, Ithaka.[12] Human bones together with local vases were found in the Mycenaean deposit, which has been interpreted as votive, due to the paved area. The few protogeometric dedications are cauldrons and have been connected with the games of the Odysseia, which are attested

[9] *Supra*, n. 1. The iconography of epic representation of heroes already in the Geometric period (Dipylon vases) has been argued by some quite convincingly; S. Karouzou, Ein frühes Bild des Achilles, Athen. Mitt. 91 (1976) 23–30, esp. 25ff.

[10] M. Andronikos, Totenkult (Arch. Homer. III, W Göttingen 1968) 127. Mylonas, *op. cit.* 179.

[11] Hesperia 24 (1955) 196.

[12] S. Benton, Annual of the Brit. School at Athens 34 (1934–5), 45ff., esp. 51f. T. B. L. Webster, From Mycenae to Homer (London 1960) 138.

by concrete epigraphic evidence only since the Hellenistic period. However, a graffito with a dedication to Odysseus was found on a 2nd–1st century B.C. female terracotta mask of a type found there since the sixth century B.C.; most probably these earlier examples were connected with the same cult. Since the deposits are continuous and in the same place, there is a strong possibility that the cult of Odysseus went back to the late protogeometric period, when the Iron Age cult starts in the cave, perhaps after the discovery of the Mycenaean deposit.

4. Protogeometric Tombs at Kerameikos.[13] The fact that the amphoras on top of two protogeometric cremation burials were not perforated, as is usually the case, could perhaps be taken as a proof for later libations, and therefore for a continuous cult. Also, the sacrifices and other features described by Andronikos point to burial rites, as he suggests, and not to a cult of heroised dead. However, future evidence from parallel cases may decisively suggest the opposite.

5. Protogeometric Heroon (?) with Circular Hearth on the Acropolis of Gortys.[14] In this early period in Crete the bothros was inside the temple and the ritual took place in the vestibule in the form of a banquet. For this reason one may be mistaking for a temple what would be a Prytaneion or an Andreion for the meetings of the men's unions. The early Geometric-to subgeometric building on the Acropolis of Gortys with its large rectangular bothros in the central room is similar to the 'Oikos' at the south of the Heroon of Eretria[15], with the difference that no tombs were found there. It could either be a Heroon itself or have served as a banquet house for the 'funeral meals'. It has been noted that at the SW under the niveau of the temple, between the pavement and the natural rock, were found the scanty remains of an earlier construction with circular hearth. The sherds from the occupation level are protogeometric. The doubts about the date of the early structure expressed by Coldstream are not particularly substantiated: that the protogeometric sherds could well come from the Dark Age settlement underneath. Similarly one could doubt almost every single dating of the earliest sacral constructions.

[13] Andronikos, *op. cit.* 93ff.; C. G. Styrenius, Submycenaean Studies, Skrifter Svenska Inst. Athens (1967) 110f.

[14] L. Renard, Ant. Class. 36 (1967) 566ff., esp. 570f., pl. I. 1, 579. H. Drerup, Griechische Architektur zur Zeit Homers Arch. Anz. (1964) 180ff., esp. 204, 216; N. Coldstream, Geometric Greece (London 1977) 280.

[15] C. Bérard, Eretria III. L'Heröon à la Porte de l'Ouest (Bern 1970) 63ff. and esp. K. Schefold–D. Knoepfler, Forschungen in Eretria 1974–74 Ant. Kunst 19 (1976) 51–58, esp. 53.

6. Pelopeion, Olympia.[16] The early Pelopeion was a round flattish hill in front of the subsequent Hera temple. To the North and South of it Dörpfeld found the stone enclosure of a prehistoric house. Geometric tripods were found in the area of the Pelopeion and a protogeometric one a little further, to the west of the later Temple of Zeus. It has been argued that the Pelopeion existed already in Mycenaean times, built by Herakles, who first sacrified to him (*Paus.* 5.13; 5.14.2); for this, however, there is no concrete evidence. To the NE of the Pelopeion a prehistoric child's grave was excavated. It is probable, taking into consideration the abundance of parallel data, that the accidental discovery of this burial prompted the Dorians to erect the tymbos and sacrifice to Pelops who, according to the old tradition, was from the Argolis and not from Asia Minor. In later times there are several different traditions about the tomb of Pelops. Pind. *Ol.* 1.149: in the Stadion; Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* 28.34: his shoulderblade was in Elis. Remains of ashes in the protogeometric enclosure point to sacrificial offerings. The information for the sacrifices on his tomb (black boar, exclusion from the monthly sacrifices, as were all heroes, Kronos, Gaia, Eileithyia, prothysia to him before the sacrifices to Zeus, as for Kourotrophos in Athens before all sacrifices)[17] is all later. However, there is no doubt about the identification of the enclosure excavated in front of the temple of Hera. It underwent alterations in later periods and its entrance was put in the west, as is usual for heroes. It is most important as the earliest reasonably well attested heroon, and has the characteristic round shape of the Homeric *tymbos*. A circular *sema* with circular enclosure of stones will be later characteristic as an ancestral heroon, often of an *eponymos*, in the Agora. Pelops was the eponymos of the tribe Pelopes. Dörpfeld's wooden enclosure was perhaps erected in the Geometric period. The find of at least one protogeometric tripod nearby attests to the association of the early cult with Athletic games. Herrmann suggested that Pelop's Funeral Games may have been the beginning of the worldwide Olympic

[16] H. V. Herrmann, Zur ältesten Geschichte von Olympia Athen. Mitt. 77 (1962) 16ff., fig. 2; *idem*, Olympia und seine Spiele Gymnasium 80 (1973) 172–205, esp. 178ff., Abb. 1. F. Willemsen, Olymp. Forschungen III (Berlin 1957) 161ff., 168, Dreifußkessel. A. Mallwitz, Olympia und seine Bauten (München 1972) 134ff. Price (*supra*, n. 1) 143–4; R. Martin, L'Agora Greque (Paris 1951) 194ff. P. Lévêque, Continuités et innovations dans la religion Greque de la lère moitié du ler millenaire, Parola del Passato 28 (1973) 23–50, esp. 27f., 32ff.; however, there is no concrete evidence for a Mycenaean *worship* of Pelops or Herakles, even if the names or mythology were known.

[17] W. Burkert, Homo Necans (Berlin 1972) 108ff., esp. 111f. Schol. Pind. *Ol.* I. 149a. T. Hadzisteliou Price, Kourotrophos, Cults and Representations (Leiden 1978) 108f.

Games, since his cult has traits similar to the rites of the dead, and the Games are part of such rites in this period. The former is possible, but for the latter there is no proof; such games were apparently not universal for all dead but for heroic dead only, such as Achilles and Pelops.

7. The Hippodameion, Oinomaeion and Altar of Herakles.[18] Pausanias saw the Hippodameion in the Altis and the grave of Oinomaos, an earthen tymbos, on the other side of the river Kladeos (Paus. 6.20.7; 21.3). He also saw a wooden column, remains of the Palace of Oinomaos, between the Heraion and the Metroon (Paus. 5.14.7; 20.6–7). One is tempted to think that these should be contemporary with the early tymbos of Pelops. It is possible that whatever meagre evidence for them might have survived was missed during the earliest excavations. The tymbos of Oinomaos near the Kladeos may still await excavation. The altar of Herakles in front of the Sikyonian treasure (Paus. 5.14.9) is equally evasive for the lack of any concrete early evidence. Some distinguished three periods, while others accept only two with an early place for offerings under the altar, according to Dörpfeld's plans. However, how early this 'ältere Opferablagerung' might be is anybody's guess, since early offerings might have been cleared out for the building of the later altar. Dörpfeld arbitrarily pushed its date back to the late Helladic. It is probable, however, that Herakles was venerated here as early as Pelops.

8. Erechtheion, Athens.[19] The antiquity of the cult of the first king of Athens has been always a matter of dispute. Leaving aside Diodorus' statement about his Egyptian provenience (I. 28.6), taken from a curious Egyptian record, one must examine the evidence for an early post-Myceanean

[18] Herrmann, Athen. Mitt., *op. cit.*, 8ff., 22ff. W. Dörpfeld, Alt-Olympia, I (Berlin 1935) 108ff., fig. 20, 115. Paus. 5.14.9.

[19] Chr. Kardara, Πυκινὸς Δόμος Arch. Eph. 1960, 165ff., 170ff. A. Lesky, Pauly-Wissowa RE Suppl. XI, Homeros, 687ff., 787 that the Catalogue of Ships was based on Mycenaean elements which Homer reworked. M. M. Willcock, Comment. on Iliad I–IV (London 1970) 71. R. Hope–Simpson–J. F. Lazenby, The Catalogue of Ships (Oxford 1970) 56ff. C. H. Whitman, Homer and the Homeric Tradition (Cambridge, Mass. 1958) 66–86, against the 'Peisistratid' theory. G. W. Elderkin, The Cults of the Erechtheion, Hesperia 9–10 (1940–41) 113ff., 117. T. B. L. Webster, From Mycenae to Homer (London 1960) 159, 143. A. Furumark, The Sacral Kingship (Contrib. Viiith Intern. Congr. Hist. Rel. Roma 1955 (Leiden 1959) 370. S. Marinatos, Studies D. M. Robinson I (St. Louis 1957) 126–34. Eretria, *supra*, n. 15. Mylonas, Homeric and Mycenaean Burial Customs Amer. Journ. of Arch. 52 (1948) 77. F. G. Maier, Torgötter, Festschrift Hommel (Tübingen 1961) 94f., 102ff. M. Launey, Etudes Thasiennes, I (Paris 1944) 139ff. L. Pouilleux, Etudes Thasiennes, III (Paris 1954) 231, A. 4,352ff., T. H. Price, An Enigma in Pella: The Tholos and Herakles Phylakos, Amer. Journ. of Arch. 77 (1973) 431–34, pls. 93–4. N. Kontoleon, Τὸ Ἐρεχθεῖον (Athens 1949) 68.

cult supported by some scholars. Webster suggested that songs sung in honor of dead kings at their anniversaries may have survived in Athens, where Homer knows of his cult. He accepts, however, unquestionably the greatly disputed divine Mycenaean kingship. Homer (*Od.* 7.78f.) says that Athena entered the well-built house of Erechtheus. Willcock, Whitman and other Homeric scholars and archaeologists have quarelled on the date of the passage and the date of the joint temple of Athena and Erechtheus, as well as on the passage of the Iliad (2.547) on his temple and sacrifices. Kardara interpreted the Mycenaean tower on the Acropolis and the open air eschara excavated under the temple of Athena Nike as the tomb of Erechtheus. She identified *pykinos domos* with his temenos in the entrance of the Acropolis, by the compactly built Mycenaean Tower (*pykinos*); below the Tower on the West side is the 5 meter long shrine that housed the xoanon of Athena. She also suggested that the two columns in front of the Classical Erechtheion are Geometric-archaic and do not belong to the original Mycenaean megaron, which was never abandoned completely but was still used in the archaic period. The subsequently demolished megaron was considered an *enelysion* (place where a thunder fell) and hence the later tradition that this was the burial place of the first kings of Athens. Kardara explained the transfer of his cult to the site of the megaron by the fact that in this way it would be nearer the early Prytaneion and Bouleuterion which were on the north slope and had to be on the Acropolis. She points out that the early submycenaean or protogeometric shrine on the Tower was in the tradition of the Gate Shrines of Mycenae and Tiryns. In the same tradition, one could add, is the recently excavated Heroon of Eretria and the one in Thasos. Kardara tried to restore below the Tower (shrine of Athena) a tripartite Mycenaean peak-shrine with altar outside; on the altar-hole ashes and remains of burnt bones were found. The eschara of the Tower would only receive chthonic unburnt offerings. The former recall the sacrifies mentioned in Il. 2.547. The sub-mycenaean or early protogeometric date of the eschara and its chthonic character are archaeologically evidenced. The identification with the cult of Erechtheus is almost unavoidable since most scholars support now the antiquity of Od. 7.78f. referring to the *pykinos domos*. An early cult of Erechtheus on the Acropolis as of Pelops in Olympia seems very probable. Kardara also brought together some literary and archaeological evidence which shows that until the Persian wars, by ἄδυτον, μέγαρον, and πίονα νηόν one meant the shrine of Athena by the Tower. It is true that both the temple of Athena Nike and the Erechtheion were only built after that shrine was out of use. When, after the Persian

wars, the Tower was covered anew with masonry and the shrine was closed in it, two openings were left in the West side of it. These correspond to the architecture of the previous tripartite shrine. Kontoleon noticed also that they correspond to the architecture of the West side of the Classical Erechtheion, and noted the use of this West part for the chthonic cults of the Classical Acropolis.

9. The House of Akademos.[20] Stavropoulos excavated in the area identified through inscriptions as the ancient Academy an Early Helladic house from ca. 2300 B.C., and near it a large Geometric building full of successive layers of sacrifices. He identified the Early Helladic house with that believed by the settlers of the 'Synoikismos of Theseus' to be the house of the Hero Oikistes Akademos; he associated the 'Hiera Oikia' of the sacrifices with the early cult of the hero. He also found several bothroi in the vicinity. Although it is not made clear whether a protogeometric stratum was found in the succesive (at least four) layers of sacrifices in the *Hiera Oikia*, the excavator mentions a protogeometric deposit of over 200 vases placed in rows the one inside the other in a small area ca. 150 m. to the SW of the Early Helladic house; there is no other building that the former could be connected with.

10. Hyakinthos and the Amyklaion near Sparta.[21] Chirassi considered Hyakinthos as a Minoan hero solely on the evidence of the suffix -nt(h) and the meaning of the name as a flower (the pre-cerealic elements of the cult could surely be due to remains of influence of an earlier different cult). He was the son of Amyklos, the eponymos of the Lacedaemonian city, near which his cult flourished (Apollod. *Bibl.* 1.3; 3.10.3; Nikandros, *Ther.* 902ff.). He was also connected with Athens as father of the *Parthenoi Hyakinthides* who sacrified their lives on the tomb of Cyclops Geraistos to save the city of Athens (Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.15). Hyakinthos was worshipped together with Apollo in the Amyklaion near Sparta, identified with remains of the hill of Hagia Kyriake.[22] The Hyakinthia had initiatory character for

[20] Ergon 1956, 10ff., fig. 9; Ergon 1958ff. Arch Anal. Athen. 1968, 107, the 6th century. *Horos tes Hekademeias* found nearby.

[21] I. Chirassi, Elementi Precereali nei miti e riti Greci (Roma 1968) 157ff.

[22] Tsountas, Arch. Eph. 1892; E. Buschor Ath. Mitt. 52 (1927) 2ff.; Bull de Corr. hell. (1957) 548–9; Annual of the Brit. school at Athens (1960) 74; Annual of the Brit. school at Athens (1961) 164, 170, 173; F. Kiechle, Lakonien und Sparta (München 1963) 49ff. Paus. 3.19.4 for the ritual: prothysia of *enagismos* poured into the altar-tomb which bore representation of his *Apotheosis*. Nonnus, *Dionys.* 19.101: sacred songs. His death and rebirth celebrated in conjunction with Apollo's cult was the most important feast in Sparta. Hdt. 9,7; Thuc. 5.23. In Classical times Hyakinthos was not forgotten in spite of the

young men, indicated also by the representation of the hero as youth *and* as bearded man, and of his life, death and resurrection as different stages. Strabo VI. 268C talks about an Agon as part of the Hyakinthia; Philostratos (*V. Soph.* 2.12) names the Hyakinthia together with the Isthmian and the Pythian Games. A rustic meal, *kopis*, was part of the ritual as well as the sacrifice of a goat (Athen. 4.139D). Even if the elements of the myth and the cult seem to belong to a very early stage of the Greek religion, the present archaeological data do not support such an early cult. Dietrich[23] suggested that the Hyakinthia are a survival, but a Dorian one. He admitted however, the archaeological gaps even in the ceramic remains in the Amyklaion, in the same way as there is a gap between the Mycenaean remains and the foundation of the 'Menelaion' in Late Laconian Geometric. In the hill of the Amyklaion was found some protogeometric pottery, but nothing to indicate that it was in any way connected with the cult. It is probable, though, that the cult was already practised then, since among the Dorians of the Geometric period Hyakinthos' cult was well enough established to be transplanted by the colonists Parthenioi to Taras.

The new theory of Chadwick on the subordinate coexistence of the Dorians in Mycenaean times[24] suggests that *in principle* Greek hero cults similar to these evidenced by Geometric remains may have existed among the Dorians already in the Mycenaean era. It is perhaps more probable that even if the myths existed in some form the practice of hero-cult was the result of the domination of the Dorians over their previous masters, hence also such myths as those of Herakles, their hero *par excellence*, who at first performs exploits serving some Mycenaean king, but eventually attacks Tiryns, Elis and Pylos. The establishment of the hero-cult probably progressed along with the establishment of the Dorian success and dominion, in the same way that the worship of saints progressed along with the establishment of the Christian Church and the Christianized Byzantine Empire.

The most substantial evidence for a hero cult in the protogeometric period is the round tymbos of Pelops in Olympia. A similar cult for Erechtheus on the eschara of the Mycenaean Tower of the Acropolis of Athens is very probable. It is significant that both the above heroes are

importance of the Apollinean cult: Eur. Hel. 1465f., nightly orgiastic *komos* (pointing to the precerealic ritual?); *pannychis* with choruses of women. Apollod. I. 3: Hyakinthos was the first who 'started falling in love with men'.

[23] *supra*, n. 4.

[24] *supra*, n. 4, esp. 116f.

ancestral, leaders of tribes, γενάρχαι and Eponymoi of the Pelopes and the Athenians (later of the phyle Erechtheis). For both a foreign origin is reported at some time in the tradition: Asia Minor for Pelops, Egypt for Erechtheus. It seems that an early cult was also practised for Akademos. The evidence for veneration of dead in Helladic tombs in the protogeometric period is at present scanty and unclear; it is a case of veneration, anyway, rather than cult; that of Odysseus in Ithaka, however, probably started in the late protogeometric (since the deposits are continuous in the same place), after the discovery of the human bones and the Mycenaean votive deposit in the paved area.

Even this meagre archaeological evidence is ample enough to support the existence and distribution of protogeometric hero-cult, well before 'Homer'. What exactly were the incentives for its beginning? One may speculate for ever. Pre-homeric saga and the need for self assertion and identity seem probable causes, especially since the heroes were leaders of *Gene* and kings. One may think also of the need for an ideal human, to look up to. The Greeks were always noted for veneration of their ancestors; they may have brought along with them a kind of ancestral worship common among their Indo-european forefathers[25].

The recently expressed view of the Dorians as old but subordinate inhabitants in Greece raises the question of the hero-cult in the Bronze Age. Even if the Achaeans did not seem too respectful of the dead and the afterlife maybe the Dorian minority were different. The Protogeometric cult of Pelops was instituted near a prehistoric burial. Especially the Mycenaean votive deposit near the human bones in the paved area of the Odysseion of Ithaka is something to think about. There is no evidence so far for Mycenaean epic poetry, but perhaps there were chronicles[26], which may have contained heroic mythology. The exact time of intersection between mythology and actual practice of worship is still to be discovered. It might even be before the Protogeometric period.

[25] W. Caland, Ueber Totenverehrung bei einigen der Indo-germanischen Völker (Amsterdam 1888).

[26] C. Galavotti, I documenti Micenei e la Poesia Omerica, La Poesia Epica e la sua Formazione (Congr. Roma 1969, Acc. Naz. dei Lincei 1970) 79–89. The *Ti-ri-si-ro-e* tablet has not yet been convincingly interpreted; Price (*supra*, n. 1) 131.

MICHAEL GAGARIN

The Athenian Law against *Hybris*

The Athenian law against *hybris*[1] is preserved in Demosthenes' speech *Against Meidias* (21.47):[2]

> Ἐάν τις ὑβρίζῃ εἴς τινα, ἢ παῖδα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄνδρα, τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τῶν δούλων, ἢ παράνομόν τι ποιήσῃ εἰς τούτων τινά, γραφέσθω πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας ὁ βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων οἷς ἔξεστιν, οἱ δὲ θεσμοθέται εἰσαγόντων εἰς τὴν ἡλιαίαν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν ἀφ' ἧς ἂν γραφῇ, ἐὰν μή τι δημόσιον κωλύῃ, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅταν ᾖ πρῶτον οἷόν τε. ὅτου δ' ἂν καταγνῷ ἡ ἡλιαία, τιμάτω περὶ αὐτοῦ παραχρῆμα, ὅτου ἂν δοκῇ ἄξιος εἶναι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι. ὅσοι δ' ἂν γράφωνται γραφὰς ἰδίας κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐάν τις μὴ ἐπεξέλθῃ ἢ ἐπεξιὼν μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, ἀποτεισάτω χιλίας δραχμὰς τῷ δημοσίῳ. ἐὰν δὲ ἀργυρίου τιμηθῇ τῆς ὕβρεως, δεδέσθω, ἐὰν ἐλεύθερον ὑβρίσῃ, μέχρι ἂν ἐκτείσῃ.

> "If anyone commits *hybris* against another, either child or woman or man, whether free or slave, or if he does anything unlawful to anyone of these, let any eligible Athenian who wishes bring a *graphē* before the Thesmothetai. Let the Thesmothetai bring the case before the people's court within thirty days of the bringing of the *graphē* unless some public business prevents this, in which case as early as possible. If the court convicts someone, let it immediately assess the penalty it thinks he deserves to suffer or to pay. If anyone brings a private *graphē* under this law and either does not carry through with the prosecution or in the final verdict

[1] The following works will be referred to by the author's name alone: L. Gernet, Recherches sur le développement de la pensée juridique et morale en Grèce (Paris 1917); H. F. Hitzig, Injuria (München 1899); J. H. Lipsius, Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren (Leipzig 1905–15); D. M. MacDowell, *Hybris* in Athens, Greece and Rome 23 (1976) 14–31; E. Ruschenbusch, ΥΒΡΕΩΣ ΓΡΑΦΗ. Ein Fremdkörper in athenischen Recht des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr., Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung (Rom. Abt.) 82 (1965) 302–309.

[2] There is a different version of the law in Aeschines 1.16, which is agreed to be corrupt; see MacDowell 31 n. 23, Lipsius 421–23.

> does not receive one-fifth of the votes, he shall pay 1000 drachmas to the state treasury. If a fine is assessed against one convicted of *hybris*, let him be imprisoned, if he has committed *hybris* against a free man, until he pays it."

The immediate question raised by this law is, to precisely what conduct does it apply? A further question will arise if we find that the law against *hybris* overlaps to a large extent other Athenian laws, in which case we shall have to ask, what then was the purpose of the law against *hybris?*

The opening clause of the law contains two expressions designating the conduct prohibited by the law – "commits *hybris* against" and "does something unlawful to" – each of which we must examine in turn. First, it is clear that the term *hybris* and its derivatives in fifth- and fourth-century Athens could designate a wide variety of conduct, from physical assault (often sexual assault) to outrageous or excessive behavior of various sorts.[3] It may seem doubtful, however, whether the law could apply to such a wide range of behavior (even bearing in mind that in Greek law the designation of offenses tends to be rather broad), and we first note that the law is restricted to *hybris* committed against another person (εἴς τινα). In other words, excessive behavior by itself or outrageous treatment of a god is not prohibited by the law. It should also be noted that the indefinite victim – "anyone" – is further specified as "child or woman or man, whether free or slave." The order of the first three terms may suggest that sexual offenses were uppermost in the lawgiver's mind, though in fact in the cases we know about striking a blow is the most common manifestation of *hybris*.

A further restriction on the application of this law was that the injury done to another person probably had to be physical and not merely verbal. All certain examples of *hybris* subject to the law involve some physical injury,[4] and a passage in Isocrates (20.2–3; cf. Dem. 21.32) specifically contrasts the offense of *hybris* with verbal abuse, κακηγορία (see Lipsius 423). This observation leads us to the most disputed question concerning this law: was a physical assault in itself a sufficient ground for a charge of

[3] I find MacDowell's survey very useful, even though I disagree with him at several points. For our purpose Fisher (Greece and Rome 23 [1976] 177–93) adds little to MacDowell.

[4] In Isaeus 8.41 a *graphē hybreōs* is brought when a person is wrongly seized and held prisoner; this certainly involves physical force. Aeschines is clearly stretching the term when he says (1.15) that hiring a young boy (for sex) is an example of *hybris*, because it can be considered a form of rape. In Dem. 45.4 a charge of *hybris* was brought against Phormio for marrying the speaker's mother; this case was admittedly brought because normal *dikai* were not allowed at the time, and the charge is of dubious validity (see Hitzig 42).

hybris, or must the assault have been accompanied by a certain state of mind, a state MacDowell (27) calls "self-indulgent egotism" and which we may call by the modern term "hubristic."[5]

The evidence on this point is difficult to assess. There are certainly passages in the orators where an assailant's "hubristic" state of mind is emphasized (e.g. Dem. 54.9), and the common definition of *hybris* in the later lexica stresses the contemptuous or insulting nature of the offense.[6] On the other hand, we can also find passages in the orators (e.g., Dem. 21.45, 53.16; Isoc. 20.2–3) where *hybris* seems to be spoken of simply as a physical offense, apparently not requiring any special state of mind. All these passages must be treated with caution, however, since rhetorical considerations can easily lead a speaker to emphasize one or another aspect of the situation and the later writers may not have had reliable information.

Several scholars have found stronger support for the view that *hybrizein* in the law designates a "hubristic" assault in two passages in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. In one passage (1378B23–30) *hybris* is classified as a kind of contempt (ὀλιγωρία), since it involves doing or saying something "in order to bring dishonor on the victim, not to acquire something for oneself."[7] This analysis occurs, however, during a discussion of character and emotion and is, therefore, not so useful for our purpose as another passage (1374A13–15), where *hybris* as a legal offense is specified as follows: "for not in every case does one commit *hybris* if one strikes someone, but only if one does so for some purpose, such as to dishonor the victim or give oneself pleasure."[8] This latter passage has seemed to some (e.g., MacDowell) to provide further support for the view that *hybris* involves a "hubristic" state of mind, but if we consider the full context of Aristotle's remark, we may have to modify this conclusion.

Aristotle is in this section (1373B28–74A17) reminding his reader that an act must be intentional to be a "crime" (ἀδίκημα), and that the names of certain offenses in themselves indicate deliberate choice (προαίρεσις). After the example of *hybris* he continues (1374A15–16), "nor if anyone takes

[5] Hitzig (35–43) and Gernet (184–87) argue for a fairly restricted sense of *hybris;* Lipsius (425–26) and MacDowell (esp. 27–29) for a wider sense; for references to other views see Ruschenbusch 302.

[6] The definition of *hybris* is the same in Photius, the *Suda* and the *Et. Mag.:* ὕβρις, ἡ μετὰ προπηλακισμοῦ καὶ ἐπηρείας, αἰκία δὲ πληγαὶ μόνον. Cf. *An. Bekk.* I. 355.

[7] ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνη ἔστι τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γίγνηται αὐτῷ (1378B23–25).

[8] οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξεν πάντως ὕβρισεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἕνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκεῖνον ἢ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι.

something secretly, does he in every case steal it, but only if he intends to cause damage to the owner of the property and to appropriate it for himself." What Aristotle is saying is that *hybris* must have some motive, and that a blow struck accidently, or perhaps even in anger or retaliation (that is, without premeditation) would not be *hybris*. In other words, just as theft is roughly (though not precisely) equivalent to "taking something secretly," so *hybris* is roughly (though not precisely) equivalent to "striking someone". Thus *hybris* may designate more than a simple blow, but it does not necessarily involve (though it may) a "hubristic" state of mind.

The conclusion that *hybris* designates an "unprovoked assault" seems to me to fit both Aristotle's testimony and the conflicting evidence of the orators; it is consistent, moreover, with one further consideration, that *hybris* includes assaults against slaves, against whom an attitude of "hubristic" superiority on the part of the assailant would not normally be condemned or even noticed.[9] This interpretation also eliminates one problem MacDowell finds with the law, namely that a "hubristic" state of mind would be very difficult to prove in court, so difficult in fact that the law against *hybris* was only rarely used. I shall later return to the question, why the law was so little used, but we should here note that no orator ever mentions the difficulty of proving a "hubristic" attitude as a reason for not bringing a charge of *hybris*,[10] though one would expect a mention of this factor in cases like Dem. 54 or Isoc. 20, if such were the speaker's feeling.

This does not necessarily mean that *hybris* designates precisely the same offenses as are designated by laws against assault (*aikia*)[11] or rape (for which a δίκη βιαίων was normally brought), though it is hard to know just which offenses (if any) in the latter categories could not have been considered examples of *hybris*.[12] *Hybris* certainly was considered a more serious offense than *aikia* (Dem. 54.1), but it seems equally clear that in practice

[9] Lipsius (426–27) accepts both Aeschines' (1.17) and Demosthenes' (21.46) slightly different explanations of the extension of the law to slaves (on which see Gernet 186), but even if these are correct, the fact that it was possible to speak of *hybris* against a slave suggests that a "hubristic" mental attitude was not a necessary part of the offense.

[10] Demosthenes (21.72) talks of the difficulty of describing vividly all the features of an act which may indicate *hybris*, but he does not suggest that this might be a reason for not bringing such a prosecution.

[11] Note that αἰκία, which as a legal term all scholars take to designate simple assault, also means "outrage" or "disgrace" (cf. Isoc. 20.5).

[12] Meidias' assault against Demosthenes, for example, might have appeared to an unbiased observer to be a rather simple blow, perhaps even provoked by Demosthenes himself; cf. J. Humbert, Démosthène, Plaidoyers politiques II (Paris 1959) 4.

most assaults could be treated as either the one or the other, as the prosecutor wished.[13]

The second kind of conduct designated by the law against *hybris* is doing "something unlawful" (παράνομόν τι) to another person. This appears to mean that the law applied to acts directed against another person which were prohibited by law, but since such a provision would appear to duplicate many other laws, and since he finds this interpretation of *paranomon* "vague," MacDowell (26) suggests that *paranomon* be understood as referring to unwritten laws and customs:[14] "the purpose of our law is to forbid *hybris* or 'any improper behaviour.'" MacDowell further maintains that the law was written in the sixth century, before *nomos* began to be used of written laws.

There are several objections to this suggestion. First, a law prohibiting "any improper behavior" would be both vague and unenforceable. Of course, it is not impossible that the Athenians might have passed a vague and unenforceable law, but we know of no other such laws and have no evidence to suggest that "unwritten laws" in any sense[15] were ever mentioned in written Athenian law. Moreover, the story that Pericles advised the Athenians to enfore unwritten laws in cases of impiety (Lys. 6.10) lends no support to the theory that they did in fact enforce unwritten laws. If anything, this report implies that the Athenians did not at the time enforce unwritten laws in cases of impiety, and they would probably be less likely to enforce them in other cases.

Secondly, we know that the Athenians had written laws prohibiting certain specific kinds of "improper behavior" against persons. The mistreatment of one's parents, for instance, was subject to legal prosecution (by the γραφὴ κακώσεως γονέων). Indeed, even rape and assault would have to be included as "improper behavior" unless there were some specific indication that *paranomon* referred to conduct prohibited by unwritten laws but not prohibited by written law, and this is clearly not the case. Thus even if *paranomon* could apply to "improper behavior" in general (and I do not think it could), this part of the law would duplicate other written laws.

[13] In this conclusion I am in fairly close agreement with Hitzig (40).

[14] Ruschenbusch (306–9) also takes *paranomon* to refer to ἄγραφα ἀδικήματα.

[15] For various meanings of this expression see M. Ostwald, Was There a Concept ἄγραφος νόμος in Classical Greece? in Studies Vlastos (Phronesis Suppl. 1 [Assen 1973]) 70–104; for the application of *nomos* to written law see Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy (Oxford 1969), esp. 55–60.

We must therefore reject MacDowell's interpretation of *paranomon* in the law against *hybris* together with his sixth-century dating of the law. If *paranomon* designates conduct contrary to written law, then the law must be no earlier than the fifth century. Moreover, *paranomos* and its derivatives do not appear in extant literature until the latter part of the fifth century, when suddenly they begin to be used by many authors in Athens (Herodotus, Thucydides, Euripides, Aristophanes, and the orators), and it is a plausible conclusion that the word was only coined after *nomos* came to be used of written laws. If the law against *hybris* dates from the mid-fifth century, then the use of *paranomon* to designate "unlawful" conduct would be quite consistent with its use elsewhere, for instance in the γραφὴ παρανόμων, or prosecution against sponsors of illegal laws. Such a prosecution (best known from Demosthenes' *On the Crown*) could be brought against the author of any law which contravened some previous written law, and it was used at least as early as 415 (And. 1.17). It is thus quite possible that both the γραφὴ παρανόμων and the law against *hybris* were instituted not long before this date, perhaps during the third quarter of the fifth century.[16]

We have seen that in its application to those who "commit *hybris* against another" the law against *hybris* overlaps to a large extent the laws against assault and rape, and in its application to those who "do anything unlawful to another" it explicitly duplicates these and other Athenian laws. I might add that the two expressions also overlap with each other to a large extent. This does not seem to me a problem (*pace* Ruschenbusch), since we are probably meant to understand "if one commits *hybris* against another . . . or does anything else unlawful to any of these."[17] In short, the law against *hybris* applies to all offenses against another person.[18] This conclusion, however, raises the objection that, in MacDowell's words (26), the authors "cannot have meant their law to forbid simply what was forbidden in other laws, because that would be pointless." To answer this objection we must suggest some reason for passing the law against *hybris* and we must thus consider in what ways this law does differ from the other laws concerning the same offenses. The main differences are two: first the law against *hybris*

[16] Ruschenbusch (307) dates the law between ca. 450 and 422 (when it is mentioned in Aristophanes' *Wasps*, 1417–18).

[17] In the law against injuring orphans (Dem. 43.75) we find the same double expression: ἐὰν δέ τις ὑβρίζῃ ἢ ποιῇ τι παράνομον . . .

[18] Cf. the laws of Hippodamus of Miletus, which according to Aristotle (*Pol.* 1267B37–39) were divided into three basic categories, *hybris, blabē* and *thanatos* (i.e. offenses against a person, offenses against property, and homicide). Strictly speaking, homicide could perhaps be subsumed under *hybris*, but we have no evidence that it ever was.

provides for a different procedure, a *graphē* instead of a *dikē*, and secondly it allows for a more severe penalty.

The significance of the first feature is that a *graphē* was a public prosecution, which could be brought by any Athenian citizen who wished, not just by the victim of the assault. Demosthenes at one point (21.45) hails this feature as a sign that "the lawgiver considered every deed one commits with violence to be a public wrong . . . for he thought that the one who commits *hybris* wrongs the city, and not only his victim." The suggestion that this was the purpose of the law is an attractive one, but without further evidence it must remain simply a hypothesis.[19]

The second difference, that the γραφὴ ὕβρεως allows for a more severe penalty, is emphasized by Ruschenbusch. He argues (304–9) that the original laws against assault, rape, etc. had fixed monetary penalties, which had become so devalued by inflation that a new law was necessary. Thus the law against *hybris* was passed, leaving it up to the jury to decide the penalty in each case. Against this suggestion we must object, first, that not only did the other laws against assault continue to exist, but they were often employed in preference to the law against *hybris* (Dem. 54.1; cf. Isoc. 20). Secondly, the penalties in the common suits for assault could probably be assessed by the court in accordance with the harm done, and thus could be adjusted to current values (cf. Isoc. 20.19).

On the other hand, the penalty in an ordinary case of assault could only be a monetary fine, whereas in a γραφὴ ὕβρεως it could be as severe as death,[20] and this difference may have some significance. There is one passage in Demosthenes (54.1) which gives an explicit indication of the reason for bringing a δίκη αἰκίας instead of a γραφὴ ὕβρεως and the speaker there says that although he wanted to bring a γραφὴ ὕβρεως, he was advised "not to get involved in something greater than I would be able to carry out nor to appear to be bringing a prosecution for what I have suffered in a manner too great for my [young] age."[21] Of course, this may not be his real reason, but it is clear nonetheless that a γραφὴ ὕβρεως was considered a more serious prosecution than a δίκη αἰκίας. This severity is

[19] It is true that a γραφὴ ὕβρεως was usually brought or contemplated by the victim of the assault (or the master of a slave), but Dem. 53.16 seems to indicate that this was not always the case.

[20] Cf. Lysias fr. 44 (Thalheim): καίτοι τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὑμῶν ὅτι τὴν μὲν αἰκίαν χρημάτων ἔστι μόνον τιμῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ ὑβρίζειν δόξαντας ἔξεστιν ὑμῖν θανάτῳ ζημιοῦν.

[21] μὴ μείζω πράγματ' ἢ δυνήσομαι φέρειν ἐπάγεσθαι, μηδ' ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡλικίαν περὶ ὧν ἐπεπόνθειν ἐγκαλοῦντα φαίνεσθαι.

confirmed not only by the fact that the penalty could be death but also by the provision that a prosecutor who dropped his case in a γραφὴ ὕβρεως or did not receive one-fifth of the votes would be fined 1000 drachmas. This provision coupled with the fact that a successful prosecutor received no monetary compensation in a γραφὴ ὕβρεως (Dem. 21.45) may account for the rarity of actual prosecutions for *hybris* (cf. MacDowell 27–29).

Taking all this evidence together I would conclude that the author of the law against *hybris* felt that certain physical attacks against persons deserved more severe treatment than the current laws provided. He therefore proposed a law which could apply to any attack against a person,[22] which allowed anyone who wished to prosecute in such cases, and which allowed the death penalty to be imposed for such attacks. To insure that such prosecutions were only brought in truly serious cases, however, he added the provision that the prosecutor who dropped his case or did not receive one-fifth of the votes would be fined 1000 drachmas. In practice the law was seldom used, probably because the incentive of monetary compensation made prosecution by an ordinary *dikē* more attractive. But even if seldom used, prosecution by a γραφὴ ὕβρεως was an important threat, and the orators on occasion made the most of it in their rhetoric.

[22] We may speculate that the author designated the offense ὑβρίζειν in order to stress the seriousness of the offense, but added the further designation παράνομόν τι ποιεῖν in order to insure that all assaults could be prosecuted by this law.

KURT RAAFLAUB

Polis Tyrannos: Zur Entstehung einer politischen Metapher

Vor 25 Jahren hat der Gelehrte, dem diese Zeilen gewidmet sind, in einem kurzen Artikel, wenige Jahre später wesentlich ausführlicher in seinem „Oedipus at Thebes" in eindringlicher Analyse einen zuvor höchstens ansatzweise erkannten, für das Verständnis des sophokleischen ‚Oedipus' bedeutsamen Assoziations- und Interpretationszusammenhang herausgearbeitet,[1] der sich in seinen eigenen Worten wie folgt zusammenfassen läßt: „Oedipus *tyrannos* . . . is more than an individual tragic hero. In his title, *tyrannos*, in the nature and basis of his power, in his character, and in the mode of his dramatic action, he resembles Athens, the city which aimed to become (and was already for along the road to becoming) the *tyrannos* of Greece, the rich and splendid autocrat of the whole Hellenic world. Such a resemblance . . . must have won him the sympathy of the Athenian audience and firmly engaged the emotions of that audience in the hero's action and suffering. But it does something more. It adds an extra dimension of significance not only to his career but also to his fall, which suggests, in symbolic, prophetic, riddling terms, the fall of Athens itself." Und: „the play is a tragic vision of Athens' splendor, vigor, and inevitable defeat . . ."[2]

Diese Interpretation hat, wie nicht anders zu erwarten, keineswegs allgemeine Zustimmung gefunden.[3] Manches scheint mir freilich dafür zu

[1] B. M. W. Knox, Class. Journ. 50 (1954) 97ff. Oedipus at Thebes (New Haven–London 1957) 53ff.

[2] Oedipus at Thebes 99. 105 (fast in den gleichen Worten bereits Class. Journ. 50, 101). Vgl. auch 67: „These resemblances between the Athenian supremacy in Greece and Oedipus' peculiar power in Thebes suggest that the word *tyrannos* as applied to Oedipus is part of a larger pattern, a comparison of Oedipus to Athens itself. The character of Oedipus is the character of the Athenian people. Oedipus, in his capacities and failings, his virtues and his defects, is a microcosm of the people of Periclean Athens."

[3] Vorbehalte etwa bei D. W. Lucas, Class. Review 8 (1958) 229f. M. Delcourt, Revue belge de Philol. 37 (1959) 114. P. T. Stevens, Journ. of Hell. Stud. 79 (1959) 164f. E. R. Dodds, in: Twentieth Century Interpretations of Oedipus Rex, hrsg. von M. J. O'Brien (Engle-

sprechen, daß das hochpolitisierte und im Heraushören rhetorischer und politischer Effekte und Hintergründigkeiten in Rede und Drama in schwer nachvollziehbarer Weise geschulte athenische Publikum zumal in der hochpolitisierten Atmosphäre der frühen 20er Jahre fast unvermeidlich in die Richtung solcher Assoziationen gedrängt wurde.[4] Wie dem immer sei – wenn wir von der Haltbarkeit der vorgetragenen These ausgehen,[5] so bedurfte es für einen derart ausgefeilten, komplexen und bedeutungsschweren Vergleich mindestens zweier grundlegender Voraussetzungen: zum einen der selbstverständlichen und substantiellen Verankerung der Tragödie in der jeweiligen sozialen und politischen Gegenwart, was ebenso selbstverständlich die Möglichkeit oder gar die Verpflichtung des Dichters zur Stellungnahme zu und Interpretation von zeitgenössischem Geschehen – auch und gerade: politischem Geschehen – implizierte;[6] zum andern der bereits bestehenden allgemeinen Vertrautheit der Gleichsetzung der Herrschaft Athens im Delisch-Attischen Seebund mit einer Tyrannis. Diese zweite Voraussetzung wirft, so unproblematisch sie zunächst zu sein scheint, einige Fragen auf. Zu derjenigen nach dem Zeitpunkt und den historisch-politischen Bedingungen ihres Aufkommens seien im folgenden einige Überlegungen vorgetragen.[7]

Unproblematisch ist sie insofern, als genügend zeitgenössische Parallelzeugnisse zu ihrer Bestätigung zur Verfügung stehen. Thukydides läßt die Korinther in ihrer Kriegsrede an der zweiten Tagsatzung der Peloponnesier den polemischen Vergleich gleich zweimal verwenden und insbesondere mahnen: „Denkt auch, daß von der Tyrannis, die diese Stadt in Hellas auf-

wood Cliffs 1968) 27. A. Cameron, The Identity of Oedipus the King (N. Y.–London 1968) 149.

[4] Auch wenn an der Oberfläche der etwa von V. Ehrenberg, Pericles and Sophocles (Oxford 1954) bes. 95. 98. 105. 112f. 113ff. 142ff., mit der nötigen Vorsicht herausgearbeitete Vergleich mit Perikles selbst näher liegen mochte.

[5] Die im übrigen im Rahmen meiner Überlegungen nur insofern wesentlich ist, als sie ein zusätzliches Zeugnis für die Verbreitung und Selbstverständlichkeit einer bestimmten Verwendung des Tyrannisbegriffs liefert.

[6] Vgl. dazu nur Knox, Oedipus at Thebes 61ff., mit dem Verweis u. a. auf Ehrenberg, ebd. Kap. 1, und G. Thomson, Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound (Cambridge 1932). – Im übrigen wird vermutlich eine solche Annahme, wie M. P. Cunningham, Class. Philol. 53 (1958) 188, zu Recht feststellt, immer bei den Historikern größern Anklang finden als bei dem meisten ‚reinen' Literaturwissenschaftlern.

[7] Wegen der Beschränkung des zur Verfügung stehenden Raumes kann dies nur skizzenhaft und unter Anführung weniger Zeugnisse geschehen. Namentlich der Gleichheitsbegriff bedürfte einer eingehenden begriffsgeschichtlichen Untersuchung. Die folgenden Überlegungen sind im Zusammenhang meiner Untersuchungen zur „Entstehung des politischen Freiheitsbegriffes der Griechen" entstanden; manches hier nur Angedeutete wird in meiner Habilitationsschrift näher ausgeführt.

gerichtet hat, alle gleich betroffen sind."[8] Solche Attacken aufnehmend, warnen sowohl Perikles wie Kleon die Athener davor, die Gefahren zu unterschätzen, die ihnen aus der „wie eine Tyrannis" bzw. „als Tyrannis" ausgeübten Herrschaft und dem durch sie erzeugten Haß der Untertanen notwendigerweise erwachsen.[9] Daß hier nicht ein spezifisch thukydideischer Sprachgebrauch vorliegt, ergibt sich aus seiner Beliebtheit in der zeitgenössischen Komödie;[10] die Glorifizierung des Herrn Demos in den ‚Rittern' des Aristophanes ist dafür nur ein besonders ausgeprägtes Beispiel: „Demos, was für eine prächtige Herrschaft besitzt du doch, wo dich alle Menschen fürchten, gerade wie einen Tyrannen!", ruft dort der Chor etwa aus.[11]

Weniger gut bekannt als diese Passagen, aber nicht weniger aussagekräftig, ist ein Zeugnis bei Herodot, das etwas näher zu erläutern ist: Nach der Vertreibung der Peisistratiden und den vergeblichen Versuchen des Kleomenes, der durch Kleisthenes eingeleiteten und jeder äußeren Kontrolle entgleitenden Entwicklung durch die Etablierung einer spartahörigen Oligarchie einen Riegel vorzuschieben, habe Sparta seinen Bündnern vorgeschlagen, Hippias wieder nach Athen zurückzuführen. Der Vertreter Korinths habe in einer eindrucksvollen Rede an die Erfahrungen erinnert, die seine Stadt mit der Tyrannis gemacht habe, und vor der Ungeheuerlichkeit gewarnt, daß gerade Sparta, der Hort von Freiheit gegenüber den Tyrannen, in einer Stadt eine Tyrannis einsetzen sollte. Hippias habe ihm geantwortet, „gerade Korinth werde sich nach den Peisistratiden sehnen,

[8] Thuk. 1,124,3: καὶ τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῇι Ἑλλάδι πόλιν τύραννον ἡγησάμενοι ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως καθεστάναι . . . Dazu 122,3: . . . τύραννον δὲ ἐῶμεν ἐγκαθεστάναι πόλιν.

[9] Perikles: 2,63,2 (ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν). 3,37,2 (οὐ σκοποῦντες ὅτι τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄκοντας ἀρχομένους). Vgl. auch 6,85,1 (ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράννωι ἢ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἐχούσηι οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὅτι ξυμφέρον) Uebers. hier wie im folgenden nach G. P. Landmann.

[10] Häufiger scheint freilich der direkte Vergleich mit dem δεσπότης und seinen δοῦλοι gewesen zu sein (so bes. in Aristophanes' ‚Babyloniern' und Eupolis' ‚Poleis'), der aber sprachlich und inhaltlich nahe genug an dem mit den δοῦλοι des Tyrannen liegt (deshalb wohl bei H. Berve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen [München 1967] II 627f., beides zusammengenommen). – Der Vergleich mit der monarchischen Alleinherrschaft (ohne Nennung des Wortes *tyrannos;* vgl. jedoch u. Anm. 11) Aristoph. Vesp. bes. 546f. 548f.

[11] Aristoph. Eq. 1111ff.: ὦ Δῆμε, καλὴν γ' ἔχεις/ἀρχήν, ὅ τε πάντες ἀν/θρωποι δεδίασί σ' ὥσπερ ἄνδρα τύραννον. Vgl. auch 1329f.: μόναρχος; 1333: βασιλεύς. Zur Erklärung der häufig mangelnden terminologischen Unterscheidung zwischen *monarchos, basileus* und *tyrannos* vgl. Berve, ebd. I 194f. 199. Bezeichnenderweise verwendet Aristoph. hier jedoch *tyrannos* gerade dort, wo er die Furcht der Untertanen als Beweis für die Größe der Herrschaft anführt. – Zu beachten auch Wespen 587 der Hinweis auf die Rechenschaftslosigkeit der Richter: auch dies ist ein topisches Kennzeichen der Tyrannis (vgl. nur Hdt. 3,80,3).

wenn einst die Tage kämen, wo es unter den Athenern zu leiden haben werde."[12] Durch die Berufung auf dieselben, die ‚Hellenischen' Götter, wird der Rede des Hippias trotz ihrer Kürze dieselbe Bedeutung zuerkannt wie der des Korinthers; durch den doppelten Verweis auf die Existenz entsprechender Orakel in Athen, die sowohl dem Hippias als auch den Spartanern bekannt gewesen seien, erhalten Spartas Befürchtungen wie Hippias' Prophezeiung großen Nachdruck; durch die deutlich markierten Bezüge zwischen dieser Szene und der (uns durch Thukydides bekannten) Tagsatzung der Peloponnesier im Herbst 432 wird über den beabsichtigten historischen Assoziationszusammenhang kein Zweifel offen gelassen.[13]

Dieser kann freilich erst richtig wirksam werden, wenn Athens Rolle und Ruf in der Abfassungszeit des Werkes als Hintergrund vorausgesetzt werden. Gewiß sind explizite Anspielungen auf Ereignisse und Situationen nach 479 darin selten.[14] Aber in der neueren Forschung ist verschiedentlich plausibel gemacht worden, daß Herodot nicht nur unter dem Einfluß der gleichen machtpolitischen Theorien gestanden ist wie die führenden Politiker der Zeit und Thukydides,[15] sondern auch gelegentlich in die Darstellung seines historischen Gegenstandes Andeutungen hat einfließen lassen, in denen man „eine durchdachte innere Stellungnahme Herodots zur politischen Rolle Athens nach den Perserkriegen" zu erblicken hat.[16] Dies trifft offenkundig auch auf diesen Fall zu:[17] Man hat ständig dazuzudenken, daß dieses Athen, welches damals zum zweiten Male von der Tyrannis gerettet und dadurch erst in den Stand gesetzt wurde, zum Vorkämpfer der Freiheit der Griechen gegen die Perser zu werden,[18] wenige Jahrzehnte später selbst den befreiten Städten seine Tyrannis aufoktroyierte. Erst dann erhält es seinen vollen hintergründig-ironischen Sinn, daß ausgerechnet Hippias, der Tyrann, die nur allzu wahre Warnung ausspricht;

[12] Hdt. 5,90ff. Die Rede des Korinthers: 92. Hippias' Antwort: 93,1.

[13] Götter: ebd. 92η,5. 93,1. – Orakel: 90,2. 91,1. 93,2. – Zu den Bezügen: u. a. 90,2. 91,1. Vgl. insgesamt H. Strasburger, in: Herodot, Eine Auswahl aus der neueren Forschung, hrsg. von W. Marg (Darmstadt ²1965) 590f.

[14] Ein bes. deutliches Beispiel: 6,98.

[15] So etwa F. Kiechle, Gymnasium 70 (1963) 298ff.

[16] So bes. H. Strasburger (Anm. 13) 574ff. pass. (Zitat: 604).

[17] Dies gilt, auch wenn allenfalls die Grundzüge der Rede des Korinthers auf vorsophistisches Gedankengut zurückgehen mögen (so bes. F. Wehrli, Mus. Helv. 25 [1968] 222 Anm. 28). So wie wir die Episode bei Herodot lesen, ist sie in historischer Sinngebung, Terminologie und Ideologie von den Anschauungen der Abfassungszeit geprägt. Das gleiche gilt für die von Wehrli (ebd. 223) ebenfalls in den Grundzügen der spätarchaischen Novellistik zugeschriebene Maiandrios-Episode (Hdt. 3,142f.); dazu Näheres in der o. Anm. 7 genannten Arbeit.

[18] Dies ist die wichtige Funktion von Hdt. 5,78 im Gesamtzusammenhang.

daß gerade Korinth, das schon 506 (wie dann wieder 446)[19] Spartas Interventionspläne Athen gegenüber zunichte gemacht hatte, sich vehement gegen die Beherrschung der Städte durch Tyrannen zur Wehr setzt; daß schließlich Sparta, der Befreier der Griechen von Tyrannis schon im 6. Jh.,[20] seinem Grundsatz an dieser einen Stelle untreu zu werden beabsichtigt, um durch Tyrannei im Kleinen Tyrannei im Großen zu verhindern und durch die Opferung der Freiheit einer einzigen Stadt die aller andern zu retten. Daß dies anachronistisch und gerade im Hinblick auf Athens Rolle in den Perserkriegen auch nicht so überzeugend ist, wie es zuerst scheint, ist weniger wichtig als der von Herodot doch offenbar angestrebte und auf der Vorstellung der ‚*polis tyrannos*' aufgebaute Sinnzusammenhang.

Nimmt man alle diese Zeugnisse zusammen, so können kaum Zweifel daran bestehen, daß die Charakterisierung der Herrschaft Athens als einer Tyrannis in der Art und der Zeit, die wir bei Thukydides vorgegeben finden, einen festen Bestandteil des politisch-rhetorischen Begriffsarsenals bildete.[21] Es ist kaum nötig zu betonen, daß dabei ‚Tyrannis' nicht als beliebig einsetzbarer Terminus technicus für die Inhabe von Herrschaft schlechthin diente.[22] Vielmehr wird das Wort, wie namentlich Thukydides zeigt, entweder von Außenstehenden in polemisch-propagandistischer Absicht gegen Athen eingesetzt, um alle damit verbundenen negativen Assoziationen zu wecken, oder aber von den Verteidigern der athenischen Herrschaft im Seebund, um vermittels eben dieser Assoziationen gewisse Züge ihrer Herrschaft drastisch herauszuheben und damit die Notwendigkeit bestimmter politischer Maßnahmen oder Verhaltensweisen zu begründen, oder schließlich, wie sich aus den übrigen Zeugnissen ergibt, um in kritisch-warnender Absicht diese Herrschaft in einer bestimmten Richtung zu charakterisieren und damit wesentliche Zusammenhänge sichtbar werden zu lassen. Von Athens Vormachtstellung im Seebund als von einer ἀρχή zu sprechen oder diese als τυραννίς zu bezeichnen, war in jedem Fall zweierlei; war der eine Terminus weitgehend wertneutral und deshalb auch in

[19] Zur Möglichkeit, daß der ältere Vorgang nach dem Vorbild des zeitgeschichtlichen gestaltet wurde, vgl. F. Robert, Rev. de Philol. 38 (1964) 220ff.

[20] Vgl. bes. Thuk. 1,18,1. Isokr. 4,125. Aristot. Pol. 1312 b 7f.

[21] So (namentlich gegen H. Strasburger, in: Thukydides, hrsg. von H. Herter, [Darmstadt 1968] 498ff., bes. 500. 519 mit Anm. 57) unter vielen andern H. Diller, ebd. 651f. D. W. Bradeen, Historia 9 (1960) 261 mit Anm. 25. H. Popp, Historia 17 (1968) 428f. R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972) 288. W. Schuller, Die Herrschaft der Athener im Ersten Attischen Seebund (Berlin–N. Y. 1974) 121.

[22] So etwa G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, Historia 3 (1954/55) 2: „. . . terms such as τύραννος πόλις do not necessarily imply . . . that Athens was an oppressive or unpopular ruler." Für den, der das Wort verwendet, steht es fest; mindestens will er diesen Eindruck erwecken.

sachlicher Erörterung verwendbar, so war der andere unbedingt negativ und implizierte Kritik, Polemik, Propaganda.[23] Zumal in der politischen Auseinandersetzung und zumal in Athen war mit der Nennung des Tyrannisvergleichs die Beschwörung einer Fülle von negativen Assoziationen unvermeidlich verbunden – und deshalb ohne Zweifel bewußt einkalkuliert. Seiner Nutzbarmachung zur ethischen oder theoretischen Deutung politischer Zusammenhänge in Tragödie oder Geschichtsschreibung waren durch die vorgegebene Assoziationsrichtung klare Grenzen gesetzt.[24]

Da der Terminus somit eindeutig negativ belegt und in der politischen Praxis verhaftet war, dürfte er kaum von den Verteidigern der athenischen Herrschaft aufgebracht worden sein – auch wenn diese ihn dann zur Verdeutlichung ihrer Argumente aufgriffen. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit spricht vielmehr dafür, daß es Gegner oder Opfer der athenischen Herrschaftsausübung im Seebund waren, die ihn ins politische Vokabular einführten:[25] Gegner außerhalb Athens (es ist ja wohl kein Zufall, daß bei Thukydides die Korinther zuerst von der Tyrannis Athens sprechen!) oder aber die innenpolitische oligarchische Opposition gegen die perikleische Seebundspolitik. Nach Plutarch hat bereits der große Gegner des Perikles in den 40er Jahren, Thukydides Melesiou, sich des Vergleiches bedient,[26] und aus

[23] *tyrannis* hat somit im Bereich der Herrschaftsterminologie eine ähnliche Funktion wie *douleia* unter den Bezeichnungen für Untertanenschaft. De Ste. Croix' Auffassung (ebd.: „It must be allowed that in such political contexts both ‚enslavement' and ‚tyranny' ... are often used in a highly technical sense: any infringement of the *eleutheria* of a city, however slight, might be described as ‚enslavement'." Ähnlich ders., The Origins of the Peloponnesian War [London 1972] 36) erscheint mir zumindest als einseitig. Eine genaue Überprüfung des zeitgenössischen Sprachgebrauches ergibt, daß mit *douleia* zwar nicht ein bestimmtes Ausmaß an Untertanenschaft bezeichnet, wohl aber eine bestehende (und im Ausmaß eben variable) Abhängigkeit in einer bestimmten Richtung, durchweg negativ und in polemisch-propagandistischer Absicht, charakterisiert wird. Dies muß an anderer Stelle näher begründet werden.

[24] Der Vorschlag H. Dillers, in: Thukydides (o. Anm. 21) 652f., die Darstellung der Entwicklung der Tyrannis des Peisistratos und seiner Söhne im Peisistratidenexkurs für die Deutung der Entwicklung der Tyrannis Athens im Seebund nutzbar zu machen, kann deshalb höchstens für eine im wesentlichen theoretisch-abstrakte Ebene der Geschichtsdeutung erwogen werden (V. Hunter, Class. Journ. 69 [1973/74] 120ff., geht in der Verabsolutierung solcher Deutungsversuche entschieden zu weit). Dasselbe gilt für die Interpretation Schullers (u. Anm. 40). Wichtig scheint mir, daß das Wort von Thukydides nur in Reden eingeführt wird, der direkte Bezug zur politischen Praxis somit immer erhalten bleibt.

[25] So auch Berve (o. Anm. 10) I 205. – Ob der Anstoß allenfalls aus dem Bereich der sophistischen Theorie gekommen sei, ist aufgrund unserer Quellenlage nicht zu entscheiden.

[26] Plut. Per. 12,2: ... καὶ δοκεῖ δεινὴν ὕβριν ἡ Ἑλλὰς ὑβρίζεσθαι καὶ τυραννεῖσθαι περιφανῶς. Als Quelle nennt E. Meinhardt, Perikles bei Plutarch (Diss. Frankfurt 1957)

Komödienfragmenten wissen wir, daß in jenen Auseinandersetzungen (oder doch wenigstens im Hinblick darauf) auch gegen Perikles selbst der Vorwurf der Tyrannis erhoben worden ist.[27] Das ist zwar gewiß nicht dasselbe, hängt aber, gerade in der Person des Perikles, unmittelbar zusammen und beweist zumindest die Aktualität der Parole in der politischen Polemik jener Jahre. – Wenn dies richtig ist, ist damit auch ein Terminus ante für das Aufkommen der Metapher gegeben: daß dies in den Jahren um die oder kurz nach der Jahrhundertmitte geschehen sei, der Zeit also, in der die organisatorische und ideologische Ausgestaltung der athenischen Herrschaft im Seebund ihren Abschluß gefunden hat,[28] ist von vornherein nicht unwahrscheinlich und kann später noch erhärtet werden.

Dies führt uns zu unserem wichtigsten Problem: der Entstehung der Metapher. Daß man darauf kam, Athens Herrschaftsstellung mit einer Tyrannis gleichzusetzen, mag uns, für die der Tyrannisbegriff zu einer bloßen Formel für jede Art von Gewalt- und Willkürregime geworden ist, selbstverständlich erscheinen. Die Gleichsetzung dürfte auch den Zeitgenossen und ihren Nachbarn eingeleuchtet haben, nachdem sie einmal eingeführt worden war. Aber darf man deshalb auch diese ihre Einführung selbst als völlig selbstverständlich betrachten? Der Tyrannisbegriff der archaischen und frühklassischen Zeit war doch, obschon er keineswegs präzise gefaßt war und eine Vielzahl von allenfalls beträchtlich divergierenden Erscheinungen in sich schließen konnte, mindestens in einer Hinsicht völlig eindeutig: Das Wort bezog sich zunächst ausschließlich auf den innenpolitischen Bereich und bezeichnete dort die außergewöhnliche Herrschaftsstellung eines einzelnen Mannes über seine Mitbürger.[29]

Freilich bestanden einige Ansatzpunkte, welche eine Anwendung des Terminus auch im außenpolitischen Bereich erleichtern mochten. Zum einen war die Tyrannis bereits seit dem späten 7. Jh. im griechischen Mutterland dazu benützt worden, mittels persönlicher Abhängigkeiten

40f., Stesimbrotos von Thasos, was für die Historizität des Zeugnisses spräche. Vgl. dazu auch J. de Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism (Oxford 1963) 126.

[27] Vgl. bes. V. Ehrenberg (o. Anm. 4) 84ff. mit reichen Belegen. 104. Berve (o. Anm. 10) I 198 mit Belegen II 627f. J. Schwarze, Die Beurteilung des Perikles durch die attische Komödie und ihre historische und historiographische Bedeutung (München 1971) 11f. mit Anm. 13. 170f.

[28] Dazu bes. R. Meiggs (o. Anm. 21) 109ff., sowie Harv. Stud. in class. Philol. 67 (1963) 1ff. Schuller (o. Anm. 21) 169ff.

[29] Dazu bes. Berve (o. Anm. 10) I 3ff., sowie in: Zur griechischen Staatskunde, hrsg. von F. Gschnitzer (Darmstadt 1969) 208ff. Die Ungenauigkeit des Begriffs und die Vielfalt der davon erfaßten Phänomene betont stärker als manche andere K. Kinzl in einem im Amer. Journ. of anc. Hist. 1978 erscheinenden Beitrag.

außerhalb des Polisterritoriums liegende Gebiete oder Poleis (Kolonien) in der (gewiß recht lockeren) Abhängigkeit von einer herrschenden Polis bzw. ihres Tyrannen zu halten.[30] Obschon dabei – wie ja später auch in Sizilien und namentlich im persisch beherrschten Kleinasien – für die jeweils Betroffenen die Unterordnung unter ihren Stadttyrannen – also die innenpolitische Unfreiheit – offenbar im Vordergrund stand,[31] kann diese der Tyrannis innewohnende Möglichkeit, als Träger bzw. Inhaber von äußerer Herrschaft zu fungieren, dem allgemeinen Bewußtsein kaum entgangen sein. Zum andern war in den nichtgriechischen Formen der Alleinherrschaft die Tatsache der Beherrschung von Städten und Territorien selbstverständlich inbegriffen. Insbesondere in der am nächsten liegenden und am besten bekannten persischen Monarchie, deren Inhaber seit den Perserkriegen von den Griechen als ‚Tyrann par excellence' dargestellt wurde,[32] fielen Herrschaft nach innen (über die Perser) und nach außen (über die unterworfenen Völker, darunter eben auch die kleinasiatischen Griechen) zusammen.[33] Zum dritten hatte sich, wie der ‚Prometheus' des Aischylos zeigt, in dem uns interessierenden Zeitraum bereits eine differenzierte ‚Tyrannentypologie' ausgebildet,[34] und spätestes für die 60er Jahre ist nach dem Zeugnis der ‚Hiketiden' des Aischylos und für etwa die Jahrhundertmitte nach dem der später von Herodot in sein Werk eingearbeiteten ‚Verfassungsdebatte'[35]

[30] Ein charakteristisches Beispiel: Korinth; vgl. dazu Ed. Will, Nouv. Clio 6 (1954) 41ff. F. Gschnitzer, Abhängige Orte im griechischen Altertum (München 1958) 124ff. R. Werner, Chiron 1 (1971) 68ff.

[31] Dies scheint sich jedenfalls aus der Analyse der Motive für den Ionischen Aufstand zu ergeben; vgl. dazu etwa G. Walser, Schweiz. Beitr. z. allg. Gesch. 17 (1959) 226f.

[32] Vgl. etwa Berve (o. Anm. 10) I 193f. mit Belegen II 625f. G. Thomson (o. Anm. 6) 6ff., sowie Class. Review 43 (1929) 3ff. A. Alföldi, in: Late Classical and Medieval Studies in Honor of A. M. Friend Jr. (Princeton 1955) 25ff. 28ff. G. Walser, Hist. Zeitschr. 220 (1975) 531f., 540.

[33] Was u. a. zur Folge hatte, daß alle (Städte wie Individuen, Satrapen wie gemeines Volk) gleicherweise als δοῦλοι galten. Und dies nicht nur den Griechen (vgl. etwa Hdt. 1,114,5. 7,8β,3. 11,4. 39,1. 96,2. 135,2f. 8,102,2f. Xen. Anab. 2,5,38. Kyr. 4,61; dazu allg. Walser, ebd. 529ff., bes. 536f.), sondern auch im Sprachgebrauch der Perser selbst (vgl. nur Syll. I⁴ 22, sowie insgesamt Walser, ebd. 533ff.).

[34] Vgl. zum Datum (wohl am ehesten 457/56) A. Lesky, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur (³Bern–München 1971) 292. C. J. Herington, The Author of the Prometheus Bound (Austin–London 1970) bes. 103ff. – Zur Tyrannentypologie im ‚Prometheus' vgl. bes. Thomson (o. Anm. 32), sowie A. J. Podlecki, The Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy (Ann Arbor 1966) 101ff.

[35] Zu den ‚Hiketiden' vgl. bes. V. Ehrenberg, Polis und Imperium (Zürich–Stuttgart 1965) 266ff. Zu Hdt. 3,80/82 bes. K. F. Stroheker, Historia 2 (1953/54) 382ff. K. Bringmann, Hermes 104 (1976) 266ff.

auch die theoretische Beschäftigung mit dem Phänomen unbezweifelbar.[36] Aufgrund der innenpolitischen Auseinandersetzungen in Athen seit 510 (besonders zwischen Marathon und dem Xerxeszug) und der ersten Ostrakismen, bei denen der Vorwurf der Peisistratidenfreundlichkeit oder des Strebens nach Tyrannis eine wesentliche Rolle gespielt haben muß,[37] wird man schließlich als sicher annehmen können, daß das Wort längst zum festen Bestand innenpolitischer Polemik und Propaganda gehörte.

Es spricht somit vieles dafür, daß der Tyrannisbegriff im zweiten und erst recht im dritten Jahrzehnt des Seebundes bereits weitgehend ‚verfügbar' war. Somit dürften auch die Loslösung von der Herrschaft einer Person und die Übertragung in den zwischenstaatlichen Bereich keinen allzu großen Gedankensprung mehr erfordert haben. Dazu kommt eine allgemeine Beobachtung, die hier nicht vertieft werden kann: Die außerhalb des polisinternen Lebens liegenden Phänomene und die zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen dürften sich insgesamt erst relativ spät und in größerem Umfang überhaupt erst in jenen Jahrzehnten der Beachtung, dem Nachdenken und der Definition erschlossen haben. Den Wortschatz, der zu ihrer begrifflichen Erfassung nötig war, hat man fast ausschließlich durch Übertragung aus dem innenpolitischen und dem individuell-privaten Bereich, nicht durch Neuprägung gewonnen.[38] Aber – und dies ist zu betonen – solche Übertragungen erfolgten nicht beliebig und erst recht nicht zum voraus, sondern nur von Fall zu Fall, wenn sich zur Bezeichnung eines neu aufgetretenen und neu zu bezeichnenden Phänomens der entsprechende Bedarf einstellte. Es würde deshalb entschieden zu weit gehen, daraus, daß diese Möglichkeit der Begriffsübertragung bestand, oder daraus, daß man polisübergreifende größere Herrschaftsgebilde, die diesen Namen wirklich verdienten, nur in monarchischer Form kannte, zu folgern, es sei ganz natürlich gewesen, auch die Herrschaft Athens als Monarchie und dann

[36] Für den vorwissenschaftlichen Hintergrund solcher Theorien vgl. etwa F. Wehrli (o. Anm. 17) 214ff., bes. 221ff.

[37] Vgl. etwa Berve (o. Anm. 10) I 173f. mit II 617. Wichtig ist hier allein der Vorwurf und seine Verwendung als politische Waffe, unabhängig davon, ob er berechtigt war und ob die Tyrannengefahr in jenen Jahren als Thema der politischen Auseinandersetzung vor oder hinter der Persergefahr rangierte (dazu etwa J. Martin, Chiron 4 (1974) 24ff.).

[38] Man denke etwa an *eleutheria* und *doulosyne* (dazu die o. Anm. 7 genannte Arbeit), *symmachia* (dazu E. Bickerman, in: Zur griech. Staatskunde [o. Anm. 29] 474f.), *polypragmosyne* (dazu Ehrenberg [Anm. 35] 466ff. A. H. W. Adkins, Class. Philol. 71 [1976] 301ff.), *pleonexia*, *deos* (dazu J. de Romilly, Class. & Mediaev. 17 [1956] 119ff.) u. a. m. – Das Thema würde wohl eine umfassende Untersuchung lohnen; einige wichtige Bemerkungen dazu bei Wehrli (o. Anm. 17) 214ff., bes. 218ff. 224f. J. de Romilly, Bull. of the Inst. of class. Stud. 13 (1966) 7.

eben auch als Tyrannis zu bezeichnen. Denn das Wort ‚τύραννος' war immer zu negativ belastet und zu sehr dem Bereich der Polemik verhaftet, um ein Herrschertitel wie βασιλεύς oder eine Funktionsbezeichnung wie μοναρχία werden zu können.[39]

Damit das Wort auf Athen angewandt werden konnte, bedurfte es deshalb einer entsprechenden Veranlassung und einer oder mehrerer auslösender Assoziationen. Wenn es nun richtig ist, daß die Übertragung in der mit grobem Messer schnitzenden Tagespolitik aufgekommen und nicht der fein ziselierenden Analyse des Schreibstubendenkers entsprungen ist, kommen als erforderliche Assoziationsträger nur zentrale, unmittelbar einleuchtende, sich geradezu aufdrängende, gleichsam als Balkenüberschriften geeignete Tertia comparationis in Frage. Alle die bis ins Detail gehenden strukturellen Übereinstimmungen, die man namentlich bei sorgfältigem Studium der zahlreichen im Werk des Thukydides verstreuten Hinweise zwischen einerseits der gängigen Tyrannentypologie, ihren vom Historiker aufgenommenen Zügen und den Ausführungen im Peisistratiden-Exkurs und andrerseits der Charakterisierung der athenischen Herrschaft und ihrer Entwicklung aufspüren kann, dürften deshalb kaum primär gewesen sein; solches kam dann noch hinzu, rundete das (einmal im Groben entstandene) Bild ab und füllte es aus, diente namentlich auch der weiterführenden theoretischen Analyse und Interpretation.[40]

In unseren Quellen finden sich vorwiegend zwei Kriterien, die der geforderten Bedingung zu entsprechen scheinen. Das eine, das häufig und in der Regel allein als Erklärung angeführt wird,[41] ist das der unkontrollierten Gewalt, der Rechtlosigkeit der Herrschaft, allenfalls verbunden mit der Erzeugung von Haß und Furcht bei den Untertanen. Zweifellos sind dies politisch wirksame und die gesuchte Assoziation nahelegende Kompo-

[39] Vgl. Berve (o. Anm. 10) I 5.

[40] Für das Verständnis der Geschichtsbetrachtung und -darstellung des Thukydides haben diese tiefgreifenden strukturellen Gemeinsamkeiten deshalb ihre wichtige Funktion. Dazu zuletzt W. Schuller, Die Stadt als Tyrann – Athens Herrschaft über seine Bundesgenossen (Konstanz 1978) 10ff., bes. 13. Uns dagegen kommt es hier darauf an herauszufinden, welche der von Thukydides als unserer zeitnächsten und ausführlichsten Quelle angeführten Vergleichselemente prägnant und offenkundig genug waren, den Vergleich Jahrzehnte früher überhaupt aufkommen zu lassen.

[41] Vgl. etwa V. Martin, La vie internationale dans la Grèce des Cités (Paris 1940) 287 („. . . une tyrannie, c'est-à-dire une autorité usurpée, imposée par la force et sans fondement légitime"). A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides II (Oxford 1956) ad 3,37,2 („Athenian rule is a tyranny because it is a rule over unwilling subjects who are always conspiring against it"). Ähnlich Ed. Will, Le monde grec et l'orient I (Paris 1972) 173. R. Meiggs (o. Anm. 21) 379. V. Ehrenberg, Aristophanes und das Volk von Athen (Zürich 1968) 163.

nenten. Bei Thukydides finden sich dafür genügend Belege,[42] und in der vornehmlich durch Aristoteles und Plutarch repräsentierten Sekundärüberlieferung wird gerade der Aspekt der ὕβρις, des Verstoßes gegen Recht und Herkommen, unterstrichen, der den Vorgang der athenischen ‚Machtergreifung' charakterisiert habe.[43]

Demgegenüber scheint ein zweites Kriterium bisher vernachlässigt worden zu sein, welches vielleicht noch spezifischer die Assoziation der Tyrannenherrschaft provoziert, den Zustand von Gewalt und Willkür noch schärfer hervortreten, das Gefühl der Ohnmacht bei den Untertanen noch deutlicher spürbar werden läßt und deshalb besonders heftige Erbitterung erzeugt. Dieses Spezifische liegt im Wesen ihrer Entstehung und ihres Inhabers. Die Begründung von Tyrannis aufgrund von militärischer Eroberung oder Einsetzung von außen ist zwar keineswegs selten. Aber häufiger und charakteristischer ist es doch, daß ein Adliger als Angehöriger einer relativ kleinen politisch-sozialen Führungsschicht, in der er allenfalls durch besondere Leistungen bereits den Rang eines Primus inter pares erworben hat, sich unter Mißachtung von Recht oder zumindest der in seiner Schicht herkömmlichen Normen über die andern erhebt, die Alleinherrschaft usurpiert, die Inhalte und Möglichkeiten adligen Herrschens in seiner Person und für seine Familie und Freunde monopolisiert und damit die Mitadeligen aus dem Zustand von Gleichen in den von Ungleichen, Untertanen, aus dem von an der Macht Beteiligten, Mächtigen in den von Ohnmächtigen herabdrückt.[44] Diesen Tyrannen hassen vor allem die entmachteten Mitadeligen, gegen ihn wollen sie die ursprüngliche Gleichheit zurückgewinnen.[45] Ἰσονομία, ‚Anteilsgleichheit an der politischen Mitbestimmung', ist deshalb das erste und noch lange gegenüber ‚Freiheit' vorherrschende Kampfwort gegen die Tyrannis, ein Wort, welches sowohl das

[42] Bes. ausgeprägt in der Rede der Athener in Sparta, in der letzten des Perikles und derjenigen Kleons. Vgl. dazu etwa Berve (o. Anm. 10) I 205 mit II 629. J. de Romilly (o. Anm. 26) 125f.

[43] Vgl. bereits Thuk. 1,98,4; später bes. Aristot. Pol. 1284 a 40f. Ath. Pol. 24,2. Plut. Per. 12,2. Arist. 25,1ff.

[44] Vgl. die typologische Beschreibung bei Berve (o. Anm. 10) I 4 u. ö., sowie in: Zur griech. Staatsk. (o. Anm. 29) 162. 166f. 171. Wichtig ist auch hier allein die Optik der betroffenen Mitadeligen, für die eine durch den Demos erfolgte ordnungsgemäße Wahl zum Aisymneten als die Standesnormen und -gleichheit verletzende Machterhebung eines Einzelnen über die andern nicht weniger verdammenswert ist als die durch Gewalt usurpierte Herrschaft. Dafür ist die Haltung des Alkaios Pittakos gegenüber charakteristisch; dazu Berve (o. Anm. 10) I 92ff.

[45] Vgl. bes. Hdt. 3,142,3. Aufschlußreich auch die Bemerkung des Thukydides (8,89,3) zu den Machtkämpfen in einer Oligarchie.

Recht wie die Gleichheit betont.[46] Tyrannis ist somit trotz der erwähnten Ausnahmen im wesentlichen Herrschaft, die von innen her, aus dem Kreise Gleichberechtigter, entsteht, nicht von außen aufoktroyiert wird.

Die Übertragung dieses Modells in den außenpolitischen Bereich setzt nun die Vergleichbarkeit der Voraussetzungen voraus. Diese ist in der Tat in zweierlei Hinsichten gegeben: Zum einen ist die Hegemonialsymmachie auf einer höheren Ebene nichts anderes als ein dem Personenverband der Polis (oder wohl genauer: der adligen Führungsschicht in der Polis) entsprechender Verband von gleichberechtigten (isonomen)[47] politischen Individuen, unter denen der Hegemon als Primus inter pares fungiert. Genau darauf liegt denn auch die Betonung in der Definition des Status einer Hegemonialmacht, welche bei Thukydides die Korinther als die Vertreter derjenigen Polis vortragen, die nicht nur als schärfster Gegner der athenischen Herrschaftsausübung und -ausdehnung bekannt ist, sondern traditionellerweise besonders empfindlich auf Versuche Spartas reagiert, die Machtverhältnisse im Peloponnesischen Bund zu seinen Gunsten zu verschieben.[48] Zum andern erfolgt der Vorgang der Herrschaftsbildung in der Symmachie wie beim Tyrannismodell von innen her, indem der Primus inter pares sich unter entschlossener Ausnützung der gegebenen Möglichkeiten und unter Mißachtung der als selbstverständlich vorausgesetzten Normen und Verhaltensregeln zum Herrscher aufschwingt und die bisher Gleichen in den Status von Untertanen herabdrückt.[49]

[46] Zu *isonomia* vgl. bes. V. Ehrenberg, Pauly-Wissowa RE Suppl. 7 (1940) 293ff., sowie (o. Anm. 35) bes. 253ff. 279ff. G. Vlastos, Am. Journ. of Philol. 74 (1953) 337ff., sowie in: Isonomia, Studien zur Gleichheitsvorstellung im griechischen Denken, hrsg. von J. Mau und E. G. Schmidt (Berlin 1964) 1ff. M. Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy (Oxford 1969) 96ff. 137ff. Chr. Meier, in: ders., Entstehung des Begriffs ‚Demokratie' (Frankf. 1970) 7ff. B. Borecký, Eirene 9 (1971) 5ff. Ed. Will, Rev. de Philol. 45 (1971) 103ff. H. W. Pleket, Talanta 4 (1972) 63ff. – Zum Aufkommen von *eleutheria* als Kampfwort gegen die Tyrannis und ihrem Verhältnis zu *isonomia* vgl. Abschn. 11.2. meines Beitrages „Zum Freiheitsbegriff der Griechen. Materialien und Untersuchungen zur Bedeutungsentwicklung von *eleutheros/eleutheria* in der archaischen und klassischen Zeit", erscheint in: Politische und soziale Gruppen- und Typenbegriffe im Alten Griechenland, hrsg. von Ch. E. Welskop (Berlin 1979).

[47] Zu *isonomia* im zwischenstaatlichen Bereich vgl. H. Schäfer, Staatsform und Politik (Leipzig 1932) 160ff.

[48] Thuk. 1,120,1: χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τὰ ἴδια ἐξ ἴσου νέμοντας τὰ κοινὰ προσκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐκ πάντων προτιμῶνται. Dazu bes. die Erläuterungen von Gomme (o. Anm. 41) ad loc. – Zu Korinths Rolle als Gegengewicht gegenüber Sparta vgl. etwa D. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca–London 1969) 23ff.

[49] Der Vorgang ist, wenngleich von außerhalb des Seebundes betrachtet, anschaulich formuliert in der 2. Korintherrede (Thuk. 1,122,2f.). Welche Rolle dabei die permanente Kriegführung und das dadurch erworbene militärische Übergewicht spielte, hat bereits Plut.

Daß nun in dieser spezifischen Entstehungsweise der Herrschaftsform ein grundlegendes Tertium comparationis liegt, welches die Anwendung des Tyrannisbegriffs auf Athens Herrschaft besonders nahegelegt hat, ergibt sich namentlich aus der in den Äußerungen thukydideischer Redner gespiegelten vorherrschenden Betrachtungsweise der Miterlebenden. Der Historiker selbst gibt darauf bereits in dem Kapitel, in dem er die Ursachen der Aufstände gegen Athen behandelt, einen deutlichen Hinweis: Die Athener hätten mit der Zeit als Führungsmacht[50] ihre Beliebtheit verloren; sie hätten insbesondere auf den Feldzügen die übrigen nicht mehr von gleich zu gleich behandelt.[51] – Anläßlich der ersten Debatte in Sparta läßt er die athenischen Gesandten in Entgegnung auf die scharfen Angriffe der Korinther die Zurückhaltung und Milde ihrer Herrschaft hervorheben: Gewiß, es sei Herrschaft, aber sie blieben dabei doch viel gerechter als sie ihrer tatsächlichen Macht nach müßten. Dies aber werde von den Kritikern nicht berücksichtigt: „Niemand prüft, warum andere, die irgendwo ein Reich beherrschen und nicht so maßvoll gegen ihre Untertanen sind wie wir, von solchem Tadel frei sind: wer nämlich knechten kann, braucht nicht zu rechten. Aber sie sind gewohnt, mit uns auf gleichem Fuße zu verkehren, und wenn sie einmal zu ihrer Enttäuschung wegen eines Rechtsspruches oder der Macht, die uns die Herrschaft gibt, nur im mindesten zurücktreten müssen, ... schmerzt sie die kleinere Beschränkung mehr, als wenn wir von Anfang an alles Recht hintangesetzt und unverhohlen zugegriffen hätten ... Es scheint eben, daß erlittenes Unrecht die Menschen mehr empört als Gewalttat; jenes empfinden sie als Übergriff eines Gleichgestellten, dieses als den Zwang, den man von einem Stärkeren hinzunehmen hat ..."[52]

Dies ist eindeutig: Gewaltsam, also etwa durch Krieg aufgerichtete Herrschaft ist für den Unterworfenen, weil sie klare und mit traditionellen Normen und Denkvorstellungen übereinstimmende Rechts- und Machtverhältnisse schafft, leichter zu ertragen als das Diktat dessen, der unrechtmäßige Herrschaftsgewalt usurpiert hat und in dem man immer noch den ursprünglich Gleichgestellten sieht. Genau darauf legen auch die Mytilenäer

Kim. 11,1ff., erkannt. Dazu jetzt bes. Schuller (o. Anm. 21) u. a. 153ff. sowie (o. Anm. 40) 6f.

[50] ἄρχοντες hier ganz doppeldeutig: ‚Führende' wie ‚Herrschende', also vielleicht: „wegen ihrer herrscherlichen, despotischen Führungspraktiken" analog Aristot. Ath. Pol. 24,2, oder Plut. Arist. 25,1.

[51] Thuk. 1,99,2.

[52] Thuk. 1,76,3/77,4, bes. 77,2ff.

in der Rechtfertigung ihres Abfalls den Hauptakzent: Jeder Austritt aus einem Bündnis enthalte ein Element der Treulosigkeit, aber verdammenswert sei dieses nur, wenn zwischen dem Abtrünnigen und dem im Stich Gelassenen ein Verhältnis der Gleichheit sowohl hinsichtlich der Gesinnung wie auch der Machtebenbürtigkeit bestanden habe. Das Gegenteil treffe jedoch auf die Situation im Seebund zu: „Solange sie unsere gleichgestellten Führer waren, folgten wir in guten Treuen; als wir sie aber den Kampf mit Persien aufgeben und dafür die Knechtung der Verbündeten betreiben sahen, begannen wir uns zu fürchten." So seien mit der Zeit alle anderen Verbündeten zu Untertanen Athens geworden, nur Chios und eben sie selbst seien weiterhin autonome Bündner und, wenigstens dem Namen nach, frei geblieben. Aber dies sei eine prekäre Freiheit gewesen, die Gleichberechtigung selbst zur größten Bedrohung geworden. „Da ihnen die meisten botmäßig sind und nur wir gleich zu gleich mit ihnen stehen, mußten sie es begreiflicherweise übelnehmen, wenn, zumal gegenüber der gefügigen Mehrzahl, wir allein unser gleiches Recht behaupteten, wo sie doch auch von Tag zu Tag erstarkten und wir vereinsamten." Mit Sicherheit könne deshalb erwartet werden, daß Athen auch mit den letzten Resten der ursprünglichen Symmachie bei erstbester Gelegenheit aufräumen werde.[53]

Die Mytilenäer folgern aus alledem, gegenseitige, sich die Waage haltende Furcht sei die einzige Gewähr bei einem Bündnis, denn wenn einer ohne Übermacht angreifen müsse, so schrecke er doch vor geplanten Übergriffen zurück.[54] Solche Äußerungen finden sich mehrfach bei Thukydides. Schon in der Erzählung über den themistokleischen Mauerbau gehen die Athener von dieser selben Überlegung aus.[55] Seinesgleichen nicht nachzugeben, sich dem Stärkeren jedoch mit Anstand zu beugen und dem Schwächeren gegenüber maßzuhalten, damit fahre man gut, sagen die Athener im Melierdialog. Seinesgleichen nachzugeben; den Gegner nicht zu zwingen, einem von gleich zu gleich zu begegnen; sich einer Forderung zu fügen, die Gleichberechtigte ohne Richterspruch erhöben: dies bedeutet nach Perikles bereits Unterjochung, δούλωσις.[56]

[53] Zusammengezogen aus 3,9,1/11,8. Die Erwähnungen der Gleichheit: 9,2. 10,4. 11,1. 4. Vgl. dazu auch Aristot. Pol. 1284 a 38ff.

[54] 3,11,2.

[55] Thuk. 1,91,7.

[56] Melos: Thuk. 5,111,4. Perikles: 1,140,5/141,1. – Vgl. ferner 1,34, 2. 39,1. 42,1. 4. 5,89. Eur. Phoen. 535ff.

Dieses Insistieren auf der Respektierung der Gleichberechtigung und auf der Gleichwertigkeit als Voraussetzung für politische Vollwertigkeit mag zum Teil bereits die Konsequenz darstellen, die das griechische politische Denken gerade aus den Erfahrungen mit der athenischen Herrschaftsbildung gezogen hat.[57] Es lehrt jedoch, und darauf kommt es hier an, was an dieser speziellen Art der Herrschaftsbildung für die Betroffenen besonders bitter und politisch viel schwerer zu verwinden was als offene, brutale militärische Unterwerfung. Und gerade dieser Faktor dürfte eben – und zumal aus der Sicht der Bundesgenossen – die Assoziation an die Tyrannis provoziert haben.

Wenn dies richtig ist, läßt sich aus der historischen Situation der Zeitraum rekonstruieren, in welchem die Anwendung des Tyrannisbegriffs auf Athens Herrschaft im Seebund aufgekommen sein muß. Vorauszusetzen sind dafür nicht primär die gewaltsame Niederwerfung einzelner Aufstände verbündeter Poleis oder eine verbreitete Verstimmung wegen zunehmend straffer Führungspraktiken der Hegemonialmacht. Der Anlaß muß vielmehr gewesen sein, daß die generelle Mißachtung der in den Bundesverträgen vorausgesetzten und anfänglich auch praktizierten Gleichberechtigung der Verbündeten offenkundige Gewißheit, sogar institutionell belegbares Faktum geworden war. Dies muß spätestens in der Folge der Maßnahmen von 454 der Fall gewesen sein, als nicht nur das Bundeszentrum von Delos nach Athen verlegt, sondern das gemeinsame politische Führungsorgan, die Bundessynode, zur Bedeutungslosigkeit verdammt, der Bund im Sinne einer effizienteren Herrschaftsausübung reorganisiert und bald auch durch in Athen erlassene allgemeinverbindliche Gesetze sowie von Athen in den Bundesstädten eingesetzte Funktionäre zentral ‚regiert', zumindest kontrolliert wurde.[58] Man kommt damit von einer andern Seite her nahe an den zuvor aus den literarischen Zeugnissen rekonstruierten Terminus ante heran. Nicht zufällig hat sich im gleichen Zeitraum die Anwendung einer unverhüllten Knechtschafts- und Herrschaftsterminologie auf das Verhältnis der Seebundsstädte zu Athen allgemein durchgesetzt. Und in dieselbe Richtung weist schließlich auch das gleichzeitige Aufkommen eines neuen Terminus für die politische Selbstbestimmung (αὐτονομία), der in charakteristischer Weise für die durch

[57] Dies spiegelt sich auch in den Vertragstexten des späten 5. Jh., wo zunehmend Gewicht auf die Gleichheit der Partner gelegt wird; vgl. etwa Thuk. 5,27,2. 79,1 mit Hdt. 9,7α,1. Thuk. 5,47,7 mit Xen. Hell. 7,1,13f.

[58] Vgl. dazu die o. Anm. 28 angeführte Lit.

aktuelle und drängende Erfahrungen herbeigeführte Differenzierung des Freiheitsbegriffes zeugt[59] und damit verrät, wie sehr in jenen Jahren die politischen Auswirkungen der athenischen Herrschaftsbildung das politische Denken beherrschten und damit natürlich auch in reichstem Maße zu Propaganda und Polemik Anlaß gaben.

[59] Dazu Näheres in der o. Anm. 7 genannten Arbeit.

David Harvey

Leonidas the Regicide?

Speculations on the death of Kleomenes I

King Kleomenes I of Sparta went mad, says Herodotus, and committed suicide. Most Greeks, including Herodotus himself, saw this as divine retribution for his impiety; the Spartans attributed it to his heavy drinking (Hdt. 6. 75, 84). Modern scholars have offered a diversity of explanations. Kleomenes' madness has been diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia; others have argued that he was an epileptic; that he may have indulged in cannabis, having learnt the habit from the Scythians (Hdt. 6.84 + 4.74–5); that he was a Frazerian king who, when his time was up, had to commit suicide, or be killed. Many have believed that he was assassinated. It is this last theory that I wish to investigate in this paper.[1]

Herodotus informs us (6.75.2) that it was Kleomenes' relatives, οἱ προσήκοντες, who put him in the stocks. Who were they? Kleomenes had three step-brothers, Dorieus, Leonidas and Kleombrotos. Dorieus had died some time before. Leonidas was a year or two younger than Kleomenes, that is, about fifty, at this date, and Kleombrotos not much younger (possibly a twin). Kleomenes had no son, but his daughter Gorgo

[1] This is a revised fragment of a longer study of Kleomenes sketched in the conspicuously unSpartan surroundings of the Center for Hellenic Studies in 1967/8; it is a pleasure to offer it as a tribute to Bernard Knox. For the sake of brevity I have pruned references to secondary literature, refrained from exploring tempting by-ways, and have in places perhaps adopted too dogmatic a tone. I am most grateful to Professor W. G. Forrest for enthusiastic encouragement, and to Dr. P. A. Cartledge for a number of most helpful suggestions. They are not to be blamed for any blunders, naivetés or inconcinnities that remain.

Paranoid schizophrenia: W. G. Forrest, A History of Sparta (London 1968) 93; G. Devereux & W. G. Forrest, forthcoming. Epilepsy: A. Giusti, Atene e Roma ser. 2, 10 (1929) 54–76. Cannabis: Giusti, art. cit., 72–3. Frazerian king: S. Luria, Berl. Phil. Wochenschr. 48 (1928) 27–9. Assassination (with varying degrees of conviction): M. Duncker, Geschichte des Altertums VII[5] (Leipzig 1882) 167–8; G. Busolt, Gr. Gesch. II (Gotha 1895), 574 n. 4; K. J. Beloch, Gr. Gesch.[2] II. 1 (Strassburg 1914) 36; T. Lenschau, Klio 31 (1938) 429; W. P. Wallace, Journ. of Hell. Stud. 74 (1954) 33, 35; A. R. Burn, Persia & the Greeks (London 1962) 270; G. L. Huxley, Early Sparta (London 1962) 87; A. Toynbee, Some Problems of Greek History (Oxford 1969) 245; etc.

was now about seventeen. She married Leonidas at an unknown date.[2] Οἱ προσήκοντες must therefore mean Leonidas, Kleombrotos and Gorgo, or any two of them.

Presumably it was normal practice for the nearest relatives to take action if a member of the family went mad.[3] But as Kleomenes was a king, the ephors will perhaps have been involved, though Herodotus says nothing about them; for it was an offence for anyone else to lay hands on the king (Plut. *Agis* 19.9, cf. 21; see also more generally Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 8.4, 15.7; cf. Thuc. 1.131.2, 134.1). We may therefore assume that Leonidas and the others had the right to act as they did; but they may have needed the acquiescence of the ephors.[4]

Who stood to gain if Kleomenes were put out of the way? Clearly, the man who would succeed him on the throne. By the rules of succession at Sparta,[5] if, as was the case with Kleomenes, the previous king had left no sons, then his nearest male agnate succeeded: in other words, Leonidas. At first glance, the identity of the man who had Kleomenes locked up and the man who succeeded him, Leonidas in both cases, looks sinister. But the coincidence becomes much less striking when we observe that this would inevitably happen in such cases: the nearest male relative was responsible for a man who went insane, and (to simplify a little) the nearest male relative was the heir to the throne.

Some have held that Herodotus acquired his information on Spartan history – or at least some of it – from none other than the ageing Gorgo, the widow of Leonidas, or from her son Pleistarchos[6]. If we accept this, the assassination theory becomes even more tempting: Herodotus' story of a king who went mad and committed suicide would have come to him straight from the mouth of the conspirators. No wonder Herodotus did not

[2] Evidence for these assertions, and family tree, in M. E. White, Journ. of Hell. Stud. 84 (1964) 149–51. As for the puzzling Euryanax, son of Dorieus (Hdt. 9.10.3; 53.3; 55.1), various suggestions will be found in R. W. Macan, Herodotus, the seventh, eighth, and ninth books I. 2 (London 1908 = repr. New York 1973) 609 (cf. I. 1, 307); C. Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion of Greece (Oxford 1963) 286–7; and Miss White, art. cit., 150.

[3] No evidence. E. S. Shuckburgh in his Commentary (Cambridge 1889) ad loc. irrelevantly cites Cic. *de Senect.* 22.

[4] On the unimportance of the ephors during Kleomenes' reign, however, see now P. Carlier, Ktema 2 (1977) 65–84, esp. 65–7, 69–70, 82 n. 64 and 83–4 n. 68.

[5] Evidence collected by G. Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. trs. (London 1895) 42–3.

[6] e.g. R. W. Macan, Herodotus, the fourth, fifth, and sixth books (London 1895 = repr. New York 1973) I 192. W. W. How & J. Wells, Commentary on Herodotus II (Oxford 1912) 20.

divulge what "really" happened! We might then begin to speculate on Leonidas' marriage. Was it Gorgo's reward for her cooperation, and a means of keeping her mouth shut? We teeter here on the verge of melodrama. The crucial question is whether or not the marriage had been arranged by Kleomenes and had taken place before his death; unfortunately, in the absence of evidence[7], it is a question that cannot be answered. In any case, the marriage was no doubt essentially dynastic: by marrying Gorgo, Leonidas will have strengthened his claim to succeed Kleomenes ahead of his brother – possibly his twin – Kleombrotos (Hdt. 5.41.3; 7.205.1)[8]. The arguments that Gorgo was Herodotus' source are incapable of proof, but admittedly tempting; most striking, of course, is Hdt. 5.51, the anecdote that shows the eight-year-old Gorgo upstaging her father.[9] Herodotus tells us that the notoriously superstitious Spartans attributed Kleomenes' death to a secular cause – not perhaps the kind of explanation that one might expect from the average Spartiate. We may note Gorgo's rebuke to her father: "the better the wine, the more degenerate the drinkers" (Plut. *Mor.* 240D–E (2)); apocryphal, or the product of the same mind that attributed Kleomenes' death to excessive drinking? Whether or not Gorgo was, directly or indirectly, Herodotus' Spartan informant, we are entitled to call his account of Kleomenes' death the "official" story. For although the different states of Greece had different explanations of Kleomenes' lurid end (Hdt. 6.75.3, 84), all these explanations presuppose the truth of the story given by Herodotus. This agreement on the facts strongly implies a single source; presumably it is the official Spartan line.[10]

Let us step back a little in time. When Kleomenes' bribery of the Delphic Oracle had become general knowledge, he had fled. What had happened at Sparta? Herodotus' narrative (6.74) throws a spotlight on the movements of Kleomenes, and leaves the rest in darkness. We know that Kleomenes returned home, but at the time of this flight, no-one can have foreseen this; no doubt it was generally assumed that he would not return.

[7] Their only son, Pleistarchos, was born c. 485 (M. E. White, art. cit. in n. 2, 151); this is no help.

[8] I owe this point to Dr. Cartledge, who also observes that Gorgo's position, if she was unmarried at the time of her father's death, should not be regarded as similar to that of an Athenian *epikleros*: the Spartan πατροῦχος is closer to the πατρῶιοκος of Gortyn, who was not bound to marry her nearest relative. See G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, Class. Review n.s. 20 (1970) 277–8; D. Schaps, Class. Quart. n.s. 25 (1975) 53–7, esp. 57 n. 1; P. A. Cartledge, forthcoming.

[9] For the clever Gorgo, cf. also the anecdote in Hdt. 7.239 (relevant even if spurious) and the six *bon mots* in Plut. *Mor.* 240D–E.

[10] So e.g. Macan, op. cit. in n. 6, 333.

We do not know how long he was away. The chronology of these years is notoriously problematic.[11] I cannot accept Hammond's view that all the events narrated by Herodotus between 6.49 and 93 took place in 491/0, and that Kleomenes was in exile for a mere fortnight (end of October to mid November).[12] According to our manuscripts of Herodotus, Kleomenes travelled to Arkadia via Thessaly, a rolling Spartan drunkard following a rolling Balkan road; we should surely accept the emendation Σελλασίην for Θεσσαλίην in 6.74.1.[13] Even so, we must allow time for Kleomenes to get in touch with leading Arkadians, and to persuade them to take up his cause – and we should not underestimate, for roads and communications in mountainous Arkadia were particularly difficult – and then to lead them to the remote source of the Styx. Possibly he was also in touch with the helots and Messenians[14]. We may assume that the exile was long enough for the Spartans to start thinking about Kleomenes' successor.

The monarchy must indeed have been the subject of sharp controversy. For the disclosures about Kleomenes' discreditable activities at Delphi put both the kings in an awkward position. If the situation was so alarming that Kleomenes, who had succeeded legitimately to the throne, thought it prudent to take to his heels, what of Leotychidas, whose claim rested entirely on the basis of an oracle now known to be fraudulent? But who was to replace him? The obvious answer is Demaratos, who had been wrongfully deposed to make room for Leotychidas. But he had been made welcome by the Persians (Hdt. 6.70.3); the Persian threat must have been obvious to anyone by now, and it must have been unthinkable to propose the restoration of the pro-Persian Demaratos. Leotychidas retained his throne for lack of a suitable alternative candidate.

More relevant to our present enquiry, of course, is the gap left by Kleomenes himself. When Leotychidas was sent into exile (Hdt. 6.72), the throne passed to Archidamos.[15] When Pleistoanax withdrew from Sparta in 446 after being accused of bribery – a closer parallel with Kleomenes – first a regent, then his son Pausanias acted as king until his return c. 427.[16] When Pausanias was exiled in 394, his son Agesipolis succeeded him (Diod.

[11] Most recently, A. J. Podlecki, Historia 25 (1976) 396–413, esp. 400–3; earlier discussions listed in his n. 1 on p. 396.

[12] N. G. L. Hammond, Historia 4 (1955) 406–11.

[13] D. Hereward, Class. Review n.s. 1 (1951) 146.

[14] W. P. Wallace, Journ. of Hell. Stud. 74 (1954) 32–5.

[15] Hdt. 6.72; for the difficulties here, see How and Wells ad loc.; A. W. Gomme, Hist. Comm. Thuc. I (Oxford 1945) 406–7.

[16] Thuc. 1.114.2; 2.21.1; 3.26.3; 5.16, with Gomme ad locc.

14.89). Similarly, when Kleomenes withdrew from Sparta, moves must surely have been made to fill the vacant throne. The Spartan rules of succession must have operated at this point just as they operated after Kleomenes' death: they will have pointed to Leonidas. Leonidas, then, whether or not he was actually proclaimed king, and whether or not any overtures had been made to him – we do not know how quickly the Spartan machinery operated – must have had at the very least very high hopes of succeeding to the throne.

Then Kleomenes' activities in Arkadia became known, and he was invited back to Sparta. Herodotus says that Λακεδαιμόνιοι invited him (6.75.1); this I take to mean a vote of the assembly.[17] Kleomenes had enemies at Sparta (Hdt. 6.82.1: 494/3), but this vote shows that his friends outnumbered them. We know nothing of the role of the ephors in these events, though most modern reconstructions give them a prominent part.[18] Whatever the details, one fact is clear: when Kleomenes returned home "on the same terms as those on which he had ruled previously" (Hdt. 6.75.1), Leonidas' hopes were dashed – perhaps (he will have thought) dashed for ever, as he was only slightly younger than his step-brother (Hdt. 5.41.3). Kleomenes might well outlive him, or produce an heir to the throne.

If my interpretation of events in Sparta during Kleomenes' absence is correct, we have in Leonidas an obvious centre for palace intrigue. Leonidas had been within reach of the throne; unexpected events had snatched it from his grasp – what more natural than that he should attempt to retain it? Thus to Leonidas the relative who put Kleomenes in the stocks, and to Leonidas as the man who stood to gain most from Kleomenes' death, we may add the disgruntled Leonidas from whose fingers power had slipped away, perhaps never to return, almost as soon as he was in sight of it.

Nor should we overlook the words of Herodotus when he reintroduces Leonidas in 7.204–205.1. Leonidas, he says, "gained the throne un-

[17] I know of no parallels, but we may note that when there was any dispute about the kingship, the Assembly made the decision: Hdt. 6.66.1 (Σπαρτιῆται); Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.4 (ἡ πόλις). Only at a later date do we hear of the Gerousia (Paus. 6.6.2, in 309) or the ephors (Polyb. 4.35.9–14, c. 219) being involved.

[18] They should not: see Plut. *Agis* 21.5, quoted on p. 259 below, and Carlier, art. cit. in n. 4. The abrupt change of attitude towards Kleomenes might however be explained by a change of ephors: cf. Thuc. 5.36.1. On the twists and turns of Spartan policy, see P. A. Brunt, Phoenix 19 (1965) 278–80 and (in relation to foreign policy) G. E. M. de Ste. Croix. The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London 1972) 151–66. If there had been a change of ephors, it would probably have been in the autumn: A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, K. J. Dover, Hist. Comm. Thuc. IV (Oxford 1970) 38.

expectedly (ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου). For as he had two elder brothers, Kleomenes and Dorieus, he had put the possibility of becoming king right out of his mind (ἀπελήλατο τῆς φροντίδος)". Does this protest too much? Herodotus devotes quite a bit of space to it: can it be the echo of Leonidas' reply to his critics, who had alleged that all along he had been plotting to get the throne?

So much for the assassination hypothesis. Let us now examine the arguments which tell against it.

In the first place, the story of Kleomenes' suicide in Herodotus makes a very odd cover story. If you or I murdered someone, and wanted to maintain that the deceased had committed suicide, the story given by Herodotus, with its bizarre and gruesome details (6.75.3), is not exactly the first thing that would leap to our mind. "He *minced up* his stomach *as for a sausage*" is the way that Liddell and Scott tell us to translate καταχορδεύω; the verb appears to be used nowhere else in classical Greek, but χορδή, *guts, tripe, sausage,* is well attested, most commonly in a comic context. Herodotus' language implies that all Greece agreed on these gruesome details: τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, he says (6.75.3); and "the Argives say he died κακῶς, in this shameful way" – not because there was necessarily any stigma attached to suicide as such,[19] but because of the appalling method he used.

The only conceivable reason for a cover story of this kind is the difficulty which the conspirators would have had with the corpse. The *prothesis,* the laying out of the body, was a universal Greek practice, and it was followed by the *ekphora,* the funeral procession[20] – and a Spartan king's funeral was a great occasion, as Herodotus tells us (6.58; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.1). If violence had been used on the king's body, such a story might have been invented to account for its condition, or to justify the omission of the usual rites. But this seems far-fetched.

On any theory, we may add, Kleomenes' funeral will have been an awkward occasion. At a royal funeral, many thousands of Spartiates, perioikoi and helots, together with the women, indulged in a great display of grief, and said that the late king was the best of all kings (Hdt. 6.58.2–3).

[19] Th. Thalheim in Pauly-Wissowa RE s.v. Selbstmord (1923); W. B. Stanford, Sophocles: Ajax (London 1963) 289–90.

[20] D. C. Kurtz & J. Boardman, Greek Burial Customs (Ithaca 1971), 142–6, and index s.vv. *prothesis* and *ekphora;* on Spartan customs, 181. *Prothesis* and *ekphora* for Spartan kings are guaranteed by Hdt. 6.58.3: if a king died in war, an effigy (εἴδωλον) was displayed in the procession; this will have taken the place of the actual body that was honoured when the king died at home.

If, as Herodotus alleges, Kleomenes had been a drink-sodden maniac, there must have been some embarrassment at this point in the proceedings.

Apart from the sheer grotesqueness of the story, there are other indications that it is unlikely to be an official invention. If the suicide story really were a fiction concocted by Leonidas and his supporters, surely they would have taken care to fix the responsibility for having Kleomenes put away on someone else – the ephors, for example, or Kleomenes' medical advisers. The fact that nothing is said of anyone other than οἱ προσήκοντες, and that no attempt is made to play down their action, surely suggests that they had nothing to hide. This argument, however, will only work against the theory that both madness and suicide were official lies. If it is held that the madness was real (and Herodotus does mention it elsewhere: 5.42.1), and only the suicide an invention, there was no need to hide the activity of οἱ προσήκοντες.

Again, we must take into account the fact that we have already mentioned in another context, that this unlikely story won general acceptance throughout Greece (p. 255 above). In a world where the inhabitants of one city-state enjoyed telling discreditable stories about the inhabitants of other city-states, it is difficult to believe that a rival tradition according to which Leonidas was a scheming conspirator responsible for the death of his own step-brother would not have gained ground had there been any truth in it. In particular, it is difficult to believe that such a tradition would have escaped the notice of Herodotus, who devotes considerable attention to the death of Kleomenes, and who had enquired about it at Athens, at Argos, at Sparta, and among "the majority of Greeks" (6.75.3; 84). On the other hand, could anyone outside Sparta have known anything about what happened, apart from what the Spartans chose to tell them?[21] All the states named by Herodotus had good reason to hate Kleomenes, and they will have been happy to interpret his death as divine retribution without asking too many questions.

We may be certain that no Greek historian ever suggested that Kleomenes was murdered by the ephors.[22] Plutarch explicitly tells us that Agis IV was the first Spartan king to die at the hands of the ephors: ἐν δὲ Λακεδαίμονι πρῶτος Ἄγις βασιλεύων ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀπέθανε (*Agis* 21.5; 241 B.C.). Plutarch was very well read in history, and had access to far more historians than we have; and he is well-informed on Spartan

[21] I am indebted to Dr. Cartledge for this important point.
[22] On Kleomenes and the ephors see nn. 4 and 18.

affairs. If anyone had ever suggested that the ephors had been responsible for the death of Kleomenes, he would surely have mentioned it in this context.

There is, of course, another possible reason for the silence of later historians. Leonidas was the great hero of Thermopylai. Already by the time of Herodotus the events of that battle had been distorted so as to emphasize the heroic self-sacrifice of Leonidas[23]. The same tendency might explain the suppression of facts about his earlier life which would have been discreditable to him. Even so, it is hard to believe that such a tendency would have totally obliterated a rival version of the death of the great Kleomenes among that talkative, malicious, curious and politically-minded people, the Greeks.

What conclusions emerge? Was there a conspiracy and an assassination? I leave the reader to decide, and prefer to end on a note of scepticism. There is still no agreement on the details of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, which took place in our own lifetime, and about which there have been innumerable investigations, innumerable interviews, innumerable articles and whole shelffuls of books. The actual event was even filmed. In the light of this, what hope is there of establishing the truth about the death of a king in a notoriously secretive society (Thuc. 5.68.2) some two and a half millenia ago, for which we have only a single source?[24] As Macan wrote: "It is in vain to speculate what [Kleomenes'] brethren the lion-hearted Leonidas, the ill-starred Kleombrotos, what his daughter, the precocious and shrewd Gorgo, were about all this while".[25]

[23] Hdt. 7.219ff.; Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion of Greece, 146–8, cf. 371–8. Toynbee (op. cit. in n. 1, 245) has no doubt that Leonidas was "respectable and gallant".

[24] The accounts in Plutarch (*Mor.* 223 B–C) and Pausanias (3.4.5) are wholly derived from Herodotus.

[25] Macan, op. cit. in n. 6, II 88–9.

Jack Martin Balcer

Imperialism and Stasis in Fifth Century B.C. Ionia

A Frontier Redefined

Thucydides' historical analysis of the Peloponnesian War stresses two essentially antithetical principles: the naval primary of successful imperial systems and the disruption of imperialism caused by internal factional strife (*stasis*). Minos and Agamemnon's naval empires (1.4, 8–9; cf. 13–14) parallel Athens' imperial Delian Confederacy (1.98–118); and the staseis within Corcyra (3.10–85) and Mytilene (3.27–28) parallel Athens' civil war of 412 B.C. (8.66–70). The acute costs and fatalities of Athenian imperial ventures, for examples, in Egypt in 454 (1.109–110),[1] at Potidaia in 432–430 (1.58–67, 2.70), and at Syracuse in 413 (7.82–87) did not disrupt fundamentally the Empire while the *stasis* within Athens in the year 412 did. These two principles moreover interact with others factors, such as Persian imperialism and Spartan intervention within the process of historical causality; and analyzing them, a better understanding of the Ionian frontier emerges, the realization of a broad zone of Ionian Greeks and indigenous enclaves caught among the conflicts of the antagonistic Athenian and Persian Empires.

While Thucydides briefly referred to the interaction of imperialism and *stasis* in Ionia within his Pentekontaetia Excursus, other literary and epigraphical evidence provide important insights into these complex processes and the nature of the frontier in that region and for that period. Within that Excursus, among the events of the Samian affair of 440–439 (1.115–117)[2] important to this study are three: (1) Samos' attempt to gain the long contested control of mainland territories at Priene allied to Athens, (2) the contemporary *stasis* within Samos, and (3) the alliance of a rebellious Samian faction with a Persian military power eager to disrupt Athenian

[1] J. M. Bigwood, Ctesias' Account of the Revolt of Inarus, Phoenix 30 (1976) 1–23, rejects the evidence of Ktesias *Pers.* 32, and reemphasizes the loos of 250 Greek triremes.

[2] A. W. Gomme, Commentary on Thucydides 1 (Oxford 1959) 353–60; D. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca 1969) 170–8; R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972) 188–95, 428.

imperialism. While the Samian oligarchic faction desired those mainland territories, the democratic faction sought Athenian intervention to overthrow the ruling oligarchs. Consequently, when Athens ultimately subjugated Samos and denied her former autonomous status, oligarchs in exile on the mainland rallied and in political coalition with oligarchs remaining in Samos allied with Pissouthnes, the Persian satrap of Sardis.

These principles in relationship to later Thucydidean statements illustrate the complex processes which I have noted. Athenian imperialism faltered when factionalism divided the polis: while the successful if only temporarily ruling faction (oligarchic, democratic, or pro-Persian medizing) held the polis' centralized *asty,* the faction in rivalry for political control organized either in the polis' *chora* or in the case of island *poleis* on the mainland *chora*. The accumulated evidence indicates that the rival faction could organize on political, military, and economic levels in those *chorai* outside of the traditonal centralizing *astē*. Consequently, when analyzing Ionian *stasis* within the Athenian imperial system during the Pentekontaetia we detect a division, or a political bipolarity, in which each segment functioned as a separate and distinct unit.

Throughout Thucydides' *History* we note oligarchs in exile in the *chora* or on the mainland outside of the central *asty* where the ruling faction was democratic, pro-Athenian, and enmeshed within the Athenian imperial system. Those oligarchs in the eastern Aegean islands or in Ionian, Aeolian, or Karian imperial *poleis* in order to regain political control of the *astē* and to succeed in their rebellions against Athens often sought Persian and/or Spartan assistance. By 427, for example, the Samian oligarchs had centered at the rural village of Anaia near Ephesos (3.32.3) where they approached the Spartan general Alkidas. In the previous days, Alkidas (3.29.2) had sailed to Embaton in Erythrai and to Myonnesos in Teos (3.32.1), both villages within their respective *poleis* but away from their *astē*, apparently to link up with their oligarchic factions. Furthermore, at Anaia, other Ionian oligarchic exiles advised Alkidas to seize *poleis* in Ionia or Kyme in Aeolia in order to bring Ionia into revolution against Athens (2.31.1). Similarly, in 424, Mytilenean and other Lesbian oligarchs also in exile had gathered on the mainland and sought to hire Peloponnesian mercenaries to aid their revolt against Athens (4.52.2). In their attempt to succeed, they seized first the village of Rhoeteion north of Troy and then the southern Athenian allied *polis* of Antandros (4.52.3), for their plan was to seize the mainland area north of Lesbos taken in 427 by the Athenian general Paches (3.50.3). That part of the mainland had been under oligarchic Mytilenean

control (3.50.3). Thucydides then noted (4.75.1) that the Mytilenean dominance of Antandros menaced democratic Lesbos and the Athenian Empire just as the Samian oligarchs at Anaia had menaced Samos (3.9.2, 3.32.2, 4.75.1).

This division between the oligarchic, anti-Athenian *chorai* and the democratic, pro-Athenian *astē* is also apparent in Thrace, when the Spartan Brasidas campaigned successfully in the *chorai* but could not budge the *astē* of Sane and Dion in 424 (4.109.4). And the Persian support of apparently oligarchic exiles is reported among the events of the Delian exiles in 422, who settled Atramytteion on the Asian coast across from Lesbos, territory given to them by Pharnakes, the satrap of Daskyleion (5.1).

One of the clearest instances of these factors at work may be seen in the division of the Kolophonian *polis* in 427 (3.34.1) caused by *stasis* and Persian intervention. In this case the *asty* came to be held by the oligarchs and guarded by the Persian general Itamenes and his troops, while the Athenian imperial forces under Alkidas held the Kolophonian port of Notion. Nevertheless, further *stasis* disrupted Notion, as the anti-Athenian faction of oligarchs there allied with Pissouthnes and, supported by Arkadian and Persian mercenaries, joined in political union with the ruling faction in the *asty*. In reaction, the democratic faction in Notion (3.34.2), part there and part in exile, actively sought Paches' military assistance, and successfully regained Notion (3.34.4) as a democratic pro-Athenian center, to which exiled Kolophonian democrats scattered among the other Ionian *poleis* were summoned.[3]

The political and military bipolarity of imperial Ionian *poleis* is reflected in the records of the Athenian tribute lists for Erythrai and Miletos. With a pro-Persian tyranny controlling the *asty* of Erythrai, pro-Athenian democrats in the northern *komē* of Boutheia paid their tribute to Athens (ATL 1.248) until 453/2(?) when Athens subjugated the *asty* and established a democratic government[4] to control not only Erythrai and subordinate Boutheia, but also the *komai* or *teichē* of Polichna, Pteleon, and Sidousa, four subsidiary centers north of Erythrai along the coasts of

[3] Notion (ATL 1.358–9) and Kolophon (ATL 1.316–7) paid their Athenian tribute separately as two distinct poleis. In 450, when Kolophon revolted against Athens, Notion remained loyal [IG 1^2.14/15; M–L GHI 47; D. Bradeen and M. McGregor, Studies in Fifth-Century Attic Epigraphy (Norman 1973) 94–9].

[4] IG 1^2.10; revised text by H. Engelmann and R. Merkelbach, Die Inschriften von Erythrai und Klazomenai I (Bonn 1972) 38–47; Meiggs, Athenian Empire 112–5, 421–2.

that sub-peninsula,[5] and the island of Elaiousa to the north-east off the coast of Pitane,[6] all forming the greater *polis* of Erythrai.

Similarly, in 453, oligarchic Milesians exiled in their pro-Athenian *komai* or *teichē* of Leros and Teichioussa[7] (ATL 1.342) paid their confederate tribute to Athens, while a pro-Persian tyranny held the *asty* of Miletos.[8] Teichioussa marked the southern coastal border of the Milesian *polis* (Thuc. 8.26) which occupied its sub-peninsula,[9] and Leros lay to the south-west, an island between Kalymna and Lepsia.[10] As with Samos and Lesbos, island and mainland regions structured the formal *polis*, yet for Miletos a third group of oligarchic exiles had temporarily settled on the Leuka promontory north of Halikarnassos at the *komē* of Neapolis, a region outside of the Milesian *polis*; and there the Milesians called themselves "Neapolitai from Miletos."[11] The Athenians after subjugating Miletos in 452, rewarded those loyal exiled oligarchs with the governing of the *polis*, but in 446/5 they too rebelled against Athens[12] and controlled the entire *polis* (but not Neapolis). Finally, in 443/2, Athens once again subjugated Miletos[13] and installed the democratic faction to power ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.11).[14]

The traditional interpretation of a Greek *polis* is that of "central place": an *asty* as a primate urban center governing a rural, agricultural *chora*, or a settlement or aggregation of socio-political and economic functions as the

[5] ATL 1.446–7.

[6] ATL 1.484.

[7] G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, The Carian Coast III, BSA 52 (1957) 106–16.

[8] The separate and neighboring poleis of Latmos (ATL 1.328) and Myous (ATL 1.346) to the north of Miletos may have joined her in this rebellion, ATL 3.255–6; and have been subjugated in the campaign season prior to the subjugation of Miletos, thus they paid tribute in 453/2.

[9] On the Kazıklı peninsula, at the head of the Iasic Gulf; Bean and Cook, Carian Coast III, BSA 52 (1957) 106–16; nor east of Didyma, as in ATL 1.533–4.

[10] ATL 1.510–1; Bean and Cook, Carian Coast III, BSA 52 (1957) 134–5; Hdt. 5.125 quotes Hekataios as recommending that Aristagoras build a teichos on Leros as a refuge; J. L. Benson, Ancient Leros (Durham 1963) 48–9.

[11] B. D. Meritt, The Tribute Quota List of 454/3 B.C., Hesperia 41 (1972) 406–10.

[12] SIG³. 58; E. Schwyzer, Dialectorum Graecorum exempla epigraphica potiora (Leipzig 1923) 727; Tod GHI 1².35; M–L GHI 35.

[13] IG 1².22+; revised text of Bradeen and McGregor, Studies in Fifth Century Attic Epigraphy 63–5 (n.b. this text has numerous orthographic errors).

[14] A. J. Earp, Athens and Miletos, c. 450 B.C., Phoenix 8 (1954) 142–7; J. Barron, Milesian Politics and Athenian Propaganda, c. 460–440 B.C., Journ. of hell. Stud. 83 (1962) 1–6; P. Herrmann, Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Athen und Milet im 5. Jahrhundert, Klio 52 (1970) 163–73; Kagan, Outbreak 98–101; Meiggs, Athenian Empire 115–6.

focus of a hierarchical social system. This primate center may also serve a more complex regional system with several centers (ports and *komai*) as nodes for several systems at various levels within the greater primate *polis*-unit.[15] This interpretation is based upon the erroneous assumption that the population of a given *polis* was homogeneous in income and consequently political inclination was evenly dispersed.[16] In Ionia, the early fifth century *poleis* were governed by oligarchic families, as for example, at Teos where they lived upon great landed estates centered about fortresses called *pyrgoi*[17] or what elsewhere were labelled *teichē*.[18] After Artaphernes' reorganization of the Ionian poleis within his satrapy in 494, the Persians allowed the local rural oligarchic factions to gain political control where formerly Persian enforced Greek tyrannies prevailed (Hdt. 6.43).[19] The coastal *astē*, while they lacked both economic industry[20] and political control of the *poleis*, nevertheless were centers of urban artisans, merchants, and landless workers who tended to be democratic and pro-Athenian. In contrast, the wealthy oligarchs held power based upon their strong rural agricultural estates.

The Ionian *poleis*, consequently, were "dendritic systems" with the *pyrgoi* functioning as rural centers for their own estates and other smaller agricultural centers, which were apparently linked to rural *komai* as mercantile centers, and under normal political conditions to the primate urban center, the *asty*.[21] Under these conditions, the *asty* and the *chora* as a single *polis* remained allied with Athens, served the imperial Delian Confederacy, and paid its annual tribute to the Athenians. When *stasis* occurred, however, the *asty* separated from the *chora*, and each were governed by rival factions. While we normally consider the *asty* as the only center of the organized economic, political and military complex, the *chora* through its dendritic relationships even though severed from its

[15] C. Smith (ed.), Regional Analysis: Vol. 1, Economic Systems (New York 1976) 6.

[16] *Ibid* 12.

[17] Y. Béquignon, Les 'Pyrgoi' de Teos, Rev. arch. 28 (1928) 185–208; D. W. S. Hunt, Feudal Survivals in Ionia, Journ. of hell. Stud. 67 (1947) 68–76.

[18] Similar to the teichos noted by S. Casson, A Greek Settlement in Thrace, Antiquity 7 (1933) 324–8.

[19] While Hdt. states "democracies" were set up; we understand these to be the restoration of constitutional governments (Diod. Sic. 10.25.2) which in most cases were oligarchic; W. W. How and J. Wells, Commentary on Herodotus 2 (Oxford 1928) 80; A. R. Burn, Persia and the Greeks (New York 1962) 222.

[20] J. M. Cook, The Problem of Classical Ionia, Proc. of the Cambridge philol. Soc. 7 (1961) 9–18.

[21] Smith, Regional Analysis 34.

primate center also functioned as a similar political complex with abilities to organize militarily, to raise taxes and to pay tribute, and to contract diplomatic alliances. The *chora* separated by *stasis* from the *asty* then functioned as a distinct *polis* much like that *polis* in central Greece which Pausanias (10.4.1) degraded: "no government buildings, no theater, no agora, no water conducted to a fountain, and where the people lived in hovels like mountain cabins on the edge of a ravine." The dendritic system of an Ionian *polis* without its *asty*, therefore, served in lieu of a primate center.[22]

This distinct separation and function of the two *polis*-units, the *chora* on the one hand and the *asty* on the other, may also be observed at Lampsakos and Myous (Thuc. 1.138.5; Plut. *Them.* 29.11; Nepos *Them.* 10.3)[23] and at Perkoté[24] (if that tradition be historical). While these *poleis* paid their tribute to Athens,[25] Themistokles as vassal of King Artaxerxes I also held these *poleis* as imperial fiefs,[26] and from their resources and that of Persian Magnesia-on-the-Maeander paid his imperial tribute to his feudal King. This double alliance and payment of tributes has perplexed students of Ionia; it is now possible to consider the payments to Athens as being from the democratic factions apparently in the primate *asty*-centers; while the payments to the King as being from Themistokles who held rural agricultural estates in the *chora*-dendritic system.

When considering the question of the frontier between the Athenian and the Persian Empires in Ionia during the fifth century, we are now in a position to perceive a further complexity. While *poleis* allied to the Delian Confederacy-cum-Empire remained loyal to Athens' direction, the border of a given *polis* was apparently definite. Yet when *stasis* separated the *asty* from the *chora*, the *chora* when oligarchic often allied itself with the Persian Empire, and then the border shifted from relatively defined *polis* divisions to relatively less defined borders between the oligarchic estates and their

[22] Between 428/7 and 426/5 (ATL lists 27–29, 1.343), Miletos, Leros, and Teichioussa as distinct poleis paid tribute to Athens; ATL 1.448.

[23] Magnesia: Plut. Them. 31.3 = Theopompos FGrHist 115 F 87; Magnesia, Lamsakos and Myous: Diod. Sic. 11.57.7; Ath. Deip. 1.29; Schol. Ar. Eq. 84; Lampsakos G. Hill, Sources for Greek History (Oxford 1951) B 122.

[24] Plut. Them. 29.11; Neanthes of Cyzicus FGrHist 84 F 17a; Phanias Fr. Hist. Gr. 2.296, fr. 10; Ath. Deip. 1.29; Aristod. 10.5; Schol. Ar. Eq. 84.

[25] ATL 1.326–7, 346–7, 374–5.

[26] On Persian fiefs see: G. Hüsing, Porušātiš und das achamanidische Lehenswesen (Wien 1933); R. Coulborn (ed.), Feudalism in History (Princeton 1956) 108–10; G. Cardascia, Le fief dans la Babylonie achéménide, Recueil de la Société Jean Bodin 1.2 (1958) 55–88.

subsidiary and dependent agricultural units (the *komai, pyrgoi,* or *teichē,* and other petty farm units) and the *asty* and its subsidiary and dependent agricultural units.[27] In other instances, namely Erythrai and Miletos, the *asty* allied with Persia and the *chora* remained loyal to Athens; yet in these two cases the *asty* also retained landed connections with Sardis and the Persian Empire. A third variation, however, was the alliance of the *chora* with Sparta which produced an intermediate zone between the Athenian and the Persian Empires.

In each of these three examples, the antagonists determined the frontier regardless of how ill-defined: Persian alliances with oligarchic *chorai* or *astē* shifted the Athenian frontier westward; while Athenian retention and subjugation of confederate *poleis* held Persia's Sardian frontier along the traditional eastern line between the Greek *poleis* and the satrapy of Sardis. Nevertheless, Artaxerxes could seize territories from several of those *poleis* and bind them to his Empire as fiefs. Sparta's intervention complicated the frontiers; for while the territories allied to Sparta were anti-Athenian there is no indication of overt alliance with Persia yet it may have been covert. Sparta had not allied with Persia nor were her actions pro-Persian, in fact a state of war still existed between Sparta and Persia until their treaties of 412–411.[28]

Consequently, we may define the Ionian frontier as a physical space in which cultural groups (Athenian imperial and Persian: socio-politico-economic units each with distinct identities) came into conflict. The frontier, therefore, was a broad zone of the Athenian and Persian antagonists and the Ionian Greeks and their local indigenous enclaves: three identifiable cultural groups. Within this confliction existed other groups with separate subidentities which interacted with the two or three (Athenian, Persian, and Spartan) major factors; and within that interaction did not lose their subidentities (as *astē*, *chorai*, and variations thereof) nor were they apparently assimilated.[29] In redefining this Ionian frontier it is necessary, therefore, to consider not only the problems of the external frontier but also that of the internal frontier, as in this Ionian example

[27] The first two treaties of 412 between Persia and Sparta (Thuc. 8.18, 37) note the distinction between the Persian chora and the poleis, the third treaty of 411 (Thuc. 8.58) refers only to the chora; see also Tod GHI 2.185, a treaty between Alexander III and Priene; D. Lewis, Sparta and Persia (Leiden 1977) 105.

[28] Lewis, Sparta and Persia 62.

[29] In Karia and Lykia, the assimilation of Anatolian populations into the Persian satrapal system with a marked retention of their indigenous native character appears to have occurred to a greater degree than in Ionia. In Ionia, the indigenous (non-Greek) populations within the confederate poleis appear to have lost their subidentities.

political, military, and economic boundaries between the Athenian and the Persian Empires. The Thucydidean principles of Athenian imperialism and internal factional strife coupled with the factors of Persian imperialism and Spartan intervention, therefore, enable the historian to analyze and define more precisely the nature and the complexity of the fifth century Ionian frontier.

Abbreviations: ATL = Athenian Tribute Lists
BSA = British School Annals
M–L GHI = R. Meiggs, D. Lewis (ed.) Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford 1969)
Tod GHI = M. N. Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford 1947²)

W. Robert Connor

Thucydides 2.65.12

σφαλέντες δὲ ἐν Σικελιᾳ ἄλλῃ τε παρασκευῇ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τῷ πλέονι μορίῳ καὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἤδη ἐν στάσει ὄντες ὅμως †τρίαt μὲν ἔτη ἀντεῖχον τοῖς τε πρότερον ὑπάρχουσι πολεμίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σικελίας μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἔτι τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀφεστηκόσι, Κύρῳ τε ὕστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, ὃς παρεῖχε χρήματα Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὸ ναυτικόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐν σφίσι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς περιπεσόντες ἐσφάλησαν.

. **14** τρία μὲν ἔτη om. T | τρία codd.: δέκα Haacke, coll. Xen. *Hell.* II 4, 21 et Isocr. XII 57: ὀκτὼ E. Müller ad Xen. p. 24, 1: πέντε Alberti, *Maia*, N.S. 15, 1963, 131sqq., alii alia | ἔτη BCEF⟨G⟩M: ἔτι A . **14–17** ἀν]τεῖχον – π[αρεῖχε Π^{25} . **19** ἐν del. Herwerden, sed cf. Steup, *App.* p. 316sq. | σφίσι ABEFMT: σφίσιν αὐτοῖς C⟨G⟩ .

Alberti's apparatus criticus indicates both the difficulty of this notorious crux and the premise upon which almost all attempts at improvement have been based. Most recent editors have not been convinced by the attempts to defend τρία.[1] With the exception of Madvig's ⟨ἐς⟩ τρία μέρη (μεριστοὶ?) ἀντεῖχον all emendations have depended on the assumption that another numeral was needed.[2] Argument has focussed on the question, "Which numeral?". But is it indeed a numeral which is required? At first glance Thucydides' other famous passage on Athenian endurance (7.28.3) seems to corroborate this widely held idea:

> . . . κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τριῶν γε ἐτῶν οὐδεὶς πλείω χρόνον ἐνόμιζον περιοίσειν αὐτούς, εἰ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐσβάλοιεν ἐς τὴν χώραν, ὥστε ἔτει ἑπτακαιδεκάτῳ

[1] For defences see the discussion in A. W. Gomme, Historical Commentary on Thucydides II (Oxford 1956) 196f., W. Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur I, 5 (München 1948), 132, and S. P. Widmann, Bursians Jahresbericht 242 (1934) 6.

[2] J. N. Madvig, Adversaria Critica I (Copenhagen 1871; reprinted Hildesheim 1967) 311f. Cf. A. G. Laird, Classical Philology 25 (1930) 184–187.

μετὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐσβολὴν ἦλθον ἐς Σικελίαν ἤδη τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ πάντα τετρυχωμένοι, καὶ πόλεμον οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω προσανείλοντο τοῦ πρότερον ὑπάρχοντος ἐκ Πελοποννήσου.

But on closer inspection the rhetorical strategies of the two passages can be seen to be quite different. The passage in book seven relies on the contrast between the initial expectation of a war of one or two years, and the fact that the invasion of Sicily began a new phase of the war in the seventeenth year after the first invasion. The series of numbers is essential to the technique. But 2.65.12 uses a different method to make a similar point. It works not by stressing the length of time but by cataloguing the difficulties that confronted Athens – the Sicilian disaster, the revolt of the allies, Cyrus' aid, and finally internal dissent. Any figure – three, five, eight or ten – is otiose.

Hence the fundamental premise must be questioned, and the warning in A that ἔτη is not entirely secure should be taken seriously. Madvig noted that the *men solitarium* pointed to a more extensive corruption. Shilleto recognized that it was likely to conceal a participle and suggested τρυχόμενοι or τριβόμενοι or τετρυχωμένοι ἔτη ἡ.[3] The last of these participles is echoed in 7.28.3 – ἦλθον ἐς Σικελίαν ἤδη τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ πάντα τετρυχωμένοι – and suggests a variant of Shilleto's proposal:

. . . καὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἤδη ἐν στάσει
ὄντες ὅμως τετρυχωμένοι ἔτι ἀντεῖχον . . .

The construction ὅμως followed by participle and then the main verb is not uncommon in early Greek prose (e.g. Thucydides 8.93.1; Xenophon *Oec.* 2.8; Plato *Lys.* 213a) but rare in later writers.[4] This, and the easy confusion of ἔτι with forms of ἔτος (also evident in 5.16.3), may have encouraged the corruption.

Reflections of this passage in later authors support the conclusion that the original text did not contain any calculation of the number of years of Athenian resistance. Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.4.21 and Isocrates *Panathenaicus* (XII) 57 show no sign of being directly modelled on this passage and the figure 'ten' which they use could readily be derived by independent calculation. Arrian *Anabasis* 1.9.2 is more clearly related to Thucydides but his ὡς καὶ ἐς ὕστερον ἐπὶ πολὺ τῷ πολέμῳ ἀντισχεῖν . . . need be nothing

[3] R. Shilleto, Thucydides II (Cambridge 1880) 275f.

[4] Cf. LSJ s. v. ὅμως II and F. Ellendt, H. Genthe Lexicon Sophocleum (Berlin 1872, reprinted Hildesheim 1965) 529.

more than an inference from the general sense of the passage. More telling are the parallels in Aelius Aristeides *Panathenaicus* (XIII, Dindorf I 263) and *Peri Homonoias* (XLII sec. 52, Keil II 46; Dindorf I 786) both of which lack any indication of the number of years of Athenian endurance.[5] All considerations point, then, to the conclusion that the passage did not originally contain any statement about the number of years of Athenian resistance.

[5] F. Goeller in his edition (London 1835) cites Phavorinus: τρίσιν ἔτεσι πονεῖ, ἤγουν ἐργάζεται, κοινῶς· Ἀττικῶς δὲ αἰτιατικῇ. Θουκυδίδης· καὶ κατὰ πόλιν ἤδη ἐν στάσει ὄντες ὅμως τρία ἔτη ἀντεῖχον. This Phavorinus is the sixteenth century compiler, Guarino of Fabera (K. Krumbacher, Geschichte der byzantinischen Literaur [München 1891] p. 274), not Favorinus of Arles.

Another alumnus of the center and admirer of our honorandus, John Keaney, has helped me with this problem, as with so many others.

HUNTER R. RAWLINGS III

The *Arche* of Thucydides' War

In the first two chapters of Book II Thucydides formally announces the beginning of the Peloponnesian War:

> Here begins the war of the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies of each, in which they no longer continued to visit each other without heralds, and, having started the war, they fought continuously. It has been composed successively, as each event occurred, by summers and winters.
>
> For the 30 years' treaty made after the capture of Euboea lasted 14 years. In the 15th year, in the 48th year of the priesthood of Chrysis at Argos and in the ephorate of Aenesius at Sparta and in the archonship of Pythodorus at Athens, which had still two months to run, in the sixth month after the battle in Potidaea, at the beginning of spring a little more than 300 Thebans . . . came at the first watch with arms into Plataea, a Boeotian ally of the Athenians.

This elaborate introduction seems unambiguous enough: when Thucydides says "here" (ἐνθένδε ἤδη) in 2.1 he means the entrance of the Thebans into Plataea which he reports, complete with six systems of dating, in 2.2. Unfortunately, all is not so simple as it seems. There are problems, some serious, some less so, but together they form a serious obstacle to acceptance of the view that for Thucydides the Theban entrance into Plataea was the *arche* of the Peloponnesian War. Two of the problems center around Thucydides' explicit statement in 5.20.1 regarding the date of the Peace of Nicias: "This treaty was concluded as the winter was ending and spring came on, immediately after the City Dionysia, ten years plus a few days having gone by since the first invasion of Attica and the beginning of this war." Editors have been forced to excise the phrase ἡ ἐσβολὴ ἡ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καί since the first invasion of Attica took place at the height of summer, 431, "some 80 days after the events in Plataea" (2.19.1). In addition, a minor problem arises from the expression τελευτῶντος τοῦ

χειμῶνος ἅμα ἦρι: this should mean that negotiations took several days and that those days were the last days of winter and the first day or so of spring. But if this is so then one would expect Thucydides to say that the first ten-year war lasted precisely ten years or, if anything else, ten years *minus* a few days.[1]

There is one more objection to the view that Thucydides considered the Theban attack upon Plataea the *arche* of the Peloponnesian War, and it is, I think, at the same time the most significant and the most neglected objection which has been brought against it. H. Müller-Strübing in 1883 showed that if Thucydides took the events at Plataea as the beginning of the war he did so against his own carefully established criteria for what does and what does not constitute a "war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians."[2] Thucydides had already rejected the Corcyraean and Potidaean affairs as *archai* of the War on the basis that they were private issues concerning only the Corinthians and the Athenians (see 1.66 and cf. 1.146, where he calls these events "accusations and disagreements before the war," and "dissolution of the peace and a *prophasis* of war," but not war itself). But if τά τε Κερκυραϊκὰ καὶ τὰ Ποτειδεατικά, events in which Athenians and Corinthians, that is, Peloponnesians, came to blows, do not, for Thucydides, constitute war, then how can the Theban invasion of Plataea do so? How can an action in which neither Athenians nor Peloponnesians took part, "ein allerdings hochwichtiges und folgenschweres, aber an und für sich nichts entscheidendes Ereignis," be the *arche* of the Peloponnesian War? As Müller-Strübing argues, Thucydides must have chosen this event as the beginning of the war for purely subjective reasons: "Ich will es nur gerade heraussagen: das ist willkürlich, ist unhistorisch."[3] So far as I know, no one has refuted this charge, though there have been scholarly complaints about the conclusion which Müller-Strübing has drawn from his arguments.[4]

Before we convict Thucydides of this historiographical faux pas, it would be beneficial to consider the first sentences of "Book II" in their proper context, that is, as a direct continuation of "Book I". Commentators have been induced by a Hellenistic editor's division of Thucydides' text into books to read the first two sentences of "Book II" as though they were

[1] Cf. A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford 1945) *ad loc.* for this problem and the others associated with 2.1 and 5.20.

[2] Jahrb. f. class. Philol. 127 (1883) 577–612, 657–713.

[3] *Op. cit.* 669.

[4] Cf. W. Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur I 5 (München 1948) 72, n. 7.

unconnected with the preceding sentences of "Book I". Thucydides, of course, wrote 1.146 and 2.1 without a break. The particle δέ in 2.1 tells us that this sentence is closely related to what comes before, and, as we shall see, tells us a good deal more besides.

In order to appreciate fully the context of 2.1–2 we should go back to 1.139, where Thucydides tells us that the Lacedaemonians sent embassies to the Athenians asking them to get out of Potidaea and to leave Aegina autonomous, and, most important of all, to rescind the Megarian Decrees. The Athenians did not obey these requests: "*finally the last ambassadors came from Lacedaemon*, Rhamphias and Melesippus and Agesandrus, and said nothing of what they had been accustomed to say before, but only this: 'the Lacedaemonians want peace and there would be peace if you left the Greeks autonomous.' The Athenians convened an assembly and offered their opinions, and it seemed best to hold counsel and *to give an answer once and for all.*" The first italicized phrase stresses the fact that this was the final Spartan embassy to come to Athens with requests or demands. The fact that this embassy did not make the usual complaints, but delivered an ultimatum suggests strongly that the Spartans knew it would be the last embassy, in fact intended it to be so. The second italicized phrase emphasizes the fact that the Athenians decided to give to this embassy their final answer on the question of war or peace. Both sides knew that after this there would be no more negotiations. Thucydides gives us only one speech from this assembly, that of Pericles. His advice was that "we must come to the realization that it is necessary to go to war" (1.144.3). Though he told them to "do nothing, but to say that they were ready to settle the dispute on an equal and fair basis by *dike*", he knew, and the Athenians knew, that this answer was tantamount to a declaration of war.

Thucydides' following remarks suggest that the Spartans treated it as such: "And they went back home and they no longer sent ambassadors later." This was, then, the last embassy sent by Sparta to Athens. "These were the accusations and disagreements on both sides before the war, beginning immediately from the events in Epidamnus and Corcyra. But nevertheless, during the period of accusations and disagreements (ἐν ἀυταῖς) they continued to meet with one another and they sent embassies to each other without heralds, but not without suspicion. For the things that had happened were a dissolution of the peace and a *prophasis* of the war." For Thucydides, the period of accusations and disagreements was a prelude to war but not war itself, because there had been during this period diplomatic relations between the two sides without heralds. Let us now

read the first sentence of Book II, not as a new point but as the continuation of the preceding sentences: "The war begins from this point, in which they no longer continued to meet with one another without heralds and, having started hostilities, they fought continuously." There should be little doubt that Thucydides here defines war as the period in which the two sides ceased diplomatic relations, that is, in which they stopped visiting each other without heralds. But when was that? Surely when the last Spartan embassy went back home and gave the Spartans the Athenians' final answer.

We can now examine the syntax of 1.145–2.1 as a whole, as, in fact, it was written by Thucydides. In the concluding sentence of 1.145, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ' οἴκου καὶ οὐκέτι ὕστερον ἐπρεσβεύοντο, the particle μέν looks forward to a following δέ. Which δέ? The one in the next sentence? That is the way it is generally taken, but these two sentences are not correlatives. Nor does the δέ in the next sentence (ἐπεμείγνυντο δὲ ὅμως ἐν αὐταῖς) answer the μέν in 1.145. The clear and logical correlative to the μέν of 1.145 is the δέ of 2.1. The two sentences read smoothly and naturally as follows: "And they went home and they no longer sent ambassadors later. The war begins from this point, at which they no longer continued to meet with one another without heralds . . .." Note the explicit contrast between μὲν . . . οὐκέτι and δὲ . . . οὔτε . . . ἔτι. The μέν and δέ sentences frame two sentences which define the period before the war (1.146). This period was characterized by suspicion, it is true, but also by full diplomatic relations, carried on without heralds. The phrase ἐν αὐταῖς in 1.146 contrasts with the phrase ἐν ᾧ in 2.1; the clause ἐπεμείγνυντο . . . καὶ παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων ἀκηρύκτως in 146 contrasts with the clause οὔτε ἐπεμείγνυντο ἔτι ἀκηρυκτεί in 2.1. Chapter 146 is a parenthesis within the two sentences which define the beginning of the war.[5] The function of this parenthesis is to explain why the preceding period was not war, only a prelude to it. The definitions of war and non-war depend on a single criterion: diplomatic relations, that is, the sending of embassies without heralds.[6] This is the point of 1.145, 146 and 2.1.

[5] U. v. Wilamowitz, Kleine Schriften III (Berlin 1969) 96–98, contends that 1.146 is not Thucydidean, but rather an insertion by his "editor." His argument is unconvincing and has not been generally accepted. Even if true, it would only serve to confirm our case that δέ in 2.1 is correlative with μέν in 1.145.

[6] For the idea that ἐπιμειξίαι ware crucial to Thucydides' distinction between conditions of peace and conditions of war cf. 5.35.2 (with 35.8) and 5.78 (with 5.76.3 and 77); see also Hdt. 1.68.1 and, for a telling appraisal of the conditions of Greek warfare, Plato, *Laws* I 626A (note especially the phrase ἀκήρυκτον πόλεμον).

We are now in a position to understand the import of the phrase ἐνθένδε ἤδη. The adverb ἤδη, when added to another adverb such as ἐνταῦθα or τότε or οὕτως, serves to intensify the meaning of that adverb just as *demum* does in Latin. While *demum* sometimes adds simply the force of the English "precisely" or "exactly", it frequently means "finally" or "at last", as in the well-known expression *tum demum*. The same is true with ἤδη when it is joined to adverbs in Greek. The expression τότ' ἤδη is an exact equivalent of *tum demum*. By the same token, ἐνταῦθ' ἤδη can mean, as Kühner-Gerth explains,[7] "da vollends oder: dann erst, tum demum," just as οὕτως ἤδη often means *ita demum*. It is this force of ἤδη, which we generally render in English as "then at last", or "then and only then", which we find in the phrase ἐνθένδε ἤδη in 2.1. Thucydides uses it here because he wants to contrast the period after the Spartan ambassadors went home and no more embassies were sent with the period before the war, which he has just described in 1.146. His thoughts run this way: The Spartans went home and no longer sent any embassies. So ends my description of the period of accusations and disagreements before the war. This period was one of suspicion and hostility, and even caused a dissolution of the treaty and made war imminent. But the war, properly speaking, begins *from this point and this point only*, at which they no longer visited one another without heralds . . .." Thucydides' dispute is not with those who thought that the war began *later*, with the invasion of Attica, but with those who believed it began *earlier*, with the events at Epidamnus and Potidaea.[8]

There has been discussion over the phrase ἐν ᾧ. One scholiast thinks that it defines war and glosses with πολέμῳ, another that it defines time and suggests that ἐν ᾧ is used "ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἀφ' οὗ", "in place of 'out of which' and 'from which'." The second scholiast is on the right track. The natural reading of the sentence is "The war begins from this point and not before, from which they no longer. . . ." One would expect, and the second scholiast obviously did expect, ἀφ' οὗ. Why did Thucydides write ἐν ᾧ? Because, I think, he wanted a strong contrast between the period of time described in this sentence and that described in 1.146. The latter

[7] R. Kühner-B. Gerth, Ausführliche Grammatik der Griechischen Sprache (Hannover 1904) II 121, where Thuc. 4.35 is cited as an example.

[8] That this was a prevalent view in the fifth century is clear from Aristophanes' *Peace* (987–990), where the war which ended in 421 is called the 13-year war. Cf. also the (admittedly confused) passage in Andocides, 3.3 (Aeschines 2.172), where what is presumed to be the peace of 446/5 is said to have lasted 13 years.

was expressed in the phrase ἐν αὐταῖς. Hence it seemed best to use ἐν ᾧ in 2.1 to describe the period of actual war. Thus ἐν ᾧ stands for ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ, as is often the case in Thucydides, and defines ἐνθένδε ἤδη rather than ὁ πόλεμος. "The war begins only from this point, at which they no longer continued to meet with one another without heralds, and, after they had started hostilities, they fought continuously." I have translated καταστάντες τε ξυνεχῶς ἐπολέμουν "after they had started hostilities . . ." in order to separate this phrase temporally from the first part of the relative clause. L. Herbst was, it appears, the first scholar to recognize that there must be an interval between the points in time designated by the last two parts of the sentence: "Mit dem zweiten relativsatz und καταστάντες bezeichnet er den eigentlichen thatsächlichen beginn des krieges, den einfall der Peloponnesier in Attika, mit dem ersten relativsatz, ἐν ᾧ οὔτε ἐπεμίγνυντο die zeit, die diesem einfall noch vorausgegangen ist. . . ."[9]

The particle γάρ in 2.2, found also *in litura* c and accepted by most editors, has also played a part in scholars' connecting 2.1 closely with 2.2, and thus in their arguing that by ἐνθένδε ἤδη Thucydides means the Theban attack upon Plataea. But it is far better to take this γάρ with only the preceding sentence: "my account of the war has been composed successively, as each thing happened, by summers and winters." It is normal Thucydidean practice after such a sentence, in which he announces his intention to describe some historical period or subject, to begin the following sentence with γάρ.[10] Thus, after announcing his method of composition in 2.1, in 2.2 he begins his discussion of the attack on Plataea with γάρ, the attack which clearly broke the 30 years' peace.

In summary, it appears that Thucydides defines four distinct events in his discussion of the beginning of his war: 1. the *aitiai* and *diaphorai*, the period of suspicion during which, however, the two sides carried on diplomatic relations without heralds (1.66, 1.146, and cf. 1.23.5); 2. the *arche* of the war, that is, the point at which the two sides ceased to carry on diplomatic relations without heralds (1.145, 2.1); 3. the invasion of Plataea, the clear breaking of the treaty (2.7.1); 4. the start of hostilities, the manifest beginning of the war (2.19.1, cf. 1.125.2).

What are the consequences of this interpretation? First, the objection raised by Müller-Strübing to Thucydides' choice of an *arche* for the war is met. Thucydides did not, as he thought, select as his *arche* the Theban

[9] Philologus 38 (1879) 507–508.

[10] Cf. the examples cited by J. Classen, J. Steup, Thukydides II (Berlin 1889) *ad loc.*

attack upon Plataea, an event which Müller-Strübing calls "an und für sich nichts entscheidendes." Rather, he chose precisely the moment which Müller-Strübing, after careful study of Thucydides' criteria for war, believed be should have chosen: "warum nicht schon von da ab, als bei der letzten gesandtschaft der Lakedaimonier Ramphias dem athenischen volk die fast brutale alternative stellte: die Lakedaimonier wünschen die erhaltung des friedens; er kann erhalten werden, wenn ihr die Hellenen als autonom entlaszt, dh. wenn ihr das athenische reich auflöst (I 139). als dann die Athener diese forderung ablehnten, da könnte man allenfalls sagen, staatsrechtlich sei dadurch der kriegszustand eingetreten, der krieg habe also angefangen, wenn auch keine unmittelbaren thätlichkeiten eintraten." These were, as we have shown, the very thoughts which led Thucydides to take this occasion as his *arche* for the war.

Second, the problem of the "ten years plus a few days" for the length of the "Archidamian War" disappears. Thucydides did not begin counting from the Theban attack upon Plataea at the beginning of spring, but rather from the cessation of diplomatic relations, some time before that attack. How long before? We do not know. All we know is that the last Spartan embassy returned from Athens to Sparta before the Thebans carried out their night attack. But that is enough. There is nothing standing in the way of war of ten years plus a few days ending "as the winter ended and the spring began" in 422/1. We can gain no more precision than this, since Thucydides does not date the embassy, but we are better off than before, since the old interpretation caused a probable contradiction.

As for the third problem, here too we are in a better position than before. On the old interpretation, it was necessary to excise the phrase ἡ ἐσβολὴ ἡ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ from 5.20.1 since the invasion of Attica could have nothing to do with the *arche* of the war. And yet, as Gomme points out, the removal of the offending phrase ". . . is not an easy correction, both because the offending words do not look like a later supplement or comment, and because in themselves, that is, apart from the difficulty of the date, they would suit the description of the invasion in ii. 19.1."[11] But with the new interpretation, we no longer need to account for an intrusive gloss of seven words. We need only postulate that a word or two has dropped out of the text. What Thucydides probably wrote was

[11] Commentary, *ad loc.* O. Lendle, Thukydides. Wege der Forschung, ed. by H. Herter (Darmstadt 1968) 661–682, tries to resolve the difficulty by arguing that Thucydides added 2.1 and parts of 2.2 to an already completed narrative, and then failed to remove the statements in the following chapters which reflected his former view.

"ten years plus a few days had gone by since the invasion of Attica was first destined to take place and the *arche* of this war occurred." A copyist, misled by Thucydides' frequent references to this invasion as the "clear beginning of hostilities" and by the fact that this invasion seems, even in Thucydides' narrative, to be the natural starting point of the war, removed the offending words and created a sentence which looks peculiar but seems to make sense. This kind of "correction" occurs in texts of all periods and is one of the simplest for a zealous scribe to make.

There are parallels, indeed nearly exact parallels, for the kind of expression postulated here. In 2.13.9, the catalogue of resources available to Athens before the war, Thucydides writes . . . ταῦτα γὰρ ὑπῆρχεν Ἀθηναίοις . . . ὅτε ἡ ἐσβολὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἔμελλε . . . ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο. Here the phrase ἔμελλε ἔσεσθαι is used in a purely temporal sense (cf. LSJ s.v. μέλλω, II), and means the invasion "was about to take place." In 1.114.1 a similar expression is used to refer to the imminence of the invasion of Attica. But μέλλειν can also be used in a slightly stronger sense to indicate "an estimated certainty or strong probability" (LSJ s.v., I). We find an example of this usage in 2.18.1: Ὁ δὲ στρατὸς τῶν Πελοποννησίων προϊὼν ἀφίκετο τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Οἰνόην πρῶτον, ἥπερ ἔμελλον ἐσβαλεῖν. "The Peloponnesian army advanced and came first to Oenoe in Attica, where they were to make the invasion." I would suggest that the phrase ἔμελλε ἔσεσθαι originally stood in 5.20 after ἡ ἐσβολὴ ἡ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν. The phrase is thus almost identical to that of 2.13.9, but carries a stronger connotation, one of near certainty. This was in fact the situation after the last Spartan embassy returned home, the point which Thucydides chose for the *arche* of his war.

Whether one accepts this suggestion for the missing phrase in 5.20 or prefers another, one point should remain clear: on the new interpretation of the *arche* of the war 5.20 raises difficulties, but these difficulties are not nearly so severe as those raised by the old view, according to which the *arche* was the Theban attack upon Plataea. On that view, no relationship between the first invasion of Attica and the *arche* of the war was possible.

PETER SIEWERT

Poseidon Hippios am Kolonos und die athenischen Hippeis*

1. Der kultische Mittelpunkt der athenischen Reiterei

In der Ebene Athens bei einem kleinen Felshügel namens Kolonos, der 10 Stadien nördlich der antiken Stadt liegt, hatte Poseidon Hippios, der ‚Gott der Pferde', sein Heiligtum.[1] Zugleich war er, was naheliegt, Schutzherr der Reiter: Pherekrates, ein Komödiendichter zur Zeit des Peloponnesischen Krieges, nennt den Ort zur Unterscheidung vom Kolonos Agoraios nicht wie üblich Kolonos Hippios, sondern Kolonos der Reiter.[2] Bleibt hier offen, ob mit ‚Reiter' (τῶν ἱππέων) die solonische Zensusklasse oder die Truppengattung der Kavallerie gemeint ist, so macht sein Zeitgenosse Aristophanes in seiner Komödie Ἱππῆς (424 v. Chr. aufgeführt) deutlich, daß diese Reiter, die den Poseidon Hippios als ihren Herrn (ἄναξ) anrufen (551ff.), als militärische Abteilung auftreten: ihre genannte Zahl von 1000 Mann (V. 225) ist die Stärke der athenischen Reiterei jener Zeit;[3] sie betreten die Bühne in militärischer Formation (242ff.) und wollen ohne Sold fürs Vaterland kämpfen (576f.). In Sophokles' Oidipus auf Kolonos, dessen Handlung in nächster Nähe des Poseidon Hippios-Heiligtums spielt, stürzen die Athener, als sie den Raub der Oidipus-Töchter durch Kreon erfahren, mitten aus einer Opferfeier für Poseidon weg auf die Pferde, holen die Thebaner ein und besiegen sie in einer Reiterschlacht; dabei rühmt der Chor der Kolonos-Bewohner die athenische Reiterei, daß sie der Athena Hippia und dem Poseidon Ehre erweisen.[4]

* Die ersten Gedanken zu diesem Thema entstanden eher beiläufig während meines erinnerungsreichen Aufenthalts im Center for Hellenic Studies 1974/5. Die Anteilnahme und das geduldige Interesse, das B. M. W. Knox in mehreren Gesprächen zeigte, ermutigten, sie weiter zu verfolgen.

1 Zur Lage, Karte bei J. Travlos, Bildlexikon zur Topographie des antiken Athen (Tübingen 1971) 318 Abb. 417; zur Forschung, E. Kirsten, Wiener Stud. 86 (1973) 12f.

2 Com. att. Fr. 134 Kock: . . . εἰς Κολωνὸν ἑέμην, οὐ τὸν ἀγοραῖον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ἱππέων. Von J. M. Edmonds, The Fragm. of Attic Comedy I (Leiden 1957) 257 ohne Gewähr auf ca. 424 v. Chr. datiert.

3 G. Busolt–H. Swoboda, Griech. Staatskunde II (München 1926) 1128 mit Nachweisen.

4 O. C. 818–1098; das unterbrochene Poseidonopfer, 888; 897–9; die visionär geschilderte Reiterschlacht, 1044–84; Athena Hippia und Poseidon von der Reiterei (ἄμβασις) geehrt,

Im Jahr 282/1 beschließt die athenische Reiterei, ihre Kommandanten, die Hipparchen und Phylarchen, wegen ihrer vorbildlichen Amtsführung und ihrer Verdienste um die Truppe zu belobigen und zu bekränzen und den Beschluß auf 2 Stelen zu veröffentlichen; die eine soll in dem Poseidonion, d. i. dem Heiligtum des Poseidon Hippios, die andere in der Hermenstoa aufgestellt werden.[5] Ein anderes, jedoch sehr fragmentiertes Ehrendekret aus der Zeit von ca. 160 v. Chr. lobt die beiden Hipparchen des Vorjahres für die Erfüllung ihrer Opfer-Pflichten gegenüber dem Poseidon und einigen anderen Gottheiten.[6] Noch im 3. nachchristlichen Jahrhundert ist etwas von dem kultischen Mittelpunkt der attischen Reiterei bekannt; denn Philostrat verwendet ‚Kolonos' als Metonymie für die athenische Reitertruppe der Perserkriegszeit.[7]

Die vorgelegten Zeugnisse von den Dichtern des 5. bis zu den Inschriften des 3. und 2. Jh. erweisen, daß das Poseidonion am Kolonos das spezifische Kultzentrum der athenischen Reitertruppe war.[8]

2. *Das Opfer für Poseidon Hippios*

Bei Sophokles bringt Theseus zusammen mit den Athenern dem Poseidon am Kolonos ein Rinderopfer dar.[9] Opfer für Poseidon (Hippios) durch die Hipparchen sind bezeugt in der schon erwähnten Inschrift aus der Zeit

1070f. (Poseidon wird hier wie an anderen Stellen als Gott des Meeres apostrophiert, z. B. 711; 888; 1492). Athena Hippia und Poseidon Hippios hatten am Kolonos einen gemeinsamen Altar (Paus. 1,30,4).

[5] Gefunden wurde die Stele von der Hermenstoa, publiziert von J. Threpsiades–E. Vanderpool, Deltion 18 (1963) A' 103–9; dort 105 Z. 42f.: στῆσαι τὴν [μὲν] πρὸς τῶι Ποσειδονίωι, dazu der Kommentar 108.

[6] A. G. Woodhead, Hesperia 29 (1960) 78–80, Nr. 155; dazu neue Ergänzungen von Chr. Habicht, Ath. Mitt. 76 (1961) 141–3 und von Threpsiades u. Vanderpool a. O. 107.

[7] *Vit. Apoll. Tyan.* 4,21 (Apollonios wirft den Athenern ihre weibische Kleidung am Dionysosfest vor)

κροκωτοὶ δὲ ὑμῖν καὶ ἁλουργία καὶ κοκκοβαφία τοιαύτη πόθεν; οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ Ἀχαρναί γε ὧδε ἐστέλλοντο, οὐδὲ ὁ Κολωνὸς ὧδε ἵππευε.

Acharnai, dessen Wehrkraft in klassischer Zeit berühmt war (Aristoph. *Ach.* 181; Pi. *N.* 2,16f.; Thuk. 2,20,4; 21,3), ist hier metonymisch wohl für die Hoplitentruppe gesagt.

[8] Ähnlich, allerdings in hypothetischer Form, E. Kirsten, Wiener Stud. 86 (1973) 13–5. Daß sich die ‚Hippeis' als soziale Schicht außerhalb ihres Reiterdienstes mit Poseidon Hippios verbunden fühlten und an seinem Kult teilnahmen, wird im folgenden Abschnitt 3 behandelt.

[9] O. C. 887ff. Τίς ποθ' ἡ βοή; τί τοὔργον; ἐκ τίνος φόβου ποτὲ
βουθυτοῦντά μ' ἀμφὶ βωμὸν ἔσχετ' ἐναλίῳ θεῷ
τοῦδ' ἐπιστάτῃ Κολωνοῦ;

um 160 v. Chr.[10] Damit läßt sich die bisher noch ungeklärte Stelle eines Ehren-Beschlusses verstehen, den die athenische Reiterei 187/6 v. Chr. für ihren Hipparchen des Vorjahres faßte;[11] unter seinen löblich erfüllten Amtspflichten wird angeführt, Z. 22f.: [. . . παρεκάλεσεν τοὺς ἱππέας] ἅπαντας καὶ ἐβουθύτησεν τῶι θεῶι μετ' αὐτ[ῶν]. Die nicht identifizierte Gottheit[12] ist nach all dem hier Gesagten der Reitergott Poseidon Hippios. Ihm pflegten also die Hipparchen unter vollständiger Anwesenheit der Truppe ein Opfer zu leisten. Zwar stellen die von Sophokles und von der Inschrift genannten Rinderopfer weder in der griechischen Religion noch im Poseidon-Kult etwas Besonderes dar,[13] doch ist es hübsch, daß die Inventarliste des Poseidon Hippios-Heiligtums, etwa von 406/5, Geräte zum Abziehen der Rinderhaut (βουδόροι) erwähnt.[14]

3. Poseidon Hippios und der athenische Reiterstand

Den Poseidon Hippios an dem Kolonos, seinem einzig bekannten Kultort in Attika, ehrten die Hippeis auch außerhalb ihres Kriegsdienstes. Die militärisch auftretenden und Poseidon Hippios anrufenden ‚Ritter' des Aristophanes erscheinen zugleich als Vertreter ihres Standes, als καλοὶ κἀγαθοί (227) mit ihrer besonderen Haartracht (580);[15] ebenso gehen bei

897ff. Οὔκουν τις ὡς τάχιστα προσπόλων μολὼν
πρὸς τοῦσδε βωμοὺς πάντ' ἀναγκάσει λεὼν
ἄνιππον ἱππότην τε θυμάτων ἄπο
σπεύδειν ἀπὸ ῥυτῆρος.

1491ff. Ἰὼ ⟨ἰώ⟩, παῖ, βᾶθι, βᾶθ', _ _ _ _
εἶτ' ἄκρον ἐπὶ γύαλον
ἐναλίῳ Ποσειδαονίῳ θεῷ
βούθυτον ἑστίαν ἁγίζων, ἱκοῦ.

[10] S. o. A. 5; Text nach Deltion 18 (1963) A' 107 Z. 3–5: [. . . ἔθυσαν τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ] εἰσιτητήρια καλῶς κ[αὶ εὐσεβῶς τῶι τε Δήμωι καὶ ταῖς Χάρι]σιν καὶ τῶι Ποσειδῶνι [τῶι Ἱππίωι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια].

[11] Herausgegeben und vorzüglich kommentiert von Chr. Habicht, Ath. Mitt. 76 (1961) 127–41.

[12] Habicht a. O. 135.

[13] W. Burkert, Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche (Stuttgart 1977) 38, 101; P. Stengel, Die griechischen Kultusaltertümer (München ³1920) 121f. Rinderopfer für Poseidon: E. Wüst, Poseidon, Pauly-Wissowa RE 22 (1953) 505; Burkert, a. O. 159, 215, 217.

[14] A. M. Woodward, Hesperia 32 (1963) 155 Nr. 2 Z. 9, Kommentar dazu 159; W. E. Thompson, Hesperia 40 (1971) 232–4; T. Linders, The Treasurers of the Other Gods in Athens and their Functions (Meisenheim am Glan 1975) 74 A. 8.

[15] Zum Reiterstand zur Zeit des Aristophanes vortrefflich V. Ehrenberg, Aristophanes und das Volk von Athen (Zürich–Stuttgart 1968) 104–121.

Deinarch in dem Ausdruck ἱππαρχηκὼς ἀνδρῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν (3,12) die militärische und soziale Sphäre ineinander über. Fernab allen Kriegsdienstes leistet der auf Pferderennen versessene Sohn einer hochadeligen Mutter einen Eid beim Poseidon Hippios (Aristoph. Wolk. 83f.; vgl. 46) und weiht eine Frau dem Gott eine Reiterstatue.[16] Der in Attika geläufige, wohl adlige Name ‚Poseidippos' erweist die Verehrung des Rossegottes,[17] die besonders ‚hippisch' und lokalbezogen bei Ποσείδιππος Καλλίππου ἐκ Κολωνοῦ (IG II/III² 6528) zutage tritt.

Sophokles setzt die Verehrung des Poseidon durch die Reiterei und das übliche Rinderopfer in die Zeit des Theseus (O. C. 1070f.; 888; 1492ff.); in noch fernere Zeiten greift der einer Kultlegende entsprechende Lobpreis (707ff.) zurück, Poseidon habe am Kolonos die Zügelung der Pferde erstmals gelehrt. Die frühesten direkten, bereits vorgelegten Zeugnisse vom Kult der Hippeis für Poseidon am Kolonos stammen aus den 20er Jahren des 5. Jh.[18] Der etwa ab der Mitte dieses Jh. nachweisbare Name ‚Poseidippos' spricht angesichts des üblichen Konservativismus in der Namengebung für ein wesentlich höheres Alter des Poseidon Hippios-Kultes.[19] Die athenischen Hippeis lassen sich anhand von Darstellungen bewaffneter Reiter oder Pferdehalter auf Vasen bis ins 8. Jh.[20] und über einen Grabfund mit Pferdetrense, Schwert und Lanzenspitzen aus der Zeit

[16] IG II/III² 4691 (2. Jh. v. Chr.), leider ist der genaue Fundort nicht bekannt.

[17] J. Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica, s. v. (einschließlich der Nachträge, II 439ff.): ‚Poseidippos' 22 Personen; zum Vergleich dazu: ‚Poseidonios' 15; der häufigste Athena-Name ‚Athenodoros' 30, ‚Athenippos' (analog zu ‚Poseidippos') nur 7. Unter den athenischen Buleuten bis ins 3. Jh. v. Chr. hinein (B. D. Meritt–J. S. Traill, The Athenian Agora XV: Inscriptions: The Athenian Councillors [Princeton N. J. 1974] Index 349ff., s. v.) ‚Poseidippos' 9; ‚Poseidonios' 14; ‚Athenaios' 30; ‚Athenodoros' 28; ‚Athenippos' 2 Personen. Allgemein E. Sittig, De Graecorum nominibus theophoris (Halle 1911) 74: . . . in Attica nomina a Neptuno derivata theophora sunt usitatissima. vgl. 166f. Der Bestandteil -ιππος als Kennzeichen vornehmer Namen, Aristoph. *Nub.* 63ff.; vgl. F. Bechtel, Das Wort ΙΠΠΟΣ in den eretrischen Personennamen, Hermes 35 (1900) 326–31.

[18] Aristoph. *Eq.* (aufgeführt 424 v. Chr.) 551; *Nub.* (423) 83f.; Pherekrates s. o. Anm. 2. Die früheste Erwähnung des Heiligtums überhaupt ist wohl IG I² 310,60f. 141f. von 429/8 mit der Nennung von Geldern des Gottes, ohne Bezug auf Hippeis.

[19] IG I² 943,34 (440/39); 950,19 (412/1?); II/III² 2344,1 (Anfang 4. Jh.); 1951, 407 (wohl Syntrierarch bei der Arginusenschlacht 406 v. Chr., vgl. J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families (Oxford 1971) 468); Lysias, Fr. 214 Thalheim. Die Geburt und Namensgebung der Erwähnten liegen natürlich Jahrzehnte früher. Allgemein über theophore Namen in Athen mit Häufigkeitsstatistik nach Epochen, S. Dow, Names, Theophoric, Personal (Greek), Oxford Class. Dict.² 721f.

[20] P. A. L. Greenhalgh, Early Greek Warfare (Cambridge 1973) 47–53; 88–91; 111–36; H. Metzger – D. van Berchem, Hippeis, in: Festschrift K. Schefold (Bern 1967) 155–8.

um 900[21] bis zu einem behelmten Reiterfigürchen der mykenischen Epoche zurückverfolgen.[22]

Auf unterschiedlichen Wegen kommen F. Schachermeyr und M. P. Nilsson zu dem Ergebnis, daß die Verbindung Poseidons mit dem Pferd aus der vordorischen Schicht stammt.[23] Zwar steht eine ausdrückliche Bestätigung aus den Linear B-Tafeln für Poseidon als Herrn der Pferde oder der militärisch damals maßgeblichen Streitwagenfahrer noch aus,[24] doch spricht vieles dafür, die Verehrung des Poseidon Hippios durch die Hippeis für alt, vielleicht sogar in die mykenische Zeit zurückreichend zu halten.[25] Die oben nachgewiesene Verehrung des Gottes durch die athenischen Hippeis stellt den Kolonos in die Reihe der festländischen Poseidonheiligtümer von z. T. gesichert hohem Alter, deren Kult, erkennbar an der Rolle des Viergespanns oder der Wagenrennen, ritterliche Züge trägt: auf der Peloponnes Mantineia, Pallantion, Sparta, Olympia, Korinth, in Böotien Onchestos und vielleicht Tilphusa.[26]

Ganz anderer Natur ist der Poseidon auf Athens Akropolis: Dreizack und Salzsee und sein mit dem Areopag verbundener Sohn, der den sprechenden Namen Halirrhothios trägt, kennzeichnen ihn als den Gott des Meeres. Als solchen verehren ihn nahezu ausnahmslos die ionischen Bewohner der Inseln und Kleinasiens.[27] Ebenso zeichnet ihn Homer: bei der Aufteilung von Kronos' Erbe habe er die Herrschaft des Meeres erlost, Zeus die des Himmels und Hades die der Unterwelt.[28] Der Rückzug Poseidons schlägt sich nieder in einer ganzen Reihe von Sagen über seinen Streit mit anderen Olympiern um die Herrschaft von Attika, Theben,

[21] Gefunden an der Agora, Hesperia 21 (1952) 279–94.

[22] Gefunden bei Spata (= Erchia), außer dem Reiter die noch weit ungewöhnlichere Darstellung einer reitenden Frau mitgefunden, beide Terrakotta, ferner aus Stein ein Dreifuß mit Stierprotome, D. Levi, La dea micenea a cavallo, Studies pres. D. M. Robinson (St. Louis 1957) I 108–25; Taf. 4a–d; J. Wiesner, Fahren und Reiten, Archaeologia Homerica F (Göttingen 1968) 118.

[23] F. Schachermeyr, Poseidon (Bern 1950) 51ff.; 150ff. M. P. Nilsson, Gesch. d. griech. Religion (München 1955²) 449; vgl. auch W. Burkert, Griech. Religion (1977) 218.

[24] Es gab in Pylos eine ‚Herrin der Pferde' (*potinija iqeja*), Burkert, Griech. Religion 85, vielleicht eine weibliche Poseidon-Gottheit (*Posidaeja*), Burkert 64, A. Heubeck, Aus der Welt der frühgriechischen Lineartafeln (Göttingen 1966) 101, die neben dem dortigen Hauptgott Poseidon stand. Die in Attika gefundene Terrakottafigur einer reitenden Frau interpretiert Levi als Pferdegöttin, s. o. Anm. 22.

[25] Terminus post ist die Übernahme des Streitwagens aus dem Orient am Anfang des 16. Jh., Schachermeyr, Poseidon, 51–60.

[26] Schachermeyr 15f.; 17; 20; 34; 38–41; E. Wüst, Poseidon, RE 22 (1953) 511–521.

[27] Wüst 490f.; Schachermeyr 43–49; 158–160.

[28] *Il.* 15,187ff.; Schachermeyr 167f.

Argos, Akrokorinth, Delphi, Troizen, Aigina und Naxos, wobei er niemals siegt.[29] Der ionische, von Homer meist als wild und gefährlich geschilderte Meeresherrscher schwächt die Popularität des Reitergottes. Als zweite Ursache für den Rückgang der Poseidonverehrung sieht Schachermeyr (170f.) das Aufkommen der Hoplitenphalanx und den dadurch sich ausbildenden Polisstaat: die bis dahin militärisch und politisch entscheidenden Hippeis und der mit ihnen verbundene Poseidon Hippios-Kult verloren ihre frühere Bedeutung. Dies mag erklären, weshalb so wenig über den Poseidon Hippios am Kolonos bekannt ist. Schon Sophokles, der von dort stammte, betont, daß die Gottheiten dieses Gebiets mehr durch gemeinschaftlichen Kult (ξυνουσίᾳ) als im Mythos (λόγοις) verehrt würden (O. C. 62f.). Das bis ins 2. Jh. v. Chr. bezeugte Poseidonopfer der Reiterei am Kolonos erscheint damit als das Rudiment eines ehemals bedeutsamen vorhomerischen Kultes der attischen Hippeis. Da Parallelkulte für Poseidon Hippios in Attika fehlen, scheint er den politischen Synoikismos des Landes vorauszusetzen.[30] Nur in dem relativ spät an Athen angeschlossenen Eleusis sind Spuren eines ‚hippischen' Poseidon erhalten in dem Mythos von Alope, deren Sohn aus ihrer Verbindung mit Poseidon den sprechenden Namen ‚Hippothoon' erhielt und von einer Stute aufgezogen wurde.[31]

4. Die Volksversammlung im Poseidonheiligtum zur Einführung der oligarchischen Verfassung (411 v. Chr.)

Der Eindruck der ungeheuren sizilischen Katastrophe veranlaßte Athen 413 v. Chr. zu ersten Änderungen seiner demokratischen Verfassung. Man setzte ein Kollegium von 10 Probulen ein – darunter angesehene Männer der perikleischen Zeit wie Hagnon, der Vater des Theramenes, und der Dichter Sophokles[32] – welches durch Wahl statt Erlosung, durch ein

[29] Wüst 460f.; Schachermeyr 23; 157f.

[30] Der Poseidon Hippodromios im sog. Salaminier-Dekret Z. 89f. (W. S. Ferguson, Hesperia 7 (1938) 1–68 = Suppl. epigr. graec. 21,527) gehört ins Hippodrom in Echelidai bei Phaleron (Ferguson 25f.) nachzutragen in die Listen attischer Poseidon-Kulte bei Wüst a. O. 515 und Schachermeyr a. O. 37. Eine Athena Hippia ohne Poseidon ist in Acharnai mehrfach bezeugt, die Stellen bei S. Solders, Die außerstädtischen Kulte und die Einigung Attikas (Lund 1931) 12. Zum Synoikismos als Vereinigung des attischen Adels um Athen G. Alföldy, Rev. belge de Philol. 47 (1969) 5–35.

[31] Schachermeyr 37f.

[32] Aristot. *Rhet.* 1374b 35; 1416a 14; 1419a 25; einen anderen Sophokles vermutet H. C. Avery, Historia 22 (1973) 509–14; dagegen begründen M. H. Jameson, Historia 20

Mindestalter von 40 Jahren und durch den Wegfall der Annuität oligarchischen Charakter zeigt.[33] Im Winter 412/11 akzeptiert die athenische Volksversammlung in der Hoffnung auf persische Hilfsgelder grundsätzlich, eine oligarchische Verfassung einzuführen (Thuk. 8,53–54,1). Nach allerhand geheimen und terroristischen Machenschaften oligarchischer Umstürzler ernennt das Volk im Frühsommer 411 eine Kommission der *Syngrapheîs*, welche die ‚beste' Verfassung entwerfen und zu einem festgelegten Tag der Volksversammlung vorlegen soll (Thuk. 8.67,1). An diesem Termin berufen nun die *Syngrapheîs* die Volksversammlung in das Poseidonheiligtum am Kolonos ein (Thuk. 8,67,2), das wir oben als den kultischen Mittelpunkt der athenischen Hippeis kennengelernt haben. In der Tat wird dort die Demokratie ohne Widerspruch abgeschafft; die Verschwörer ergreifen als Bule der Vierhundert die Macht, bilden also de facto eine radikale Oligarchie, verhüllen dies aber mit dem Programm, die Regierung solle in die Hände der 5000 militärisch und finanziell Leistungsfähigsten gelegt werden.[34]

Initiatoren und Träger der Verfassungsänderung waren nach Thukydides' Aussage die δυνατώτατοι, die Trierarchen und Hetairien,[35], oder – wie sie sich selbst gerne nannten – die βέλτιστοι oder καλοὶ κἀγαθοί,[36] also im wesentlichen die Hippeis,[37] die wegen ihrer bekannten antidemokratischen Einstellung schon 424 v. Chr. auf der Bühne als Verschwörer bezeichnet sind.[38] Die Beteiligung der Hopliten stand nur auf dem Papier. Folgerichtig ging dann von ihnen der Sturz der Vierhundert aus (Thuk. 8,92,4ff.), gegen die Meuterei der Hopliten werden τῶν ἱππέων νεανίσκοι geführt (8,92,6) und sie übernehmen als die 5000 ὅπλα παρεχόμενοι die Staatsverwaltung (8,97). Der Gegensatz zu der demokratisch gebliebenen Flotte (Thuk. 8,73ff.) und zu den meuternden Hopliten enthüllt, daß die

(1971) 541–68, und P. Karavites, Klio 58 (1976) 359–65, daß Aristoteles zu Recht den Dichter meint.

33 G. Busolt, Griech. Geschichte, III 2 (Gotha 1904) 1409; C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution (Oxford ²1958) 269.

34 Thuk. 8,65,2f.; 67; 72; 89,2; 92,11; 93,2. Ich stütze mich hier ausschließlich auf den klaren, kohärenten und für die Argumentation völlig ausreichenden Bericht des Historikers. Die mit Thukydides nur schwer zu vereinenden Urkunden bei Aristot. Ath. Pol. 29ff. (ein neuerer Harmonisierungsversuch von D. Flach, Chiron 7 (1977) 9–33) sagen über die tatsächlichen Vorgänge kaum etwas.

35 8,47,2; 48,1; 48,3; 65,2.

36 8,47,2; 48,6.

37 Hignett a. O. 272; V. Ehrenberg, Aristophanes u. das Volk v. Ath. 120.

38 Aristoph. *Eq.* 236; 257; 452; 475f.; 628; 862. Vgl. *Vesp.* 345; 483; 488; 507, 953; Ehrenberg a. O. 118f.

Vierhundert – wie später die Dreißig – ihre militärische Stütze in der Reiterei fanden, die sich ja aus dem gleichen Stand rekrutierte, dem sie größtenteils selbst angehörten.[39]

Daß die Wahl eines Platzes für eine Volksversammlung politische Bedeutung haben kann, zeigt die Figur des Demos in Aristophanes' Rittern (749), der sich weigert, sich anderswo als auf der Pnyx niederzulassen, ferner der ausdrückliche Hinweis des Thukydides,[40] daß die Pnyx erst wieder unter den Fünftausend für Ekklesien benützt wurde. Es besteht der Verdacht, daß die Einberufung der verfassungsändernden Versammlung in das Poseidonheiligtum politische Gründe hat.[41]

5. Die mythische Volksversammlung zum Poseidonopfer in Sophokles' Oidipus auf Kolonos

Ausdrücklich das gesamte Volk (O. C. 884; 898: πᾶς λεώς), nämlich Reiterei und Fußvolk (898f.: πάντα λεὼν ἄνιππον ἱππότην τε), ist in Sophokles' Drama versammelt, um am Opfer seines Königs für Poseidon teilzunehmen. Schafft hier der Dichter, der dies zwischen 409 und 406 schrieb, einen mythischen Präzedenzfall, um die dortige Ekklesie von 411 zu motivieren oder gar zu rechtfertigen? Doch einem solchen tagespolitischen Anliegen widerspricht nicht nur das sonstige Oeuvre des Dichters, sondern auch die nachlässige Motivierung jener Opferszene im Handlungsablauf. Das nur hier genannte Fußvolk hat keine dramatische Funktion, die Verfolgung der Thebaner und die anschließende Schlacht erfolgen zu Pferde (800; 1054–71). Auch das völlig unmotivierte Auftauchen und Verschwinden der Poseidonfeier im Verlauf der Handlung und die immer nur ganz knappe Erwähnung (884–9; 897–9; 1159f.; 1491–5) sprechen dagegen, daß der Dichter damit eine besondere Absicht verband. Das

[39] Hinzukamen auswärtige Hopliten, die die Verschwörer aus Seebundsstädten geholt hatten, Thuk. 8,65,1; 69,3. Die Reiterei als Truppe der Dreißig, Xen. *Hell.* 2,4,2; 8–10; 3,1,4.

[40] Thuk. 8,97,1; dazu W. A. McDonald, The Political Meeting Places of the Greeks (Baltimore 1943) 45f.

[41] Bezug auf die Hippeis vermuten R. E. A. Palmer, The King and the Comitium (Wiesbaden 1969) 41 und E. Kirsten, Wiener Stud. 86 (1973) 15f. Überwiegend vermutete man taktische Absichten: 1,8 km von der Stadtmauer entfernt, unter Gefahr eines spartanischen Überfalls, in einem räumlich beschränkten Platz habe man möglichst wenige Teilnehmer gewünscht, die man durch die zum Schutz mitgenommenen Waffen einschüchtern konnte, G. Busolt, Griech. Gesch. III 2, 1478; Ed. Meyer, Gesch. d. Altert. IV 2 (Stuttgart 1956⁴) 290f.

Poseidonfest dient nur als Hintergrundshandlung, um Theseus nach Bedarf auf die Bühne, die den Eumeniden-Hain darstellt, rufen lassen zu können und um ein Heer zur Verfolgung der Thebaner schnell bereit zu haben. Daß Sophokles das für den Handlungsablauf nutzlose Fußvolk erfunden hätte, ist unwahrscheinlich. Vielmehr scheint eine Tradition zugrunde zu liegen, die von Zusammenkünften des 'Gesamtvolkes' im Poseidonheiligtum in alter Zeit wußte. Diese Tradition vermag die Einberufung des Gesamtvolkes im Jahr 411 zur Einführung der oligarchischen Verfassung zu erklären.

6. *Eine frühe politische Bedeutung des Poseidonheiligtums?*

Eine gesamtstaatliche Funktion des Poseidonions läßt sich für die Zeit annehmen, in der die Hippeis allein, d. h., vor Erteilung politischer Rechte an die Hopliten, den athenischen ‚Staat' repräsentierten.[42] Die oligarchische Politeia der Hippeis nach Beseitigung des Königtums und vor dem Aufkommen der Hoplitenphalanx (ca. 700–650 v. Chr.[43]) bezeugt Aristoteles für Eretria, Chalkis und griechische Städte Kleinasiens und sie gilt als eine allgemeine frühe Stufe der Verfassungsentwicklung griechischer Staaten.[44] Aber für eine frühe Herrschaft der Hippeis in Athen fehlen Zeugnisse. So muß der Versuch Hypothese bleiben, die beiden seltsamen ‚Volksversammlungen' im Poseidonheiligtum, nämlich zur oligarchischen Verfassungsreform von 411 und zum Poseidonopfer zur Zeit des Theseus[45] aus einer ehemals gesamtstaatlichen, politischen Bedeutung der Hippeis und ihres Kultmittelpunktes zu erklären. Die Analogie anderer Reiterpolitien,

[42] Ähnlich auf anderem Wege E. Kirsten, Wiener Stud. 86 (1973) 15.

[43] P. Cartledge, Journ. of Hell. Stud. 97 (1977) 18ff.; J. Salmon ib. 85ff.

[44] Aristot. *Pol.* 1289b 27; 1297b 16; 1321a 5; *Ath. Pol.* 15,2, nicht überzeugend bestritten von P. Vanderwaeren, Historia 22 (1973) 177–90. Über die Reiterpolitien z. B. Busolt–Swoboda, Griech. Staatskunde, 210f.; 345; H. Volkmann, Die Waffentechnik in ihrem Einfluß auf das soziale Leben der Antike, in: Die Entwicklung der Kriegswaffe und ihr Zusammenhang mit der Staatsordnung, hg. v. L. v. Wiese (Köln 1953) 75–78 = H. Volkmann, Endoxos Duleia, Kl. Schr. z. Alten Gesch. (Berlin, New York 1975) 266–270; A. Alföldi, Die Herrschaft der Reiterei in Griechenland und Rom nach dem Sturz der Könige, in: Festschrift K. Schefold (Bern 1967) (Ant. Kunst, Beih. 4) 13–47; V. Ehrenberg, Der Staat der Griechen (Zürich 1965²) 59; P. A. L. Greenhalgh, Early Greek Warfare (Cambridge 1973) 3; 42; 44.

[45] Falls Sophokles mit dem „unberittenen Volk" (*O. C.* 899) nicht Leichtbewaffnete, sondern Hopliten meinte, hätte er im Hinblick auf die erst im 7. Jh. entstandene Hoplitenphalanx einen kleinen Anachronismus begangen.

das Alter des vorhomerischen Poseidon Hippios-Kultes, den die athenische Reiterei nachweislich bis in die hellenistische Zeit pflegte, und die maßgebliche Rolle, die die Hippeis in der Oligarchie von 411 spielten, verleihen der Hypothese einige Plausibilität. Ob die oligarchischen Drahtzieher der Verfassungsreform ihren Drang zur Macht mit Vorstellungen einer Patrios Politeia der Hippeis nährten, bleibt völlig offen, da jede Nachricht darüber fehlt. Bekannt ist nur, daß sie zur Tarnung ihrer Absichten eine Regierungsbeteiligung der Hopliten in der Verfassung der Fünftausend propagierten.[46] Eine Identifizierung und Ausgrabung des Poseidonions könnte klären, inwieweit die Vorgänge von 411 in der Kultstätte der Hippeis und das Bild, das der vom Kolonos stammende Sophokles von ihr vermittelt, historische Bezüge auf die frühe, zumindest vorsolonische Geschichte Athens aufweisen.

[46] S. o. bei A. 37–9.

CHARLES D. HAMILTON

Greek Rhetoric and History: the Case of Isocrates

Almost all societies have some interest in the past, but not all exhibit a critical historical attitude to the past in which "what has happened", *ta genomena*, is more than an undifferentiated, trackless collection of deeds or events. The mark of a true historical sense is the ability to recognize movement or development in society, of change over time, usually indicated by the historian's unavoidable tendency to periodize, "to cut the seamless web of durée".[1] This ability naturally presupposes sources of knowledge and at least some critical principles in approaching this material. Finally, good history has a theme or purpose which gives significance to the past.

The fourth century witnessed a much greater interest in the past than previously in Greek history. The numerous historical works produced in this period by Xenophon, Ephorus, Theopompus, and the Atthidographers, for example, reflect a growing concern for historical knowledge. In addition to formal histories, the works of the orators are full of historical allusions and examples and provide an intriguing body of material. It is very difficult to determine, however, to what extent historical consciousness in the fourth century corresponded with a concern for detailed, accurate, and impartial reconstruction and depiction of the past, or to what extent the orator could deliberately color or manipulate the past to suit his purposes. Various attempts to discuss aspects of these questions have yielded less than satisfactory results, however, both because the orators are usually treated together and because no rigorous approach has been established to evaluate their attitudes toward history.[2] With this as the central focus of investigation, I intend to develop a series of categories

[1] D. Hay, The Italian Renaissance (Cambridge 1968) 24.

[2] See, for example, K. Jost, Das Beispiel und Vorbild der Vorfahren bei den attischen Rednern und Geschichtschreibern bis auf Demosthenes (Paderborn 1935), L. Pearson, Historical Allusions in the attic Orators, Class. Philol. 36 (1941) 209ff. and S. Perlman, The Historical Example, its Use and Importance as Policitcal Propaganda in the Attic Orators, Scripta Hierosolymytana 7 (1961) 150ff.

which may help to answer these interrelated questions. Rather than attempting to consider all, or even several, of the fourth century orators, I shall limit this inquiry to the case of Isocrates. The method suggested, however, should prove a valid approach to any of the other orators. Clearly, Isocrates was one of the great thinkers of the fourth century. Although subsequent generations have tended to rank him far below his contemporaries, Plato and Aristotle, because of his literary style or the determined repetition of his principal ideas, nevertheless he was enormously successful as a teacher of rhetoric in his own day and he possessed great political influence.[3] Furthermore, a substantial body of evidence exists in the form of various speeches and letters attributed to him, and throughout these works are to be found numerous references to and arguments drawn from the past. Isocrates also criticizes on more than one occasion his fellow rhetoricians, from which remarks some useful information might be derived about contemporary practices. Finally, tradition has made him the mentor of two of our principal fourth century historians, Theopompus of Chios and Ephorus of Cyme. Thus, we may presume that his ideas about the past and its relationship to rhetoric are of the first importance, *if* we can discover what they were. Although Isocrates does not elaborate in detail a theory of history nor discuss the use of the historical example in rhetoric, it is a virtual certainty that he carefully considered these and related questions and independently formulated his opinions about them.[4]

There is no single term in Isocrates for "the past," but several recur and it is usually clear enough when he is speaking of the past.[5] The most common terms are those like: τὰ γενόμενα; αἱ πράξεις τῶν προγόνων; τὸ παλαιόν; αἱ πράξεις αἱ προγεγενημέναι; τὰ ἔργα γενόμενα, etc. Very often one of these phrases is used to introduce a comparison with a contemporary situation which is being analyzed, or to cite an historical example in support of some argument. Isocrates' examples reach far back

[3] See R. C. Jebb, Attic Orators (London 1893) and F. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit (Leipzig 1887–98) for Isocrates and his place in rhetoric.

[4] See H. Ll. Hudson-Williams, Thucydides, Isocrates and the rhetorical method of composition, Class. Quart. 42 (1948) 76ff. and C. B. Welles, Isocrates' View of History, in The Classical Tradition. Literary and historical studies in honor of H. Caplan, ed. by L. Wallach (Ithaca 1966). There is a disappointing lack of discussion of Isocrates' ideas about history in the standard works which treat either his ideas about rhetoric and education (e. g. Jaeger in Paideia) or his political thought (J. Kessler, Isokrates und die panhellenische Idee [Diss. München 1911], G. Mathieu, Les Idees politiques d'Isocrate [Paris 1925], or K. Bringmann, Studien zu den politischen Ideen des Isokrates [Göttingen 1965]).

into what we consider the legendary past – to the generation of the Trojan War and even beyond – at one end of the spectrum, and they are drawn from as recent a period as the mid-fourth century at the other. It is important to recognize this latter point because the possibilities for knowledge and for variation of presentation differ greatly according to whether one is considering the quite remote or the most recent past.[6] Isocrates frequently refers in retrospect to numerous events since the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War. In terms of scope, Isocrates is prepared to make references to τὰ γενόμενα which have occurred within living memory; in fact it is sometimes hard to distinguish between τὰ γενόμενα and τὰ γιγνόμενα.

Since Isocrates ranges from the very recent to the very remote past, we must ask whether he differentiates the past, and on what basis. In the *Philip*, Isocrates is eager to establish the fact that change is of frequent and sometimes unexpected occurrence in human events. To prove this point, he cites the example of Athens' rise to empire in the fifth century and her subsequent fall and Sparta's brief hegemony after 404; these themes recur in the *Panegyricus* and the *Panathenaicus* and elsewere. He regards the Persian Wars as a seminal turning point in Athens' history, since it was because of her unselfish bravery in fighting on behalf of the freedom of the Greeks that she was willingly awarded hegemony by the other Greeks in the Delian League in 478. He speaks glowingly of the many benefits which Athens conferred upon Greece during the early decades of her rule, but in the *Areopagiticus* and *De Pace* he recognizes that a change has occurred in Athens' behavior by the middle of the fifth century. Her rule has become harsh and almost ruthless, and the cause of this is her naval predominance, together with its effects on the internal structure of the state. The allusion is made and the causal connection suggested, but no detailed social or political analysis is drawn. Thus, within what we would consider quite strictly the historical period, Isocrates not only recognizes development and change, but views these changes in a causal nexus. With regard to the Heroic Age, he knows about the coming of the Heraclidae to the Pelopon-

[5] One of the problems of this study was precisely this: to discover when he was speaking of the past.

[6] Welles, *art. cit.*, 13, imputes to Isocrates the view of history formulated by the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herrenium*: "Historia est gesta res sed ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota." This is too restrictive a definition, for which I find no warrant in Isocrates' practice, and which also goes against the practice of such contemporary historians as Thucydides abd Xenophon, both of whom dealt with contemporary events.

nesus, the story of their conquest and settlement, as well as the results which this produced. Likewise, he has much to say about the accomplishments of Theseus of Athens. His view of the past is hardly static, and his treatment of events from the Persian Wars down to the 360s seems coherent and sensible in that, where he discusses particular events, he exhibits an interest in cause and effect and he recognizes both continuity and change in history.

Most of Isocrates' historical examples come either from the post-Solonian period or from the traditional legendary material known to all Greeks. Did he distinguish between myth and history? The general opinion that his critical sense did not extend to the distant past is asserted by Welles with little argument. "In common with most Greeks and Romans, he felt no distinction between myth and history."[7] What Isocrates himself says on the subject shows a more perceptive attitude than this, as I hope to show from a consideration of the passages in which he employs the words μῦθος or μυθώδης. The first instance occurs in the *Panegyricus* (4.28) where he speaks of the story of Demeter and Kore thus: "For even if the story has become mythical, it nevertheless deserves to be told now."[8] Isocrates does not distinguish between μῦθος and λόγος as antithetical concepts; rather he qualifies *this* λόγος as having become μυθώδης. The passage seems to imply something about the way in which the Demeter *logos* was treated or celebrated rather than about its possible veracity. A later passage in the same speech (4.158) may illustrate this usage more clearly. Here Isocrates characterizes the Trojan and Persian Wars, about the historicity of which neither he nor his audience can have had any doubts, as μῦθοι: "We are so hostile to them (barbarians) by nature that of our myths we listen most gladly to those of the Trojan and Persian Wars, through which we can learn of their misfortunes."[9] Myth here seems to mean a story which has come to have a special fame and function in Greek tradition. It is the special reverence and prominence given a particular story that, for Isocrates, causes a *logos* to become a *mythos*. But not all *mythoi* are factually true; not all deserve the same degree of credence. In the *Panathenaicus* (12.237–238)

[7] Welles, *art. cit.*, 14.

[8] Isoc. 4.28:
καὶ γὰρ εἰ μυθώδης ὁ λόγος γέγονεν, ὅμως αὐτῷ καὶ νῦν ῥηθῆναι προσήκει.

[9] Isoc. 4.158:
οὕτω δὲ φύσει πολεμικῶς πρὸς αὐτούς ἔχομεν, ὥστε καὶ τῶν μύθων ἥδιστα συνδιατρίβομεν τοῖς Τρωϊκοῖς [καὶ Περσικοῖς], δι' ὧν ἔστι πυνθάνεσθαι τὰς ἐκείνων συμφοράς.

Isocrates represents his supposed critic as attributing to him a distinction between τὰ μυθώδη and τὰς πράξεις τὰς ὁμολογουμένας. The former are commonly told but not necessarily believed universally, while the latter are acknowledged as true. Even more explicit is the distinction in *Evagoras* (9.66): "For if we discard the *mythoi* and examine the truth, whom shall we find among the men of that time who has accomplished such things . . .?"[10] It is possible that Isocrates means pure invention by the word μῦθος in this context, but also that he means "exaggeration, elaboration" which is the product of the poet's art. His purpose is to glorify Evagoras' achievements, and in order to create a favorable comparison with the celebrated deeds of the legendary heroes he must reduce their deeds from the superhuman level. Yet, it was possible even to doubt the very existence of the heroes and their deeds (9.6): "For some men are so ill-disposed naturally that they would listen more gladly to the praise of men of whose existence they have no certain knowledge than of those from whom they personally may have benefited."[11] For Isocrates, then, myth apparently could mean different things and be distinguished from history, i.e. factual, verifiable occurrence.

Isocrates chooses not to reveal by name the sources of the historical evidence that he adduces in support of his arguments. The sole author who is clearly cited by name is Homer. At the same time, it is easy enough to isolate the types of material which he drew upon. For his earlier historical examples, Isocrates relies upon Homer, "the poets", and common tradition, both oral and written. In the *Philip*, he cites examples from the distant past of Argos, Thebes and Sparta without mentioning sources, but immediately says of Athens (5.33): "Concerning our city, those whom we trust with regard to ancient time say . . ."[12] implying both the existence of sources and a critical attitude toward them on his part: some he trusts, others he does not. Elsewhere (12.177) in discussing the Dorian invasion and its sequel for Peloponnesian history, he says, "The Lacedaemonians, according to those who study their affairs closely, were rent by faction as

[10] Isoc. 9.66:
Τίνα γὰρ εὑρήσομεν τῶν τότε γενομένων, εἰ τοὺς μύθους ἀφέντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοποῖμεν, τοιαῦτα διαπεπραγμένον, ἢ τίνα τοσούτων μεταβολῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν αἴτιον γεγενημένον;

[11] Isoc. 9.6:
οὕτω γάρ τινες δυσκόλως πεφύκασιν, ὥσθ' ἥδιον ἄν εὐλογουμένων ἀκούοιεν, οὓς οὐκ ἴσασιν εἰ γεγόνασιν, ἢ τούτων, ὑφ' ὧν εὖ πεπονθότες αὐτοὶ τυγχάνουσιν.

[12] Isoc. 5.33:
τὴν δὲ πόλιν, τὴν ἡμετέραν φασίν, οἵσπερ περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν πιστεύομεν . . .

no other Hellenes"[13] – a tradition that Thucydides knew as well. For Sparta's early history he knew several sources (12.155): "That they ordered their affairs at that time moreover in the same way as ours formerly were, can be learned from many sources by those who wish to know."[14] There were limitations to his knowledge of the past, however, and he admits being unable to discover certain things, such as how Agamemnon attained his position as leader of the expedition against Troy (12.76). Recognizing the problem and anticipating perhaps the criticism of some that his historical examples are fabulous inventions or untrustworthy legends, Isocrates indicates the principles by which he evaluates the legendary period (4.31): "And yet about what should we be more trustful than about matters which the god (Apollo) proclaims and on which many Greeks agree, and when the stories told of old confirm current practices while what is done now agrees with what has been said by them?"[15] Three tests are indicated here: the sanction of religion, the general acceptance of the Greeks, and a correspondence between contemporary practices of long standing and ancient tradition.[16]

With regard to the more recent past, Isocrates' attitude is different. He expects people to know first hand about what has occurred since Aegospotami (7.64): τίς οὐκ οἶδε τῶν πρεσβυτέρων; sometimes he even taxes his audience with their own past words and actions (8.69): παρ' ὑμῶν μαθὼν ὑμᾶς ἔχω διδάσκειν, spoken in reference to Athenian criticism of Sparta's hegemony after 404, and here applied to the renewed attempt at empire in the 350s. The expression τίς οὐκ οἶδε; occurs repeatedly with reference to events that have occurred within living memory, occasionally of celebrated events from an earlier period, like the Persian Wars (6.42), and it presupposes a certain degree of familiarity on the part of the audience. Isocrates, therefore, appears to demonstrate some critical sense about the acquisition of knowledge of the past, and he takes pains to establish the

[13] Isoc. 12.177:
οὓς καλοῦμεν νῦν Λακεδαιμονίους, στασιάσαι μὲν φασιν αὐτοὺς οἱ τἀκείνων ἀκριβοῦντες ὡς οὐδένας ἄλλους τῶν Ἑλλήνων,

[14] Isoc. 12.155:
"Οτι μὲν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τἀκεῖ καθέστηκεν, ὥσπερ εἶχε τὸ παλαιὸν καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν, παρὰ πολλῶν ἔσται πυθέσθαι τοῖς εἰδέναι βουλομένοις·

[15] Isoc. 4.31:
καίτοι περὶ τίνων χρὴ μᾶλλον πιστεύειν ἢ περὶ ὧν ὅ τε θεὸς ἀναιρεῖ καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνδοκεῖ, καὶ τά τε πάλαι ῥηθέντα τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔργοις συμμαρτυρεῖ καὶ τὰ νῦν γιγνόμενα τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνων εἰρημένοις ὁμολογεῖ;

[16] Cf. Isoc. 12.149.

plausibility of his historical material for the benefit of his readers on several occasions.

The last topic to be considered is Isocrates' use of the past. We should begin by examining what he says about the subject in an early passage (4.9) that is obviously of fundamental importance and appears to be an unequivocal statement about the relationship of rhetoric to history. "For the deeds of the past have been left in common to us all; but to apply them properly at the right moment and to conceive appropriate ideas about each of them and to display them well in words is the special mark of the facile (the orator)."[17] In this passage, Isocrates is primarily interested in theorizing about rhetorical technique, but the phrase αἱ πράξεις αἱ προγεγενημέναι in his usage means very clearly *the content of the past.* The passage, therefore, seems to imply two things: 1) that the past was the common knowledge of all men (potentially); and 2) that the orator, at least, had some choice over the use he made of these πράξεις. Welles says of this passage, "In other words, history is what you make of it in a particular situation."[18] Now in an elementary sense, this is true; the past has meaning only if one looks to it for ideals, for information to explain a subsequent practice, custom or situation, for practical experience that may be relevant to an immediate situation (καιρός) or for some other purpose. Isocrates well knew that the same events or developments could be construed in radically different senses, depending on one's viewpoint. His task as a rhetorician was not to find *the* correct interpretation of events, if it is ever possible to do so, but rather to select material from the past to suit his particular purpose at a given moment (ἐν τῷ καιρῷ).

He often employs historical examples to exhort his audience to adopt a particular course of action, or to alter their conduct in conformity with certain standards. Very often the examples by which he appeals to someone (the Athenians, the Spartans, Philip, or whomever) to act according to the traditions or character of their state or family are drawn from τὰς πράξεις τῶν προγόνων. In the *Panegyricus* (4.54), he argues that the character and the fame of Athens can be gauged from her past: "Anyone may learn the character and fame of the city from the supplications that certain people

[17] Isoc. 4.9:

αἱ μὲν γὰρ πράξεις αἱ προγεγενημέναι κοιναὶ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν κατελείφθησαν, τὸ δ' ἐν καιρῷ ταύταις καταχρήσασθαι καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα περὶ ἑκάστης ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὖ διαθέσθαι τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἴδιόν ἐστιν

[18] Welles, *art. cit.*, 14.

have already made to us."[19] In the *Archidamus* (6.82), he tells the Spartans "it is a good thing to imitate your ancestors".[20] Again, in the *Panegyricus* (4.181), he rehearses the terms of the King's Peace and its effects in order to urge the Greeks to action: "On this account it is proper to become indignant and to consider how we can take revenge for the past, and set the future right."[21] Here Isocrates indicates a second use of the past, as a source of knowledge which can help the well-informed to avoid making mistakes in similar circumstances.[22] In the *De Pace* (8.11) he asks, "How can men judge well about the past or take counsel for the future, unless they compare the speeches of those who hold opposite opinions and afford to both an equal hearing?"[23] Likewise, the differences and similarities between more or less analogous situations, when properly pointed out, can prompt one to adopt correct policy; thus Philip hears about the accomplishments of Alcibiades, Conon, Dionysius of Syracuse and even Cyrus, because the recollection of what they were able to achieve may help convince him that he can succeed in the policy of unification that Isocrates urges upon him.[24]

Yet another, and final, area in which the past plays an important role for Isocrates is in helping to explain the present. There are numerous instances of this usage, but one example should suffice. In the *Archidamus* (6.16) the past history of the relations between Sparta and Messenia is reviewed, precisely in order that the Spartans can have the information they need to understand their current situation: "For this reason I will go back rather far into the past, in order that you may know that the land (Messenia) which they are trying to deprive you of, you were possessed of no less justly than

[19] Isoc. 4.54:
Γνοίη δ' ἄν τις καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν ῥώμην τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐκ τῶν ἱκετειῶν, ἃς ἤδη τινὲς ἡμῖν ἐποιήσαντο.

[20] Isoc. 6.82:
καλὸν οὖν μιμήσασθαι τοὺς προγόνους.

[21] Isoc. 4.181:
Ὑπὲρ ὧν ἄξιον ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ σκοπεῖν, ὅπως τῶν τε γεγενημένων δίκην ληψόμεθα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα διορθωσόμεθα.

[22] Compare the more cautious and subtle formulation of Thucydides, 1.21, and the remarks of Andocides, 3.2, 29, and 32 on the use of the past to help clarify future policy.

[23] Isoc. 8.11:
πῶς ἂν ἄνθρωποι καλῶς δυνηθεῖεν ἢ κρῖναι περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων, εἰ μὴ τοὺς μὲν λόγους τοὺς τῶν ἐναντιουμένων παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐξετάζοιεν, αὐτοὶ δ' αὑτοὺς κοινοὺς ἀμφοτέροις ἀκροατὰς παράσχοιεν;

[24] Cf. Isoc. 5.57.

the other, that of Lacedaemon."[25] The past was useful to Isocrates in many ways, therefore, and his use of historical example or allusion differs depending on his purpose.

I have attempted in this paper to formulate a series of questions which may help us to derive information from the orators about historical consciousness and historical knowledge in the fourth century. I have argued that Isocrates had a relatively sharp sense of the past as well as a critical awareness of the varying value of the sources available to him. He also had a sense of his readers and of what they expected to hear about the past. His own use of the historical example was conditioned by these factors as well as the exigencies of the moment, as reflected in particular speeches. It should prove possible now to approach the remaining orators, particularly Lysias and Demosthenes, in this manner in order to attempt to establish what their attitudes to the past were. Comparison among them along these lines will then permit us to speak with greater authority of "the rhetorical tradition" and to understand better the relationship between Greek rhetoric and history.

[25] Isoc. 6.16:

διὰ τοῦτο δὲ προλήψομαι πορρωτέρωθεν, ἵν' ἐπίστησθε, διότι ταύτην ὑμᾶς τὴν χώραν ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀποστερεῖν, ἣν ὑμεῖς οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τὴν ἄλλην Λακεδαίμονα κέκτησθε δικαίως.

EDWIN L. BROWN

Antigonus Surnamed Gonatas[1]

The origin of Gonatas as surname of Antigonus II of Macedon has long resisted unraveling. In the continuing effort to comprehend the name's significance Bruno Helly has revived an ancient explanation, in his recent voluminous study of Thessalian Gonnoi.[2] In that hill town at the northern edge of the Vale of Tempe Antigonus had been born and brought up, according to a statement by Porphyry,[3] on whom Helly relies. But Tarn in his monograph on Antigonus[4] had already sifted the evidence and like others before him found this solution wanting. No link is traceable between Gonnoi and the Antigonid house either at or near the time of the boy's birth, although the inscriptional records turned up on the site are especially full for the fourth and third centuries. These epigraphical documents have gone on growing in number since Tarn wrote. His point remains valid, nevertheless, that the ethnic is never 'Gonatas', but regularly 'Gonneus,' spelled with a double ν where the surname invariably has a single ν.

Yet in widely differing times and places men have acquired surnames, titles, and soubriquets from a city or town whose history has become linked with pivotal events in the lives of those thus surnamed. Uticensis, Numantinus, and Isauricus spring readily to mind if we consider the agnomina of the Late Republic. Earl Kitchener of Khartoum, Viscount

[1] To Bernard Knox, who made me sharply aware of the multivalent force of proper names in Greek tragedy, I offer this onomastic study of an historical figure who like him sought constantly to validate his philosophy by his actions and to treat his stewardship as an ἔνδοξος δουλεία.

[2] Gonnoi I (Amsterdam 1973) 85. C. Ehrhardt does not offer a new explanation of Gonatas in "Demetrias ὁ Αἰτωλικός, and Antigonid Nicknames," Hermes 106 (1978) 251–53. I am much indebted to T. R. S. Broughton for my knowledge of Ehrhardt's note and for his patient discussion of prosopographical matters. To J. V. A. Fine, who first kindled my interest in the Antigonid house and who also read a draft of this paper, I am likewise obliged for encouragement and good counsel. The faults are chargeable to me alone.

[3] In Euseb. *Chron.* I, 237 Schoene.

[4] W. W. Tarn, Antigonos Gonatas (Oxford 1913, repr. 1969) 15, n. 1. This work is abbreviated A. G. hereafter.

Allenby of Megiddo, and Viscount Montgomery of el Alamein, illustrating a tradition closer home, share in holding titles wherein the placenames again memorialize a decisive military action that they had successfully mounted.

We may wonder, then, whether Antigonus may not similarly have celebrated his dramatic victory over the Gauls, ending years in which he had remained essentially a king without a country. These Gauls invaded Greece in 279 and till Antigonus repelled them somewhere in Thrace went undefeated in open battle. Even the famous Celtic disaster at Delphi seems chiefly to have been the combined result of blizzard conditions, lack of provisions, and the defenders' dogged pursuit of the retreating host.

This whole operation aimed at the pillaging of the Panhellenic shrine Polybius refers to as the peril around Delphi, περὶ Δελφούς, though the flying column under the great chieftain Brennus set out from the Spercheus River and was finally annihilated only on its return there (so at least Paus. 10.23.13). With possibly equal vagueness Diogenes Laertius (2.141) provides our sole geographical datum on Antigonus' fateful encounter with the Celts. Quoting a decree couched in terms suggesting an exile's restoration, he wrote of the victor's return to his own country, "after having defeated the barbarians around Lysimachia."[5]

Assuming first that περί here means literally 'in the neighborhood of,' and second that Justin's reference (25.2.6) to the *litus* upon which Antigonus' ships were drawn up on the day of battle signifies 'seacoast,' one might attempt to reconstruct this Thracian campaign by placing the battlefield on the coast of the N. Aegean west of Lysimachia (itself at the base of the Gallipoli peninsula). The Thracian shores of the sea of Marmara, however, merit prior consideration, since they are equally "near Lysimachia," since Antigonus' alliance with the Northern League had recently led to his campaigning in this region (Memnon 18), and since Polybius (4.45.9–46.) dwells on the danger the Gauls posed to the league member Byzantium.

But if we seek, on either of these shores, for placenames that might furnish a basis on which to form the surname Gonatas, the search appears doomed to failure. A little coastal cite called Ganos has, to be sure, existed at least since the fifth century B.C. some miles up the Propontic shoreline

[5] . . . περὶ Λυσιμαχίαν . . . μάχῃ νικήσας τοὺς βαρβάρους παραγίγνεται εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν. . . . (2.141 f.)

from the isthmus of the Thracian Chersonese.[6] The position of Ganos at the narrowest point along the shore, between the Propontis and a coast-flanking mountain also called Ganos, as well as its fortified status as early as Xenophon's activity in these parts, might make it appear promising as a place to block a horde of migrating Celts. But the remarkable consistency with which the name is spelled with a ΓΑ- in the Classical, Byzantine, and even later records discourages further inquiry. And I am not inclined to entertain the possibility that an ethnicon 'Ganotas' gave rise to 'Gonatas' (Γονάτας whence Γοναταῖς) under the influence of -gonus in Antigonus.

Instead, I should prefer to question the strictness with which Diogenes intended "around Lysimachia" to be taken, and the assumption that *litus* in Justin's account of the battle meant 'seacoast' and not, as so often, the 'river strand' or 'lake shore,' With these new bearings in mind, we may turn to the story as it can be patched together.

It is with the great division of Celtic invaders under Cerethrius that according to ancient authority (Paus. 10.19.7, Just. 25.1–2, ?Polyb. 4.46.1) we must be concerned. These had first overrun inland Thrace and conquered the independent tribes there who had never submitted to any Macedonian king. "By the spring of 277 ⟨they⟩ were rolling seaward, threatening the Greek cities of the Chersonese."[7] Their most probable route south from the Thracian interior would bring them down the valley of the Tonzus or of the Upper Hebrus by way of present-day Edirne. It was in part the potential importance of this site as a gateway to the Balkan world that the Roman Emperor was to recognize in refounding the old native town there as Hadrianopolis. And the strategic character of the place was to appear in somber colors when the Caesar Valens met the Gothic host of Fritigern a few miles north of the city and fell – along with 20,000 to 30,000 Roman infantrymen – in a battle that left Greece exposed thereafter to repeated barbarian incursions.[8] Is it possible that with like intent but far different results Antigonus, also, ventured to defend the settled lands of southern Thrace by meeting the invaders before they turned the eastern end of the Rhodope range? If so, he might well have embarked his forces at the port of Lysimachia, sailed west to the mouth of the Hebrus,

[6] B. D. Meritt/T. H. Wade-Gery/M. F. McGregor, The Athenian Tribute Lists I (Cambridge 1939) 475, 481 (map), 545–46 and sources cited there.

[7] Tarn, A. G., 165. I have here largely drawn on his brave attempt to sort the *testimonia* on these obscure events.

[8] For a recent account see T. S. Burns, The Battle of Adrianople: a Reconsideration, Historia 22 (1973) esp. 342ff. and references there.

and so upriver to the neighborhood of the future Adrianople. It is certain at least that ships could accompany such a march upcountry, since the Hebrus is navigable all the way to Philippopolis (Plovdiv).

Besides his namesake military colony, Philip II established a string of forts all along the river and could hardly have failed to place one at the confluence of the Hebrus, Tonzus, and Harpessus. We know from several ancient sources that Hadrianopolis succeeded a town whose Thracian name was Uscudama,[9] knowledge of which it is not remarkable to find surviving in Roman authors, for according to Besevliev it is precisely in the districts of Hadrianopolis and Philippopolis that Thracian speech maintained itself longest. But the Greek and Macedonian settlers in Thrace were accustomed to dubbing even their refoundations of older native settlements with a new official name, and a pre-existent Uscudama would have been no exception. What the colonists' own place name in this instance was may appear among the entries in the epitome of Stephanus' *Ethnika*. Under Γονεῖς we read that the inhabitants of a πόλις in Thrace were so designated, but that "some called these Adrianopolitans." Already in 1894 Tomaschek had interpreted Goneis as a quarter in the Hadrianic city, and tentatively detected in the name traces of a Macedonian colony from Thessalian Gonnoi.[10] I prefer to regard the word as the Greco-Macedonian placename or *ethnicon* corresponding to Uscudama, and to seek its meaning in a striking feature of the local geography. For here the Hebrus, having flowed for nearly 200 miles in an east-south-easterly direction, now suddenly angles sharply southward upon clearing the eastern shoulder of the Rhodope massif.

That the great bend in the Hebrus should suggest the name chosen for the colonial foundation there situated will not seem fanciful to one who consults an atlas of placenames on the North American continent. The South Bends are more famous, the North Bends more frequent. There are East Bends, West Bends, Big Bends, Great Bends, even a Grand Bend, not to mention all the cases like Gila Bend on a bend of the Gila. Of Knees on N. American rivers I am not aware, though both Knee and Elbow Lakes exist with shapes sufficiently apt for their name. To the question whether or not the ancients ever imagined river bends in terms of elbows or knees[11], I can only reply that Herodotus (2.99) wrote of the 'elbow' in the course of

[9] D. Detschew, Die thrakischen Sprachreste (Schriften d. Balkankommission, Ling. Abt. 14, Vienna 1957) 349, explains the name as meaning approximately 'Wasserburg.'

[10] W. Tomaschek, Die alten Thraker II, 2 (Sitzungsb. d. Wien. Ak. 131 [1894]) 88.

[11] Γωνία or rather, in keeping with ancient and widespread anthropomorphic conceptions of river parts, its congener γόνυ.

the Nile above Memphis, while Strabo (17.1.2), whom no one ever accused of waxing lyrical, referred to the great 'elbows' in the same river below Meroe.

Accordingly, I propose, first, that Goneis or, if that is the *ethnicon*, the place name corresponding to Goneis is to be sought in the district of the present Edirne. Now that we know something about the division of the city territories in Roman Thrace into *regiones* whose towns could lie as many as 60 miles from the civic center,[12] it might seem tempting for present purposes to place our Thracian πόλις whose inhabitants were said in the Stephanus epitome to be called 'Goneis,' but by some 'Adrianopolitans,' several score miles in the direction of Lysimachia; but I think it sufficient explanation of Diogenes' phrasing περὶ Λυσιμαχίαν, if Antigonus advanced to battle *from*, or proceeded in triumph *to*, that capital city of Lysimachus' derelict kingdom.

Second, I would infer from the *ethnicon* offered by Stephanus in plural form that the placename itself may have been, in the nominative singular, Gona or Gonas. For either of these names Γονάτης[13] (Γονάτας) would serve as an alternative *ethnicon*, and would in turn yield Γονατᾶς with the perispomenon -ᾶς of so many Greek hypocoristics. This is much like Stephanus' own account of 'Gonatas' except that he was trying to work from 'Gonnoi' with its double ν and no α.

This derivation of 'Gonatas' from *Gonas or *Gona is not inherently unlikely; but it would become more immediately plausible if as bearer of the new ἐπίκλησις Antigonus (together with his adherents swiftly increasing on the morrow of the victory being commemorated) perceived an additional appropriateness about this nickname 'Gonatas' inspired by the field of battle. Now Antigonus' crediting of his critical victory to the intervention of Pan and to the panic fear that the deity spread among the plundering Gauls is well known and variously attested. From the time of Antigonus' return to Macedon as king recognized in his own country, a long series of silver tetradrachmas minted at Pella, Chalcis, and Athens

[12] B. Gerov, Die Einteilung der städtischen Territorien im römischen Thrakien in *regiones* (χῶραι), Phylen und Komarchien, Akten des VI. Internationalen Kongresses für Griechische und Lateinische Epigraphik (München 1973) 492–95.

[13] Cf. Stephanus s. v. Τύρας: πόλις καὶ ποταμὸς ἐν τῷ Εὐξείνῳ πόντῳ. καὶ ἔδει παρὰ τὸν Τύραν Τυράτην εἶναι τὸ ἐθνικόν. The fact that the stem of γόνυ is γονατ- would have tended to favor the ethnic form Γονάτης; but toponymics in -ας can equally produce ethnics in -εύς: see Ino Michaelidou-Nicolaou, ". . . ΑΟΙΡΩΝΕΙΣ = ΟΙ ΡΩΝΕΙΣ: Inhabitants of Ronas," *op. cit. supra*, n. 12, 559–61. And not infrequently more than one ethnic form for a given town was current.

presented on their obverse the head of Pan.[14] Eventually a festival, the Paneia, was established by Antigonus at Delos.[15] Already in 276 Aratus was commissioned to compose a Hymn to Pan in celebration of Antigonus' marriage to Phila.

That the rustic god became – oddly at first blush – the patron divinity of the nearest approach to the philosopher king among Hellenistic monarchs has thus long been acknowledged. What has not been fully appreciated, I think, is the implication of Antigonus' portraiture, which appears on at least some of the coins with head of Pan. The fact seems assured by the portrait-like features on a number of the coin variants, by the representation of Pan diademed on two coins, and by the presence of ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΝΤΙΓΟΝΟΥ round the head on a unique specimen in Berlin.[16] The diecutter repeatedly conveys the impression that his subject is a man rather than a youthful version of Pan, but with the god's attributes of goat's horns and ears and of shepherd's throwing-stick behind the head.[17]

[14] See I. L. Merker, The Silver Coinage of Antigonos Gonatas and Antigonos Doson, The Amer. numism. Soc. Museum Notes 9 (N. Y., 1960) 39–52.

[15] To be sure, the choice of deity on this occasion, if it commemorated Antigonus' naval victory off Cos (261 B.C.?: H. Heinen, Untersuchungen zur hellenistischen Geschichte des 3. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. [Wiesbaden 1972] 193–96), may have been governed in part by Pan's importance in Coan cult; see The Lycidas of Theocritus' Idyll 7 (forthcoming).

[16] It may further be observed that silver drachmas minted under Philip V are commonly admitted to bear the hardly concealed profile of that king – portrayed as the New Perseus – upon a Macedonian shield as here; see M. Price, Coins of the Macedonians (London 1974) 29.

[17] What prose word most of the Greeks and Macedonians circulating these coins would have applied to Pan's rustic weapon must remain in doubt; it is only by Hesychius that we are informed even of a Macedonian term for ῥαβδός (γάρκαν; see Hsch. s.v., and J. N. Kalléris, Les anciens Macédoniens I [Athènes 1954] 136–37). Theocritus called the shepherd's throwing-stick κορύνα at *Idyll* 7.19 and λαγωβόλον at *Idylls* 4.49 and 7.128, but the latter term is first preserved in that poet, and may in any case represent an original compound adjective modifying, e.g., ῥόπαλον, which Xenophon (Cyn. 6.11.17) used in describing the hare-chase (Dozens of the forms in -βολος listed in C. D. Buck & W. Petersen, A Reverse Index of Greek Nouns and Adjectives (Chicago 1945) 368–70, are demonstrably both substantive and adjectival).
But ῥόπαλον and κορύνη are heavier than the bucolic *pedum*, which also – unlike these – has a slight bend or curve lengthwise. If evidence were at hand that γονάτιον, the prosaic(?) word for 'plow-beam' *vs.* γύης (Hes. *Op.* 427, 436; cf. A.S.F. Gow, The Ancient Plough, Journ. of Hell. Stud. 34 [1914] 249–75, esp. 262–65 and fig. 15), could serve to signify as well the similarly shaped *pedum*, it would be tempting to see Pan's attribute on the coins as a canting badge for 'Gonatas,' or simply as an emblem that, being thus linked to Antigonus' fortunes, suggested Γονατᾶς < γονάτιον for his surname. As it is, the existence of names such as Ἀκοντεύς, Ἀκόντης, Ἀκόντιος, Ῥόπαλος and of soubriquets like Κορδυλίων (cf. the famed cognomen 'Scipio') must be set down to coincidence.

As for the implication, it seems to me that Antigonus himself must have been willing to be viewed in some sense *sub specie Panos.* Perhaps he saw in the god who – to echo Pindar (frr. 96, 95.2, 95.3) – served the Great Goddess as 'agent,' 'guardian,' and 'companion,' an archetype for his own Stoic-inspired conception of kingship. Certainly he conscientiously submitted, as his father never had, to the urgent needs of his Macedonian subjects so long distracted by wars internecine as well as external.[18] Possibly Antigonus in his self-mocking way ("I'm no god to my chamber-pot bearer" Plut. *Mor.* 360C) had cast himself in this satyric part already when his father was playing the New Dionysus.[19]

In any case, Antigonus now, I submit, in assuming the *nomen* Gonatas with added import after his Thracian victory under the aegis of Pan, also accepted the *omen.* For Gonatas is an epithet by which it would be equally apt to characterize Pan with physical literalness. A favorite means of the poets to evoke an image of Pan in one word was to apply some adjective descriptive of his caprine legs. So, at the end of *Idyll* IV, Theocritus has Battus call the old rascal there being discussed "a near match for the . . . scrag-shanked Pans."[20] But if the god could thus be termed κακόκναμος, the dancing Pans could be called εὔκνημοι in token of their agility. It was just such agility that Antigonus was to evince when he raced up Acrocorinth to seize it while its mistress Nicaea was celebrating her intended marriage to his son Demetrius II.[21]

If the septuagenarian Antigonus was still so formidable a jogger, how sturdy of knee must he have been when at 40 or so he routed those bootyladen Gauls! At any rate, I like to think the heirs of Archilochus in

It remains curious that Ptolemy Ceraunus, Antigonus' predecessor on the Macedonian throne, may have chosen to flaunt the audacity that gave rise to *his* surname by minting coins with a thunderbolt (κεραυνός) within the same sort of shield rim as surrounds the Pan's heads. As P. Roussel, Inscr. Délos 1417, p. 26f. and 72, first saw (cf., most recently and hypercautiously, H. Heinen, *op. cit. supra,* n. 15, p. 83f.) Ceraunus also dedicated at Delos a gilt shield having for device a thunderbolt (and recalling an earlier, gold and ivory one; see P. H. Blankenhagen, The Shield of Alicibades, Essays in Memory of Karl Lehmann, ed. L. F. Sandler [New York 1964] 38–42). The very unOlympian throwing-stick may well have seemed, to those who had witnessed Ceraunus' τόλμα and nemesis (Paus. 1.16.2, 10.19.7), chosen by Antigonus out of conscious modesty.

[18] Tarn, A. G. 252.

[19] Witness especially Plut. *Demetrius* 12.

[20] A. S. F. Gow, Theocritus I (Cambridge 1950) 39; αἰγιπόδης twice in the Homeric Hymn to Pan (2 and 37). I am indebted to Gow, *op. cit.* II, 91, for the citation of εὔκνημος in Nonnus 18.60.

[21] For the full flavor of this escapade see Tarn's version (based on Plut. *Aratus* 17) in A. G. 373.

Thrace remembered the archaic lyricist's description of the general whom *he* admired, and applied it to the hero περὶ Λυσιμαχίαν, with the effect perhaps, of making 'Gonatas,' even if previously applied on occasion to Antigonus, now his with seeming inevitability. Not the tall, foppish general, tripping along, the poet had written,

ἀλλά μοι σμικρός τις εἴη καὶ περὶ κνήμας ἰδεῖν
ῥοικός, ἀσφαλέως βεβηκὼς ποσσί, καρδίης πλέως (fr. 60.3–4)

or in Lattimore's rendering, "Give me a man short and squarely set upon his legs, a man/full of heart, not to be shaken from the place he plants his feet."[22] Precisely what ῥοικός denotes is subject to discussion; "knock-kneed" in the scholiast's interpretation and that of most of Archilochus' commentators.[23] As to the short stature, it is worth recalling that Seneca's *De ira* 3.22.4, which Charles Edson first recognized as dealing with our man of Macedon,[24] not only mentions Antigonus' *conlisum nasum* (Englished by Edson as "snub-nose," and paralleled by the best of the coin-portraits, if such they are), but also refers to his *staturam humilem.*

Edson considers *deformitatem* in the Latin of Seneca a support to Tarn's ultimate dictum on the meaning of Gonatas: "if Greek, it might be knock-kneed" (Cambridge Ancient History VII 94). Earlier Tarn had based his preference for this way of taking the nickname (one first put forward in modern times by Ludwig Dindorf) on the late antique version of Theon's *Life of Aratus*, where 'Geniculosus' translates 'Gonatas.' The Latin word, to be sure, might rather seem to denote a thing or person full of knots, much as *geniculatus* describes a knotty or jointed stalk.

In this way I arrive at my own tentative reading of Gonatas: instead of 'Knock-kneed' exactly, Antigonas 'Knot-knees', expressive of the gnarled or knotted look of the veteran soldier's legs, not the supple physique of a Polyclitan athlete.

In reaching this conclusion it may have seemed diversionary or at best superfluous for me to canvas the possibility that the Thracian Goneis and a critical battle in their neighborhood might have contributed to, if they did not first prompt, the adoption of the hypocoristic 'Gonatas.' Yet in picturing Antigonus as the great defender of the northern marches of

[22] R. Lattimore, Greek Lyrics[2] (Chicago 1960) 2.
[23] See E. Diehl, Anth. Lyr. Graeca[3] 3 (Leipzig 1952) 27.
[24] The Personal Appearance of Antigonus Gonatas, Class. Philol. 29 (1934) 254f.

Greece till Rome was able and ready to assume the task,[25] I have hoped not merely to shed new light on his surname. It is more important if I have in any way evoked anew what first and foremost the re-founder of the Macedonian kingdom meant to his contemporaries.[26] Some hint of such a vision of Antigonus may mark a passage in Theocritus that combines reference to Thrace and the divinity newly proclaimed as its guardian. In *Idyll* 7.111–12 Pan is warned lest "in dead of winter he find himself amid the mountains of the Edonians,[27] turned towards the river Hebrus, close to the Great Bear." Gow noted in his commentary that no other *literary* evidence for Pan in these parts exists, and that τετραμμένος has been suspected.[28] But if we envision Antigonus steadfastly turned towards the peril imminent from the Upper Hebrus or the Tonzus, then these verses – probably composed in the safety of Aegean Cos but while the Gauls were still wreaking havoc in Asia Minor – may be seen to be ostensibly addressed to Pan but really spoken in at least grudging admiration for Pan's earthly representative "in the Thraceward region."

[25] As Tarn, A. G. 202, expressed it, adducing the testimony of Greeks and Romans.

[26] The evidence that should sharpen – or radically alter – this picture may be forthcoming from Vergina; at all events, continued excavation there may yet reveal something more of Macedonian realia from the age of Antigonus, in mute compensation for the nearly total loss of its history.

[27] Rhodope is the natural inference from these words.

[28] *Op. cit. supra*, n. 20, II, 159.

Thomas Drew-Bear

A Metrical Epitaph from Phrygia

During travel within the region between the cities of Aezanoi and Ankyra Sidera in northwestern Phrygia, undertaken in the course of my systematic exploration of this district in preparation for the Corpus of Greek and Latin Inscriptions of Phrygia, it proved possible to fix the location of an ancient site near the village of Hasanlar,[1] to the northwest of the ancient city of Kadoi; among the inscriptions there is a metrical epitaph with letters of the latter part of the second or first portion of the third century of our era, engraved on a funerary altar of white marble with projecting mouldings at top and bottom (h. 0,93; w. at top and bottom 0,42, at shaft 0,325; th. at top and bottom 0,40, at shaft 0,33). The inscription stands above, within and below a recessed panel on the shaft, to each side of which is carved in low relief a tendril with stylized leaves and grape clusters, and reads as follows (Pl. 7):

οὐ τὸ θανεῖν με
πονεῖ, ἐπὶ ᾗ τό-
δε πᾶσι μέτρη-
4 ται | ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἡ-
λικίης καὶ πρότε-
ρον γονέων· |
οὐ γάμον οὐχ ὑ-
8 μέναιον ἰδών,
οὐ νύμφια λέ-

[1] On this district and new epigraphical finds there see my discussion "Problèmes de la géographie historique en Phrygie: l'exemple d'Alia" in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II 7 (in press), with n. 28; for the plan of the Corpus and references to previous publications see *ibid.* n. 1. It is a pleasure to thank the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung for rendering possible a stay in Germany during which this article was written; Professor P. Herrmann for communicating to me the texts of two unpublished epigrams from Lydia cited *infra;* and Mr. Hikmet Gürçay, former Director General of Antiquities and Museums, and Mr. Durmuş Acar, former Director of the Kütahya Museum, for their aid and authorizations during my work in this part of Phrygia.

κτρα | ὀκτωκαι-
δεχέτης ἔθα-
νον, τοκέες δέ
με τύμβοις |
τείμησαν τούτοις μνή-
μης χάριν ἀιδίοιο. |
Δημοσθένει φιλοκυνή-
γῳ leaf

Ligatures (only in that portion of the text which is within the recessed panel, where the engraver had less space): l. 3 *mu epsilon;* l. 4 *pi rho;* l. 5 *eta sigma, pi rho;* l. 6 *omicron nu* (twice); l. 7 *mu omicron, nu omicron;* l. 8 *mu epsilon, omicron nu, omega nu;* l. 10 *omicron kappa;* l. 11 *eta sigma;* l. 12 *omicron nu, omicron kappa.* The engraver preserved syllabic word-division (for this reason, he gave *eta* at the end of l. 3 half the size of the other letters, in order to place it there). The end of each verse is marked by a symbol: S, which is used also to fill the space at the end of l. 9 (where the mason might well have carved *kappa*).

In l. 2 ἐπί stands by iotacism for ἐπεί, as often;[2] the collocation ἐπεὶ ἦ is Homeric, an instance among hundreds of the influence exerted by the Homeric epics on the poetry of Roman and late Roman times throughout the Greek East.[3] The first two of the five hexameters inscribed upon the tomb of Demosthenes are well-known, although this inscription is here published for the first time: for these lines appear, with variations, on a series of epitaphs found in diverse cities, and first of all in the neighboring village Yenice just to the west-northwest of Hasanlar, where Philippe Le Bas copied the following epitaph:[4]

[2] For an interesting illustration of this phenomenon see Th. Drew-Bear and W. Lebek, Gr., Rom. & Byz. Stud. 14 (1973) 65–73, explaining the meaning of an oracle of Apollo at Miletus which turns on the line ἀλλ' ἐπὶ αἶσαν ἑλεῖν γεράων φθάσεν Ἀφρογενείης "after (ἐπί) she had previously obtained her share of the gifts of Aphrodite."

[3] For illustration of this Homeric influence at Metropolis and Eumeneia in southern Phrygia see my Nouvelles inscriptions de Phrygie (Zutphen 1978) 24–25 and 76. A recent instance in a quite different region is provided by this line in a late semi-metrical epitaph from Demetrias in Thessaly published by C. Habicht in Demetrias I (ed. V. Milojcic and D. Theocharis) 200: ἰ δὲ κὲ σὺ γνῶνε θέλις, τίς γένος ἢ πόθεν ἥδε. The editor remarks (202) that this line is "ganz formelhaft" and cites a series of expressions from W. Peek's Griechische Vers-Inschriften (Berlin 1955) – but the common origin of all these phrases is of course the Homeric line τίς, πόθεν εἶς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἠδὲ τοκῆες.

[4] Ph. Le Bas and W. H. Waddington, Inscriptions grecques et latines recueillies en Asie Mineure (Paris 1847/76) no. 1023. This text, attributed (with hesitation) by Waddington to Ankyra Sidera, was classified by G. Kaibel, Epigrammata Graeca (Berlin 1878) no. 373, as "prope Aezanos" and assigned by Peek, *op. cit.* no. 1668, to "Ankyra", although an indication of provenience in this form can refer only to Ankyra in Galatia, the modern Ankara: see L. Robert, Opera Minora Selecta III (Amsterdam 1974) 1658–59. The restoration in l. 4 is by Wilamowitz *apud* Kaibel.

οὐ τὸ θαν[εῖ]ν [ἀ]λγεινόν, [ἐπεὶ] τό [γε] πᾶσι πέπρωται,
ἀλλὰ [πρὶν ἡλι]κίης καὶ γονέων πρότερον·
οὐ γάμον, οὐχ ὑμέναιον ἰδών, οὐ νύμφια λέ[κ]τρα
κεῖμαι ἔρως πολλ[ῶ]ν, ἐ[σσό]μενος πλεό[νω]ν.

Well to the southeast, beyond Kadoi and Mt. Dindymos, an epitaph erected by a municipal councillor of the little city of Alia begins with these words:[5]

οὐκ ἀλγηδ̣ὼν τὸ θ[α]νῖ̣ν, ὅτι [– – ἀ]-
λλ' ὅτι πρὶν μητρὸς ἰ[δίας? (ἀπ)έθ]α-
νεν, κατέλιπε δὲ δάκρυα πόλλα κτλ.

Further to the north, on the border of a plain to the south of Kotiaeion, a long Christian epitaph from the city of Appia contains the following lines:[6]

μαὶ γὰρ τὸ θανῖν ἀλγινόν, τοῦτο πᾶσ[ι] πρόκιται
ἀλά με Πλουτεὺς ἥρπασε κουριδίης γαμετῆς Δημητριανῆς.

At Kotiaeion itself, Ph. Le Bas copied in an Armenian cemetery, on a "stèle mutilée, sur laquelle on voit un personnage debout, tenant un arc de la main gauche . . . gravée sur différentes portions de la stèle" the *disiecta membra* of an epitaph in six fragments, notably the date ἔτους σος´ (191/2 A. D., according to the Sullan era of 85/4 B.C.), the phrase μνήμης χάριν, the words Μοῖραν and ἐλεῆσαι which once formed part of a metrical text, and the remains of two lines which in the copy of Le Bas are thus disposed:[7]

ΟΥΤΟΘΑΝΙΝ . . . . . .
ΓΟΥΠ . . . ΡΟΝΕΠΙΤΟ . . . . . .

The text was distributed on this gravestone between various reliefs, as was the custom on funerary steles in the region of Kotiaeion, and it was there-

[5] Cf. *supra* n. 1. The noun ἀλγηδών "source of grief" replaces the adjectives ἀλγεινόν or λυπηρόν which appear in the majority of the texts cited here, doubtless as a result of an attempt to renew a well-worn theme on the part of the author of the epigram which served as a model for the person who composed the prose epitaph at Alia. Cf. M.-Th. Couilloud, Les monuments funéraires de Rhénée no. 481 l. 4: πᾶσι γὰρ ἀλγηδὼν ἐσθλὸ[ς] ἀποιχό-μενος.

[6] J. Fraser, Aberdeen Studies 20 (1906) 143: this inscription is now in the museum at Kütahya and I shall republish it elsewhere, with photographs, improved readings and commentary. The lines cited here display unskillful adaptation of the poem which served as their model.

[7] Le Bas–Waddington, *op. cit.* no. 802 *d* (the verses were restored according to the schema of this epigram in CIG 3827 gg, but the restoration was omitted from Waddington's commented edition of Le Bas' copies and ignored in subsequent discussions of this epigram).

fore easy for Le Bas to place on different lines of his copy sections which were meant to follow one another, especially since large portions of the text were in his time apparently illegible. Under the supposition that this did in fact happen, and in light of the parallel texts to be cited *infra*, it is possible to reconstitute these verses as follows:

[ἀλγη]ρόν, Μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν],
οὐ τὸ θανῖν ἐπὶ τό [γε
[λυπη]ρόν, πᾶσι πέπρωται],
[ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἡλικίας καὶ ⏑ ⏑]ΓΟΥ π[ρότερον].

At the end of l. 2 it is possible that this epigram contained an elsewhere unattested variant in place of the word γονέων, for example [πατρὸς ἐ]μοῦ (cf. the text from Karystos quoted *infra*). Finally, the city of Dorylaion in northern Phrygia also furnished an example of our epigram:[8]

οὐ τὸ θανεῖν λύπησε⟨ν⟩, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ' ἐπέ[κ]λωσε,
ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἡλ̣ι[κί]ης καὶ ἥβης μέτρον ἱκέσ[θαι].

After these six texts from Phrygia we may next consider those found in other regions of Asia Minor. The only example of this epigram known to me from the peninsula to the east of Phrygia, comes from the town of Boubon in northern Lycia, where it is preceded on the stone by a curious attribution:

Κερελλαῖος μαντιάρχης λέγει·
οὐ κακόν ἐστι τὸ θανεῖν, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν
ἀλλὰ πρὶ[ν] ἡλικίης καὶ γον[έ]ων πρότερος.

This inscription, first published by R. Heberdey and E. Kalinka,[9] was discussed by M. Guarducci,[10] G. Pasquali,[11] and again by Guarducci,[12] before it was incorporated in the Corpus of Boubon.[13] The Italian scholars concluded that the epigram at Boubon was attributed to a soothsayer

[8] Peek, *op. cit.* no. 1669 (*nu* is added by the editor *metri causa*).

[9] Denkschr. Wien 45 (1897) 40 no. 58. Below the inscription is a relief depicting a standing boy with raised right hand.

[10] Riv. di Filol. N.S. 27 (1949) 118–21.

[11] Riv. di Filol. N.S. 28 (1950) 351–52.

[12] Riv. di Filol. N.S. 30 (1952) 340–45.

[13] F. Schindler, Die Inschriften von Bubon (Nordlykien) (Wien 1972) no. 35. The most recent editor might well have devoted a sentence to informing his readers about the content of these articles, but the republication of this text in *I. Bubon* is without commentary (cf. the remarks in Bull. épigr. 1973 no. 462). Here again (cf. *supra* n. 6) the original was deformed *contra metrum*.

named Cerellaius (a Latin name of Etruscan origin), who was not related to the person on whose tomb these verses were engraved; however, a copy of this epigram at Rhodes (see *infra*) must date, according to the letter-forms reproduced typographically in the edition by L. Ross, to the fourth or third century B.C., a time at which it is difficult to suppose that such verses could have been written by a Roman. Hence either the date enunciated by Ross must be considered inexact, or the attribution of these verses accepted at Boubon must be false, the true author being then a Greek who lived well before Cerellaius.

Returning toward the west, our epigram was known to the north of Phrygia in the neighboring region of Bithynia, where it is attested in the following form:[14]

οὐ τὸ θανεῖν ἀλγε[ινόν], ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ' ἐπέ[κλω]σεν
ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἡλικί[ας] καὶ γονέων πρότε[ρον].

Another epitaph, found in the same district, has this version:[15]

οὐ θανεῖ[ν] λυπηρόν, ὦ ξεῖνε, ἐπὶ τόδε Μοῖρα ἐπέκλωσεν
ἀλλὰ παρ' ἡλικίαν καὶ γονέων πρότερον.

On a tombstone attributed to Cyzicus, which is decorated with a bas-relief depicting a funerary banquet, is the inscription:[16]

οὐ τὸ θανεῖν ἀλγε[ινόν, ἐπ]εὶ [τό γε Μοῖ]ρ' ἐπέκλωσε,
ἀ[λλὰ πρὶν ἡλικίης καὶ γονέων πρότερον].

In the region bordering upon Phrygia to the west, P. Herrmann has copied at the city of Saittai in Lydia an unpublished epitaph on which he read the interesting variant ἀλγηρόν, unique among the versions known to date:

οὐ τὸ θανεῖν ἀλγηρόν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσι πέπρωται,
ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἡλ⟨ι⟩κίας καὶ γονύων πρότερος.

Nearby (at Ayazviran) the same scholar recorded a likewise unpublished funerary inscription, dated to 260/1 A.D. according to the Sullan era, which contains the verses:[17]

[14] F. K. Dörner, Ist. Forsch. 14 (1941) 117 no. 142 (like the following, from the region of Prusa ad Olympum).

[15] S. Şahin, Bithynische Studien (Bonn 1978) 61–62 no. 13 (in the first line of this text, the photograph suggests that the name of the deceased should be read Μοψκάπορις).

[16] Peek, *op. cit.* no. 1664.

[17] These two epigrams bear the numbers 137 and 481 respectively in the Corpus of Northeast Lydia now awaiting publication.

οὐ τὸ θαν[εῖν ἀλγεινόν, ἐ]πὶ τόδε πᾶσιν [πέπρωτ]ε,
ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἡλικίης [καὶ γον]έων πρόταιρον.

If the restoration at the end of l. 1 is correct, then *nu* was added to the preceding word by an ancient copyist or stonemason ignorant of meter.

Still further to the west, our epigram is attested at Smyrna:[18]

οὐ τὸ θανεῖν λυπηρόν, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν
ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἡλικίας καὶ γονέων πρότερον.

Another version was found at Erythrai:[19]

οὐ τὸ θανεῖν ἀλγεινόν, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὶν ἡλικίης καὶ γονέων πρότερον.

The epigram was not however confined to Asia Minor, for a fragment copied at Mitylene bears the following text:[20]

[οὐ τὸ θανεῖν λυ]πηρόν, ἐπὶ Μοί[ρη τόδ' ἔκλωσεν],
[ἀλ]λὰ πρὶν ἡλικί[ας καὶ γονέων πρ]ότερον.

What appears to be the most ancient example of these verses comes from Rhodes, on an inscription dated, as we have seen, to the fourth or third century B.C.:[21]

[οὐ τὸ θανεῖν ἀλγ]εινόν, ὅπερ καὶ [π]ᾶσι [πρό]κειται
[ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἡλικία]ς καὶ γονέων πρότερον.

A third island on which our poem was represented is Crete, for among the inscriptions of Lato is one which reads as follows:[22]

οὐ τὸ θανῖν ἀλγεινὸν ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρα ἐπέκλωσε
ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἡλικίας καὶ γονέων προτέραν.

[18] Dörner, *loc. cit.* (after a copy by J. Keil).

[19] H. Engelmann and R. Merkelbach, Die Inschriften von Erythrai und Klazomenai II (Bonn 1972–3) no. 314 (note the repetition of the article in the second line, *contra metrum,* doubtless in an effort to indicate that the verb in l. 1 is to be understood again here). The editors comment "ἀλγεινόν von Keil gelesen" (confirmed by Dörner, *supra* n. 14) but do not mention that earlier editions (CIG 3136; Kaibel, Epigrammata Graeca no. 300), depending on the text given by the *editio princeps* in a Greek journal, have the form: οὐ τὸ θανεῖν ἐστι κακόν (Kaibel commented: "notissimum distichon inscite corruptum"; cf. the similar ancient slip in the word order of the text at Boubon *supra*).

[20] IG XII.2 467 (Peek, *op. cit.* no. 1667): "infimae aetatis".

[21] IG XII.1 146 (Peek, *op. cit.* no. 1663); also for example in J. Geffcken, Griechische Epigramme (Heidelberg 1916) no. 157.

[22] I. Cret. I 147–48 no. 50 ("saec. fere I a. Chr. n.").

Finally an epitaph recently discovered at Karystos in Euboea has another variant in the second line:[23]

[ο]ὐ τὸ θανεῖν ἀλγεινόν, ἐπεί περ Μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν,
[ἀλλ]ὰ πρὶν ἡλικία[ς, μ]ητρὸς ἐμῆς πρότερον.

The version first published here is longer than most of the parallel poems, which generally consist only of the first two verses (only the epigrams at Yenice and Dorylaion have more than two verses; the tombstone at Ayazviran continues with a semi-metrical text, and at Karystos our couplet appears at the end of a poem after four preceding verses). The theme expressed here may be found in various forms throughout ancient literature: it is not death itself which is a proper source of grief, but rather premature death before marriage and during the lifetime of one's own parents.[24] We have seen that the third verse on the tomb of Demosthenes reappears on the metrical epitaph at Yenice; it too occurs elsewhere, for example in an epitaph at Carnuntum:[25]

[οὐ γάμον ο]ὐδ' ὑμέναιον ἰδ[ών, οὐ νύ]νφια λέκτρα
[κεῖμαι ὑ]πὸ στήλῃ κεκλι[μέν]ος παρ' ὁδῷ.

The collocation οὐ γάμον οὐδ' ὑμέναιον at the beginning of a verse is also frequently attested, e.g. at Thasos,[26] on the island of Amorgos,[27] at Gonnoi in Thessaly,[28] at Athens[29] etc. A personal element is added to our poem by the following verse, which informs us that Demosthenes died already at the age of 18 and was buried by his parents, both of whom were

[23] Peek, Zeitschr. f. Pap. u. Epigr. 24 (1977) 33: "frührömisch?"

[24] On this theme in general one may consult E. Griessmair, Das Motiv der Mors immatura in den griechischen metrischen Grabinschriften (Diss. Innsbruck, 1965) 24–28 (without necessarily accepting all of the suggestions there set forth). On the two types of ending in the first line of our epigram – death is inevitable for all, or death is a gift of the Moirai – see especially the discussion *ibid.* 26.

[25] R. Egger in R. Noll, C. Praschniker *et al.*, Carnuntum 1885–1935: Zum 50-jährigen Bestande des Vereins Carnuntum (Vienna 1935) 23–27 (text revised by Peek, *op. cit.* no. 1853).

[26] IG XII.8 441 (Peek, *op. cit.* 2038: "um 100 v. Chr.") l. 19: οὐ γάμον, οὐχ ὑμέναιον ἐμοὶ φί[λα ἄνυσε μάτηρ] (restored by Kaibel).

[27] IG XII.7 516 ("litterae alterius a. Chr. n. saeculi"): οὐ γάμον οὐδ' ὑμέναιον ἐπὶ προθύροις [– –]. Cf. Peek, *op. cit.* no. 1991 (in Locris) l. 13: οὐ γὰρ ἐμοῖς ὑμέναιον ἐπὶ προθύ[ρ]οισιν ἔμελψαν.

[28] B. Helly, Gonnoi II (Amsterdam 1973) no. 212 ("fin du I^{er} s. av.–I^{er} s. ap. J. C."): οὐ γά[μον] οὐδ' ὑμέναιον ἐσέδρακον.

[29] IG II^2 7198 (Peek, *op. cit.* no. 1821: "II. Jh."): οὐ γάμος οὐδ' ὑμέναιος ἔμεινέ με τλήμονι μοίραι.

still alive – a poignant circumstance that motivated the use of poetry on this tomb, which, in allusion to a common motif, is described as eternal.[30]

The deceased is characterized, in addition to the mention of his age at death, only by the epithet φιλοκύνηγος. This word may have various meanings, attestations of which have been collected by L. Robert; for the sense "fond of hunting", a parallel is furnished by an epitaph at Gortyn in Crete:[31] Γάσστρις Κλεάρχου ὁ φιλ⟨ο⟩κύνηγος ἐνθάδε κεῖμαι. Likewise a tombstone from the *vicus Trullensium*, between Oescus and Serdica in Bulgaria, commemorates a huntsman:[32] [– –]ον τὸν Νεικίου [τὸν] φιλοκύνηγον, [ἐβί]ω(σ)ε ἔ(τ)η νβ΄, καὶ [– –]αν καὶ γαμβρὸν [– –]ανὸν βφ΄ [ἡ] σύμβιος κτλ. However the word can also mean *venator* in the amphitheater,[33] or even designate those who were special amateurs of such spectacles.[34]

It is interesting to observe that attestations of the couplet that begins the epitaph of Demosthenes have now appeared in recognizable form on no fewer than eighteen inscriptions, found at places as far apart as Karystos and Boubon, and carved at dates which range from the early Hellenistic period to the reign of Gallienus.[35] This phenomenon invites consideration

[30] Cf. the phrase ἀέναον τόδε σῆμα which appears at the beginning of a metrical epitaph from the region of Soa, Aberdeen Studies 20 (1906) 121. On the conception of the tomb as an eternal home see R. Lattimore, Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs (Urbana Ill. 1942) 165–67; on the lament for death before marriage, *ibid.* 192–94 and Griessmair, *op. cit.* 68ff.

[31] I. Cret. IV 351 ("litterae saec. fere 1 a. Chr. n."); the interpretation "amateur de chasse", given by L. Robert, Les gladiateurs dans l'Orient grec (Paris 1940) 322, is accepted by Guarducci *loc. cit.*

[32] I. G. Bulg. II 508; cf. Robert, Gladiateurs 323: "ce beneficiarius [post indicated by the abbreviation βφ΄] ne devait pas être le gendre d'un bestiaire."

[33] Thus I. Didyma no. 539 (for the photograph of a squeeze see Robert, Hellenica XI–XII [Paris 1960] Pl. 18 no. 2): [Ἀντ]έρω[ς φι]λοκύνηγε ἥρως χρηστὲ χῆρε. Ἐμνήσθη σου Ἀμμιάς, as well as an epitaph erected by Χρυσέρω[ς] φιλοκύνηγο[ς] for himself and his family in the Thracian Chersonese (Gladiateurs no. 26), both included (with hesitation) by Robert among the inscriptions of *venatores* (*ibid.* 322) because of the absence of patronymics in these texts; the same is true of Demosthenes, who bore a fine 'classical' name infrequent in Phrygia.

[34] Two bas-reliefs with dedications by a priest of Nemesis ὑπὲρ φιλοκυνήγων τοῦ στέμματος at Philippi attest the existence there of "une association d'amateurs de chasses à l'amphithéâtre" (Gladiateurs nos. 23–24 and p. 323). Certainly the word does not bear this sense in our text.

[35] Doubtless the present collection of attestations will encourage the publication of still further examples, as was the case after my article (with P. Herrmann and W. Eck) "Sacrae Litterae", Chiron 7 (1977) 355–383, on a missive of Septimius Severus and Caracalla, copies of which are attested in Phrygia, Lydia and on the island of Paros: as a result of this publication, L. Robert recognized another copy of this same document at Ankara, Bull. de

of the question of "models" for funerary epigrams which are assumed to have circulated (in the form of books written for this purpose) among the "village schoolmasters" who are said to have composed much of the poetry which is preserved for us on stone.[36] It may be suggested that groups of this sort of moral *topoi* could well have been widely diffused in collections of popular verses not necessarily limited strictly to subjects suitable for funerary epigrams; on the other hand, one must not forget the importance of learning by memory and oral instruction in antiquity, cultural characteristics which doubtless explain the existence of the variations, and occasional deformations, that this couplet underwent in the inscriptions studied here, which must represent only a very small proportion of the tombstones on which these verses were once inscribed.[37]

Corr. hell. 102 (1978) 432–437, and R. Merkelbach and D. Knibbe two more at Ephesus, Zeitschr. f. Pap. u. Epigr. 31 (1978) 229–32 (as I had suggested to P. Herrmann in 1976, the inscription from Phrygia certainly dates to a period later than the end of the reign of Septimius Severus, in view of the letter forms and the absence of the full imperial titles).

[36] This often-discussed topic is examined by Griessmair, Mors Immatura 27 and in greater detail by Lattimore, Themes 18ff.

[37] A particular aspect of the transmission of such funerary verses is the influence exerted by the inscription on a tombstone upon authors searching for themes to employ in subsequent metrical epitaphs within the same region (cf. the case of the two epitaphs at the neighboring villages of Hasanlar and Yenice); for other characteristic examples see J. G. C. Anderson, Aberdeen Studies 20 (1906) 195–96 and C. H. E. Haspels, The Highlands of Phrygia (Princeton, N.J. 1971) 181–82 (I shall discuss elsewhere the rock-cut metrical inscription no. 38 published ibid. 312, which I have restudied on the original, with a new squeeze and photographs; several problems in the text may be resolved). I shall publish elsewhere a series of new metrical epitaphs from Phrygia, now in the museum at Afyonkarahisar.

ALEXANDER P. D. MOURELATOS

"Nothing" as "Not-Being": Some Literary Contexts That Bear on Plato

It has often been noticed that Plato, and before him Parmenides, assimilates "what is not" (τὸ μὴ ὄν) to "nothing" (μηδέν or οὐδέν).[1] Given that the central use of "nothing" has important ties with the existential quantifier ("Nothing is here" = "It is not the case that there is anything here"), it has widely been assumed that contexts that document this assimilation also count as evidence that both within them and in cognate ontological contexts the relevant sense of "being" or "to be" is that of existence. That this assumption is not to be granted easily, has been compellingly argued by G. E. L. Owen.[2] His main concern was to show that the assumption is particularly mischievous in the interpretation of the *Sophist*, where he found it totally unwarranted. My own concern is to attack the assumption on a broader plane. "Nothing" in English has uses that do not depend on a tie with the existential quantifier. So too in Greek: *mēden* or *ouden* can be glossed as "what does not exist," but it can also be glossed as "not a something," or in Owen's formulation, "'what is not anything, what not-in-any way is': a subject with all the being knocked out of it and so unindentifiable, no subject."[3] In effect, the assimilation of "what is not" to "nothing" may – in certain contexts – work in the opposite direction: not from "nothing" to "non-being" in the sense of non-existence; rather from "non-being" as negative specification or negative determination to "nothing" as the extreme of negativity or indeterminacy. To convey the sense involved in this reverse assimilation I borrow Owen's suggestive translation "not-being" for *mē on*, a rendering which makes use of an incomplete participle, rather than the complete gerund, of the verb "to be."

[1] See Parmenides B 6.2, cf. B 7.1, B 8.7–13, B 9.4; Plato *Rep.* 478 B 12–C 1, *Tht.* 189 A 10, *Soph.* 237 C 7–E 2. Cf. G. E. L. Owen, Plato on Not-Being, in G. Vlastos, ed., Plato, I, Metaphysics and Epistemology (Garden City, N.Y. 1971), 225–27.

[2] Op. cit. 241–48 and passim. For use of this assumption in interpreting Parmenides, see D. J. Furley, Notes on Parmenides, in: Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos, Phronesis suppl. vol. 1 (Assen and New York 1973) 12.

[3] Plato on Not-Being 247.

To make alternatives clear I begin with an exploration of the relevant English uses. The semantic spectra of "nothing" and of the personal form "nobody" are, of course, wider than logic books might suggest. Only two uses concern us, and these can be quickly formulated if we take the expressions "nobody" and "nothing" as answers to two types of questions.

(a) 1. Who is in the house now? – Nobody.
    2. What is in the box? – Nothing.
(b) 1. Who is the gentleman over there? – Nobody.
    2. What is that shape over there? – Nothing.

The one-word answers in exchanges (a) are clearly equivalent to more perspicuous expanded paraphrases of the form "There is no *K* in *L*," where *K* can be replaced by an appropriate classifier or natural-kind expression and *L* can be replaced by a locative word or phrase. This is the use of "nobody" or "nothing" that is closest to the negative existential quantified expressions in formal logic, $\sim(\exists x)Fx$. For suggestive convenience, in spite of some infelicity – since (a)-type sentences are tensed, whereas the existential quantifier imports no time implications – I shall call (a) the "existential" use of "nobody" and "nothing."

It is not as easy to give a single perspicuous paraphrase of the one-word answers in type (b). The respondent may intend to dispute the interrogator's presupposition that there actually is something, let alone a gentleman or a shape, in the region referred to. In that case, the question receives in effect a type (a) answer. A distinct type (b) is defined in the case in which the respondent does not dispute the interrogator's existential presupposition. He says, roughly: "I notice who you are referring to, but he's nobody," or "I notice what you're referring to, but it's nothing." In that sort of case the respondent may be using the words "nobody" or "nothing" to convey the following message:

(i) The subject is "of no account": he or she or it lies outside the interlocutors' scope of interests, in whatever way and however broadly these interests are defined by the interlocutors' current endeavor.

Thus the snobbish respondent might say "He's nobody" with reference to someone of inferior status; or "It's nothing" may be the reassuring response of a doctor to a patient concerning certain physical changes in the patient's body they have both observed.

With the term "nothing," but in reference either to a thing or to a person, the respondent can also convey this message:

(ii) The subject is an extremely poor, worn out, or reduced specimen of the kind it prima facie appears to be.

The point is that the subject is extensively deprived of the normal characteristics of its kind, so it can "barely" or "hardly" be called, as for example in exchanges (a) and (b), a "gentleman" or a "shape." One can more aptly speak of what the subject "is not" rather than of what he, she, or it "is." In the limiting case, to borrow one of the definitions in *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, the subject is "something that is characterized by utter absence of determination: perfect indistinguishableness." Let me refer to (b) in either of its two subtypes as the "characterizing" use of "nobody" or "nothing."

What underlies type (a), the existential use, is a conception of non-being as *emptiness:* I search the house and find that it is vacant; or I open the box and find that it is empty. What underlies type (b), the characterizing use, is a conception of non-being, or properly not-being, as (i) *lack of standing* (almost in that juridical sense in which someone may have "no standing" in a particular court and case) or (ii) *privation* or *attenuation*. Just as the existential use of "nobody" or "nothing" corresponds to the existential use of "to be," the characterizing uses correspond to copulative "to be." The person or thing deprecated as a "nobody" or a "nothing" is certainly no fictive or non-existent entity.

One might object at this point that there is no need to import a copulative construction in the analysis of the characterizing use. For may we not explain the use by leaning on the possible paraphrase, "the subject is treated *as though* he, she, or it did *not exist*"? The answer is that the paraphrase just given is really an elaboration, not an analysis, of the characterizing use. For it suppresses an important implication the characterizing use proclaims: the reason why the person or thing disparaged as "of no account" may be said not to exist is that he or she is a "no-body," or it is "not-a-thing": the subject *is not* identical with any particular person/thing we are prepared to deal with, nor classifiable under any of the kinds of persons/things that are of concern to us. Similary to speak of a person or thing as a "nothing," in the sense that the subject is a very impoverished, enfeebled, or attenuated specimen of its kind, admittedly could be paraphrased by "might just as well not exist." But the paraphrase will not do as an analysis of the locution in the characterizing use. For the latter alludes to the rationale of the "just as well" version: the subject is no-thing, not-being in that it is "not-F_1,"

"not-F_2," "not-F_3," and so on, where the *F*'s stand for characteristics familiar to us, and which the subject normally ought to have.

The characterizing use of *mēden* and cognate negative terms, such as *ouden* and the personal forms *mēdeis, oudeis,* has been studied in detail by A. C. Moorhouse.[4] Let me review some of his major points and expand with my own comments on two of his most suggestive examples.

In Homer the characterizing sense[5] is served by the adjective of disparagement *outidanos,* "a no-somebody-fellow," a person "of no account, worthless, sorry, good for nothing." The Homeric indefinite pronoun *outis,* from which *outidanos* is derived, has only the existential sense of "nobody," never the characterizing sense.[6] The usual forms *oudeis* and *mēdeis* are also restricted to existential uses in Homer. But beginning in the Archaic period first *oudeis, ouden,* and then also *mēdeis, mēden,* expand their use by taking over the characterizing sense of Homer's *outidanos,* now in reference both to persons and to things.

A remarkable early example of the developing new use of *oudeis* is in the opening of Pindar's Sixth Nemean Ode:

> "There is one race of men, one race (*genos*) of gods; both have breath of life from a single mother. But a power that has sundered itself through and through holds us divided (διείργει δὲ πᾶσα κεκριμένα δύναμις), so that the one (scil. *genos,* 'race') is nothing (*ouden*), while for the other the brazen sky is established their sure citadel forever. Yet we have some likeness (*prospheromen*), either in great intelligence (*megan noon*) or in

[4] A Use of οὐδείς and μηδείς, Class. Quart., N.S. 15 (1965) 31–40.

[5] This is my terminology, not Moorhouse's.

[6] It is fascinating to notice how deftly Homer exploits the semantic distinctness of *outis* and *outidanos* in the episode of the blinding of Polyphemus, the Cyclops, in *Od.* 9.364ff. The Cyclops naively believes that Odysseus' name is *Outis.* So his screams, when Odysseus is blinding him, bring no help from the other Cyclopes. For they assume he is complaining of a natural illness, hearing him, as they do, cry: "No one (*outis*) is killing me" (9.403–414). Homer's finishing touch to this dramatic pun is at 460. The powerful monster, now reduced to ineffectual groping, yet still confident he will capture Odysseus and take revenge, speaks to his favorite sheep about the ills wrought on him by that "οὐτιδανὸς Οὖτις" In putting the two words together has Polyphemus now finally understood the fateful ambiguity of the sound "*outis*"? Or does he now understand *Outis* – wrongly – merely as a variant of *outidanos*? Or had he foolishly lulled himself from the start with the belief that Odysseus had called himself *Outis* (= *outidanos*) in abject humility and self-deprecation? Homer leaves us to wonder. In the end, Polyphemus' favorite animal carries Odysseus safely out of the cave and beyond the Cyclopes' reach. The crucial point, however, is clear: Odysseus not only is not, as Polyphemus' fellow Cyclopes thought, "no one," he also is not, as Polyphemus himself – at one time or another – thought, "a man of no account."

strength (*physin*), to the immortals, though we know not (*ouk eidotes*) what the day will bring, what course after nightfall destiny has written that we must run to the end."[7]

The race of men is certainly not a "nothing" in the sense of non-existence. It is a "nothing" in the sense of lacking many of the attributes the gods have, and exemplifying poorly or marginally those attributes that the two races possess in common. Pindar illustrates with reference to one such attribute: "Like the gods we have intelligence, and yet we do *not know*. . . ." It is relevant to note here that in another ode Pindar conveys this not-being of humanity using the very image and turn of phrase that Plato was to use in formulating a metaphysics of degrees of reality:

ἐπάμεροι· τί δέ τις; τί δ' οὔ τις; σκιᾶς ὄναρ ἄνθρωπος.
"We are things of a day. What are we? What are we not? Man is the shadow of a dream." (*Pyth.* viii. 95–96)

The characterizing use, amply attested in other fifth-century authors, including Aeschylus and Aristophanes, becomes especially prominent in Sophocles and Euripides. Most instructive for our purposes is a passage from Sophocles, *Electra* 1163–67:

"Dearest one, how you have destroyed (ἀπώλεσας) me! Surely (δῆτα) you have destroyed me, beloved brother! So then receive me into this your shelter (ἐς τὸ σὸν τόδε στέγος), me who is nothing into that which is nothing (τὴν μηδὲν ἐς τὸ μηδέν), that I may dwell with you below from now on."

Electra is here addressing the urn she thinks contains the ashes of her dead brother Orestes. A recent critic confesses bewilderment (I append translations of the lines he cites):

"Electra seems to assert in 969 that the dead are living ['you'll win the praise of piety from your dead father below']; then she seems to deny it in 1166 ['nothing to nothing,' quoted above] and 1170 ['dead men do not suffer pain'] . . . [t]he problem of the ontological status of ghosts in this play seems to me very obscure."[8]

[7] R. Lattimore, trans., The Odes of Pindar (Chicago 1947) 111, with my own fuller translation of line 2.

[8] W. Sale, Electra, by Sophocles: A Translation with Commentary (Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 1973) 139 *ad* 834.

I believe there is no such problem; the supposed obscurity and the critic's bewilderment arise simply from a failure to appreciate a certain natural or inevitable, but logically transparent, semantic complication, one that is inherent in discourse about the dead – in Greek or in English. The point is worth a digression, for it has implications for an understanding of the concepts of "nothing" and "non-being" that go beyond the *Electra* passage.

What, in the event of a person's death, makes semantically possible the locutions "he is no more," "he does not exist," "he is nothing (existential sense)," and their respective counterparts in Greek, is the *absence* of that person from the world of the living.[9] But if we should picture a world of the dead, to which persons who are no longer alive recede, and where they take permanent abode, denizens of that world can be said "not to exist" only by a sort of semantic legerdemain: a linguistic transposition, a metonymy. For that world is one of (existential) non-being not on that world's own terms and from the perspective of its denizens, but on the terms of the living, and in the perspective of the living. So the Underworld is the domain of "nothing" (existential) even though it has quite a large population, the members of which, however shadowy in their texture and however reduced they be in their powers, are involved in trials, in acts of expiation or purification, and who relish or loathe, praise or censure, the acts of their survivors in the world above.

This metonymy holds only with respect to the existential use of "non-being" and "nothing." In the characterizing use there is uninterrupted continuity between the two worlds. Indeed it is the characterizing use that permits us and even encourages us to picture the world of the dead as an extension of the world of the living. The characterizing use mediates, in effect, the metonymous and hyperbolic uses of "non-being" and "nothing."

[9] There is, of course, a "vital" use or nuance of "to be," "to exist," and correspondingly of *einai*. But the fact that the paraphrases or translations "to live" or "to be alive" and "to die" or "to be dead" are available for positive and negative predications, respectively, in this type of use does not warrant saying that "to be," "to exist" or *einai* in such cases simply *means* "to live" or "to be alive." At the very least, the vital use of these verbs carries greater rhetorical force, greater pathos, than corresponding use of the predicates "lives" or "dies." This is especially clear in literary examples that might otherwise be taken as pleonastic: ἤ που ζώει τε καὶ ἔστιν (Homer *Od.* 24.262); ζώντων καὶ ὄντων Ἀθηναίων (Demosthenes 18.72); ὄλωλεν οὐδ' ἔτ' ἔστι Τροία (Euripides *Troad.* 1292). See J. Klowski, Zum Entstehen der Begriffe Sein und Nichts und der Weltentstehungs- und Weltschöpfungstheorien im strengen Sinne (I. Teil), Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos. 49 (1967) 139; C. H. Kahn, The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek, Foundations of Language suppl. ser., 16 (Dordrecht and Boston 1973) 240–45, 378–79.

For while there is no sense to the idea of degrees of *existence*[10] or degrees of *nothingness* (in the existential sense), there is no conceptual bar to thinking of degrees of "not-being" (not of "non-being") or of "nothing" in the characterizing sense. Thus it is possible for a living person to employ an effect of hyperbole by saying "I am dead already," "I do not exist," "I am nothing" (existential) because without hyperbole and with no recourse to metonymy he perceives himself as privatively or negatively characterized to a degree that verges on what is appropriate for someone in the realm of the dead. In a nutshell: the dead can call themselves "nothing" (existential) by metonymy; the living can call themselves "nothing" (existential) by hyperbole. But both the dead and the living can quite properly call themselves "nothing" in the characterizing sense; for in *that* sense it is simply a matter of more and less.

So now let us go back to the *Electra* passage. Critics, including Moorhouse, have failed to notice an important syntactic ambiguity. The expression *to mēden* may well be understood as "the nothing" or "nothingness," as a synonym of "extinction" or as an abstract name of the Underworld pictured as the domain of non-existence. Preserving parallelism of sense, the meaning of 1165–66 would then be: "receive me, the one who (already) does not exist (τὴν μηδέν) into (the realm of) non-existence (*to mēden*)," a strongly emotional utterance in which the hyperbolic and metonymous uses of "nothing" are juxtaposed.

But there is also another way of understanding *to mēden*, by construing the neuter article *to* not as introducing an abstract noun but simply as referring to the neuter noun that occurs in the preceding line, *to stegos*, "the shelter," Electra's metaphor for the funerary urn. That construction is ready to hand, as is clear from the parallelism ". . . me . . . to this shelter here; . . . the one who is nothing to this (urn) that is nothing." Both Electra and Orestes, the latter as embodied by the ashes contained within the urn, as well as by the urn itself as container, are a "nothing" in the characterizing sense. The supposed nothingness of Orestes is obvious: he does not speak, he does not move, he cannot come to Electra's help – and so on and so forth with the many "not-*F*"'s implied in Orestes' utterly deprived state. It is precisely in that sense that Electra, at the beginning of this scene (1129), calls Orestes – again identified with the ashes in the urn – a "nothing":

[10] Cf. G. Vlastos, Degrees of Reality in Plato, in Renford Bambrough, ed., New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (London 1965) 8–9.

"Now I hold you in my hands as a nothing (οὐδὲν ὄντα)."[11] In fact, Sophocles does not leave us to imagine Orestes' "not-*F*"'s; as though to confirm the sense of "nothing" in line 1129 and prepare us for the second half of the "nothing to nothing" of line 1166, he has Electra recite a whole string of Orestes' deprivations beginning at line 1136:

> "Out of (ἐκτός) your home, an exile on alien (ἄλλης) soil, you died wretchedly (κακῶς ἀπώλου), without your sister near (δίχα); nor (κοὔτε) did I wash you . . . nor (οὔτε) did I get to pick you up off the blazing pyre . . . but tended by the hands of strangers you have come back a diminutive mass (σμικρὸς ὄγκος) in a diminutive receptacle (σμικρῷ ἐν κύτει) . . . [your] nurture unavailing (ἀνωφελήτου) . . . ." (1136–45)

The nothingness of the urn itself is not simply its diminutive size; the urn is hardly a "shelter" (as it is called at 1165); the oxymoron figure, "a shelter that is not a shelter," is here very close to the surface.[12]

In this same speech Electra gradually identifies her own fate with that of Orestes. At one point the rhetoric goes even beyond identification, picturing the dead Orestes not merely as the one totally deprived but as one who is actively depriving Electra "of everything," "like a storm" (1150–51). So we are already inclined to think of Electra as a "nothing" in the characterizing sense before we finally hear her climactic hyperbole, "I am dead" (1152, cf. 1164). Even before this scene Sophocles has spelled out Electra's privative nothingness: from the first scenes the play has been studded with Electra's remarks of self-pity, in which she characterizes her predicament by using negative phrases and privative *a-* or *apo-* compounds.[13]

To attempt to determine whether at 1166 it is the existential or the characterizing sense of *mēden* that constitutes the primary semantic layer would seem gratuitous. In Electra's speech of desolation a line that packs together the characterizing, the hyperbolic (with respect to Electra), and

[11] The characterizing sense for *ouden* here is guaranteed by the immediate context: "I did not receive you back in the form in which (hōsper) I sent you off" (1128); "I sent you off resplendent (λαμπρὸν ἐξέπεμψα)" (1130).

[12] See below, at n. 17.

[13] See 164–67 ἄτεκνος . . . ἀνύμφευτος . . . ἀνήνυτον οἶτον ἔχουσα κακῶν. 186–92 βίοτος (scil. Electra's) ἀνέλπιστος, *οὐδ'* ἔτ' ἀρκῶ· ἄτις ἄνευ τεκέων . . . ἃς φίλος οὔτις ἀνὴρ ὑπερίσταται . . . ἀναξία . . . ἀεικεῖ σὺν στολᾷ, κεναῖς (cf. "*not* full") δ' ἀμφίσταμαι τραπέζαις. 230–32 τάδε γὰρ [Electra's woes] ἄλυτα κεκλήσεται· *οὐδέ* ποτ' ἐκ καμάτων ἀποπαύσομαι ἀνάριθμος ὧδε θρήνων. 813–22 ἀπεστερημένη . . . ἄφιλος . . . (in Electra's life) *οὐδεὶς* πόθος. Cf. Orestes' remarks: σῶμ' ἀτίμως κἀθέως ἐφθαρμένον (1181); φεῦ τῆς ἀνύμφου δυσμόρου τε σῆς τροφῆς (1183).

the metonymous (with respect to the Underworld) use of "nothing" is just what we would expect from the pen of a tragic poet.

The evidence alluded to and discussed so far is certainly adequate to establish that the characterizing use of *mēden/ouden* and *mēdeis/oudeis* is at least as viable and familiar in classical Greek as the corresponding uses of "nothing" and "nobody" are in English. But an even stronger conclusion is warranted. Doubtless, in terms of frequency, this use cannot fail but appear minor compared to the existential use. But this comparison belies the importance of the characterizing use in the development of Greek concepts. In non-philosophical sources the use is documented in contexts of major dramatic or rhetorical impact. So its literary conspicuousness is high. Given this conspicuousness, we should hardly presume – as has generally been the case – that when "nothing" becomes thematic for a philosophical author focus will necessarily be on the existential sense. A good case can be made, I believe, for the thesis that even in Parmenides *mēden,* where it appears in significant contrast to *eon,* has characterizing sense.[14]

With reference to Plato the characterizing use of *mēden/ouden* must have played a significant role in the development of the doctrine of degrees of reality. The latter, as Vlastos has shown, cannot be coherently understood as a doctrine of degrees of existence, but as one that involves the characterizing *F*-ness and non-*F*-ness of sensible particulars.[15] The connection with our theme ought to be obvious: the negative pole in a doctrine of degrees of reality corresponds to the characterizing sense of "nothing," not-F_1 and not-F_2 and not . . . not-F_n. If there are to be degrees of reality, there must be degrees of *un*reality; the characterizing use both allows this and projects the relevant extreme.

The connection can be rendered more faithfully and its significance better appreciated if we remind ourselves of other respects in which Plato's doctrine draws on the resources of ordinary speech and on the literary tradition. Plato himself called our attention to one such respect. In *Republic* 479B the notion that there are "ambivalent" or "equivocal" (cf. ἐπαμφοτερ-ίζουσιν) entities is introduced through humorous allusion to the folk riddle:

> "A man who was not a man (a eunuch), saw (looked at) but did not see (recognize) a bird that was not a bird (a bat) perched on a tree that

[14] See Determinacy and Indeterminacy, Being and Non-Being in the Fragments of Parmenides, in R. A. Shiner and J. King Farlow, New Essays on Plato and the Pre-Socratics, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 2 (Guelph, Ontario 1976) 45–60.

[15] Op. cit. 10–11.

was not a tree (a rafter or beam), hit it (hit at it) and did not hit it (actually hit it) with a stone that was not a stone (a draughtboard piece)."[16]

Obviously related to this type of folk riddle is one of the most striking forms of the oxymoron figure in Greek literature: "an *F*-person (or thing) that is not an *F*-person (or thing)." A good example can be drawn from that same scene of Sophocles' Electra discussed above: μήτηρ ἀμήτωρ, "unmotherly mother," or "mother hardly a mother" (1154).[17] As in the example cited, this type of oxymoron involves juxtaposition of a noun against a compound consisting of the same noun prefixed by α-negative. A quite distinct, yet significantly related figure, is that of alliteration through α-negative compounds. Here too we have a good example from Sophocles' *Electra,* though not from the same scene discussed earlier: ἄτεκνος ... ἀνύμφευτος... ἀνήνυτον οἶτον ἔχουσα κακῶν, "child*less*... *un*married... suffering an *un*ending doom of ills" (164–67).[18] An impure variant of this device produces the same effect of pathos through accumulation of α-negative compounds, negative predications, *apo-* compounds and similar expressions. We saw such a figure in the description of the supposed ashes of Orestes.[19] Both α-negative alliteration and its impure variant of accumulating negatives are among the most favored devices of Greek authors, from Homer through the dramatists, the orators, and beyond. What is more, predilection for these devises reflects tendencies characteristic of the Greek language itself. For Greek not only has a richer variety of morphological variants of the negative prefix than any other Indo-European language,[20] it also is by far more productive of negative compounds than the two other ancient languages for which we have a comparable body of literature, Sanskrit and Latin.[21] The conception of a person, thing, action, or event that is characterized in negative terms through and through is no invention

[16] See J. Adam, The *Republic* of Plato, Edited with Critical Notes, Commentary and Appendices 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Cambridge 1963); vol. 1, 342–43 *ad loc.* I have altered slightly the usual interpretation.

[17] For a discussion of the figure, see H. A. Hamilton, The Negative Compounds in Greek (Baltimore 1899) 48–49; cf. A. C. Moorhouse, Studies in the Greek Negatives (Cardiff 1959) 66–68.

[18] Other examples: Homer *Il.* 9.63–4 ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος/ὃς πολέμου ἔραται, Soph, *Ant.* 876 ἄκλαυτος, ἄφιλος, ἀνυμέναιος ἔρχομαι τὰν πυμάταν ὁδόν. Cf. above, n. 16, and Hamilton 44–45.

[19] Above, at n. 11–12. Cf. description of Electra's predicament, n. 13.

[20] Moorhouse, Studies 47.

[21] Hamilton 58.

of philosophical ontologists; it is one of the commonplaces of Greek literature.

It is thus no idle historical exercise to point out antecedents or prototypes in literature and in forms of speech for Plato's doctrine of degrees of reality. Sources for the intermediate degree lie not only in the type of folk riddle Plato alluded to; they also lie in the oxymoron of the type μήτηρ ἀμήτωρ. Correspondingly, the Platonic μηδαμῇ ὄν, "in no way being," or πάντως μὴ ὄν, "altogether not being," that is equated to *mēden*, "nothing," is prefigured and made familiar in the characterizing use of *mēden/mēdeis* etc., especially by the great tragedians, in the figure of α-negative alliteration, and in the figure of accumulating negatives. All of these devices facilitate, reinforce, and promote one another. So it is properly the whole complex that constitutes an important pre-philosophical background for the Platonic doctrine of degrees of reality.

Observations made in this paper can be read as providing support, in yet a different way, for a thesis advanced by Charles H. Kahn[22] and others. In a formulation I prefer, the thesis is that the dialectic of Being in classical Greek speculation focuses not on "What there *is*" but on "*What* it is" or "*How* it is"; not on existence but on *physis*, constitution, or form.[23]

[22] See Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos. 58 (1976) 323–34; cf. Verb 'Be' 394–419.

[23] I thank Friedrich Solmsen and Michael Gagarin for criticism of an early draft of this paper. I have also profited from discussions of the paper at the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy 1977 meeting at Atlanta, and at classics seminars at The University of Auckland and The University of Sydney.

STEVEN S. TIGNER

Stars, Unseen Bodies and the Extent of the Earth in Anaxagoras' Cosmogony:

Three Problems and Their Simultaneous Solution

Problem 1: the genesis of stars. The earliest direct suggestions we have regarding Anaxagoras' view of the genesis of stars are both conflicting and independently challengeable.

> (a) Plutarch *Lys.* 12,2 (DK 59 A 12). "Anaxagoras . . . maintained . . . that each of the stars is not in its natural place. For being stony and heavy, they shine by *aithēr*'s thrusting against them and breaking round them. They are dragged along by force, bound by the whirl and tension of the rotation, as presumably even in the beginning they were prevailed over not to fall down hither, when cold and heavy things were separating out from the totality."[1]

The suggestion is that the star-stones separated out in the upper regions to begin with, and that the whirling *aithēr* kept them there, heating them to incandescence.

> (b) Aëtius 2,13, 3 (DK 59 A 71). "Anaxagoras says that the surrounding *aithēr* (which is fiery in substance) in the tension of the revolution snatched up rocks from the earth, set them afire and they turned into stars."

Here the suggestion is that star-stones were first earth-rocks, only later to be snatched up by the whirling *aithēr* and turned into stars.

The chief evidential weakness of Plutarch's version is that it is clearly no more than a presumption, a guess. Further, it is a guess which appears to strain against its own source. Would star-stones originate and forever remain in a region which is at the same time declared not to be their "natural place"?

[1] The texts used for all passages with "DK" references are from H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed. (Dublin/Zürich 1951). Translations are as literal and exegetically neutral as I can make them.

What sets off warning flashers in Aëtius' testimony is the thoroughly un-Anaxagorean vocabulary. We can be quite sure that Anaxagoras never said that Aëtius reports *in those words.*[2] Still, recasting earlier doctrines in later Hellenistic forms is not uncommon in Aëtius, and the physical picture of the genesis of stars which he attributes to Anaxagoras might well reflect Anaxagoras' actual view.[3]

Problem 2: unseen bodies. Hippolytus testifies that, according to Anaxagoras,

> [Hippolytus *Ref.* 1,8, 6 (DK 59 A 42)] "there are some bodies, not visible to us, which are carried around together with the sun and moon, below the stars."

A little further on he seems to connect them with lunar eclipses.

> Hippolytus *Ref.* 1,8, 9 (DK 59 A 42). "There is an eclipse of the moon when the earth intercepts [the sun's light], and sometimes when the things below the moon do."

[2] "substance" (or "essence": οὐσία) in this usage has a clearly Aristotelian ring; "tension" (εὐτονία) is a Stoic import which the Diels/Kranz "Wortindex" lists in this occurrence alone; "revolution" (περιδίνησις) is almost certainly a substitute for what the fragments attest to be Anaxagoras' own term, περιχώρησις; and "rocks" (πέτροι) is unusual, Fragment 16 and all other Anaxagorean testimony using "stones" (λίθοι).

[3] It is also worth inquiring whether Aëtius' statement could be a corruption or misconstruction of some similar sounding doctrine known to us from other testimony. That he was capable of confusion in such matters there can be no doubt. [See, e. g. C. H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York 1960; 2nd printing with corrective preface 1964), 17 & s. v. "Aëtius: inaccuracy of," Index of Names and Citations.] But the evidence seems against it in this case. The best candidates among similar sounding testimonia are the following. "Sun and moon and all the stars are stones, made fiery-hot when caught up in the revolving *aithēr*." – Hippolytus *Ref.* 1,8, 6 (DK 59 A 42). "Anaxagoras said that the whole heaven is composed of stones; that the intensity of the rotation set it up, and if this let up, it would fall." – Diogenes Laërtius 2,12 (DK 59 A 1). But while these attributions also represent star-stones being acted upon by the *aithēr*ial whirl, the verbs are importantly different. Aëtius uses ἀναρπάζειν ("to snatch up"); Hippolytus, συμπεριφέρειν (lit. "to carry round together with"); and Diogenes Laërtius, συνιστάναι (lit. "to set together"). It is as though we had here represented three phases of a connected process (the "pick-up, set-up, and keep-up" of the heavenly bodies) rather than rival accounts of the same process or state. Hippolytus and Diogenes Laërtius clearly do not intend to say anything about the opening scenes of the stellar drama, while Aëtius obviously does. And though we have already noted linguistic grounds for caution in admitting Aëtius' testimony, it seems hardly credible to suggest that his "snatch up" (ἀναρπάζειν) issue from a misreading or corruption of some "carry round together with" (συμπεριφέρειν) or "set together" (συνιστάναι) in his source(s).

This connection is bolstered by the reported testimony of Theophrastus that Anaxagoras held lunar eclipses to occur

> [Theophrastus *Phys. Opin.* Fr. 9 (DK 59 A 77)] "also when the bodies below the moon come in front of it."

Why the unseen bodies? What one wants here is some feature of lunar eclipses which Anaxagoras' sun-moon-earth explanation doesn't really account for, but which sub-lunar bodies would somehow explain.

One feature which solar and lunar eclipses share is that, given a stationary observer, partial eclipses (and lunar appulses) are a good deal more frequent than total ones. But the two sorts differ markedly in that (1) from the standpoint of a fixed observer, lunar eclipses are much more frequent than solar ones, and (2) they are never "crisp" in the way that even partial solar eclipses are. For, owing to atmospheric refraction, the boundary between earth's umbra and penumbra is very ill defined. Hence the most frequent of all eclipse phenomena, the amber moon of a partial lunar eclipse or appulse, is also the one in which the difference between solar and lunar eclipses is most marked. This difference was indeed noted in antiquity. Plutarch, in his "Life" of Nicias, records the following incident.

> Plutarch *Nic.* 23,1f. "At night there was an eclipse of the moon, quite terrifying to Nicias and the others, who out of ignorance or superstition were panic stricken at such a thing. On one hand, even the common people were somehow already aware that the darkening of the sun on the thirtieth came about because of the moon; but the moon itself, whatever it met with, and how of a sudden the light from the full moon should die out and it emit all sorts of colors, was not easy to grasp."

One can sympathize with their perplexity. The broad, flat earth, much larger than either sun or moon, was itself opaque. If it were the cause of the eclipse, then why did the moon darken and redden only gradually and partially? The hypothesis must have occurred to some at least that there were other bodies involved, which only partially obstructed the sun's light: some other thing or things which, while themselves unseen, still partially blocked out or filtered the light of the sun. Anaxagoras' unseen bodies seem well suited to fill this role, and I think it likely that this really was their main explanatory function. Others have tended to associate them with much rarer eclipse phenomena.[4] Their place in the cosmogony remains to be explained.

Problem 3: the extent of the earth. Gomperz posed the earth-extent problem in this way:

> "we are met by a difficulty which has still to be realized and explained. According to Aristotle's account, Anaxagoras conceived the earth as closing the centre of Cosmos like a lid and resting, as it were, on an air-cushion, from which the air underneath was unable to escape. But, according to an equally trustworthy account, his theory admitted that the stars moved under the earth as well as above it, and it is impossible to reconcile these two versions."[5]

The Aristotle passage is from *De caelo*, and reads as follows.

> "Anaximenes, Anaxagoras and Democritus say that the flatness of the earth is the cause of its remaining where it is. For it does not cut, but covers as a lid, the air beneath it – as, it appears, flat bodies [characteristically] do; for even against the winds they are hard to move, because of the resistance. The same thing, they say, holds with respect to the flatness of the earth as against the underlying air which, not having enough room to change its place, keeps it, all crowded together underneath, just as does water in clepsydrae. And that air is able to bear great weight when it is cut off [from escape] and remains where it is, they provide many proofs."[6]

It is Hippolytus who testifies that, according to Anaxagoras,

> [Hippolytus *Ref.* 1,8, 8 (DK 59 A 42)] "the revolution of the stars takes them under the earth."

[4] Boll's article s.v. "Finsternisse" in Pauly-Wissowa, RE VI. 2 contains two interesting suggestions along this line. Each has found favor with some later writers. One takes the unseen sublunar bodies as the additional obscurants apparently required in the case of so-called "paradoxical" eclipses, where rising or setting sun and fully eclipsed setting or rising moon are simultaneously visible. Heath seems to have favored this hypothesis. [Sir T. Heath, Aristarchus of Samos (London 1913) 80, n. 1. See also V. E. Thoren, Journ. of the Hist. of Astronomy 2 (1971) 23–28.] The other suggestion, seemingly favored by Guthrie, focuses on apparently total-blackout lunar eclipses, which would be a problem to anyone supposing the moon to have at least some light of its own, as Anaxagoras may in fact have believed. [See W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, II (Cambridge 1965) 307, n. 2.]

[5] T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, Vol. I, trans. L. Magnus (London 1901; 8th impression, 1969) 220.

[6] Aristotle *De caelo* 294b 14–23. On this passage see my discussion in Empedocles' Twirled Ladle and the Vortex-Supported Earth, Isis 55 (1974) 65:437f., nn. 20, 21, 26.

That it does so in straightforward celestial sphere fashion is confirmed by Diogenes Laërtius' testimony that

> [Diogenes Laërtius 2,9 (DK 59 A 1)] "the stars originally were borne as round a dome, so that the always visible pole was at earth's zenith, but later took an inclination."

The inclination was enough to treat Athenians (at about 38° N lat.) to an annual display of nearly 90 percent of the celestial sphere. There can be no doubt that Anaxagoras envisioned a roughly spherical (and expanding) cosmos.[7]

The problem at this stage is how to envision a lid-like earth, supported by underlying, confined air, in a spherical, deep-sky cosmos. What *contains* the air under the lid? Now while Aristotle lumps Anaximenes, Anaxagoras and Democritus together in the passage quoted above, the point is probably no more than that Anaxagoras et al. offered what we might call a pneumatic account, in contrast to the hydrostatic, solid, and fluid dynamic alternatives espoused by others (Thales, Xenophanes, and Empedocles, respectively). The reference to air's *confinement*, and to the "many proofs," do not fit the cases of Anaximenes and Democritus nearly as well as they do Anaxagoras'. For Anaximenes' flat earth "rides" or "floats" on aēr,[8] very likely in the same manner as does the sun, which is "flat like a leaf."[9] Air's confinement seems irrelevant. And Democritus is

[7] This implication of the testimony has been prominently missed. Thus Guthrie writes: "It is not always easy to visualize the complete world-picture of a Presocratic thinker. [!] The rotatory process of cosmogony does not inevitably involve a spherical rather than a hemispherical universe. Probably Anaxagoras did think of the cushion of air on which the earth rests as filling the lower half of a sphere, but effectively at least his universe remains hemispherical. The stars fill a sky that is dome-shaped, and if, as Hippolytus says, their revolution carries them beneath the earth, the passages just quoted [D. L. 2,9 & Aët. 2,8,1] show that this is only the effect of the inclination of the pole: when that was vertically above the earth's centre, they remained above, or level with, its surface, as Anaximenes had believed they still did. There is no question of a complete southern hemisphere of stars." – Greek Philosophy, II, 305f. What Guthrie seems to have overlooked here is that one cannot tilt the northern celestial hemisphere in the requisite way without bringing the southern hemisphere into view (nearly 80% of it at Athens). Parmenides, Anaxagoras' senior by about 15 years, seems to have been the first to apply sphere language to the universe (DK 28 B 8.42ff.). There are special difficulties here, yet even as conservative a writer as Dicks maintains that "this is of prime importance because it is the *first* completely authenticated assertion . . . of the concept of *sphericity* applied to the universe as a whole." – D. R. Dicks, Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle (Ithaca, NY 1970) 51.

[8] "Plutarch" *Stromateis* 3 [DK 13 A 6]; Hippolytus *Ref.* 1,7, 4 [DK 13 A 7]; Aëtius 3,15, 8 [DK 13 A 20].

[9] Aëtius 2,22, 1 [DK 13 A 15].

on the wrong side of the "void" controversy to be counted comfortably among those who provide the "many proofs" Aristotle mentions.[10]

A Solution. All three general problems admit of simultaneous solution on the hypothesis that the outer edge of earth abuts directly on the cosmic whirl. The assumption itself can be seen as an easy outgrowth of earlier flat-earth and dome-heaven tradition (Homer, Hesiod). And on this hypothesis, Aëtius' version of the genesis of stars becomes suddenly plausible. For the whirling *aithēr*'s snatching up of stones from the earth is natural once the two are granted the locus of interaction which the hypothesis provides: the inner face of the *aithēr*ial whirl, rushing upward along earth's eastern edge, and downward in the west.

At first, of course, such bodies as were caught up in the whirl would be close-orbiting and cool. But, swept along ever more swiftly in the current of the whirling *aithēr*, they would naturally experience both thermal and orbital elevation. They would in fact become "bodies, not visible to us, which are carried around together with the sun and moon, below the stars," to use Hippolytus' words. With further heating and still higher orbit they would eventually attain luminescent visibility and stardom. In short, I suggest that Anaxagoras' unseen bodies are simply stones on their way to becoming stars. An independent origin for the unseen bodies would be quite superfluous in Anaxagoras' system.

Reconciliation of the lid-like extent of the earth with the hypogeal circlings of the heavenly bodies is effected by the same model. For while earth's outer edges do "scrape the sky," that same sky is both substantial and deep. Its rushing, fluid inner face contains the bubble-bucket of air on which the confining earth-lid rests.

While this joint solution of the (1) star genesis, (2) unseen body, and (3) earth extent problems is appealingly economical, it is not without difficulties. Chief among them is now to envision the *evolution* of such a system within the framework of Anaxagoras' expanding cosmos. Yet in the end, I suspect, this turns out to be more a problem for Anaxagoras himself than for his exegetes.

[10] Among these are probably those mentioned at *Physics*, 213a 24–27, where Aristotle reports that Anaxagoras and those who argue similarly about void "demonstrate that air is something, twisting wineskins and showing how strong the [entrapped] air is [in resisting further compression], and entrapping it in clepsydrae." These proofs, which would obviously serve better as demonstrations of the supportive properties of confined air, were offered against those who affirmed the existence of void, and hence against a position which Democritus (Anaxagoras' junior by some 40 years) was later to hold. While this does not show Aristotle to be mistaken in attributing a pneumatic earth-support system to Democritus, it does suggest that he had the Anaxagorean case particularly in mind.

CHRISTOPHER J. ROWE

Justice and Temperance in Republic IV[1]

The purpose of this paper is to establish what Plato means by 'justice'[2] in *Republic* IV;[3] and especially what the supposed relationship is between this virtue and the virtue of temperance. These are notoriously difficult problems, which have been discussed repeatedly; but no agreed solution has yet emerged from the discussion. One view holds that justice and temperance are for Plato synonymous, or 'practically synonymous', terms;[4] another holds that they are co-extensive, but not synonymous;[5] another that they are neither synonymous nor co-extensive.[6] Plainly, the first view will not do as it stands, so far as concerns *Republic* IV; for since Plato offers separate definitions of justice and temperance,[7] he must hold, in *Republic* IV at least, that the two virtues are distinct – and this is a fact from which any proper discussion of the issues must start. Thus if we wish to maintain that justice and temperance are synonymous, the strongest

[1] A primitive version of this paper, under a different title, was presented at the 1975 Triennial Meeting of the Greek and Roman Societies in Oxford. I am grateful to Professor Gregory Vlastos and Mr. John Easterling for helpful criticisms of that version.

[2] I adopt this traditional rendering of δικαιοσύνη, and the traditional 'temperance' for σωφροσύνη, for convenience; the discussion itself will, I hope, throw some light on the degree of their adequacy.

[3] My interest will be exclusively in justice as discussed by Plato with reference to the individual; and I shall not therefore consider any consequence that my conclusions may have for Plato's analysis of justice in the state. I shall however assume that what Plato says of justice in the state is intended to hold, *ceteris paribus*, of justice in the individual.

[4] C. Larson, The Platonic Synonyms, δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη, Amer. Journ. of Philol. 72 (1951) 395–414.

[5] See G. Vlastos, The Theory of Social Justice in the *Polis* in Plato's *Republic*, in: Interpretations of Plato, ed. H. F. North (Leiden 1977) 7, n. 27; and T. H. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford 1977) 207.

[6] See e.g. Sir E. Barker, Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors, 2nd ed. (London 1925) 178.

[7] Larson admits this point, as he must, but claims that Plato's method here is only 'half-serious' (396). I do not believe that he either does or can establish this claim; Plato gives every sign of being entirely serious in this part of Book IV – and how could he be otherwise, when so important a conclusion rests on it?

thesis we can uphold is that while Plato thinks of them as distinct, his definitions of them, or his handling of them generally, fails to preserve the distinction between them. My own view is that there is some justification to be found for this thesis, but that it is not exclusively correct; if Plato sometimes makes it difficult to tell the two virtues apart, at other times he handles them in such a way as to make them clearly distinct. The true situation, I shall suggest, is rather more complex than is generally recognised.

To begin with the definition of justice: 'each of us will be just . . . when each of the parts of him does its own'.[8] This definition is unclear in a way which vitally affects the issue in hand. Does Plato intend the definition to include specification of what 'its own' is for each part, or not? And if he does, is this specification to be complete, or only partial? If the definition is to include mention of all the functions of the three parts, then it will plainly be distinguishable from the definition of temperance; for the definition of temperance only mentions one of the functions of one part, namely the ruling function of the λογιστικόν.[9] Similarly, the two definitions will differ if that of justice specifies *none* of the functions of any part, i.e. if it is purely formal.[10] If, on the other hand, Plato means the definition to include partial specification, the consequences are rather less clear-cut. I shall discuss these consequences presently.

We may, I think, rule out at once the possibility that the definition is meant to include specification of all the functions of the three parts; I see no evidence to support it in the text, and it would in any case lead to some strange results (why, for instance, should my wanting to eat breakfast – presumably a perfectly proper occupation for the lowest part of my soul – be thought to have any relevance to the question whether I am just or not?).[11] There is, however, strong evidence in the text for the second interpretation, which takes the definition as purely formal; for both when he

[8] 441 d 12–e 2; similarly at 443 b 1–2, with the addition of the words ἀρχῆς τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι.

[9] For the definition of temperance, see p. 339 below.

[10] In this case, the definition could apply even where the parts of the thing called 'just' did not stand in the same relation to each other as the parts of the Platonic state and the Platonic soul; e.g. a state consisting of equals, as in the *Laws*.

[11] Thus at 443 c 4 ff. what is said to be an ἴδιωλον of justice is not that the 'cobbler by nature' should do his cobbling, but that he should do his cobbling and not something else – and especially not ruling; cf. the crucial addition of the words ἀρχῆς τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι at 443 b 1–2.

gives the definition of justice in the state, and when he defines justice in the individual, Plato seems content to offer the bare formula τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν, without filling-out of any kind.[12] But this is not the end of the matter. Near the end of Book IV, we find Plato presupposing a different version of the definition of justice, one which does include at least a minimal description of the functions of the three parts. At 442d 10ff., he applies what he calls the 'vulgar' test to his definition: Socrates and Glaucon agree that the man in whom each part of his soul does its own ἀρχῆς τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι is the least likely to rob ἱερά, commit adultery, or do any of the things commonly accounted unjust. Strictly speaking, even with the addition of the phrase ἀρχῆς τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι, the implied definition of justice still remains formal, in the sense that we still do not know what 'its own' is for each part; the addition tells us that τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν is to be interpreted in terms of the distribution of rule, but fails to tell us what that distribution should be. But if so, why are Socrates and Glaucon so confident that justice as it has been defined will pass the 'vulgar test'? If we know only that the parts of the just soul will each 'do their own with respect to ruling and being ruled', we cannot say what the just man will or will not do, since that presumably depends on which part or parts rule and are ruled. The reason for Socrates' and Glaucon's confidence is, as the sequel shows, that they assume that we *do* know what the distribution of rule is: the just man 'rules over himself' (443d 4), i.e. his λογιστικόν rules over the two lower parts.[13] (One might well ask why even this should be assumed to result in just behaviour as commonly conceived; but at this point I shall be content to record that it *is* assumed.)[14] But in that case, they must be taking the definition as other than purely formal; justice is now when reason does its own, which is ruling, and the other two parts do their own, which is being ruled.

This, then, is the form the definition must take if Plato is to make the connection he wants between his conception of justice and just actions as understood by the world at large. That he should be able to make such a

[12] I shall also argue later that this interpretation is required by 433b 7ff., which makes justice a condition of the other virtues.

[13] If it is denied that the expression 'ruling over himself' necessarily implies this, it is certainly implied by the further description of the just man, in the same sentence, as σώφρων; for the rule of the λογιστικόν over the rest of the soul is unambiguously included in the definition of σωφροσύνη (see below).

[14] The assumption is basic not only to Book IV, but also to Books VIII–IX. The desires of the rational part are for the real good, which is virtue; and it is sufficient for the operation of these that they are not thwarted by the desires of the lower parts.

connection is of course crucial to the argument of the *Republic* as a whole; for he agreed at the beginning of Book II to prove something about justice, not about something which he merely chooses to call by the same name.[15] The question must then be whether this amplified form of the definition can plausibly be read back into the earlier parts of Book IV. The answer, I shall argue, is that it cannot, because if justice is understood in this way, it ceases to be clearly distinguishable from temperance; and this must be an embarrassing consequence if, as I have said, it is a basic assumption of Book IV that justice and temperance are two separate virtues.

The full definition of temperance runs: '[we call a man] temperate by virtue of the friendship and concord of these very [parts], when both the ruling [part] and the two subject [parts] agree that the λογιστικόν should rule, and do not rise up (στασιάζειν) against it' (442c 10–d 1). The last part of this definition shows that temperance involves not merely that the parts agree that the λογιστικόν should rule, but that it actually rules. Thus a soul is temperate if the λογιστικόν controls the two lower parts, and this control rests, not on compulsion, but on 'friendly agreement'. The first of these two conditions, the control of the lower parts by the λογιστικόν, will now apparently be included under justice; the essence of temperance, therefore, will evidently be the 'friendly agreement' between the parts. At first sight this is a concept which is rather plausibly associated with temperance: the temperate man, Plato will be saying, is not the one who has to struggle to keep his desires under control, but the one who has achieved an inner peace; not a temporary balance of opposing forces, but rather a permanent state of harmony from which the causes of στάσις have been removed.[16] From other points of view, however, this is an unsatisfactory and inadequate way of drawing the line between justice and temperance; and in any case Plato does not consistently observe it. The first and most crucial objection concerns the connection between justice and temperance, as so defined, and commonly recognised types of just and temperate actions. If the connection must exist for justice, so presumably it must for temperance; but if the sole feature that distinguishes temperance from justice is the 'friendly agreement' of the parts, no such connection in fact exists for either. If we take the

[15] See D. Sachs, A Fallacy in Plato's *Republic*, Philos. Review 72 (1963) 141–58. As Irwin (Plato's Moral Theory, 333, n. 33) points out, Sachs fails to recognise that there are certain aspects of the ordinary conception of just behaviour that Plato wants to reject – e. g. the notion that it is just to harm one's enemies. But the general point still holds.

[16] Cf. B. Williams, The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato's *Republic*, in: Exegesis and Argument, ed. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty (Assen 1973) 202.

commonest conception of justice, in terms of equality (ἰσότης),[17] just actions will perhaps be those which leave all parties having what is equal (ἴσον);[18] temperate actions, on the other hand, are in Plato's view normally understood as expressing *self-mastery*, 'control over certain pleasures and desires'.[19] But under the proposed definitions of justice and temperance, so-called temperate actions will rather be referrable to justice; and so-called just actions will be referrable to either justice or temperance, since just behaviour will not presumably occur only in the absence of 'friendly agreement' between the parts. But in any case, why should the latter be a feature of temperance, and not of justice? Should justice too not involve harmony, rather than constant inner warfare?[20] Presumably justice too should be a permanent state; yet if the λογιστικόν has to rely on compulsion, its overthrow will always remain a possibility. And on at least two occasions Plato does in fact associate the idea of 'friendship' with justice. In Book I, injustice is said to make a man incapable of acting, 'because he is in a state of στάσις and not of one mind with himself, and therefore (? ἔπειτα) ἐχθρός both to himself and to the just' (352a). Similarly, in Book IV itself, Plato says in summing up the results of the discussion of justice not only that the ἕξις involves τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν, but that it involves 'becoming one's own friend, fitting together the three parts of oneself . . ., binding these together and becoming wholly one instead of many, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον . . .'[21] (443d 5–e 2). This latter passage is particularly significant, in that it forms part of the context in which the offending version of the definition of justice (i. e. the version which leads to the problems currently being discussed) seems to be introduced.

I suggest, then, that there are two different ways in which Plato's definition of justice in the individual can be understood. Plato does not attach himself exclusively to one interpretation or the other; but neither, on its own, is satisfactory. If justice is understood as a purely formal principle, he can clearly separate it from temperance, but he cannot make the necessary connection between his 'justice' and justice in the ordinary sense; on the

[17] See *Gorgias* 489b 1, Aristotle *Nic. Eth.* V, *Politics* 1280a 11, etc.

[18] I. e. either 'geometrically' or 'arithmetically' equal (for this distinction, see E. R. Dodds, Plato, Gorgias [Oxford 1959] 339–40; and F. D. Harvey, Two Kinds of Equality, Class. & Mediaev. 26 [1965] 101–46).

[19] (*Rep.*) 430e 6–9.

[20] Another theoretical possibility would be that the two lower parts were cowed into agreement; but the same objection would apply.

[21] 'Friendship and concord' then is still associated, even here, with temperance; but what is important is that it is now apparently also a condition of justice.

other hand, if the definition is understood in such a way as to allow that connection, the line between justice and temperance becomes extremely faint, if it can be maintained at all.

In order to try to understand this state of affairs, I propose to refer briefly to the *Gorgias*. The *Gorgias* too, like the *Republic*, attempts to give a causal explanation of virtuous behaviour, but it does so in somewhat different terms. The relevant passage begins at 506 c 5. We, and everything else, Socrates says, are ἀγαθοί through the presence of some ἀρετή; and ἀρετή comes to be present in a thing through 'τάξις and correctness and expert skill'. It follows, then, that the ἀρετή of anything comes from the presence in it of a certain κόσμος. But a κόσμιος soul is a temperate one. Socrates then proceeds to argue that temperance entails justice, piety, and courage: the temperate man will do everything that is fitting, with respect both to the gods and to men; but doing what is fitting with respect to gods is piety, doing what is fitting with respect to men is justice. He will also flee and pursue 'things and men and pleasures and pains' as he should; so he will be courageous.

Here, justice appears to be understood merely as the tendency to perform just actions.[22] What explains this tendency is not 'justice in the soul', but rather temperance: temperance is the state of the soul that causes just actions, and also other types of virtuous behaviour. About the nature of the κόσμος of the soul which is temperance, we are told nothing explicitly; but earlier temperance has been identified with 'being in control of oneself, ruling over the pleasures and desires in oneself' (491d–e), and there is every reason to think that this same conception of temperance also underlies the present context.[23] The control in question must, presumably, be *rational* control; for temperance is said at 507 a 6–7 to have as its opposites both ἀκολασία and ἀφροσύνη. It is therefore Plato's view in this part of the *Gorgias* that all virtuous actions flow from the rule of reason over 'the pleasures and desires in us'; and this internal state is plausibly named 'temperance' because of the common view of temperance as 'self-mastery'.

In the *Republic*, for reasons connected with the general strategy of the argument, Plato attempts to give a separate 'internal' account of each of the four virtues of temperance, justice, courage, and wisdom. This involves no

[22] In Irwin's terminology, justice is here an 'A-power', temperance a 'B-power' (Plato's Moral Theory, 45).

[23] Cf. *Rep.* 430e 6–7, where temperance is said to be κόσμος ποῦ τις . . . καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκρατεία.

great change in Plato's view of the causes of virtuous behaviour; for the accounts of at least three of these virtues contain a reference, whether explicit or implicit, to the concept of the rule of reason over the lower desires which was fundamental to the analysis of virtue in the *Gorgias:* temperance is defined as friendly agreement between the parts that reason should rule; the wisdom of the rational part includes knowing how to rule;[24] and a soul possesses courage when the θυμοειδές 'maintains through pleasures and pains the instructions of reason (? τῶν λόγων) about what is and is not to be feared'.[25] But Plato believes that he can now go one step further back: 'what provides the power for all those things (i.e. the three ἕξεις of temperance, wisdom, and courage) to come into existence'[26] is 'the doing of its own by each part of the soul in respect of ruling and being ruled'. The least that this can mean is that 'justice' is a necessary condition of the existence of the other three virtues;[27] and this is indeed true, if justice is held to consist *simply* in each part's doing its own with respect to rule, i.e. without specification of the way rule is distributed.[28] If justice includes such specification, I have argued that it is to all intents and purposes[29] indis-

[24] 442c 6–8: the rational part will possess knowledge of what is to the advantage both of each part and of the whole.

[25] 442b 11–c 3.

[26] 433b 7ff. (said, of course, of justice in the state; but again I assume that what is said of justice in the state can legitimately be transferred also to justice in the individual).

[27] If it could be shown that for Plato 'friendly agreement' was a necessary concomitant of control by the rational part, then 'each part's doing its own' would also be a sufficient condition of the other virtues, since for Plato it is analytically true that reason should rule (and if reason should rule, it should of course rule well, so that the soul will be wise; it will also be courageous, since if it belongs to reason to rule, it belongs to the θυμοειδές to obey). In this case, justice and temperance will be co-extensive, but not identical in meaning. One further consequence is that temperance will also be a necessary and sufficient condition of justice; but perhaps Plato might mean that 'justice' was prior in practical terms – what one would aim at first in the process of education would be that each part should do its own, and the rest would follow. That Plato *does* think of 'friendly agreement' as necessarily going together with rational control is at least suggested by the apparent ease with which he moves in discussing temperance from the idea of control to that of agreement, and from agreement to 'friendship and concord' (430e 6–431e 8, 442c 10–d 1). On the other hand, he might well want to distinguish between control by coercion and 'friendly agreement' arising from the process of education (even though he does not do so clearly in the case of the third class in the state).

[28] For the addition to the definition of the phrase 'in respect of ruling and being ruled', and its implications, see p. 338 and n. 11 above.

[29] I here deliberately hedge. My argument is that the 'friendship' associated with temperance seems to provide the basis of a distinction; but that this distinction is in the event unsupportable.

tinguishable from temperance; and the question will now be whether it makes sense to say that a thing is a necessary condition of itself.

But we now have to ask what Plato's justification is for identifying 'doing one's own' with justice. The identification is of course entirely plausible in the context of the state: a just state is indeed one in which power is distributed between the citizens as it should (since this implies 'equality', however this may be interpreted).[30] But it will hardly be reason enough for calling a soul just that 'power' is distributed properly between its parts. In this case, the only means of justification finally available to Plato is the 'vulgar test'; but justice understood in the way implied by calling it a condition of the other virtues is incapable of passing that test.[31]

It follows from all this that the attempt to provide a separate internal account of justice is not a success. And there are indeed grounds for thinking that the exercise is in principle impossible. In *Nicomachean Ethics* V Aristotle divides justice into 'universal' and 'specific': 'universal' justice covers all actions which are lawful, and thus includes actions which fall also under other virtues; what makes them 'just' is that they involve other people.[32] 'Specific' justice, on the other hand, involves 'not taking more than one's fair (equal) share', whether of 'honour, money, or security'.[33] In *Republic* IV, there is no clear distinction between these two senses of 'justice': the connection between 'doing one's own' and equality draws on the specific sense, whereas the list of just actions at 442e ff. suggests the universal sense.[34] But in neither sense would it be easy to give an 'internal' account which was specific to justice. In the case of universal justice, an action will be just rather than, say, temperate in so far as it is πρὸς ἕτερον; and how could an internal account accommodate *this* differentia? If the sphere of specific justice is 'honour, money, and security', Plato's psychological model suggests that the cause must be proper control of the lower desires; but this, as I have argued before, is more naturally associated with temperance.

It may well be that Plato came to see the unsatisfactory nature of his account of justice in the *Republic;* at any rate, he has evidently abandoned it

[30] Cf. Aristotle's discussion of 'oligarchic' versus 'democratic' justice in *Politics* III 9.

[31] See p. 338 above.

[32] 1129b 11ff.

[33] 1130b 2.

[34] So for example Aristotle treats adultery which lacks a profit-motive as falling outside the sphere of 'specific justice'; adultery normally lacks a profit-motive; and 442e ff. uses as an example of an action refrained from by the just man adultery *simpliciter.*

by the time of the *Laws*. 'Wisdom', he says there, 'is the first of the divine goods, leading them all, and second is a ἕξις of soul which is temperate in a reasoned way, and out of these mixed with courage there would be, thirdly, justice, and fourthly there is courage.'[35] Justice here seems to be like Aristotle's universal justice: if you are wise, temperate, and courageous, you are also just;[36] wise, temperate, and courageous actions are just in so far as they affect others. It is interesting too that the *Laws* also distances itself from the account of the origin of virtue given in the *Gorgias*. Having a σώφρων soul still means having one's desires under rational control; but being in this condition does not now mean that one possesses complete virtue. The separation of courage from temperance is absolutely crucial to the argument of the early part of the *Laws*, which claims that it is wrong to emphasise courage to the exclusion of temperance; and Plato explicitly complains about the use of the term σωφροσύνη which 'forces it to be wisdom as well as temperance'.[37]

[35] 631c 5–d 1.
[36] Aristotle's 'universal' justice would, however, include 'specific' justice.
[37] 710a 6.

Diskin Clay

Socrates' Prayer to Pan

279 B 8 Ὦ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί,
δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν·
ἔξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια.
πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν.
τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν
279 C 3 δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων.

The end of Plato's *Phaedrus*, Socrates' prayer to Pan, must, on the strict terms set by the dialogue itself, have more reason for being where it is and simply for being than the last line of the four line epitaph for Midas which, on Socrates' interpretation, can be arranged so as to create sixteen different four line epitaphs, any one of which is as good as any other. In other words, the words of the *Phaedrus*, the prayer to Pan must have some "logographic necessity".[1] There are four things Socrates prays for, and they all seem related. Their ordering and the place of the prayer in the structure of the dialogue as a whole must be revealing of Plato's thought.

The very beginning of this prayer, as inevitable as it might seem, seems to challenge the reader to account for its function in the dialogue as a whole, for it points to the organization and articulation of the *Phaedrus* into a kind of triptych. The first panel of this triptych opens with the words ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε; the last closes with Socrates' prayer to Pan, ὦ φίλε Πάν; the conclusion of the central section of the dialogue is marked by Socrates' prayer to Eros, ὦ φίλε Ἔρως (257A3).[2] In its tripartite structure, in its over-

[1] This phrase, which should direct the reader in his attempt to interpret Plato's written *logoi*, comes from *Phaedrus* 264 B 7. Socrates' illustration of his demand that a written discourse be composed as an organic whole immediately follows in his brief criticism of the Midas epitaph, 264 D 2–E 2.

[2] I owe the term "triptych" to Ann Lebeck's description of the dialogue as kind of "diptych" in her fine analysis, The Central Myth in Plato's Phaedrus, Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 13 (1972) 268.

arching theme of philosophy, and in the riddle of its ending, the *Phaedrus* most closely resembles the *Symposium*.

At the end of his *Phaedrus*, Plato leaves his reader with two questions. One is simply, where has Pan come from? His appearance here at the end of the dialogue seems so unprepared for that it is tempting to conclude that the end of the *Phaedrus* has little to do with the dialogue as a whole.[3] The second question engaging the *Phaedrus* and Plato's reader in their "external dialogue" comes from the riddling character of Socrates' prayer. The end of the *Phaedrus* seems to pose a riddle: what quantity of gold can none other than the man of real prudence and understanding make away with?

1

Somehow, Pan is present there on the banks of the Ilissos at a time when Socrates and Phaedrus have come to the end of their discussion of rhetoric and the heat of a mid-summer's day has begun to pass (καὶ τὸ πνῖγος ἠπιώτερον γέγονεν, 279 B 4). So was Eros at noon (cf. 242 A 1 and 243 D 4). We know where Phaedrus came from; the house of Morychos where he had heard Lysias' speech displaying the reasons for gratifying a non-lover (227 B 4). Both Eros and Pan are mute actors in this Platonic dialogue, as is Lysias himself (cf. 228 E 1). Eros is naturally present to this dialogue because he is one of its themes; and he and Pan are strikingly present there in the Attic countryside at the hour of high noon as two demonic presences. This, at least, is what I would like to show, for to have shown this is to have begun to show how and why Pan is present at the end of the dialogue.

Pan is not named as one of the divinities of the place chosen as the setting for the dialogue (230 B 2–C 5). Significantly, it is Socrates, a stranger to the country-side (230 C 5–D 2), who is aware of its divinities (cf. 229 C 1; 239 B 7–8). There is a plane tree there and a spring and grass, and these and the votive offerings Socrates notices point to a place sacred to Achelous and the nymphs (230 B 7). There are also Muses there, the Μοῦσαι Ἰλισιάδες,[4] bur remarkably Pan is not mentioned at all as one of the gods of the country-side. But he was very much a presence in the area of the Ilissos. There was a relief there, dedicated by launderers after the *Phaedrus* was written, but

[3] So for example Hackforth in his Plato's *Phaedrus*, (Cambridge 1952) 168–169: "The closing prayer has no special connexion with the context of the dialogue".

[4] Pausanias I, 19.5 and *Phaedrus* 262 D 3; 259 B 5–D 8; and 278 B 9.

honoring the presence of a god who presides over the end of Plato's dialogue, which shows on its upper panel Achelous, Hermes, the nymphs, and Pan playing his pipes. So suggestive is this relief of the setting of the *Phaedrus* that some have added Pan to the gods named as the setting of the dialogue is first described.[5] A little downstream, there was another memorial to Pan. Cut into the living rock near Agia Photini is another relief of Pan which, according to Wycherley, "it needs the eye of faith to see except in the most favorable of cross lights".[6]

Pan is more distinct in the *Phaedrus*. The nymphs seem to bring him into its field of vision by their constant association with him. And so does the coming of noon. Pan is first mentioned in the *Phaedrus* only after the hour of noon and its stillness have passed and the dialogue has moved well into its third and final phase. He is mentioned then (263 D 5), as he might have been at the outset, in the company of the nymphs, and their father Achelous. Here, Socrates professes to have forgotten because of his enthusiasm whether, by virtue of this enthusiasm and divine prompting, he has given a definition of love (διὰ τὸ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν οὐ πάνυ μέμνημαι, 263 D 2). Pan is introduced here, with his father Hermes, as being more skilled in definition and therefore in rhetoric than Lysias, the son of Kephalos. But why give the parentage of the nymphs, Pan, and Lysias? It would seem only to bring Hermes into the picture. This seems to be Plato's quiet way of pointing to a conception of the god of the country-side, Pan, and his father Hermes, as somehow concerned with λόγος, discourse.[7]

It is a conception we find in the *Cratylus* where, in his long discussion of the rightness of divine names, Socrates takes up the name of Hermes (407 E 1–408 B 5). This name proves to be a compound joining the verbs for speech and thought, εἴρειν and the Homeric ἐμήσατο. This etymology reveals the character of a god whose activities are all concerned with the power of speech (περὶ λόγου δύναμίν ἐστιν πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία). Socrates and Hermogenes then turn to Pan, the son of Hermes whose nature compounds both the human and the animal (διφυὴς Ἑρμοῦ υὁς). He is either *logos* itself or the brother to *logos*, and is capable of revealing

[5] As does John Travlos in his Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens (New York 1971) 289. He gives good photographs of both the "Nani" relief (fig. 382) and the relief cut into the living rock near Agia Photini (fig. 387). G. Rodenwaldt, Pan am Ilissos, Ath. Mitt. 37 (1912) 145, also seems to see Pan in Plato's initial description of the setting.

[6] R. E. Wycherley, The Scene of Plato's *Phaedrus*, Phoenix 77 (1963) 95.

[7] An association seemingly restricted to Plato in the *Cratylus* and *Phaedrus* (by implication) and Ficino. T. G. Rosenmeyer has made the best attempt to develop it in his Plato's Prayer to Pan, Hermes 90 (1962) 34–44.

all (πᾶν μηνύων), and is as his epithet αἰπόλος or goatherd, would suggest, always circulating, ἀεὶ πολῶν.

But in the *Phaedrus* the theme of discourse is combined with still another major theme, *eros*, and together they seem to combine in the larger theme of φιλοσοφία. The themes of *logos* and *eros* combine in Socrates' prayer to Eros (257 A 3–B 6) and, at the conclusion of the dialogue, as Socrates turns to Lysias and Isocrates before he turns to offer his parting prayer to Pan. Socrates has a prophecy for the young Isocrates, but it has a condition. If some higher and more divine impulse should direct him, he will go on to still greater achievements with language (ἐπὶ μείζω δέ τις αὐτὸν ἄγοι ὁρμὴ θειοτέρα, 279 A 9); for there is naturally some philosophy in his mind. This impulse must be *eros*, the element of desire for higher things and the motive force of the philosopher (cf. 257 B 2–6).

In the *Phaedrus*, Eros and Pan are connected. It is Eros and the strange fear that possesses Socrates at midday that brings Pan into the dialogue for a second time. I say a second time, because the nymphs who are named at the beginning and end of the dialogue, but named without their constant companion, inevitably bring Pan to mind. Plato's deliberate silence on this divine presence both reveals it and conceals it (230 B 7–8; 278 B 8–9). Pan and the country beliefs in the dangers of high noon and the noonday demon are suggested by the setting of the *Phaedrus* in place and in time; they surface inevitably in the Greek pastoral and they help explain one of the oddest and least noticed features of the only Socratic dialogue set outside the walls of Athens. This is Socrates' enthusiasm. At the beginning of the *Phaedrus* there seems to be little to account for it. It seems at first to be inspired by Phaedrus and his enthusiasm for Lysias' speech. But Lysias' speech itself is too cold to account for it, and it is not surprising that Socrates goes on to appeal to some sources of inspiration outside himself before he speaks his first speech (ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων, 235 C 8; cf. 238 C 7; and 278 B 8). Socrates does speak of his fear of being possessed by the nymphs,[8] but there seems to be still another demonic presence in the background and setting of the *Phaedrus*. It is a source of both inspiration and danger. Socrates recognizes it when he speaks of the onset of some danger from the gods: ἴσως γὰρ κἂν ἀποτράποιτο τὸ ἐπιόν,

[8] 238 D 1. Such an event is attested for Attica, if attestation is needed for the possibility of nympholepsy, with simple eloquence and rough skill by Archedemos, the "nympholept" who commemorated his possession by the nymphs on the walls of a cave above Vari, IG I² 784/785; 788. The American excavations of the cave above Vari are reported in Amer. Journ. of Arch. 7 (1903) 263–349.

238 D 6). Socrates goes on to say that whether this comes to pass or not will depend on the god, but which god he does not say.

Socrates' first speech is interrupted in order to recognize the divine influences somehow present in it or to it (238 C 5–D 7). When Socrates has come to its end, the theme of divine possession becomes even more pronounced just as the day seems to come to a stand-still at the moment of noon. The real source and object of Socrates' inspiration and fear now emerges from this pastoral background. The end of Socrates' first speech is in some sense its middle, for Phaedrus had exprected that he would go on to speak on the non-lover at equal length (241 D 5). Socrates had reached the middle of his speech just before noon: σχεδὸν ἤδη μεσημβρία ἵσταται ἡ δὴ καλουμένη σταθερά, 242 A 4). His sudden intention to cross back over the Ilissos and return to Athens is checked by what he calles his δαιμόνιον, 242 B 8. There must be some "logographic necessity" connecting the lovely spot on the banks of the Ilissos, noon, the themes of discourse and love, and the inner voice which compels Socrates to stay and offer his atonement to Eros; in no other dialogue has Plato lavished such care in establishing a dramatic setting in both time and place.

Socrates' inner voice seems to echo another and outward demonic presence. It now becomes clear that Eros and not the nymphs or the Muses of the Ilissos is the source of Socrates fear and enthusiasm.[9] When Socrates confesses his offense to this god or divine thing and looks for some means of atonement and purification, he says that he is prompted by his *fear* of Eros: αὐτὸν τὸν Ἔρωτα δεδιώς, 243 D 2. This simple statement has a larger context in the *Phaedrus*. It develops Socrates' conceit that his "palinode" of atonement to Eros is like the recantation the blind Stesichoros composed to expiate his offense to Helen (242 D 11–243 B 7). But before he quotes Stesichoros, he names still another poet who, like himself, had risked offending divinity. His quotation from Ibycus expresses the premonition and uneasiness he had felt while delivering his first speech, but his quotation from Ibycus alters one significant word: καί πως ἐδυσωπούμην κατ' Ἴβυκον, μή τι παρὰ θεοῖς

ἀμβλακὼν τιμὰν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμείψω.

[9] As for the ultimate source of Socrates' strange enthusiasm and Phaedrus' wonderful glow as he read Lysias' speech (234 D 3), consider Socrates' long description of the reawakening of the memory of a vision of real beauty in 250 C 7–252 C 2, and the significance of the names *himeros* and Ganymede (255 C 1–D 6); a point nicely made by Lebeck (note 2 above) 278–279.

Ibycus wrote *δέδοικα μή τι παρὰ θεοῖς* (Page, PMG 29). Fear is present in Ibycus' language, as it is in Socrates' confession of his fear of Eros. The allusion to Ibycus allows Socrates, or Plato, to hint at the gap between gods and men.

There is still another god whose presence is felt here. He stands still deeper in the background. The time of his sudden apparitions is noon and the place is the Greek countryside. This is the god Socrates' prays to at the end of the *Phaedrus* and the panic fear he produces at noon is something best captured by Theocritus in his first *Idyll.*[10]

> οὐ θέμις, ὦ ποιμὴν, τὸ μεσαμβρινὸν, οὐ θέμις ἄμμιν
> συρίσδεν· τὸν Πᾶνα δεδοίκαμες· ἦ γὰρ ἀπ' ἄγρας
> τανίκα κεκμακὼς ἀμπαύεται· ἔστι δὲ πικρός,
> καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ δριμεῖα χολὰ ποτὶ ῥινὶ κάθηται.

With great and inconspicuous art, Plato has associated Socrates' δαιμόνιον with Eros, that god or δαίμων which the *Symposium* offers as an "ikon" of Socrates and the philosopher. By setting the *Phaedrus* at noon, in a place sacred to Pan and the nymphs, Plato has subtly fused Socrates, through his δαιμόνιον, with Eros, and through Socrates' noonday fear of Eros, he has fused Socrates, Eros, and Pan. In elaborating Alcibiades' εἰκών of Socrates as a satyr or silene, Plato has made it clear how Socrates could be seen to resemble Eros and Pan.[11] Both are erotic, and, in combining a higher and a lower nature, both are demonic in the terms of the *Symposium*. And so Socrates can turn to them in the *Phaedrus* and address them in prayer: ὦ φίλε Ἔρως, ὦ φίλε Πάν.

2

Socrates' prayer to Pan and the other gods of the place is one that only he can make (contrast εὐξαίμεθ' ἄν in 278 B 3 with εὐξαμένῳ in 279 B 6). It is true that Phaedrus asks to be included in the prayer (συνεύχου,

[10] Lines 15–18. Meleager's epigram combining Eros, Pan, and noon seems inspired by the *Phaedrus*, *Anth. Pal.* VII 196. Of all the noonday demons of the Greek countryside (beginning with Proteus in *Odyssey* 4.400–450), Pan is the demon whose apparition inspired the greatest fear; cf. Ovid, *Fasti* 4.761; Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe*, 2.25–27; Ausonius, *Mosella* 178–185.

[11] Maximus of Tyre noticed the resemblance with Eros, *Philosophoumena* (Hobein) XVIII. 84 B 2, and I have tried to explore these "ikons" of Socrates in Phronesis 17 (1972) 53–60 and Arion NS 2 (1975) 116–132.

279 C 6), but not all that a friend possesses can be made common or communicated. Phaedrus is as capable of understanding precisely what Socrates is praying for as was Crito of interpreting Socrates' dream before his death (*Crito* 44 A 10–B 6) or Simmias of understanding the meaning of Socrates' last message to Euenos of Paros (*Phaedo* 61 C 2–10). With two honorable exceptions, Plato's readers, from Hermeias on, have failed to ask what Socrates is asking of Pan.[12] The prayer is now familiar to American Hellenists as an illustration of the optative in Greek (Chase and Phillips, A New Introduction to Greek, Lesson 23). But what does it mean?

Socrates' first request of Pan and the other gods of the place is that he might become fair within. Concerning this, Hermeias asked, in genuine puzzlement: Τί γάρ; κακὸς ἦν;[13] In asking this, he is as dense as Agathon and the Socrates who needed instruction from Diotima in the *Symposium*. If Eros is not καλός he must then be αἰσχρός or κακός (*Symposium* 201 E 8–204 C 6). But this is not the way things stand, for Eros, a *daimon* combining the human and the divine, is caught between the extremes that he and the philosopher serve to unite. And so at the beginning of the *Symposium*, Socrates has *become* fair (174 A 5). This holds for wisdom as well. Philosophers desire to become wise; they desire what they do not possess.[14] Socrates then prays that his external possessions or "the things I have from without" be in harmony with this inner state, and, however these inner and outer things are to be interpreted, it is clear that the thought of external possessions moves Socrates to pray for the grace to be able to think of the wise man as wealthy and to conclude with his most riddling request of Pan: for as great a quantity of gold as none other than the man of real prudence and understanding can make away with.

These translations are mine and tendentious, but I think they tend in the direction of Plato's thought. I have translated τὸν σοφόν as "wise", but in the immediate context of Socrates' prayer it is clear that Socrates is not thinking of a god but of the philosopher who at least comes close to the divine in his love for wisdom (278 D 3–6). I have translated the word σώφρων as "a man of real prudence and understanding" because the

[12] The exceptions are Paul Friedländer, Plato III, trans. Hans Meyerhoff, (Princeton 1969) 240 and T. G. Rosemeyer, (note 7 above). Unfortunately, B. Darrell Jackson relies on Hackforth's translation of the prayer to Pan in his, The Prayers of Socrates, Phronesis 16 (1971) 27–28.

[13] Hermiae Alexandrini in Platonis Phaedrum Scholia, ed. Couvreur (reprint Hildesheim 1971) 265.23.

[14] Cf. *Phaedrus* 278 D 3; *Symposium* 204 A 1; and *Lysis* 218 A 2.

concept embodied in this word has a history in the *Phaedrus* and it figures in each of the three major sections of this dialogue. As Socrates uses it at the end of the dialogue, the word has become transformed. In its first appearance, the term σωφρονεῖν serves as a term of praise and describes Lysias' sensible, level-headed non-lover (231 D 2 and 244 A 5). But once Socrates has finished the great central speech of the *Phaedrus* and pointed to the high vantage ground from which the soul can contemplate the forms of δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη, he deliberately brings this higher form of σωφροσύνη into contrast with the mortal prudence and cool calculation of the non-lover which will condemn his soul to 9,000 years of aimless wandering (256 E 3–257 A 2). His "palinode" ended, Socrates prays to Eros to turn Lysias away from the kind of discourse he has just produced and toward philosophy so that his lover Phaedrus can turn to love as well and the discourse of philosophy (257 A 3–B 6).

This is the vantage from which the word σώφρων must be seen. It is the vantage of the philosopher who has had the experience of higher and more distant things than Lysias can dream of. It is the vantage which explains the riddle of Socrates' last request. As at least some few of Plato's readers have recognized, the words I have translated "to make away with" – μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν – are taken from the common phrase which describes, in both Greek and Latin, the plunder and ravaging of a land by some hostile force.[15] Intruders carry away all they can carry and lead away all they can lead away. The force of Socrates' words is hard to mistake, but the point of view this metaphor suggests is harder to come to. It ist the point of view of the philosopher lingering on this earth for a time, but remembering the place from which he has come. It is the point of Socrates' dream of home in the *Crito* and it explains the advice he offers Euenos in the *Phaedo*. In Plato there is a constant tension between here and there: between ἐνθάδε and ἐκεῖ. But from the point of view of a Lysias or the point of view of most men, the philosopher and philosophic lover must seem a madman (ὡς παρακινῶν). But from the philosopher's point of view, gold, a thing most men value, seems something of little or no real

[15] The obvious examples of this meaning of the phrase are *Iliad* 5.484; Herodotus 1.88 and 3.39; Euripides' *Troades* 1310; and Xenophon, *Historia Graeca* 3.2.2. LS–J, who cite these examples of the phrase, seem to have been convinced by Heindorf and Ast (cf. Ast, Platonis Phaedrus [Leipzig 1810] 396) that the phrase cannot bear the common sense of "to plunder", "to make away with" in Socrates' prayer to Pan. "To make away (or off) with" is closer to Socrates' meaning and point of view than any version that suggests that the true σώφρων is really concerned with "managing" money; cf. Helen North, Sophrosyne: Self Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature (Ithaca 1966) 180.

significance. There are plenty of passages in Plato which reflect this Socratic view of wealth.[16] But in the *Phaedrus* and in Socrates' prayer to Pan, this thought is cast in the form of a riddle. The answer to this riddle is that the philosopher is a stranger, or better, a metic, in this world. His wealth is his wisdom. He can make off with none of the gold of this world, since it has no value in another.

At the beginning of the *Phaedrus*, Socrates seemed a stranger and quite out of place in the countryside just outside the walls of Athens. He strikes Phaedrus as ἀτοπώτατος and a visitor from foreign parts (ξεναγουμένῳ τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἔοικας, 230 C 7). But this stranger is more sensitive to the divinities that haunt the Ilissos than is Phaedrus. Fundamentally, he is at home in this world of Pan, the nymphs and Muses, far from the city and its pursuits. At the end of the *Phaedrus*, Socrates prays to Pan and the strange and demonic world of the philosopher is glimpsed for the last time in the dialogue. This is the way of the Ilissos. It seems to lead to divine epiphanies, whether you follow it upstream to the setting of the *Phaedrus* or down to the sea. This remains true of the river even now as its dirty waters follow Syngrou Avenue down to the Mediterranean:[17]

> Σπάσε τὸ νῆμα τῆς Ἀριάδνης καὶ νά!
> τὸ γαλάζιο κορμὶ τῆς γοργόνας.

[16] Cf. Most immediately *Republic* III 416 D 3–417 B 9 and VIII 547 B 2–C 4. *Apology* 30 B 2–4 is the Platonic passage which is possibly the most revealing of Socrates' attitude towards wealth; for which, compare Xenophon, *Symposium* 43 (a reference for which I thank Douglas Stewart). The Socratic paradox that only the wise man is wealthy turns up, much transformed, as the sixth of Cicero's Stoic Paradoxes.

[17] From George Seferis' Syngrou Avenue, 1930, in his Collected Poems: 1924–1955, translated by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard (Princeton 1967) 78–81:

> when you let your heart and your thought become one
> with the blackish river that stretches, stiffens and leaves
>
> Break Ariadne's thread and look!
> The blue body of the mermaid.

THOMAS ALEXANDER SZLEZÁK

The Acquiring of Philosophical Knowledge According to Plato's Seventh Letter

How can we acquire knowledge of Plato's philosophy? Of course by reading his dialogues. This is so plain that any differing view could be expected to cause great surprise and provoke sharp protest. Now there is one ancient source which does hold a different view, viz. that the way to get to know Plato's philosophy is either to hear him or to hear others who have heard him or to 'find' it oneself. Surprisingly enough, this dissident view received but a moderate amount of attention, although it is expressed in the Seventh Letter, a much read and no doubt important document (important it is, whether genuine or not). Obviously the numerous other problems posed by this letter seemed to deserve more care and effort.

Prof. Guthrie, however, in the latest volume of his admirable History of Greek Philosophy, did not overlook this topic. He says that those who take 'hearing' as opposed to 'reading' have "temporarily forgotten that in fifth- and fourth-century Athens the usual way of becoming acquainted with a written work was to hear it read aloud. (. . .) This point is well brought out by Ryle in his Plato's Progress. See p. 21ff." (vol. V, 1978, 411 n. 2).

If I understand Prof. Guthrie rightly, he wants to say that there is no real difficulty in what the Seventh Letter tells us and that it does not imply at all a view different from ours. Plato read his dialogues aloud in public meetings as described by Ryle (or perhaps had other people read them aloud after or instead of him); the books read aloud were certainly the same which we can read today as well; there is no hint of an oral philosophy, no reason to assume that what was to be 'heard' from Plato was not identical with what could be read[1].

[1] The view that the Seventh Letter does not know of any unwritten philosophy is extremely widespread, both in Anglo-Saxon and in Continental European scholarship. I shall argue in this paper against Prof. Guthrie only because he is perhaps the representative of the *communis opionio* most widely read; i.e. I am more concerned with a current tendency in dealing with the questions at stake than with his particular contribution.

But is it likely that anybody could forget, if only temporarily, Gilbert Ryle's unforgettable New Plato – the great thinker as supreme actor, giving public performances of his dramatic art? Perhaps there are other reasons than just forgetfulness for taking the 'hearing' of Plato's philosophy in the Seventh Letter in a sense different from 'to hear written books read aloud'.

Of course there is also the metaphorical use of ἀκούειν, equivalent to a mere 'getting information by some way or other', where reading is clearly included as one possibility. Instances of this use are to be found in the Seventh Letter itself, e.g. at 337 e 6 (cf. 336 c 5, 339 a 4), where it is said that anyone who cares to hear (ᾧ μέλει ἀκούειν) the reasons for Plato's second visit to Dionysius can do so. ἀκούειν could mean to listen when the letter was read out in the circle of Dion's friends (οἱ Δίωνος οἰκεῖοί τε καὶ ἑταῖροι, the addressees of the letter); but if the members of that circle preferred to read the document in turn each by himself, they would have 'heard' Plato's account all the same. We have therefore, theoretically, a choice between three possibilities: (a) ἀκούειν is roughly equivalent to 'to read'; (b) ἀκούειν means 'listening to a recitation of a written work'; (c) ἀκούειν means 'hearing a conversation or the spoken exposition of someone's views'. It is of course the context which must decide which sense is appropriate in a given passage.

A good starting point for our investigation is provided by the famous passage in the Phaedo where Socrates presents himself as having heard Anaxagoras' philosophy; of course this was no unwritten oral philosophy, but simply the book of Anaxagoras read aloud: ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος (97 b 8–c 1). This seems to be decisive evidence in favour of the view of Prof. Guthrie, who indeed does refer to the passage (loc. cit. and vol. IV p. 58). Unfortunately he has temporarily forgotten that Socrates did not content himself with this first hearing; being fascinated by Anaxagoras' philosophy of Nous, he 'went on and read' the book (προιὼν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων 98 b 8). If hearing a written work read aloud was, on the evidence of Phaedo 97b, "the usual way of becoming acquainted with it", then on the evidence of Phaedo 98b reading the work oneself was "the usual way of becoming *better* acquainted with it". Socrates' 'going on' from hearing to reading is not presented as something uncommon or extravagant – it is indeed the most natural thing that listening should be followed by reading if the work listened to is of some interest, and we can safely assume that it was the

most natural thing at any time in any culture where books were not something extremely rare, or something treated as sacred or secret.

There is another point which should not be overlooked. Though hearing a book read aloud might have been the usual way to get to know it, Plato does not rely on the reader's (or, for that matter, the hearer's) knowledge of the usual thing. He makes it quite unambiguously clear that Socrates' 'hearing' was the hearing of someone's recitation out of a book (ἐκ βιβλίου τινός . . . ἀναγιγνώσκοντος). This piece of information was obviously not superfluous for Plato. And he identifies the book read aloud – "the book of Anaxagoras" being a precise bibliographical reference (at least as long as there is no clear evidence that Anaxagoras wrote more than one book; see Kirk-Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 365f.)

With the Phaedo passage (and not just half of it) in mind we may turn now to the Seventh Letter. What we do not find in it is an intimation that there ever occurred, in the situations relevant for the Letter, a reading from a book (ἐκ βιβλίου). Nor is there any reference to any particular writing – although it is obvious that it makes all the difference for one's knowledge of Plato's philsophy whether one knows it from the aporetic dialogues alone, or from the Republic, the Phaedo and Symposium and all the rest.

The relevant situations are the following ones:

(1) When Plato first came to Sicily in 387 B.C., he expounded his views to Dion. Just as Ryle assumes that Plato on his third visit read the Timaeus aloud to Dionysius (Plato's Progress, 1966, p. 25), we could assume that on his first visit he read e.g. his Gorgias to Dion. But the Letter says only τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐμοὶ βέλτιστα ἀνθρώποις εἶναι μηνύων διὰ λόγων καὶ πράττειν αὐτὰ συμβουλεύων (327 a 2–4), where διὰ λόγων is universally and no doubt rightly taken as 'in conversations', not as either 'through my writings' or 'by recitations from my writings'. Nor is it said that Dion was urged to 'go on' and read what he had so far only heard.

(2) When the younger Dionysius succeeded to his father in power, Dion urged Plato to come to Syracuse in order to influence the young ruler, who was interested in philosophy (328 a 2). It is true that the main motive for summoning Plato might have been his personal ability to influence young people for the better (328 d 6, cf. 327 d 1). But as this protreptic ability was certainly based not just on pious sermons on virtue but on clearcut philosophical views about τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια (328 d 7), we might expect that Dion meanwhile tried to satisfy Dionysius' interest in philosophy with Rylean recitation from the dialogues, or that Dionysius

'went on' to read them himself. It is significant that the Letter does not say a word about this possibility of acquiring philosophical knowledge.

(3) When Plato arrived, however, Dionysius hesitated to become better acquainted with him 'by learning and listening to λόγοι about philosophy' (μανθάνων καὶ ἀκούων τῶν περὶ φιλοσοφίαν λόγων 330 b 1). Could this mean that he hesitated to listen when Plato was reading his own dialogues or that he hesitated to read them himself? For either of these meanings we would require rather something like the expressions used in the Phaedo, e.g. . . . ἀκούων ἀναγιγνώσκοντός μου ἐκ τῶν περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐμοὶ γεγραμμένων λόγων, or . . . ὤκνει προιέναι καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν.

(4) Some years after Plato's departure, Dionysius felt a fresh and apparently much stronger urge to turn to philosophy. How was he to satisfy his desire? There were people around in Syracuse who had heard certain things from Dion about Plato's philosophy, and others had heard something from them; these tried to talk to Dionysius about these things, on the assumption that he had heard the whole about it. Now Dionysius had not heard anything on Plato's first visit, and as he was ashamed to admit this, he did everything to induce Plato to come again to Sicily, wrote a long letter and even sent a big ship for him (338 dff.). A very significant situation. Neither the unnamed Syracusans nor Dionysius seem to have tried to get hold of a text of the dialogues, but those who had heard indirectly about Plato's philosophy and wanted to know more about it – very much as Socrates wanted to know more about Anaxagoras' philosophy – turned to a person whom they believed to have heard Plato personally. The juxtaposition of 'hearing from Plato and therefore knowing what he thinks' and 'hearing from others and therefore being παρακουσμάτων τινῶν ἔμμεστοι τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν' (338 d 3) shows clearly that the 'hearing' presupposed by this passage cannot be a listening to recitations. For it would not make sense to make a sharp distinction between first-hand hearers and second-hand hearers, and describe the latter group's knowledge by the severely derogatory term παρακούσματα, if the only difference was that they heard the same texts read by a different voice. All persons who read a text or hear it read aloud are qua hearers or readers in the same position, no matter whether the book was received from the author personally or via a hundred other owners, or whether the recitation was the very first one, performed by the author himself, or the hundredth one, performed by an actor who had not listened to anyone who had heard the author. Otherwise, we would have to assume that the Letter wants to ascribe to Plato the conviction that he is the only competent reader-actor of

his dialogues, endowed with such a miraculous art of interpretation that being acquainted or not with his particular way of presenting the text makes all the difference concerning knowledge of his philosophy. I do not think that Plato – if he was the author of the Letter – could have thought or written anything like that; nor is there a good reason to believe that the forger – if a forger wrote the Letter – wanted to ascribe such a view to Plato.

(5) Now, it is essential that the same alternative, hearing from Plato or hearing from others (εἴτ' ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοότες εἴτ' ἄλλων), is applied to all who ever wrote or will write on the things about which Plato was serious (341 b 7–c 2). Let us note that this ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοότες is not dependent on the φασίν of the preceeding line, nor introduced by a ὡς (like the third possibility given in the same line: ὡς εὑρόντες αὐτοί). That means that the Letter regards it as a fact that there are people who had heard Plato and thus could set out to write on what he was serious about (περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ σπουδάζω 341 c 1). Of course other people could do the same; but the distinction between ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοότες and ἄλλων ἀκηκοότες makes it clear that they would not be in the same position. The Letter reckons, moreover, with the possibility that someone could write on these things, claiming that he had 'found' them himself. But the Letter does not reckon with the possibility that someone could write about these things after having heard them from or read them in the dialogues. In this case the distinction 'having heard it from me – having heard it from others' would be reduced to the distinction 'having got it from texts via Plato – having got it from texts via others', which is, to repeat, from the point of view of acquaintance with Plato's philosophy no distinction at all. There is little help, therefore, in stating that "παρακούειν 340 b 6 and παρακούσματα 338 d 3 (not 341 b 2) do not of course refer to the 'adepts'" (Guthrie loc. cit.); what we would need if we were to accept Prof. Guthrie's interpretation is rather a good reason for believing that those who 'heard it from others' are competent judges in their own right, since they are in the same position of having heard the texts read aloud, in short that they are not just παρακουσμάτων τινῶν ἔμμεστοι.

(6) Similarly, the possible sources of Dionysius' knowledge concerning τὰ μέγιστα of Plato's philosophy (341 b 1) are listed at 345 a 7–b 2 as (a) hearing them at the only philosophical conversation he had with Plato (which was, from the point of view of content, uncomplete: πάντα μὲν οὖν οὔτε ἐγὼ διεξῆλθον 341 a 8), (b) 'finding' (not 'understanding' or 'grasping') them by himself, (c) having learnt them before from others.

Dionysius is not suspected of having plagiarized the dialogues – just as in 361 B.C. he did not try to read the dialogues secretely in order to impose on those who had asked him about Plato's views, but tried to get the man to Sicily.

(7) The Letter represents Plato as anticipating contemptuous judgements about his philosophy (339 a 4). Dionysius himself might think that what was said (by Plato in the course of their only philosophical conversation) was of little value (φαῦλα εἶναι τὰ λεχθέντα 345 b 2–3). If the things that could be heard from Plato had been roughly identical with what could be read in his works, the most natural defence for a philosopher would have been to say to the addressees of the Letter: "Well, it's up to you to decide. Use your own brains, form your own judgement: read my dialogues (sorry: have them read aloud), compare them with Dionysius' book, and you'll see whether my philosophy is worthless or not." Instead of this, we are referred to unnamed people who are said to be much more competent judges than Dionysius (345 b 5–7). It is not said or implied that these people had heard or read more or other dialogues than Dionysius. But it is implied that they have heard Plato more than once, and more complete expositions; otherwise it would be pointless to stress that Plato 'went through' those things with Dionysius only once (διεξῆλθον ἅπαξ μόνον 345 a 4) and uncompletely (οὐ πάντα διεξῆλθον 341 a 6, to which 345 a 3 refers back).

We have examined so far seven situations mentioned by the Letter, all turning upon the acquiring and deepening of one's knowledge of Plato's philosophy. The most significant thing about these situations is not that obviously none of the persons involved behaved in the way which we must regard, on the strength of Phaedo 98b, as the natural one with regard to written philosophy, namely 'to go on and read' as Socrates had done. What is much more surprising is that the Letter nowhere reproaches those persons for having failed to behave in the Socratic way. It is clear that the author of the Letter shares himself the basic assumption of the persons he is talking of, viz. that Plato's philosophy, particularly τὰ μέγιστα of it, is something to be received by hearing, not of Rylean recitations but of oral expositions and conversations. Plato the author of dialogues is simply absent from the Letter. The Platonist philosopher as reader of (or listener to) Platonic dialogues is absent as well.

This result would be clear enough if it were based only on the evidence so far adduced. In addition to all that, the Letter says that "there is no writing of mine about these things (i.e. the things περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ σπουδάζω

341 c 1, which are the things part of which [οὐ πάντα 341 a 8] Dionysius had heard from Plato and on which he later wrote a book, things bearing on τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἄκρα καὶ πρῶτα 344 d 4)" (341 c 4–5). This unambiguous statement is turned into an extremely ambiguous one by the widespread belief that its real meaning is this: "There is no σύγγραμμα of mine about these things (but there are, as everybody knows, my dialogues, which do of course deal with the things mentioned, as far as they can be dealt with; yet dialogues are not συγγράμματα, and the dialogical presentation of philosophical thoughts is something *toto coelo* different from the non-dialogical presentation used by Dionysius and others)".

The qualifications printed here in brackets are designed to avoid an 'esoteric' interpretation of the text; it is clear, moreover, that this 'esoteric' interpretation can be avoided *only if* we add these qualifications. Before examining their content, let us state that the supplementary qualifications not only free us from an esoteric Plato, but also confront us with a prophetic Plato. For, he not only condemns all those who have written on the things he is seriously concerned with, but also all future writers (περὶ πάντων τῶν γεγραφότων καὶ γραψόντων 341 c 1). If the decisive difference is that between writing a 'treatise' (to which σύγγραμμα is allegedly synonymous) and writing dialogues, then it is reasonable to condemn all γεγραφότες, provided they all wrote treatises and not dialogues (we don't of course know whether this was the case); but to condemn all γράψοντες as well would require the prophetic gift of knowing that all of them will continue to avoid the Platonic dialogue form. And this prophet Plato is, moreover, a perfect hypocrite – for he condemns the γεγραφότες in a public letter in the harshest terms without mentioning that he, according to the anti-esoteric interpretation, wrote on the same things, as far as one can write about them, and without adding the subtle reasons for the condemnation of the others and the justification of himself as a writer in the same open and unambiguous terms in which the verdict itself was uttered. Instead of this, he relies on the reader's (or hearer's) ability to supply the decisive (though by no means easy) argument himself – and that in the same letter in which he complains about the uncertainty of all communication (cf. 343 a 1). The use of the word σύγγραμμα, which allegedly contains the explanation, does not remove the fact that the Letter talks a few lines later of Plato's writing in a hypothetical way, adding that he *would be* the most qualified to do the job – here at least the addressees would be entitled to ask: "Didn't you do it already as far as it can be done? And what is wrong if others do the same according to their own, admittedly inferior,

capabilities?" The whole way of dealing with other authors on the same things would remain dishonest and unfair, whether the decisive explanation is to be supplemented in brackets or not.

Now it might be a matter of taste which is less desirable: Plato the prophetic hypocrite or Plato the 'esoteric' philosopher[2]. It is not, however, a matter of taste whether the Greek word σύγγραμμα does have the narrow sense required by the anti-esoteric interpretation, viz. 'systematic or comprehensive treatise'. It is simply a matter of evaluating the occurrences of that word. In passages like Lysis 204 d, Laws 810 b it is opposed to ποίημα, comprising all non-metrical writings whatsoever. Isocr. 2.7 and 2.42 show that this is the normal meaning of σύγγραμμα. Whereas it can be used, as in Laws 858 c 10, in an even more comprehensive sense (including poetic works), there does not seem to exist a passage in Plato where it is used in the restricted sense 'non-dialogical systematic treatise'. Nor in other authors. For the only passage quoted by LSJ for the sense 'systematic work', Galen [2nd century A.D.] 16.532 Kühn, uses it in contradistinction to ὑπόμνημα. If we apply these two notions to a work from Galen's own time, e.g. the Anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus, it is easy to see that the Commentary will be the ὑπόμνημα, the work commented on the σύγγραμμα. This σύγγραμμα is however a Platonic dialogue. Small wonder that other authors call Plato's works συγγράμματα outright, e.g. Diogenes Laertius 3.37, talking among others of the Phaedo, or Themistius *Or.* 23 p. 356 Dindorf, talking of the Republic. And the (pseudo-)Platonic Second Letter is witness that the dialogues were generally regarded as Πλάτωνος συγγράμματα: in the famous statement ". . . τὰ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενα Σωκράτους ἐστίν . . ." (314 c 3–4), λεγόμενα goes with συγγράμμα(τα) Πλάτωνος in the preceding line: "what is now being called 'Plato's writings' belongs to Socrates . . .". It is somewhat surprising, therefore, to read in Prof. Guthrie's account of the Seventh Letter that "the Republic is no ordinary written work (σύγγραμμα, Ep. 7, 341 c 5), purporting to summarize his (Plato's) final conclusions about life and reality, but as I have called it, a *mimesis* of the living, spoken word"

[2] It is essential to bear in mind that the notion of an 'estoteric' attitude to philosophy does not include secrecy. Two things are discernible in Plato's attitude, firstly a tendency to careful selection of the candidates for philosophical education (for the idea of ἐκλογή see e.g. Republic 535 a 6, Laws 969 b 8, cf. λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν Phaedrus 276 e 6), secondly the belief that it is extremely easy to refute any written account of philosophical matters (cf. Phaedrus 275 e 3–5). Written accounts can neither choose their readers nor defend themselves against refutations. Of course an author can decide not to care for these two facts. But Plato obviously did feel embarrassed by both of them.

(vol. V p. 411; the reference is to vol. IV p. 65). As there is no reason why a mimesis should not be a σύγγραμμα, this remark cannot be regarded as a satisfactory answer to Prof. Krämer, who had long ago pointed out the real meaning of the word[3]. It should be noted that it is Prof. Guthrie's view that a dialogue is not a σύγγραμμα which has to bear the burden of proof for a rather specific theory of philosophical writing and is therefore badly in need of being supported by a Greek source, but obviously cannot be given such support, whereas the opposite view that a dialogue qua prose writing is quite naturally a σύγγραμμα has no such methodical burden to bear and is in accordance with the normal Greek usage, and would therefore be the preferable one even if the specific support given to it by the passages quoted above were lacking.

Moreover, the context does not call either for the narrow sense of 'summarizing or systematic non-dialogical treatise'. The Letter says that Dionysius did not hear "all" of the πεῖρα, but missed many and the most important points (πολλὰ καὶ τὰ μέγιστα), since he claimed to know them already (341 a 8–b 2). Later he wrote about what little "he had heard on that occasion" (περὶ ὧν τότε ἤκουσε b 3); judging from the incompleteness (οὐ πάντα a 8) of Plato's account, his σύγγραμμα cannot have been very comprehensive[4]. Though Plato did not see the book, he assumes that Διονύσιος ἔγραψέν τι τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἄκρων καὶ πρώτων (344 d 4–5), which seems to point rather to a selective (τι) discussion of basic problems than to a comprehensive account of everything that belongs to philosophy. Others too wrote on the very same things (περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων b 6) – it is not said that they managed to pack more into their writings than Dionysius. And there is not, and will not be, a writing of Plato about these things (c 4) – whether comprehensive or selective; for what his "often told" λόγος is opposed to is γράφειν τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ὁτιοῦν (342 a 3–5)

[3] Mus. Helv. 21 (1964) 144; Idee und Zahl ed. H.-G. Gadamer (Heidelberg 1968) 122 n. 54. Krämer's whole discussion of the Seventh Letter (pp. 143–148 of his Mus. Helv. article) is most useful and clear; to my knowledge he has not yet received a detailed and well-argued reply from his critics.

[4] Of course it is not admissible to extract from the words συνθέντα ὡς αὑτοῦ τέχνην, οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν ἀκούοι (341 b 4) that he wrote some kind of philosophical handbook (as Prof. Guthrie seems to be inclined to do, cf. vol. IV p. 65). τέχνη can mean, in appropriate contexts, 'Rhetorical Handbook' (τέχνη alone does of course not mean 'Handbook' without qualification.) The stress is not on τέχνη as opposed to some other type of book, but on 'his *own* art, not something he had heard' (a point already observed by Prof. Krämer). The 'art' one could get from Plato was of course his διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη. But Dionysius seems to have claimed it as his own 'art of dialectics'. It is not unlikely that he chose the dialogue form for it; at least there is no evidence that he wrote a 'treatise'.

'to write down anything of these things' (not: 'to write down all of it'). If the author of the Letter wantet to ban merely a summarizing writing, he could have made it clear with very little effort, e.g. by saying 'there is no συνοπτικὸν[5] σύγγραμμα of mine'. Interpretation becomes a very easy (and very elusive) business if we allow ourselves to supply qualifying adjectives wherever we like.

Does the 'esoteric' interpretation overlook the fact that there is something which cannot be said like other μαθήματα (341 c 5), does it eliminate the sudden flash of insight (ἐξαίφνης 341 c 7, ἐξέλαμψε φρόνησις 344 b 7)? By no means. The aim is merely not to neglect the other side of the Letter's account of philosophical insight, viz. that there are, before we get to that 'flash' which cannot be transmitted by words, many things which can be spoken of and written on (cf. the ἐξηγούμενος ἐν λόγοις ἢ γράμμασιν, the γράψας ἢ λέξας in 343 d 4, 7), which are, however, so open to eristic attacks that a serious man will prefer not to write about them (344 c 1–3). Writing and speaking about these matters is supposed to be possible throughout the Letter, most notably in the excursus and the passage before it (342 a 4–6, 343 a 1–3, d 2–8, 344 c 1–d 2). Therefore, Plato appeals to the philosopher's νοῦς to prevent him from writing (343 a 1, cf. 344 d 1). We have to act according to reason where we have a real choice. Plato took the right choice by 'honouring these things' (344 d 7), Dionysius the wrong one by writing about them and thus 'throwing them out' (ib.). There is no hint that they differed by using different methods of literary presentation; they differed by writing or not writing 'on these things'.

I have wholly avoided so far the question whether the Seventh Letter is genuine or not. To regard it as a forgery precisely because of its unambiguously 'esoteric' attitude to philosophy would be no doubt more convincing than to retain it as genuine and still maintain that the esoteric attitude is utterly foreign to Plato. But it would mean to beg the question, and it would not do away with the second awkward witness for Plato's concept of oral philosophy, i.e. the final section of the Phaedrus[6].

[5] This word is used by Plato of the specific ability of the dialectician (Rep. 537c); he could have used it also of a 'synoptic' or comprehensive written exposition.

[6] I have tried to add some new arguments to the old controversy about this text in my article "Dialogform und Esoterik. Zur Deutung des platonischen Dialogs 'Phaidros'", Mus. Helv. 35, 1978, 18–32.

ROSEMARY WRIGHT

How credible are Plato's myths?

ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν.
Aristotle Metaphysics 982b 18

In the last part of the *Gorgias* Socrates states emphatically that what he is about to say on the future of the soul after death is not a *mythos* but a *logos*, and it can be called a *logos* because it is true; he reaffirms his belief in this truth both before and after drawing the appropriate conclusion from it.[1] At the end, however, Socrates recognises that Callicles is likely to dismiss the account with contempt as an old woman's *mythos*, and admits that there would be nothing strange in despising it if something better and truer could be found. This envisages the possibility, even if deemed unlikely, that a *logos* of this kind can be down-graded to a *mythos* and its truth open to correction.

Mythoi are generally disparaged by Plato as harmful lies. In the *Cratylus* for example they are contrasted with the 'smooth' truth that belongs to the gods, and are paired with lies in that human *logos* which is concerned with the rough and *tragikon*. *Mythoi*, to the exclusion of *logoi*, are the concern of poets who invent them and of dramatists who use them as subject-matter for *mimēsis*. And as soon as the poet sits on the Muses' tripod he loses his judgment, according to an old *mythos* that has Plato's approval.[2] The results, in the majority of cases, are lies with a pernicious influence, especially on the impressionable young, providing respectable precedents for immoral behaviour. The more successful the poet is the greater the damage done, and the bigger the subject the bigger the lie.[3] In the *Politicus* the public speaker is added to the epic poet and dramatist, for he too persuades the gullible, not by teaching, but by *mythologia*.[4]

These three relay plausible fictions to the audience as to a group of children.[5] Yet such childish *mythoi* at least instil a basic belief in the

[1] cf. *Gorg.* 523a, 524a, 526d, 527a.
[2] cf. *Crat.* 408c, *Phaedo* 61b, *Rep.* 394b, *Laws* 719c.
[3] cf. *Laws* 886c, *Rep.* 377e.
[4] *Pol.* 304c–d.
[5] For myths as children's education and entertainment, cf. *Rep.* 377a–c, *Soph.* 242c, *Pol.* 268e, *Tim.* 23b, *Laws* 887d.

existence of the gods (however wrong the accounts of their nature and activity), and in this they are preferable to the *logoi* of those early and contemporary *sophoi,* who have abandoned the simple faith of childhood for intellectualism, and either deny outright the existence of divinities which command belief, or else present their own accounts in turn as *mythoi* told to children.[6]

An aetiological interpretation of a myth can increase its credibility and be superficially attractive. An example is the rape by Boreas given in the *Phaedrus,* which is an acceptable incident once it is explained as a gale blowing Orithyia to her death on rocks below. But Socrates dismisses such aetiology as ἀγροικός τις σοφία and a waste of time, which can lead to much fruitless activity when more complex mythical figures loom up demanding similar explanations. He prefers to bypass this sophistication and accept traditional beliefs. He then has scope to continue with his immediate intent, the *mythos* of the wily lover who pretends not to be in love.[7] A convenient interpretation in the *Laws* of the myth of Ganymede to provide the Cretans with a respectable precedent and an expectation of indulgence from Zeus for their customs is similarly bypassed. On the other hand the account of the foundation of Troy, the Trojan war and the Dorian invasion is a model of rationalisation, and the ktistic myths of Argos, Messene and Sparta give the basis for the subsequent balance of power theory. Elsewhere the Phaethon myth is accepted as an aetiological version of the declination of the heavenly bodies and a previous conflagration, the truth being in the explanation: τοῦτο μύθου μὲν σχῆμα ἔχον λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἀληθές ἐστι ...[8]

In the *Gorgias,* however, Socrates takes over from a *sophos* a specific interpretation of the myth of the Danaids, and tries it on Callicles, unsuccessfully, as a tool of moral persuasion. The interpretation offered is ostensibly absurd, but Socrates finds the underlying meaning apposite, and would be willing to produce other examples of the same type, if there were any hope of success. 'These comparisons may seem a bit silly, but they reveal what I want to show you, so as to persuade you, if I can, to change your mind, and instead of an unfulfilled and undisciplined way of life to choose an orderly one, fulfilled and content with whatever comes to hand.

[6] cf. *Laws* 886d–e, *Soph.* 242c; for similar faint praise of traditional myth for at least establishing the existence of the gods, cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1074b 1–14.

[7] cf. *Phaedr.* 229c–e, 237a.

[8] cf. *Laws* 636d, 681d–682e, 683d, *Tim.* 22c; cf. Aristotle on the myth of Atlas, *Metaph.* 1023a 17–21.

Am I persuading you to change, and to admit that orderly people are happier than those without discipline, or will you never change at all, however many myths of this kind I tell?' Callicles assents to the second question. The apologue of the casks of wine and honey that follows has no more success, and Callicles' position is eventually dislodged, not by myths and apologues, but arguments.[9]

The characteristic of false but attractive plausibility attached to some myth, which aetiological explanation attempts to make more credible, allows Plato, with some irony, to call philosophical theses of which he is suspicious *mythoi*. The early exponents of nature for example are said to address us as if we were children, telling us *mythoi* of loves, hates, marriages and offspring among τὰ ὄντα, and even the Eleatics are included in this group.[10] In the *Theaetetus* the *dictum* of Protagoras that 'man is the measure', and that of Theaetetus identifying knowledge with perception, are both called *mythoi* which die in the course of the discussion. But Socrates has the humour to apply the same term to his own quasi-philosophical account of the 'twins' involved in any particular act of sense-perception.[11] In a similar vein Socrates calls the long and careful speech he devises in the *Phaedrus* in defence of the non-lover a *mythos* which he is ready to dismiss. But this semi-serious attitude to some forms of philosophising turns to cynicism in the *Laws*, when the Athenian admits that respect for gods, *philotimia* and a regard for spiritual rather than physical beauty are καθάπερ ἐν μύθῳ εὐχαί ('Pious wishes! What romance!' in Trevor Saunders' vivid translation), and settles instead for hard legislation on two basic principles of sexual conduct.[12]

From another point of view myth-making is a leisure-time activity, and offers a respite from the hard work of *logoi*.[13] Examples of such relaxation by Plato are intimidating. A little myth in an idle moment will give the mathematical justification for selecting 5040 as the number most suitable to be the basis for the structure of the religious organisation of the state. In the *Timaeus* an apology for putting aside the *logoi* of eternal truth and indulging in *mythoi* comes between an explanation of rust and a list of a variety of botanic juices. Proof of the proportions in colour combinations is unattain-

[9] *Gorg.* 493a–494a. Callicles here would have the support of Aristotle, who despises the subtleties of myth but respects proof, *Metaph.* 1000a 18–20.

[10] *Soph.* 242c–e.

[11] cf. *Theaet.* 164d, 156c.

[12] *Phaedr.* 241e, *Laws* 841c–d.

[13] cf. *Crit.* 110a, *Tim.* 59c.

able, but myth gives an opportunity for a general account of the mixtures involved.[14]

The whole cosmic narrative that makes up the bulk of the *Timaeus* is regarded as a form of self-indulgence, a 'splendid entertainment'.[15] On a small and on a large scale Plato is ready to make use of myth, adapting a traditional one if there is a convenient one to hand, preferably hallowed by distant antiquity, or inventing a new one (and the antiquity appropriate to it), where an invention would suit his purpose. Old myths abound in the *Laws*, and the respectability given by their age enables their content to be incorporated with little resistance into the legislation. Three examples of such convenient *mythoi* are that women are as strong as men, that the homicide should go into exile, and that established customs should not be changed.[16] Traditional myths are effective elsewhere in driving home a psychological point as in that of Gyges' ring, and the one connected with the shrine of Zeus Lykaios. 'Let's make use of a myth', says the Athenian of the *Laws* in a warning against unjust indictments, and sets up a situation in which Patroclus regains consciousness after his encounter with Hector. But in the *Phaedrus* the meeting between Theuth and Thaumas and the rejection of writing, which is introduced by Socrates as a myth of respectable parentage, is shown up by Phaedrus to be a typical Socratic invention.[17]

The account of the growth of the skeleton *polis* and the consequent specialisation of function which spreads over books two, three and four of the *Republic* is called a myth, and the process of recounting it *mythologia*. This terminology, taken with the comments on the myth of Theuth above, clarifies the status of the description of Atlantis. The narrative of Atlantis is said to be not a *mythos* but a true *logos*, and is reported as an historical event. But the lie to this is given when the avowedly fictional citizens of the *Republic* are recast as the actual citizens of ancient Athens, set in opposition to the expansion of the empire of Atlantis.[18] The one is no more historically true than the other. It is the moral to be drawn from the story that settles the level of belief demanded for it.

In the dialogue named after him Protagoras offers with paternalistic magnanimity a *mythos* and then a *logos* in support of his thesis that virtue is

[14] cf. *Laws* 771c, *Tim.* 59c–e, 68b–d.
[15] cf. *Tim.* 59d, 29d.
[16] cf. *Laws* 804e, 865d, 913b–c.
[17] cf. *Rep.* 359d–e, 565d–e, *Laws* 944a, *Phaedr.* 274c, 275b.
[18] cf. *Rep.* 501e, *Tim.* 20d, 26c–e; on these passage cf. C. Gill, The Genre of the Atlantis Story, *Class. Philol.* 72 (1977) 287–304.

teachable. He considers either method to be persuasive, but when one reinforces the other the combination is assumed to be incontrovertible. The complex structure however cannot deal with the 'minor point of information' requested of it by Socrates, and it begins to crumble.[19] Plato himself uses the terms *mythos* and *logos* interchangeably in the *Politicus*, and in the ninth book of the *Laws* they are offered as alternative labels for the *dictum* that Dikē avenges a kinsman's blood.[20] Yet there is a division made at *Republic* 522a between μυθώδεις and ἀληθινώτεροι λόγοι which points to a basic distinction between the *mythos* that is a lie and the *logos* productive of truth; Plato on the whole takes this distinction to be decisive. But the myth being a lie does not necessarily condemn it outright.

The censorship in the *Republic* deletes from the curriculum those falsehoods found in particular in Homeric and Hesiodic works which have plausibility as well as entertainment value, and are consequently educationally dangerous. But 'beautiful myths', few in comparison with their opposite, may be retained, and by means of these the souls of the young are to be moulded more effectively than their bodies are to be manipulated. However, positive examples of beautiful myths are not forthcoming, and an invitation to suggest some is side-stepped: the responsibility for the invention and adaptation of appropriate mythical material is handed back to the poets, provided they keep to the predetermined guidelines. But the poets are being given a logically impossible task, since the value and usefulness of such beautiful myths result from their being lies made very like the truth in precisely those areas where the truth is unknown.[21]

There are passages where Plato does take up this task of myth-making as a substitute for unattainable truth. In the *Republic* Hesiod's account of Kronos is described as 'the biggest lie on the biggest subject'; elsewhere Plato gives two versions, not of Kronos' relation with his father, but of the proper interpretation to be put on the age of Kronos. In the *Politicus* the Stranger says that he is taking a large part of a big myth, 'waking it up', and relating it as a story told to children. The myth itself however is presented in all seriousness, and points up two mistakes made in the earlier attempt to define the statesman. But a few pages later myth-making is condemned as the means of popular persuasion used by public speakers in place of

[19] cf. *Prot.* 328c, 329b.

[20] cf. *Pol.* 277b–c, *Laws* 872d–e.

[21] cf. *Rep.* 377c, 378e–379a, and also *Rep.* 382d: διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψευδὸς ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν;

teaching. The second version of the age of Kronos is in the *Laws*. This is more conventional, with a strong moral line emphasising the importance of order in the soul. And it is here, with the advent of the moral, that the myth becomes a *logos* involving truth.[22]

On a larger scale, the cosmic narrative which forms the major part of the *Timaeus* is termed a 'likely myth', and in this it recalls the verdict on the growth of the state in the *Republic* as *mythologia*.[23] An argument of doubtful validity in the prelude to the *Timaeus* (29a–d) shows how such myths are to be understood. Words are there said to partake of the nature of that which they depict. A description therefore of what is changeless and fixed will have these qualities itself, that is, it will be as irrefutable as a description in words can be. Then, since the relation of truth to belief is as being is to genesis, ἡ τοῦ παντὸς γένεσις, which is an εἰκών of the changeless, can itself be no more than εἰκώς, and a description of that likeness will be merely likely. Human fallibility makes the account even less secure, for 'what we say reflects our fortuitous and random state'.[24]

Eschatological myth is similar. The fate of the soul after death is another area where truth is unattainable. The Homeric vocabulary of terror and fear is roundly denounced in the third book of the *Republic*, but the Platonic myths on this subject offer little comfort to the non-philosophic. The epistemological status of these myths is shown in a characteristic contrast in the *Phaedo*,[25] where proof is admitted to be beyond the skill of Glaucus and Socrates (and if attainable would take more than a lifetime to expound), but a narrative of Socrates' belief – the 'beautiful myth' of 110b – is possible. The subsequent account leads into the description of the judgment and sentence passed on the newly dead. In the concluding apology it is said that a reasonable man is not expected to take the description as factually true, but as probable and appropriate. Acceptance of the narrative is finally recommended, not on its approximation to truth, but on the grounds of the importance of the moral to be deduced from it.[26]

In the *Phaedrus* there is a franker confession of ignorance of the subject-matter of the eschatological myth given there. In introducing it Socrates says that only a god knows what the soul is, but we, without having seen or

[22] cf. *Rep.* 377e, *Pol.* 268d–e, 272d, 274e–275c, 304d, *Laws* 713c–714b, esp. 713e.
[23] cf. *Tim.* 29d, *Rep.* 501e.
[24] *Tim.* 29b–d, 34c.
[25] *Phaedo* 108d; the specific subject is the nature of the true earth, but the implications are for the myth as a whole.
[26] *Phaedo* 114d.

adequately understood, use our imagination,[27] and construct a narrative accordingly. This connects with the passage in the second book of the *Republic* where it is concluded that a lie is acceptable and recommended in areas where we are factually ignorant. The ultimate purpose and justification is its moral usefulness. And in this it is coupled with the lie that is like a medicine, a φάρμακον χρήσιμον, deliberately told to a friend to divert him from embarking on some *kakon* in madness or folly.[28]

The administrator of such medicine must be on firm moral ground if he is to gauge exactly the circumstances in which the supposed good of the patient takes precedence over the generally accepted obligation to be honest oneself in telling the truth.[29] The difficulties of the position is shown by Socrates' embarrassment over the 'noble lie' (a synonym for 'beautiful myth'), which it is deemed necessary to administer to the populace at large. The object is to secure acceptance, for their own good, of their status in life by the three classes, but the *mechanē* for persuasion is not easy to find, and it may take two or more generations to secure credibility.[30]

That the moral of a myth is of overriding importance is shown by the final comment on the Myth of Er – 'we shall be saved if we believe it'.[31] There is also a less well known, and somewhat unpleasant, example in the first book of the *Laws*. It is to the effect that we are puppets of the gods, jerked about by our emotions for their amusement or for some other purpose. *Logismos* however is a golden string, requiring constant attention to ensure that its pull is greater than that of all the other strings . . . καὶ οὕτω δὴ περὶ θαυμάτων ὡς ὄντων ἡμῶν ὁ μῦθος ἀρετῆς σεσωμένος ἂν εἴη. With the intrusion of the moral the *mythos* again becomes a true *logos* which the individual must accept and live by.[32]

A commentary on the underlying purpose is provided by the second book of the *Laws:* disregarding the truth of the matter, the legislator tells his lie for the good of the young, and the usefulness of the lie is in proportion to its credibility and consequent influence on conduct. Given the gullibility of people who accept Cadmus and the dragon's teeth, the legislator has only to find out the belief that would most benefit the city, and

[27] *Phaedr.* 246c 7: πλάττομεν οὔτε ἰδοντες οὔτε ἱκανῶς νοήσαντες.
[28] *Rep.* 382c.
[29] *Rep.* 382c–d; that truth-telling is the norm is shown by the abhorrence with which the liar is regarded, 382c 7.
[30] cf. *Rep.* 414e–415d.
[31] *Rep.* 621c 1.
[32] *Laws* 644d–645b.

then to brainwash the community into lifelong acceptance of it by means of chants, myths and slogans, culminating in the songs and spells of the senior citizens, whose natural reluctance to take part in such proceedings has been overcome by the cup of Dionysus.[33] The chanting of a myth, especially at length or repetitiously, has a hypnotic effect which is conducive to persuasion.[34]

Because of the nature of myth-making and its subject-matter, myth could not be used as a means of approaching, attaining or relaying knowledge of truth, but Plato, while recognising its limitations and dangers, was ready to adopt it in a variety of circumstances as an instrument of moral education. Its entertainment value and peculiar attraction could be harnessed to advantage in moulding the minds of the young, and in persuading and encouraging the adult to adopt an appropriate way of life. A loss of dignity and freedom is the price to be paid.[35]

[33] cf. *Laws* 663–6.

[34] cf. *Phaedo* 114d, *Laws* 887d, 903b. Another use for the technique (ἐν μύθοις τε καὶ ἐν ῥήμασιν καὶ ἐν μέλεσιν ἄδοντες) is in the suppression of erotic cravings, *Laws* 840c.

[35] cf. Aristotle's conclusions (i) that myth prevails over knowledge because of habit, (ii) that it is a legal and utilitarian expedient for the persuasion of the people, *Metaph.* 995a 4–6, 1074b 4–8. The problem is still with us, cf. S. Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (Brighton 1978) and M. Warnock's review, The Listener, 23 November 1978, 684.

William W. Fortenbaugh

Theophrastus on Fate and Character

Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 1.6.17c (p. 89 Wachsmuth):

Θεόφραστος προσδιαρθροῖ ταῖς αἰτίαις τὴν κατὰ προαίρεσιν· φέρεται δέ πως εἰς τὸ εἱμαρμένην εἶναι τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν· ἐν ᾗ τόπον τεττάρων αἰτιῶν ποικίλων, προαιρέσεως ⟨φύσεως⟩ τύχης καὶ ἀνάγκης.

Alexander, *De Anima Libri Mantissa* 186.28–31:

φανερώτατα δὲ Θεόφραστος δείκνυσιν ταὐτὸν ὂν τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἐν τῷ Καλλισθένει, καὶ Πολύζηλος δὲ ἐν τῷ οὕτως ἐπιγραφομένῳ Περὶ εἱμαρμένης συγγράμματι.

The above passages are by no means easy to interpret. The last portion of the Stobaeus-passage (ἐν ᾗ – καὶ ἀνάγκης) involves textual difficulties which I plan to discuss elsewhere (in my forthcoming edition of and commentary on the ethical fragments of Theophrastus). Furthermore, the authorship of the *Mantissa* and the relationship of 179.21–186.31 to Alexander's *De Fato* are problematic, but important for a full understanding of the quoted passages (especially relevant is a new paper by Robert Sharples "The last section of Alexander of Aphrodisias *de anima libri mantissa*", still in private circulation). It seems to me, however, not only possible but also in a Festschrift honoring Professor Knox quite appropritate to offer some brief comments which focus on the connection between fate and human character.

It is clear that the list of causes given in the Stobaeus-passage is no creation ex nihilo. We can think of Plato's *Laws* 888e–889a and several Aristotelian texts. Especially interesting is *Nichomachean Ethics* 1112a 31–3: αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. A relationship to the Stobaeus-passage seems obvious, only φύσις is used in connection with regularly occurring phenomena like the solstices and the sunrise (*EN* 1112 A 25–6). Such

phenomena are not ἐφ' ἡμῖν and therefore not objects of practical deliberation (βούλευσις). In the Stobaeus-passage φύσις appears to be used quite differently. It signifies the character of an individual person. In this sense φύσις is (up to a point) ἐφ' ἡμῖν and an appropriate object of deliberation. For even if an individual cannot fully alter a bad habit, he can often block or mitigate undesirable consequences. This difference in the usage of φύσις may be important. I want to suggest that Theophrastus, whose interest in human character is well known, has quite consciously modified Aristotle's list of causes. Our *Mantissa* passage tells us that in his Καλλισθένης Theophrastus connected fate with φύσις. It seems reasonable to suppose that in this work Theophrastus concerned himself with the death of Callisthenes and at the same time commented on the role of φύσις (= character) in determining the fate of individual human beings.

It is, of course, not immediately clear, how we should interpret the φύσις of an individual human being. When φύσις is contrasted with ἕξις or ἔθος (cf. Arist. *EN* 1103a 14–b 3, 1106a 6–13, 1148b 29–33) then we are likely to associate φύσις with various kinds of innate dispositions. And since the fate of Callisthenes can be explained by reference to inherited lethargy, we may think that Theophrastus used φύσις in the sense of innate character. Nevertheless, it seems to me likely that Theophrastus used φύσις in a wider sense, which included not only inherited dispositions but also acquired virtues and vices.[1] We know that Theophrastus had not only a botanical (cf. *CP* 4,11,5–7) but also an ethical interest[2] in acquired habits, which in time become second nature, and can easily imagine that Theophrastus connected τὸ κατὰ φύσιν with τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην, in order to emphasize the fate-determining role of both innate and acquired φύσεις.[3]

That φύσις in the sense of individual character is not to be identified with προαίρεσις, τύχη or ἀνάγκη is clear enough. Here I want only to emphasize that while φύσις is different from τύχη, it can combine with τύχη to cause something to happen. An example from tragedy – one so often and well discussed by Professor Knox – is Oedipus. For while Oedipus' meeting with Laius was quite unexpected, his angry response was not. A chance meeting and a particular φύσις combined with dreadful

[1] For such a wide usage see *EN* 1154a 32.

[2] Cf. Stobaeus 2,31,124; Athenaeus 6,261d–e.

[3] It should at least be mentionned that the majority, perhaps all the examples given in *Mantissa* 185.26–31: the ἀψίμαχος, ἀκόλαστος, καρτερικός and ἀνελεύθερος, are readily associated with acquired character. But since the reference to Theophrastus comes a whole page later, any argument based on these example cannot be decisive.

consequences.[4] A second example – this time from comedy and one contemporary with Theophrastus – is Polemon in the Perikeiromene of Menander. This comic character is a σφοδρός (128 OCT), who on account of his temperament is predisposed to quick and violent reactions. When this temperament is excited through a chance combination of events: his return from war and what appears to be an amorous meeting between his mistress and her brother, then φύσις and τύχη work together to set in motion a quite delightful comedy.[5]

Whether or not Callisthenes can be viewed in similar terms is problematic. On is tempted to say that Callisthenes was unlucky in that he came together with a hot-tempered man (i.e. Alexander), whose character was slowly changed through good fortune[6]. However, bad luck in the sense of unforeseeable misfortune[7] would presuppose that the change in Alexander's character and the consequent events were not to be expected. That this condition was fulfilled, is difficult to demonstrate and in my opinion something which Theophrastus never tried to show. It seems more likely that in the Καλλισθένης Theophrastus combined the effects of good fortune on Alexander with the φύσις of Callisthenes and labeled the latter εἱμαρμένη. We read in Plutarch that Alexander was a choleric person (*Quaest. Conviv.* 623E, *Vita Alexandri* 4, 3–4) and in Diogenes Laertius that Aristotle attributed a lethargic nature to Callisthenes (5, 39). Theophrastus may well have argued that the characters of these two men determined a fateful conflict.[8] Alternatively Theophrastus may have described Callisthenes as one who often and openly spoke his mind (cf. Diogenes Laertius 5.5). For in conjunction with a choleric king such a habit would be fatal. Alexander was, of course, not to be excused, for even if he suffered under an innate impetuosity, he should have conducted himself in ways that controlled his temperament (cf. *Mantissa* 185.19–21, 32–6). Nevertheless, the lethargy or frankness of Callisthenes was an important factor. Callisthenes should have removed himself from the company of Alexander and avoided provocative situations (cf. Plutarch *Quaest. Conviv.* 623F–624A). It was,

[4] On the extremly interesting use of φύσις at *Oedipus Tyrannus* 674 see Professor Knox's remarks in his Oedipus at Thebes (New Haven 1957) 142–3.

[5] On Polemon see my Menander's Perikeiromene: Misfortune, Vehemence and Polemon, Phoenix 28 (1974) 430–43; on φύσις see 434 n. 7).

[6] See Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 3,21.

[7] ἄσκοπος γὰρ ἡ τύχη, φησὶν ὁ Θεόφραστος κ.τ.λ.; Plutarch, *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 6,104 C–D.

[8] For conflict between quick and lethargic temperament see Plato, *Statesman* 305d–311c and my Plato: Temperament and Eugenic Policy, Arethusa 8 (1975) 283–305.

however, part of his nature to delay or alternatively to speak openly, so that Theophrastus could argue that the φύσις of Callisthenes played a fateful role in determining his death.

That Theophrastus in the Καλλισθένης not only focused on the particular φύσεις of Callisthenes and Alexander, but also offered a general treatment of human character seems to me very likely.[9] Here I want only to point out that both philosophy and popular thought provided sufficient occasion for a thorough discussion of individual character and its role in determining man's fate. Well known are the words of Heraclitus: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων (Diels-Kranz 22B 119). Less well known but equally significant is the speech of Onesimos in Menander's Epitrepontes (1092–99 OCT). For here we are told that in each one of us the gods have established character (τρόπος) as a garrison-commander. If we use this commander badly, we are brought to ruin; if well, then we are saved. He is to us a god and for each of us the cause both of doing well and doing badly (οὗτός ἐσθ' ἡμῖν θεὸς | ὅ τ' αἴτιος καὶ τοῦ καλῶν καὶ τοῦ κακῶς | πράττειν ἑκάστῳ 1096–8). K. Gaiser[10] remarks that the words of Onesimos indicate a philosophical source, according to which good and bad character determines our fate. Gaiser mentions Theophrastus but adds cautiously that express evidence is lacking. This caution is, of course, understandable. I want, however, to suggest that in the Καλλισθένης Theophrastus discussed the πρόπος or φύσις of the individual and that he did so in such detail, that the author of the *Mantissa* could quite properly group Theophrastus together with Polyzelos and say that in their case the identification of τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην with τὸ κατὰ φύσις is especially clear.

[9] On this point see my Commentary K (1,15) to the ethical fragments.
[10] Menander und der Peripatos, Ant. & Abendl. 13 (1967) 29.

GERHART SCHNEEWEISS

History and Philosophy in Plutarch

Observations on Plutarch's Lycurgus

In his Life of the Spartan law-giver Lycurgus, Plutarch praises his hero as the best philosopher, better than Plato, Diogenes, Zeno and all political thinkers; for Lycurgus built up the best state, which Plutarch interprets as a realization of Plato's ideal state, and so Lycurgus "brought into daylight not writings and words, but an inimitable state" (*Lyc.* 31,2–3. As far as possible, the English translation is given in the wording of Plutarch's Moralia and Lives in the Loeb Classical Library 1965 and later). Lycurgus appears as having brought into reality, what later thinkers conceived only theoretically (cp. *Mor.* 719A). But in Plutarch's mind Spartan philosophy is not restricted to the admired wisdom of Lycurgus. The greatest achievement of this law-giver is "a whole city practising philosophy" (*Lyc.* 31.3). And on the subject of Spartan education Plutarch points out as its result "that philosphy rather than love of bodily exercise was the special characteristic of the Spartan kind of life" (*Lyc.* 20,16). This seems a complete perversion of historical truth. But is it thinkable that a thoughtful author like Plutarch did not see the gap between historical facts and his interpretation? Perhaps he just intended this striking paradox.

It is obvious that in the description of education in Sparta (*Lyc.* 12–27) he diminishes its military importance and emphasizes its moral one. The moral aspect prevails even in Plutarch's presentation of physical education (14–17). Following Plato (*Leg.* IV 721a) and Aristotle (*Pol.* VII 1334b 29), Plutarch sees the first precondition for proper education in instructions concerning marriage and begetting children (*Lyc.* 14–15). But in his view the physical education of Spartan maidens not only gives them strenght for "struggling successfully and easily with the pangs of childbirth", fertility, and sturdy offspring, as in the parallel passage in Xenophon (*Lyc.* 14,3, cp. *Mor.* 227D; Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 1,3.4.6; Critias fr. 32). Plutarch emphasizes the ethical aspect of these measures as an "exercise of self-restraint and moderation", which "freed them from softness and delicacy and all effeminacy" (*Lyc.* 15,10), because childbirth is not the only purpose of

marriage (*Comp. Lyc. Num.* 4, 1f. cf. L. Goessler, Plutarchs Gedanken über die Ehe [Diss. Zürich 1962] 92, 145). It is obvious that Plutarch is less interested in the fact of these exercises as such than in the idea that education is also important for women (*Mor.* 145C; R. Hirzel, Plutarch [Leipzig 1912] 29; Goessler ibid.; K. M. Westaway, The Educational Theory of Plutarch [London 1922] 167), and he wanted to see the moral results of this education as the goal of Lycurgus' institutions both for men and women. Therefore he had to reject Aristotle's view of Spartan women, that Lycurgus desisted from teaching them self-control because he could not overcome their licentiousness and power (*Lyc.* 14,2 cp. Arist. *Pol.* II 1270A 6; 1269b 12ff.).

Here again Plutarch is in conflict with the historical view of this philosopher, by whose theoretical ideas he is interpreting Spartan history.

But temperance is only one aspect of his interpretation of Spartan marriage. He acknowledges the result of the exercises of Spartan girls as "incentives to marriage" (*Lyc.* 15,1; 14,4; cp. Plat. *Rep.* V, 458D), because the health and beauty of the maidens is attractive to men (*Lyc.* 14,7). On the side of the young men, however, passion can remain unexcited and undisturbed in the presence of maidenly beauty (*Lyc.* 14,7, cp. *Mor.* 83B). The same is true with Lycurgus' restrictive measures concerning marriage itself. Plutarch mentions not only sobriety of intercourse and mutual temperance (*Lyc.* 15,6.8; cp. *Mor.* 767E), but above all he emphasizes the psychological and ethical aspect of mutual longing and delight, as by these measures "their bodies remained full of creative energy and their affections new and fresh, not sated and dulled by unrestricted intercourse" (*Lyc.* 15,10; cp. Xen. *Lac. Rep.* I 5). In the Spartan kind of marriage Plutarch even sees marks of his idea of true fulfillment in affectionate unity full of kindly love (*Comp. Lyc. Num.* 4,1; *Mor.* 156CD, 769A, *Solon* 20,5–6; cp. Goessler 92). And though he is aware that only the beginnings of his ideal concept of affectionate living together are realized in Spartan marriage, for him just this budding realization is one reason for Sparta's welfare.

It is noteworthy that when considering the education of Spartan maidens he does not even mention Plato's view of making women ready to fight in battle for themselves, their children and their country (*Rep.* V 451 DE, 452; *Laws* VII 805 DE, 806 A, 813 E, VIII 832 E), though he apparently had adopted this in his first draft (Plut. *Apophth. Lac.* 227D); for Plutarch obviously this was as much an aberration from the leading idea of temperance as Plato's remarks on joint exercises of women and men (*Rep.* V 451ff.; *Laws* VII 804Df.). So he interprets the tradition of equality

between men and women in Sparta in a deeper sense, according to his philosophical belief that these exercises "gave also to womankind a noble spirit, for they felt that they, too, had a place in the arena of virtue and ambition" (*Lyc.* 14,7; 26,8; *Mor.* 227 E, 242 F, 243 B, 250 F, 259 DE ff.; *Popl.* 19,8; *Alex.* 12,1–6; *Cam.* 8,4; *Brut.* 13,4 ff.; 23,7; Goessler, 81–82 and 145; M. Pohlenz, Gestalten aus Hellas [München 1950] 701).

Plutarch is far away from Aristotle's view, too, that the Spartans "turn the young into savages, . . . on the ground that this is conductive to bravery" (Arist. *Polit.* VII 3,1338b 12–14). Bravery, it is true, is also in Plutarch the beginning and end of Spartan education; but, curiously enough, it is defined in a more genuinely Aristotelean manner than in the cited passage by Aristotle himself. For Plutarch this bravery of the Spartans is neither fear nor fury but its right mean, "the firm mind, full of hope and courage, believing, as they do, that God is with them" (*Lyc.* 22,6 cp. Arist. *EN* II 7,1107a 33; III 9,1115a 6; *EE* III 1,1228a 36). Thus the Spartans were raised from first childhood by skillful nurses, who taught them "not to be fearful of the dark nor afraid to be left alone nor given to ignoble peevishness and whimpering" (*Lyc.* 16,4, cp. 12,14). Bravery as the end of physical education is combined with the virtue of endurance. This is true already with the infants, and it goes on with the boys, as Plutarch shows by the story of the boy who had stolen a fox and "suffered the animal to tear out his bowels with its teeth and claws, and died rather than have his theft detected" (*Lyc.* 18,1 cp. *Mor.* 234 AB). Plutarch even testifies as an eye-witness to the unbelievable endurance of young Spartans which "frequently lasts to the point of death at the ritual flagellation at the altar of Artemis Orthia" (*Lyc.* 18,2).

Here again Plutarch is not interested in the historical facts, nor in their martial or religious meaning (cp. W. den Boer, Laconian Studies [Amsterdam 1954] 435), but only in the idea that traces of right conduct, taught by philosophy, appear in this praised Spartan virtue. In Plutarch's belief, this brave endurance is the condition and basis of virtue in general (cp. *Lyc.* 2,3; 11,3). And this is the purpose of physical training, as he declares in his "*Progress in Virtue*": "The body by virtue of training is actually capable of rendering itself and its members so obedient to its injunctions of indifference that the eyes refrain from tears at a piteous sight, and the heart from throbbing in the midst of terrors, and the passions remain unexcited and undisturbed in the presence of youthful or maidenly beauty" (*Mor.* 83 B). Following Aristotle, Plutarch derives ethical virtue from habit, by which the irrational acquires virtuous quality and differentiation in order

to be accustomed to acting virtuously, unhindered by incontinence and softness (*Mor.* 443 CD, 33 F, 119 D). From this philosophical background his interpretation of Lycurgus' educational measures can be the same as Plato's: they are conducive to virtue as a whole (ib., Plato, *Laws* I 632 CD, 630 AB, 631 C). But moral conformity to the ethical teachings of philosophy is not so much the reason why Plutarch, referring to Plato's Protagoras (342 E), calls the "Spartan way of life philosophy rather than love of bodily exercise" (*Lyc.* 20,16).

As the context shows, in this remark Plato is alluding to the Spartan's "ability to give polished, quick-witted answers, which is the sign of a learned man" (*Prot.* ibid.); and in Plutarch this is the conclusion of a series of Spartan apophthegms which he presented as a proof of another side of Spartan education (ch. 20), as they were also taught "to use a manner of speech which combined pungency with grace and condensed much observation into few words" (*Lyc.* 19,1). Ready wit in short sententious sayings was combined with "good style and purity in speech" as well as "reason and proof" (*Lyc.* 19,2; 21,1; 18,5) and showed the high value given to the word in Sparta. This approach to language, elsewhere (seldom enough) reached by long mental and philosophical training, seems to justify Plutarch's (and Plato's) characterization of "Spartan philosophy". But for Plutarch's philosophical concept intellectual education must not be isolated from its moral background. This conviction he sees confirmed in Sparta. There not only the subjects of questions and answers, by which the boys are trained, are directed to right moral judgement and habit (*Lyc.* 18,4), but even the purity of speech itself is seen as an expression of the virtue of temperance (*Mor.* 90 BC), which for Plutarch is essential in the Lycurgean constitution as well as for the health of any state in general. Intemperance in talking makes a discourse empty and vapid and he considers this fact equal to "sexual incontinence, which generally produces unfruitfulness and sterility" (*Lyc.* 19,3; *Mor.* 503 BC, 505 A, 10 B).

And further on, "those who use few words need also but few laws" (*Mor.* 232 C), for continence means the guidance of reason, which is "not a small part of virtue" (*Mor.* 90 C). This is the connecting link to the Rhetra, by which Lycurgus forbade written laws (*Lyc.* 13,1); for "the most important and binding principles, which conduce to the happiness and virtue of a city, must be implanted in the training and habits of its citizens, so that they could remain unchangeable and secure, having a stronger bond than force from outside in the deliberate resolution imparted to the young

by education, which accomplishes the disposition of a lawgiver in every one of them" (*Lyc.* 13,2).

So the absence of written laws in Sparta is not explained in the way Plato explained it, as a concession, because not everything can be regulated by prescriptions of law (*Lyc.* 13,3; cp. Plato, *Laws* VI 772 A). Plutarch not only generalizes this aspect for all, even the most important, matters and basic principles (*Lyc.* 13,2), but also he directs the view away from the subject-matter to man, who, as the result of proper education, has the right habit, the insight of a lawgiver, by which he is able to decide all matters in the right way and does not need any written laws (*Lyc.* 31,1; 25,5 *Comp. Lyc. Num.* 4,9; *Mor.* 574 A; Plato, *Laws* 875 CD, *Polit.* 294 A).

This concept of moral autonomy, of course, is Aristotelian, though Aristotle himself again denied just this presupposition for unwritten laws in Sparta (Arist. *Pol.* 1270b 28–29, 37–40). Plutarch, who sees the soundness and effeciveness of Spartan institutions – Platonist as he was – finds the reason for this health in the idea behind the real facts. This idea, of course, could be only partly realized, but for him historic greatness is unthinkable without the validity of this idea. And so he is more interested in the idea which lies behind the historical facts than in the mere facts themselves. For, as Plutarch himself points out, "only duller minds can be content with mere history", as history "in its outcome is mostly due to chance" (*Mor.* 575 C). In this sense he interprets what he finds to be sound and effective beginnings in Spartan education. This is true not only with particular aspects of Spartan education, but also with its system as a whole.

By his remark at the end of chapter 20 Plutarch not only emphasizes the high rank of Spartan mental education as "philosophy"; he also indicates the superiority of mental education above physical, as well as giving a hint as to the intent of his presentation, having first dealt with "*philogymnastein*" (14–17), then with "*philosophein*" (18–20). This hierarchy of values corresponds with what was said about the qualities of the boys' leader, whose orders they obey (16,8): not the strongest, but the wisest and the most high-spirited was chosen. By this Plutarch obviously points to the hierarchy of the three parts of human being, that is that of the body serving spirit and mind in the last instance, and he explains the concept of this education in accordance with human nature as it appears to a philosopher in the Academic tradition.

Regarding these three parts of human nature, the reason is quite obvious why for Plutarch the right education of man, as was the case in Sparta, cannot be restricted only to body and mind. Plutarch does not accept the

Stoic theory of virtue in the sense of a total rationalism. As he says, "not every part of the soul can be changed from vice by reason, but one part has need of another kind of persuasion to cooperate with it, to mould it and to tame it, if it is not to be utterly intractable and obstinate to the teaching of philosophy" (*Mor.* 441 E). As in this connection Plutarch refers to Pythagoras and "his enthusiasm for the study of music", here we have the reason why in his Lycurgus he adds a third section on Spartan education of the spirit by the means of music and poetry (ch. 21).

It is not only the subject of the songs and their texts that makes musical education ethically important (*Lyc.* 21,2.6; *Mor.* 1140 E, 1145 E). The very task of musical training is its effect on the irrational part of the soul, as "music is helpful for every occasion and all serious activity, but especially for meeting the perils of war" (*Mor.* 1140 C).

So in this passage of his Lycurgus, Plutarch describes the influence of the Doric tune, "that roused the spirit and awoke enthusiastic and effectual effort" (*Lyc.* 21,1.6; 22,6; *Mor.* 83 F, 238 B, 1145 F). But as "the over-assertive warlike spirit has to be combined with a harmonious habit, so that it might have concord and harmony" (*Mor.* 238 B), musical harmony also has the power to "compose the soul in purity, concord, and harmony" (*Mor.* 1146 D, 167 C, 1147 A cp. *Lyc.* 22,6), as is shown in the beginning of Plutarch's *Lycurgus* by the influence of Thaletas and his music, which healed the diseases of the state and restored right order and harmony (*Lyc.* 4,2ff.; *Mor.* 1146 ABCD).

This moral view of music is based on Plato, as Plutarch himself indicates. The harmony within the soul, which music creates, goes back to "God, who has shaped all things in a framework based on harmony" (*Mor.* 1147 A, 1139 B. 167 BC, 156 C). This relation between music and the gods is expressed in the *Lycurgus*: for the sound of the flute, the rhythm, and the melody of the songs gave the Spartans the conviction that God was their ally, when they were going into battle (*Lyc.* 22,6, cp. 21,7).

This conception of Spartan music is striking; for in the parallel report of Thucydides, by the rhythms of music the Lacedaemonians were only helped to march properly, while the ethical and metaphysical aspects are expressly excluded (Thuc. V 70,1).

Here again Plutarch sees the idea recognized by Plato, Aristotle, and Aristoxenus at work. For Plutarch music is the link which unites human abilities.

His understanding of what was undertaken by Spartan education goes further in the direction of a total view of human education. He cannot

believe that Sparta's great political achievements were possible on the ground of an one-sided, matter-oriented, specialized education. Therefore he shows those aspects of Spartan education that lead to a total view of the whole human being.

Real shortcomings can be overlooked, as a great idea is at work. And so he shows by the example of Sparta the idea of genuine human education.

By this approach to history, concentrating not on its chance events but on the idea behind them, Plutarch shows himself to be transferring Plato's theory of ideas to history (*Pericl.* 1,2–4; *Mor.* 575 C, 550 DE, 611 A).

HUBERT MARTIN, JR.

Plutarch as Molten Bronze: the Comparison at *Amatorius* 752D

The *Amatorius* is cast in the form of a dialogue narrated by Plutarch's son Autobulus. In his introductory remarks Autobulus informs his listeners that the conversation he is about to recount took place before his birth, during the celebration of the Erotidia at Thespiae, whither his father and mother had gone to offer sacrifice to Eros (748F, 749B). After several days of philosophical discourse in the city, Autobulus explains, Plutarch and his company of friends withdrew to the precinct of the Muses on Mt. Helicon to escape from the concerns of the festival (748E–F, 749B–C). There, however, they were sought out by two prominent Thespians, Anthemion and Pisias, both devoted to a handsome youth named Bacchon, Anthemion as a kinsman, Pisias as a lover (749C, 749E). It seems that a beautiful and wealthy widow, Ismenodora, was determined to have Bacchon for a husband and that the perplexed youth had turned to these two for guidance (749D–E); but they were at odds, Anthemion favoring and Pisias opposing the match, and had come to use Plutarch and his friends as arbiters (749C–D, 749F–750A). Among Plutarch's circle, Daphnaeus took sides with Anthemion and Protogenes with Pisias (750A), and the dialogue proper opens with a debate between Daphnaeus and Protogenes (750A–752B). Daphnaeus' vigorous defense of the heterosexual-conjugal Eros against his pederastic counterpart championed by Protogenes (750B–C, 751B–752B) provokes Pisias into an attack on heterosexual love in general (752B–C), and Plutarch himself then rushes to the aid of Daphnaeus and married love (752C–D).[1]

It is in response to Plutarch's intervention that Pisias employs the comparison that will constitute the focal point of this paper (752D):

> Δαφναῖον δ' ὁρῶ ταὐτὸν πάσχοντα τῷ χαλκῷ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος οὐχ οὕτως ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ πεπυρωμένου χαλκοῦ καὶ ῥέοντος,

[1] Daphnaeus implicitly treats marriage as the natural result of heterosexual love (see esp. 750B–C, 751C–D, 751F–752A).

ἂν ἐπιχέῃ τις, ἀνατήκεται καὶ ῥεῖ συνεξυγραινόμενος· καὶ τοῦτον οὐκ ἐνοχλεῖ τὸ Λυσάνδρας κάλλος, ἀλλὰ †συνδιακεκαλυμμένῳ καὶ γέμοντι πυρὸς ἤδη πολὺν χρόνον πλησιάζων καὶ ἁπτόμενος ἀναπίμπλαται· καὶ δῆλός ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ταχὺ φύγοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, συντακησόμενος.

This comparison has the overall form of a complex simile with three analogous pairs. The fire mentioned toward its beginning corresponds to "the beauty of Lysandra," in effect (and probably more accurately) "the beautiful Lysandra,"[2] the woman whom Daphnaeus loves and is courting (see 749B, 762F–763A);[3] bronze melting from its contact with molten bronze, to Daphnaeus; and this molten bronze, to the referent of the two dative participles.[4] This referent must be a person, as is clear from the combined effect of the thing-person correspondence that characterizes the comparison as a whole (even if one takes "the beauty of Lysandra" literally), of Pisias' claim that Daphnaeus will melt unless he flees from the referent "to us" (that is, to persons), and of the simple fact that no "thing" is mentioned either in the contextual vicinity or anywhere else which the participles could reasonably modify. It is merely a question of the identity of this person, and I will presently undertake to place on a firm base the interpretation that supplies Plutarch as the person in question.[5] To do so, however, will require some overall examinaion of the *Amatorius*, and I would like to comment beforehand on three narrower exegetical questions,

[2] Cf. the Homeric periphrases of the βίη Ἑλένοιο ("mighty Helenus") variety (*Il.* 13.770; for numerous examples, see R. J. Cunliffe, A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect [Norman 1963], s.v. βίη, 5), as well as Plutarch's κάλλη δένδρων ("beautiful trees," *Flam.* 3.5) and like expressions involving κάλλη (*Mor.* 409A, 935A).

[3] The standard editions of *Amat.*, which are cited in the body of my paper at the end of the present paragraph, agree as to the proper text of the references to Lysandra at 749B and 762F–763A. On the solution to the crux in each of these references, see, in addition to the *apparatus critici* of the standard editions, C. Hubert, De Plutarchi Amatorio (Diss. Berlin 1903), 78, n. 1 and C. Kahle, De Plutarchi Ratione Dialogorum Componendorum (Diss. Göttingen 1912) 6 and n. 2.

[4] ἅπτομαι takes a genitive object. It is, therefore, πλησιάζων, the nearer of the nominative participles, that is determining the case of the dative participles. Cf. ἅπτονται καὶ διαταράττουσιν ἡμᾶς at *Mor.* 17D, and see H. W. Smyth and G. M. Messing, Greek Grammar (Cambridge, Mass. 1956), secs. 1634–35.

[5] *Dormitat Homerus*: Wilamowitz (*apud* Hubert, diss. [above, n. 3], p. 78, n. 1) made the contextually impossible proposal that κάλλει Λυσάνδρας is to be supplied with the dative participles. Others, though none of them has really argued the case, have supplied "Plutarch": Kahle (above, n. 3), 6, n. 2; H. Blümner, Kritische Bemerkungen zu Plutarchs Moralia, Hermes 51 (1916) 418–19; Flacelière (ed. cit. at end of present paragraph), 128, n. 24; Helmbold (ed. cit. at end of present paragraph), 327, n.e. Cf. Hubert (ed. cit. at end of present paragraph), 346, *apparatus criticus*.

of which the latter two are also critical, that will not take us beyond the comparison itself. My comments will be keyed to the standard editions of the *Amatorius*, those by Curtius Hubert (Plutarchi Moralia IV [Leipzig 1938]), Robert Flacelière (Plutarque: Dialogue sur l'Amour [Paris 1953]), and W. C. Helmbold (Plutarch's Moralia IX [London 1961]).[6]

The first of these questions is not, I think, of primary importance for a proper understanding of Pisias' comparison, and it may be disposed of rather quickly. In their respective translations, Helmbold ignores πολὺν χρόνον and Flacelière takes it with the two nominative participles that follow it; the phrase could also be construed with the preceding dative participles. While I believe that Flacelière is correct, I do not care to press the point; for his interpretation is difficult of demonstration and is in no way essential to the arguments that are to follow.

The two critical questions impress me as of much greater significance, and I will argue my points concerning them with some firmness. First, συνδιακεκαλυμμένῳ is the reading of both E and B, the only MSS that preserve the *Amatorius*;[7] and, while the addition of the iota subscript satisfies the requirements of syntax, it is impossible to wrench a contextually suitable meaning from the word. συνδιακαλύπτω, in fact, occurs nowhere else in Greek literature and has not been accorded an entry in either LSJ or Daniel Wyttenbach's *Lexicon Plutarcheum* (Oxford 1830). Hubert, Flacelière, and Helmbold have all chosen Stephanus' conjecture, συνδιακεκαυμένῳ ("all ablaze," as rendered by Helmbold), although no other use of this verb is recorded either for Plutarch or in LSJ.[8] A close reading of the comparison, moreover, reveals that Stephanus' conjecture is inappropriate to the context into which it has been inserted. Though having set the comparison up as a simile, Plutarch has in typical fashion carried over a portion of the *imago* into the *res*,[9] with ὑπὸ τοῦ πεπυρωμένου χαλκοῦ

[6] The comparison at *Pomp.* 8,6, though similar to Pisias', is still not close enough to it to offer assistance in resolving any of the problems I will be dealing with in this paper.

[7] The condition of both MSS is often poor, and the question of their relationship has generated much controversy. See, e.g., H. Cherniss, Plutarch's Moralia XII (London 1957) 26–27 and Helmbold (ed. cit.) 304–305.

[8] Edward N. O'Neil informs me that his forthcoming *index verborum* to the Plutarchan corpus records only the present occurrence of this verb. While writing this paper, I have been greatly assisted by Professor O'Neil, who has graciously and conscientiously responded to my several requests for information from his index.

[9] On Plutarch's general practice in this stylistic regard, see J. J. Hartman, De Plutarcho (Leiden 1916) 75, 85, 497–99; F. Fuhrmann, Les Images de Plutarque (Paris 1964) 9, 24–25; M. R. Klaerr, Quelques remarques sur le style métaphorique de Plutarque, Actes du VIII[e] Congrès (Paris 1969) 536–41. Cf. W. B. Stanford, Greek Metaphor

καὶ ῥέοντος ("by bronze that has been heated and is molten") from the *imago* having as its (apparently chiastic) counterpart in the *res* the implicit metaphor . . . καὶ γέμοντι πυρός ("[being in close contact] with one who is . . . and is full of intense heat").[10] Context thus indicates that the blank space should be filled with a participle, and of course preferably a perfect one, indicating fluidity rather than being on fire. I propose συνδιακεχυμένῳ ("thoroughly molten"), as a word that is completely suited to the context and is consistent with Plutarchan usage.[11]

The former point has been adequately demonstrated. As to the latter, it is straightway worth noting that Wyttenbach's *Lexicon Plutarcheum* records ten instances of συγκεχυμένος, eight of διακεχυμένος, and fifteen of – κεχυμένος compounded with other prepositional prefixes (the adverb συγκεχυμένως at *Cons. ux.* 611B–C is an indication of how naturally the perfect passive participles of χέω compounds came to Plutarch)[12] and that διαχέω is contextually associated with ἐπειρρέω at *Numa* 20.5 and with πῦρ, ἀνυγραίνω, and συντήκω at *Sept. Sap. conv.* 156C–E. Several passages, however, are still more directly pertinent to the emendation I am proposing. A participle of my exact compound appears at *De pr. frig.* 953D–E: τὸ δ' εἰς ὕδωρ ἐμπεσόν . . . καθυγραίνεται [cf. Pisias' συνεξυγραινόμενος] συνδιαχεόμενον. And on at least four occasions, Plutarch uses συγχέω in reference to metal that has been melted: at *De Pyth. or.* 401F, where we are informed that when the Phocians controlled Delphi they minted coins, "after melting down" (συγχέαντες; note that συν- here, as in my emendation, clearly stresses thoroughness rather than togetherness) many of the votive offerings that were made of gold or silver; at *Eum.* 2.6, where Plutarch refers to "the gold and silver melted down by the fire" (τὸ . . . συγχυθὲν χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρός) when Eumenes' tent went up in flames; at *De Pyth. or.* 395B–C, where in the genitive absolute ὧν συγχυθέντων καὶ συντακέντων (cf. Pisias' συν-

(Oxford 1936) 135. In Pisias' comparison, συντακησόμενος is also part of the metaphorical carry-over.

[10] On the force of πυρόω and πῦρ in this comparison, cf. ὁ διάπυρος σίδηρος ("red-hot iron") at *Mor.* 660C and LSJ, s.vv. πυρόω (I. 1. b–c, III) and πῦρ (I. 5. b, I. 7).

[11] On the prefixes σύν and διὰ to indicate thoroughness or completeness, see LSJ, *s.vv.* σύν (D. I. 2) and διά (D. IV–V) and Smyth-Messing (above, n. 4), secs. 1648, 1680. Cf. συνδιατρεπόμενον at *Mor.* 442F, where the double prefix of my emendation also indicates nothing more than thoroughness.

[12] συγκεχυμένος: *Mor.* 398E, 409A, 590E, 922B–C, 1083D, *Caes.* 10.11, 33.1, *Cic.* 29.6, *Crass.* 27.10, *Rom.* 24.2. διακεχυμένος: *Mor.* 73D, 720F, 855A, 943D–E, *Alex.* 19.7, *Mar.* 19.4, *Pomp.* 57.8. And Wyttenbach's *Lexicon* is far from being an *index verborum.*

τακησόμενος) the relative has as its antecedent the gold, silver, and bronze (χαλκός) that purportedly made up Corinthian bronze; and at *Quaest. conv.* 665B, where we encounter a remark about a thunderbolt which διέτηξεν [cf. Pisias' ἀνατήκεται and συντακησόμενος] . . . καὶ συνέχεεν a purseful of coins. Finally, at *Quomod. adulat.* 73C–D, in a comparison stylistically reminiscent of Pisias', Plutarch likens friends to iron in the following manner: just as iron (σίδηρος) is transformed into steel by being chilled in cold water "after it has first been made plastic by heat and has become soft" (ἀνεθεὶς πρῶτον ὑπὸ θερμότητος καὶ μαλακὸς γενόμενος), so ought we to give, as it were, a chilling bath of frankness to our friends "after they have been fused and are hot from praise" (διακεχυμένοις καὶ θερμοῖς οὖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπαίνων). Here again, as with Pisias' comparison, Plutarch has set up a simile, but has carried a portion of the *imago* over into the *res*, to create thereby an implicit metaphor in the latter, and has in the process constructed a chiasmus, in which διακεχυμένοις occupies precisely the same position that συνδιακεχυμένῳ would in the chiasmus of Pisias' comparison. The proposed emendation is thus grounded in Plutarch's general usage as well as the contextual requirements of *Amatorius* 752D.

As to the second critical question, ἀναπίμπλαται, which I have printed above, is the reading of both MSS and appears in the editions of Hubert and of Flacelière. Helmbold, however, chose H. Blümner's ἀναπίμπραται (rendered by Helmbold as "he is . . . himself catching fire"), and Flacelière endorsed this conjecture in his review of Helmbold's edition.[13] Now, Blümner's proposal was a response to a text, quoted by him, that contained Stephanus' συνδιακεκαυμένῳ, and, as is clear from his summary of Pisias' comparison, to his belief that Daphnaeus was metaphorically catching fire rather than being melted. But we have seen that the converse is actually the case, and that Stephanus' conjecture needs to be replaced by a verb indicating fluidity. There remains, therefore, no *raison d'être* for Blümner's conjecture, and it appears next to certain that its acceptance by Helmbold and eventually Flacelière was predicated on the same critical and contextual misunderstanding (albeit a reasonable misunderstanding) that prompted Blümner to make it in the first place. Moreover, ἀναπίμπρημι does not otherwise appear in the Plutarchan corpus,[14] and LSJ records only two occurrences of the word, to which it assigns the meaning "blow, swell up."

[13] Blümner (above, n. 5) 418–19. Flacelière, Ant. class. 30 (1961) 594.

[14] O'Neil (above, n. 8) assures me this is the case. Wyttenbach omits the word.

Nor does Wyttenbach's *Lexicon* have an entry for any of the following words: ἀναπρήθω, πίμπρημι, πρήθω, ἐμπίμπρημι, ἐμπρήθω. In fact, the only support I have been myself able to find in Plutarchan usage for Blümner's conjecture (and this is support cited by neither Blümner nor Flacelière) is a single instance of ἔμπρησις, at *Fab. Max.* 26.3 in the sense of "a burning," and a possible occurrence of πιμπράναι, the reading of D, at *De superst.* 170D, where however the other MSS offer πιμπλάναι.

It remains to consider whether the reading of the MSS is appropriate to its context and consistent with Plutarchan usage. I think that it is, even if it raises a syntactical question that does not admit of a precise answer. There are approximately eighty-five occurrences of ἀναπίμπλημι in the Plutarchan corpus, and, by my count, in at least two-thirds of these it is used with pejorative connotations, that is it tends to mean "to fill (to someone's detriment), to influence (for the worse)."[15] A pair of examples will suffice to illustrate the point: before ever handling money, the sons of misers "are filled with avarice" (ἀναπίμπλανται τῆς φιλοπλουτίας) by their fathers (*De cup. div.* 526D); Lycurgus undertook to prevent the city "from being filled with evil customs" (ὅπως ἠθῶν οὐκ ἀναπλησθήσεται πονηρῶν, *Lyc.* 27.9). The reading of the MSS is, therefore, a verb that we might expect Pisias to use to refer to the bad influence which, from his point of view, is being exerted on Daphnaeus. It is also true that nearly ninety percent of the time, as in the two examples just cited, Plutarch attaches a genitive of the thing to his use of this verb. One may take account of this fact in Pisias' comparison by inferring πυρός with ἀναπίμπλαται,[16] as does Flacelière in his translation, and thereby continuing the previously remarked incorporation of the *imago* into the *res*. (But, in keeping with the fact that Daphnaeus is metaphorically being melted, not set on fire, it must be πῦρ in the sense of "intense heat," so that the phrase would amount to "is becoming redhot.")[17] A genitive of the thing may similarly be inferred with the occurrences of this verb at *De virt. mor.* 450E and *Quaest. conv.* 696F–697A.

There are, however, three passages which reveal that it is possible to make good sense of ἀναπίμπλαται at *Amatorius* 752D even without inferring the genitive in question; in them the notion of influencing so

[15] The remaining third are divided between neutral and positive connotations. Cf. LSJ, s.v. ἀναπίμπλημι (II. 2). My counts are based on O'Neil's *index verborum* (above, n. 8); Professor O'Neil kindly copied out and sent me the entire ἀναπίμπλημι entry.

[16] Cf. ἀνεπίμπλαντο . . . φλογός (*Fab. Max.* 6.8).

[17] Cf. above, n. 10.

predominates over that of filling as to remove the need for a genitive of the thing. The most notable for present purposes is at *De comm. not.* 1073B, where we are informed that according to the Stoics "badness of character ruins one's appearance" (ἡ μοχθηρία τοῦ ἤθους ἀναπίμπλησι τὸ εἶδος).[18] The other two are in *De virt. mor.*: at 443B–C, where Plutarch argues that the spirited and appetitive element within us is "influenced by its close association [with our intelligence]" (ἀναπιμπλάμενον ὑπὸ συνηθείας);[19] at 442F, where Plutarch observes that when one becomes aware that he has eaten something unclean or unlawful intense nausea will often seize "his body, being thoroughly upset and infected as it is by this awareness" (τὸ σῶμα τῇ δόξῃ συνδιατρεπόμενον καὶ ἀναπιμπλάμενον).[20] If these three passages are taken for a model, we would give Pisias' verb a non-metaphorical rendering like "is being ruined."

Finally, let us return to the question of the person referred to by the two dative participles. This person is surely Plutarch. Autobulus indicated in his introductory remarks that Daphnaeus belonged to Plutarch's circle of friends (749B–C); and, more importantly, it is Plutarch's explicit support of Daphnaeus, as whose *syndikos* he characterize himself (752C), that provokes Pisias into making the comparison. Also, the bond between Plutarch, recently married (749B)[21] and obviously devoted to his wife (see especially 752C–D, 753B–C, 767B, 769A, 769B–C, 770A), and Daphnaeus, in love with Lysandra and seeking her hand in marriage (749B, 762F–763A), *uniquely* permeates the *Amatorius*, in that they alone share the actual task of arguing the case for the conjugal Eros and the marriage of Bacchon to Ismenodora (750A–C, 751B–752D, 753B–754E, 766E–771C [note at 767C Plutarch's exhortation, "But . . ., Daphnaeus, let us fight against those arguments. . . ."]), and that no similarly close bond exists between Plutarch, the chief speaker, and anyone else in the dialogue. Indeed, who other than Plutarch could be metaphorically "full of intense [heterosexual] heat" and thereby causing Daphnaeus to melt with (heterosexual) love? Or from whom else could he be expected to flee, if his flight is to be "to us," namely Pisias and Protogenes, the only speakers to attack

[18] Cf. H. Cherniss' translation of this statement (Plutarch's Moralia XIII. 2 [London 1976]): "depravity of character defiles the outward form."

[19] Cf. Helmbold's translation of this phrase (Plutarch's Moralia VI [London 1939]): "influenced by familiar intercourse [with the intelligence]."

[20] The verb in question occurs without a genitive and with pejorative connotations, but apparently in the sense of "satisfy," at *Mor.* 694D.

[21] Cf. K. Ziegler, Pauly-Wissowa RE 21.1 (1951), s.v. "Plutarchos," col. 644, n. 1 and Flacelière (ed. cit.) 12 and n. 2, 14.

the heterosexual-conjugal Eros and to resist the proposed marriage (on the positions taken by these two, see 749C–751B, 752B–753B)?

Anthemion, in addition to Daphnaeus and Plutarch the other proponent of the marriage (749C–750A, 752D–E, 753B–C, 755D, 756A), is not a real possibility. For he lets Daphnaeus and Plutarch plead his cause and is not even involved in the conversation leading up to Pisias' comparison, and there is no statement either that he is now passionately in love or that any bond existed between him and Daphnaeus prior to his arrival at the precinct of the Muses; nor does Daphnaeus accompany Anthemion back to Thespiae (see 756A), as Protogenes does Pisias (755C). Anthemion is, in fact, a minor character who soon departs from the scene and who has merely an incidental association with Daphnaeus while he is present.

The overall dramatic tone of the *Amatorius*, as well as the context preceding the comparison, thus requires us to understand "Plutarch" with the dative participles. And we may view Pisias' comparison as a dramaturgical device whereby Plutarch, as author, calls special attention to the fact that he and Daphnaeus are friends who share a set of values and attitudes. There is also a humorous irony to Pisias' offering to rescue Daphnaeus from the molten Plutarch, for at the end of the *Amatorius* (771D–E) we learn that Pisias, after storming back to town to thwart Ismenodora's efforts to bring off her marriage to Bacchon (754E–755C), has become reconciled with her and is himself preparing to lead the wedding procession through the market-place.

Henry J. Blumenthal

Themistius, the Last Peripatetic Commentator on Aristotle?[1]

It may be thought old-fashioned to begin with dates, but the fact that Themistius' active career ran from the late 340s to 384 or 5, and that his paraphrases of Aristotle were probably compiled during the earlier part of the period 337–357 is not unimportant.[2] By the end of his life Plutarch the son of Nestorius, arguably the man who restored the study of Platonic philosophy at Athens,[3] will already have been teaching there. By the close of the 5th century the study of Aristotle had become inextricably entertwined with the exposition, as it purported to be, of Plato's thought, and the 5th and 6th century commentators whose work we now have were Neoplatonists to a man. The last major commentator before Themistius, over a century before him, was Alexander, who may claim to be a genuine Peripatetic without too much fear of contradiction. Notwithstanding recent attempts to establish that Alexander was influenced by Plato or Platonists on certain important issues,[4] the core of his thought, and so his explanation of Aristotle, is overridingly Peripatetic. That is not to say that there are no ideas in Alexander which are the product of meditation on and argument with other traditions, but he clearly stood apart from the Middle Platonist amalgam of his time.

In between came Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus. By the time of Philoponus and Simplicius Neoplatonism had been dominant for some 250 years, and independent commentary was a thing of the past. Aristotle was

[1] References to the Aristotelian commentators are to page and line of the Berlin Academy edition: where unspecified they are to commentaries on the *de Anima*.

[2] For these dates cf. O. Seeck, die Briefe des Libanius (Leipzig 1906) 292f. and 306; G. Dagron, L'Empire Romain d'Orient au IVe Siècle et les Traditions Politiques de l'Hellénisme: Le Témoignage de Thémistius. Travaux et Memoirs du Centre de Recherche d'Hist. et Civ. Byz. 3 (Paris 1968) 5 n. 3 and 12; A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale, J. Morris, Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire I (Cambridge 1971) 892 and 889.

[3] Cf. E. Evrard, Le maître de Plutarque d'Athènes et les origines du néoplatonisme athénien, Ant. class. 29 (1960) 404–406.

[4] Cf. P. Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness (Den Haag 1963) ch. 2; P. L. Donini, Tre Studi sull'Aristotelismo nel II Secolo d. C. (Torino 1974) *passim*.

by then almost always read as a thinker who was expressing the Platonic truth, sometimes inadequately or obscurely.[5] These later commentators owe a great deal to Porphyry and Iamblichus, as well as to their successors, and were not ashamed to confess their debt. Since Porphyry and Iamblichus were active before Themistius, it would not be surprising if he too were strongly influenced by Platonism, and yet one's first impression on reading his philosophical work is that he was not. Nevertheless the *Orations* make a number of pronouncements which might point in the opposite direction. So occasionally do the paraphrases. The purpose of this essay is to look at the evidence on a few points that may be taken as a test of philosophical orientation, in the hope of being able to determine which of these contrary impressions is correct.

Three kinds of evidence are available to help us make this decision. First, Themistius' own statements of his philosophical attitudes. Second, and most important, the substance of his interpretations of Aristotle: does he give what we should regard as a straight reading of Aristotle, or does he prefer the kind of explanation that makes Aristotle a Platonist? Theoretically, we should be able to derive further information on this question from Themistius' comments on previous interpretations, but the paraphrase style of commentary does not normally allow him to discuss them, though it is sometimes clear that he is following Alexander.[6] On the other hand we do have some references to Themistius in the later commentators, who will occasionally take issue with him on whether or not a passage should be read Platonically.

The main source for Themistius' own statements of his orientation is not his philosophical *œuvre*, but rather his *Orations*. Their reader cannot fail to notice the honorific terms in which he repeatedly refers to Plato. He is θεῖος, πάνσοφος, ἀιδοῖος, μεγαλοπρεπέστατος and, most often, θεσπέσιος. In addition, Themistius' admiration for Plato seems to have impressed his correspondents. Gregory of Nazianzen speaks of "your Plato" (*Ep.* 24), and Libanius attributes to Themistius, as a compliment, the possession of both Plato's faculties, noble teaching and eloquence (*Ep.* 793). Further, Themistius clearly approved of the metaphysical foundation which Plato gave to his politics. In *Or.* 34 he comments on how Plato progressed beyond Socrates and his band, who were concerned with virtue, vice and happiness on the human plane, to attach human to divine goodness, and to

[5] Cf. my Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries, Phronesis 21 (1976) 64ff.

[6] Cf. esp. Themistius comments on νοῦς δυνάμει and νοῦς καθ' ἕξιν and Alexander *de Anima* 80. 24ff.

model the human polity on that of the universe as a whole: with that disregard of progress in Plato's thought characteristic of antiquity, he sees this as the point of the *Gorgias* as well as the *Republic, Phaedrus* and *Laws*. Themistius seems to prefer this grandiose design to Aristotle's more modest treatment of virtue on the human plane alone (447. 29ff. D). Yet at other times he will say that Aristotle's view of philosophy and politics is better than that of Plato, who was too naive in saying that the world's wrongs will not end before philosophers become kings or kings philosophers (*Or.* 8 = 128. 19ff. D).

One point of particular interest that emerges from the *Orations* is the frequency with which Themistius mentions Plato's views on ethics and politics. Themistius' Plato is that of the philosopher-king and the Cave, not that of the Good beyond being or the παντελῶς ὄν of the *Sophist*. His Platonic texts – they tend to recur – are predominantly those that might be described as in the Socratic rather than the Pythagorean and metaphysical tradition, and this immediately marks his Plato as very different from that of the Neoplatonists. Plotinus, as W. Theiler once pointed out, gives us a *Plato dimidiatus:*[7] the missing half was that concerned with moral virtue in a πόλις and the organisation and structure of that πόλις. Themistius, who was, after all, a politician and man of affairs, was interested in this other half, in Plato the would-be man of action who went three times to the West (cf. e.g. Or. 8 = 125. 19–32D), thereby showing at least his independence of the Neoplatonic tradition which concentrated on Plato the metaphysician.

Themistius did not abandon his high regard for Plato when he wrote the paraphrases on Aristotle – he is alleged by Photius in a report, which in other respects is not reliable, to have written paraphrases on Plato too.[8] There, for reasons connected with the type of exposition, explicit references are comparatively rare, but when he does appear Plato is treated no less reverently than in the *Orations* (cf. e.g. 107. 22). Probably for this reason Themistius has sometimes been described as a Platonist.[9] But when it comes

[7] Plotin zwischen Plato und Stoa, Les Sources de Plotin. Entr. Hardt 5 (Vandœuvres-Genève 1960) 67.

[8] Cf. p. 398 below and n. 22.

[9] That he defended some Platonic views against Aristotle, or adopted Neoplatonist doctrines, has been claimed on the basis of texts wich will not support it, so. S. Landauer, citing *in Metaph.* 9. 3–11 (in his index thereto, s. v. Plato), Schmid-Staehlin, Gesch. Gr. Lit.[6] II. ii (München 1924) 1011 and n. 8, citing *Or.* 32 = 439. 4D and 4 ('2' is a misprint) = 61. 28D, which is not evidence for Neoplatonism. O. Hamelin, La Théorie de l'Intellect d'après Aristote et ses Commentateurs (Paris 1953) 38–43 regards Themistius as an

to actual doctrines, and here we pass to our second heading, reverence for Plato is not translated into that superimposition of Platonism on Aristotelian texts wich is the hallmark of the Neoplatonists.

At this stage we must identify some criteria by which the commentaries can be used for our present purpose. If we look primarily at the relatively well-documented tradition stemming from Aristotle's *de Anima* – "stemming from" to include independent treatises like Alexander's *de Anima* as well as commentaries, whether paraphrases or the more conventional kind – we may take the following points, *exempli gratia,* as reliable indicators:

1) Do soul and body form a single unit, related as form to matter, or is soul separate, and in control of an ontologically inferior subordinate?

2) Is the soul a continuum, possibly with a division between intellect and reason, a matter on which Aristotle himself is notoriously hesitant, or does it divide at one or more points below this level?

3) A related question: is the soul seen in Aristotle's way as a structure in which the lower components are pre-requisites for the existence of the higher ones, or as a Neoplatonic "emanation" where the higher level is given and the lower ones derive from it?

4) Does the human soul relate to higher reality by being a part, or a product, of it? Here, though as we shall see the answer may not be decisive, we may put the question which became so important later, "is the agent intellect one or many?".

The most difficult problem for exponents of a Platonist reading of Aristotle was to explain his treatment of the relation between body and soul. This was a crucial issue on which the two traditions were clearly opposed. However one might interpret certain passages from the *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus,*[10] the *de Anima* clearly presents us with a soul indissolubly linked to the body by being its form. While the intellect may be an exception, there is no doubt about the unity of the rest. For a Platonist this view was, of course, totally unacceptable.

Most of Aristotle's discussion of the actual operations of soul could be translated fairly easily into Platonist dualism by a realist reading of texts treating the activities of its faculties.[11] But the explicit discussion of the nature and definition of soul, and its connection with the body, could not

"Alexandrin" *manqué,* but he insists on seeing Platonism where it does not, or need not exist, so. e. g. the ἄυλα of 115.5 are not evidence for Platonic Ideas.

[10] *Eudemus* fr. 8 Ross, *Protrepticus* fr. 1 ob Ross.

[11] Cf. my Plotinus' Psychology (Den Haag 1971) 135 ff.

be dealt with so easily. In fact Platonists seem to have found this sufficiently difficult for some at least to have read Aristotle as if he were talking about a soul and a body that already had soul: the latter would be the form that makes matter into body, upon which the individual soul was superimposed. This is what we find in the Platonist handbook which appears in Plotinus and Porphyry, and which Themistius too may have used.[12] There this view of soul and body appears as an assumption. The later commentators, whose Platonizing of Aristotle was more thorough, tried to show that only the soul below the level of the individual soul was united to the body as form to matter, and argued that this manifestation of soul which gives formless matter the status of body could be described as εἶδος and ἐντελέχεια.

Thus Simplicius has φύσις, a standard term for this level, as an informing cause, εἰδητικὴ αἰτία, to which ψυχή is added (4.14ff.). When he comes to the discussion of the soul's definition he uses, or rather abuses, Aristotle's notion of a first and second entelechy to distinguish one entelechy which merely gives form and so life to the body and another which uses that body, so informed, as its instrument, Platonically (90.29ff.). Thus he constructively misinterprets σῶμα ὀργανικόν to mean not a body fully equipped with the necessary parts, but a body which is a tool. This is in line with the Neoplatonist concept of the human soul as a series of strata arranged hierarchically. These layers, in defiance of Aristotle's notion of form, were sometimes described as a series of forms, each being form to the one below, which constituted the matter for its superior. That was the way Philoponus approached the same problem (cf. 198.22ff.). For these men the form was not the essence of any given kind of life which subsumed all lower kinds.

In Themistius there is no sign of any such attempt to avoid the clear import of Aristotle's text, and he gives us both the Aristotelian structure of faculties and its arrangement (e.g. 44.21ff.). If it be argued that he was constrained by his genre, and unable to depart radically from Aristotle, this argument cannot be used about his treatment of the notorious πλωτήρ passage (413a8f.), where Aristotle's meaning is sufficiently unclear to allow even a mere paraphrase scope for a Platonist reading. Aristotle's hesitation here, his suggestion that perhaps the soul was an entelechy of the body like a sailor of a ship, could easily be referred to areas of soul other than the intellect to which Aristotle himself seems in the end to have

[12] Cf. Plotinus 4.7.1–8[5], Porphyry *ap.* Nemesium, *de Nat. Hom.* ch. 2, Themistius 24.22ff. and 41.11ff., and Plotinus' Psychology 11–13 with nn. 10 and 13; H. Doerrie, Porphyrios' "Symmikta Zetemata", (München 1959) 111ff.

confined it. This was done by Simplicius and Philoponus, and doubtless by other Neoplatonists whose comments we do not have. Simplicius professed to be puzzled by how Aristotle could entertain any doubt about the separability of the soul: for him it was clearly and indisputably separate (96. 8ff.). Themistius, on the other hand, perplexed though he seems to be, takes Aristotle's remark as a hesitation, and explains its presence as a feature of the early stage in the investigation. If soul were an entelechy like a steersman, he says, and it is clear that this applies to νοῦς, then it could be an entelechy, but separable. So far the whole soul had been characterised in outline, but not accurately. Up to this point, he continues, the discussion is like a sketch until we turn our attention to all the soul's faculties: that is how we would achieve clarity about whether the whole soul, or some part of it, is a separable form (43. 25–34).

Since, as we have mentioned, the soul's activities as described by Aristotle could be taken as compatible with a Platonist view of its relation to the body, there is no special occasion for widespread Neoplatonization in commenting on the rest of Book 2 or 3. 1–2. Difficulties will again present themselves over *phantasia*, a faculty which may not always or necessarily involve the body in its activity. This could lead to problems both about separability, and about whether or not the soul comes apart, as it did for some Neoplatonists, at this level just because the same sort of activity related both to sense-perception, with its clear links with the corporeal, and reason and intellection, where these links could be held no longer to apply. This, as I have shown elsewhere, is one point where there is a great deal of discussion of Aristotle in non-Aristotelian ways.[13] In particular we find that the later commentators are much concerned to find clear demarcations between upper and lower soul, a preoccupation of which Themistius is innocent, and whose absence caused Stephanus to find fault with his commentary (508. 19–25).[14] That, briefly, is the answer to our second question. The third we have answered in passing, and now we must turn to the fourth, the treatment of Aristotle's chapter on the active intellect.

Here Themistius departs from the paraphrase style and launches on an extended discussion (98. 12–109. 3), aimed primarily at resolving the status of the active intellect. In particular he is concerned with whether or not it should be identified with the πρῶτος θεός, or perhaps some other. This aspect of the problem may be understood in the light of Alexander's well-

[13] Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle on *Phantasia*, Rev. of Metaph. 21 (1977) 242–257.
[14] Cf. ibid. 253f.

known view that νοῦς ποιητικός was in fact the supreme principle itself. Themistius rejects it (102. 30ff.). His own suggestion that it is a θεός other than the first may most readily be seen as an attempt to place it in the hierarchy of unmoved movers deployed in *Metaphysics* Λ 8. By contrast there is nothing about whether it is part of a hypostasis, be it *Nous* or Soul, a question which forms the background to the Neoplatonists' discussions.[15] Though they are of course concerned with Themistius' question whether or not each intellect is internal to the individual, the later commentators "solve" this problem by saying that Aristotle's active intellect must be part of the individual because the σκοπός of the *de Anima* is ψυχὴ λογική.[16] They were all nevertheless much interested in its relation either to the simple series of hypostases of the earlier Neoplatonists, or to the complex system of unparticipated and participated souls and intellects of later Neoplatonism, a system which, let us note, was originated, if not fully developed, by Iamblichus,[17] and so should have been known to Themistius. He was certainly aware of some Neoplatonic thought on these matters, for he refers to a question that was of some importance to them, whether or not all souls were one,[18] as one that was discussed by both earlier and more recent thinkers (cf. 104. 15f.).

Themistius' stress on the unity of the actual and potential intellects at one point in his discussion seems at first sight not only to be inconsistent with the view that it was a θεός – an inconsistency he does not really resolve[19] – but also to exclude the Platonist patterns. But we must remember that they did discuss whether the active intellect was or was not part of a fully descended νοῦς, that is one that is part of the individual soul rather than, as Plotinus and some others maintained, a section of the transcendent intellect itself,[20] though it should be noted that the two "parts" of intellect they discussed were more often seen as intuitive and discursive intellect. So the type of question Themistius is asking does not in itself exclude Platonist influence on his approach. What he says in the course of

[15] For further details cf. the article cited in n. 5, 72ff.

[16] Cf. Simplic. 240.2ff., [Philop.] 536.2–5, citing Plutarch.

[17] Cf. e.g. R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London 1972) 100 and 123–34.

[18] Cf. esp. Plotinus 4.9.

[19] On this, and other points arising from Themistius' treatment of 3.5, cf. P. Moraux, "Le *de Anima* dans la tradition grecque. Quelques aspects de l'interpretation du traité, de Théophraste à Thémistius", in G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen, edd., Aristotle on Mind and the Senses (Cambridge 1978) 308–313.

[20] For a doxography cf. [Philop.] 535.2ff.

answering it is, however, so different from the Platonist treatments as to make it clear that he was not thinking in the same conceptual schemes.[21]

These conclusions are reinforced by Themistius' language. Any reader familiar with Neoplatonist writing must notice the almost complete absence of typically Platonic and Neoplatonic terminology. While one should not expect the fully developed vocabulary of 5th century Neoplatonism, there is enough in Plotinus, Porphyry and particularly Iamblichus to obtrude itself if it appeared. It could be objected that the paraphrase form did not lend itself to the introduction of un-Aristotelian terms, but while this objection might apply to the passages on *de Anima* 2, it cannot apply to the discussion of 3.5, where Themistius produces ordinary commentary. Given the control afforded by this chapter, where, if anywhere, one would expect Platonism and Platonist language, we may safely say that their absence is neither insignificant nor fortuitous.

Before turning to the later commentators we should notice a problem which their references to Themistius have been taken to present. Some of them do not correspond closely, or at all, with the text of the paraphrases. On the basis of this difficulty, of a report in Photius that there were commentaries as well, and of remarks by Themistius himself in *Or.* 23, it has been argued that he wrote a series of full commentaries, and that the later commentators sometimes refer to these. If this were correct, it would have important implications, for clearly in such works Themistius would have had more scope for departures from Aristotelianism than within the constraints of paraphrase. Since, however, the case is not convincing, we may assume that the picture presented by the extant paraphrases is accurate, and that untraceable references call for other explanations.[22]

On further preliminary point: the commentators' procedures can easily give a misleading impression of their attitudes, since they will most often refer to earlier opinions when they wish to show that these are mistaken, or use them as ammunition in a controversy. Where a matter is uncontro-

[21] A further text from outside the *de Anima* wich would give ample scope for Neoplatonizing distortion is *Met.* Λ: Themistius in his paraphrase characterises the human mind as weak and inefficient, which would not be acceptable for a commentator who thought each human mind capable of assimilation to the transcendent *nous*, and of thereby attaining its power, *in Metaph.* 32.18ff.

[22] The case for commentaries is made by C. Steel, Des commentaires d'Aristote par Thémistius, Rev. philos. de Louvain 71 (1973) 669–680; for a critique cf. my: Photius on Themistius (*Cod.* 74): Did Themistius write commentaries on Aristotle?, Hermes 107 (1979) (forthcoming).

versial, they will often simply give the standard explanation – a procedure not unlike ours.

The largest number of later named references to Themistius is in Simplicius' commentary on the *Physics*. Apart from books 7 and 8, this treatise is not as open as some to Neoplatonizing.[23] But it is of interest that only one text in Simplicius' commentary shows Themistius clearly opposed to Aristotle. That is on the independent existence of time (765. 31ff.). Otherwise Themistius is treated in the same way as Alexander, with whom he is recorded as agreeing and disagreeing more or less equally often. Simplicius himself agrees with him more often than not, but since the points at issue are often philological rather than philosophical, and most of the latter are not relevant to differences between Plato and Aristotle, one can find no evidence here for Themistius as a Platonist. In the *de Caelo* commentary, on the other hand, Simplicius says in so many words that Themistius generally follows Aristotle, but occasionally, as on movement up and down, prefers Plato's account (69. 9ff.). The remaining references there are to scientific matters. In the *de Anima* commentary, whose different style excludes frequent references to others, there is only a single named reference to Themistius, to his view that taste is only of the painful and pleasant, whereas Simplicius thinks it gives other kinds of information too.[24]

Philoponus' *Physics* commentary, like Simplicius', gives little that is to our purposes, and the few references in *in An. Po.* are also primarily technical, showing no symptoms of Platonizing. The part of the *de Anima* commentary by Philoponus himself is again unhelpful. On whether the sense of touch is one or many, Themistius is reported as disagreeing with Aristotle, and Philoponus follows him, but this has nothing to do with Platonism. The same is true of the question whether flesh is an organ or a medium, where Themistius agrees with Aristotle (418. 25f.) while Philoponus expresses dissatisfaction with the whole discussion (433. 15ff.).

The third book, by Stephanus, gives us more, and, as we have mentioned, indicates that Themistius' interpretation was seen as inadequately Platonic. One report, on his argument for the need for a soul to have all the irrational

[23] As Simplicius noted in his own commentary, 1036.14–17, Themistius did not pay much attention to 7.

[24] The authenticity of this commentary is questioned, and its attribution to Priscian suggested, by F. Bossier and C. Steel, Priscianus Lydus en de *in de Anima* van Pseudo(?)-Simplicius, Tijdschr. v. Philos. 34 (1972) 761–822; for another view. cf. I. Hadot, Le Problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Paris 1978) 193–202.

faculties before it can have reason, has him giving an argument which is not Aristotelian, but the position it maintains is (450. 8ff.). All this pertains to the discussion of how many senses we have, and Stephanus himself goes on to offer a professedly more Platonic explanation of why we have five (ibid. 27–33). Another citation, difficult to trace, has Themistius talking of φαντασία as an active power. This does look like Neoplatonizing, but the very fact that it does not appear in the paraphrases excites suspicion that either Stephanus, or a source, has introduced the Neoplatonic element himself. It is interesting that he was not content with Themistius' account, in so far as he, like Aristotle, said sensation and imagination happen together, a view not conducive to the hierarchical picture of the soul favoured by the late commentators. Stephanus proceeds to criticize Themistius for a view he did not express, namely that φαντασία can only operate simultaneously with αἴσθησις.[25]

One earlier report should be added. Ammonius, the teacher of both Simplicius and Philoponus, tells us how Julian gave a ruling against Themistius in a dispute on whether 2nd and 3rd figure syllogisms are perfect, in favour of Maximus, who had heard Iamblichus, and followed him and Porphyry (*in An. Pr.* 31. 15–22). Even if this is not a matter where a Platonic view could have been adopted, the tale is further evidence for Themistius' independence of the Neoplatonists.

Thus both the content of Themistius' works, and such evidence as we have of the commentators' attitudes to him, show that he was predominantly a Peripatetic. In this he stood out against the tendencies of his time. His frequently expressed admiration for Plato does not invalidate this conclusion. Themistius may rightly claim to have been the last major figure in antiquity who was a genuine follower of Aristotle. For him, unlike his contemporaries, Plato does not surpass the master of those who know but he, and Socrates, "innanzi agli altri più presso gli stanno".

[25] Cf. 508.19ff. and n. 14 above.

JAMES H. OLIVER

Xenophon of Ephesus and the Antithesis Historia-Philosophia

The *Anabasis* and the *Hellenica* are so important to modern students of Greek literature that we instinctively class Xenophon as a historian, even though we remember the *Oeconomicus*, the *Symposium*, the *Cyropaedia* and the *Memorabilia* which belong rather to Xenophon's philosophical interests. We do not expect that what seems to us more important would necessarily seem more important to Xenophon's admirers in late antiquity, but he was not a great philosopher in our sense of the word, and it comes as a shock to hear him identified as "Xenophon the *philosophos*." Juncus[1]

[1] An essay *On Old Age*, represented by four extracts in Stobaeus, *Anth.* 1026–1031, 1049–1052, 1060–1065 and 1107–1109 Hense, is there attributed to Juncus, whom Photius mentions as one of the "philosophers" excerpted by Stobaeus. J. A. A. Faltin, Die Juncus-Fragmente bei Stobaeus (Diss. Freiburg im Br. 1910) identified Juncus as an Atticist of the late first or second century after Christ, a writer who expressed himself as if he were an Athenian. Inscriptions discovered many years later in the American Excavations of the Athenian Agora have revealed that the daughter of the *diadochos* Varius Caelianus had a husband named Aemilius Juncus, a son named Aemilius Juncus and a son-in-law named [Fl?]avius Juncus. Since her husband was a well known figure, cos. 127 and legate of Hadrian thereafter, even proconsul of Asia, these men named Juncus are dated to the reigns of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius. Which Juncus was the author cannot yet be positively identified, though the silence of Themistius in Orations 17 and 34 tends to eliminate Hadrian's legate and the son. Faltin's conclusions, however, have been corroborated: the author was, at least by adoption, an Athenian of the Hadrianic period or the reign of Antoninus Pius. J. H. Oliver, The *Diadochê* at Athens under the Humanistic Emperors, Amer. Journ. of Philol. 98 (1977) 160–78 argued that there were in the second century after Christ three *diadochoi* at Athens, one main *diadochos* representing the interests and communal property of Platonists, Aristotelians and others who were dedicated as teachers or students to the Philosophical Muses, and two *diadochoi* for the two sects which held aloof, the Stoics and the Epicureans. Varius Caelianus was a *diadochos*, it seems, in the main tradition of Plato and Aristotle. Juncus *On Old Age* stands in a Peripatetic tradition, but the theme arose long before Theophrastus and Ariston, as shown by H. Herter, Demokrit über das Alter, Würzburger Jahrb. f. d. Altertumswiss., N.F. 1 (1975) 83–92. Fr. Wilhelm, Die Schrift des Juncus περὶ γήρως und ihr Verhältnis zu Ciceros Cato maior (Programm Breslau 1911) pointed out that Juncus drew heavily on Plato and an early Peripatetic, borrowed also from Consolation literature and Cynic-Stoic arguments and was not dependent on Cicero, with whom he had much material in common as with other writers of Roman date, both Greek and Latin.

unmistakably identifies him in this way in the essay *On Old Age* 1030 Hense, when, citing *Symp.* 4.11, he says, "it is they (old men) whom the law elects 'to carry young olive-shoots to Athena,' as Xenophon the philosopher says."

It is noteworthy that contemporaries had regarded Xenophon as a historian and that Hellenistic writers had regarded him as primarily a historian but also a philosopher.[2] In the Roman period a change appears. Quintilian, *Inst.* 10.1.81–82 and Pseudo-Lucian, *Longaevi* 21 treated him as primarily a philosopher, but even that is not the same as identifying him as a philosopher for immediate recognition in the way that Juncus did.

Or as more than two centuries later, Eunapius did, whose *Lives of Philosophers and Sophists* began with an introduction concerning "Xenophon the philosopher, unique among all philosophers in that he adorned philosophy not only with words but with deeds."

It is similar with the "New Xenophon," Arrian, whom Lucian, *Alex.* 2 describes as a disciple of Epictetus. An inscription at Athens[3] reads Ā· F̄Λ̄· Ἀρριανὸ[ν] | ὑπατικὸν φιλό[σο] | φο[ν]. Perhaps the Athenians admired him merely for his philosophical work, but Cassius Dio cannot have forgotten or despised the historical works of Arrian, when he gave the Life which he composed the title Βίος Ἀρριανοῦ τοῦ φιλοσόφου. So here again the word subsumes less or more than an English translation might suggest.

Arrian, the New Xenophon, may have been called "the philosopher" for exactly the same reasons as Xenophon was, and to emphasize the similarity of the two authors. Arrian's case is not quite independent, and I should hesitate to claim the ancient descriptive "philosopher" for any other historian in our sense of the term. It is enough to say that the way of identifying Xenophon as the philosopher may be older but can be attested as far back as the reign of Antoninus Pius or even Hadrian. Since, moreover, neither Plato nor any other famous philosopher of the classical period was ordinarily identified as "the philosopher," Xenophon the philosopher was being distinguished from another Xenophon with whom for some reason he might easily have been confused.

[2] K. Münscher, Xenophon in der griechisch-römischen Literatur (Philologus Supplementband 13, Heft 2 [Leipzig 1920]).

[3] Gr. Rom. & Byz. Stud. 11 (1970) 338, originally published with photograph but, I think, with the wrong initial letter in Arch. Anal. Athen. 3 (1967) 377–80. On the initial see S. Follet, Athènes au II^{e} et au III^{e} siècle (Paris 1976) 34–35, n. 8.

The implied opposite of Xenophon the *philosophos* was another man who could be called Xenophon the *historikos*.

If one looks in the *Suda* s.v. Ξενοφῶν Κύπριος, one finds a reference to an ancient romance as an ἐρωτικῶν ὑποθέσεων ἱστορία. There are three such *historikoi* in the *Suda*, Xenophon of Antioch who wrote *Babyloniaca*, Xenophon of Ephesus who wrote the well known *Ephesiaca* and Xenophon of Cyprus who wrote the unknown *Cypriaca*. Of these three *historikoi* Xenophon of Antioch, who wrote *Babyloniaca*, may well have been earlier than the author of the *Ephesiaca*, but the unknown author of the *Cypriaca*, Xenophon of Cyprus, is probably contemporary or identical with or not much later than Xenophon of Ephesus, the *historikos* of the *Ephesiaca*. In fact, Lavignini[4] suggested that the ethnics, unknown, were merely inferred from the titles *Ephesiaca* and *Cypriaca*. It is our theory that Xenophon the *historikos* who produced a need to distinguish the famous classical model as Xenophon the philosopher can only have been the Xenophon who wrote the successful romance *Ephesiaca* about Habrocomes and Anthia.

Xenophon the *historikos* in the *Ephesiaca* 2.13 and 3.9 mentions an eirenarch, an official first attested in the reign of Hadrian.[5] O. Weinreich in R. Reymer's translation for the Artemis series, Heliodor · *Aithiopika* (Zürich 1950), published a Nachwort with a chronological survey of datable romances. On p. 331 he first dated Xenophon of Ephesus between Trajan and Gallienus and then decided in favor of a date shortly after A.D. 100 because of the style and because only Isis and Greek divinities guide the story of the lovers. He is cited with approbation by Reardon.[6] Though the conclusion may be right, the argument is not strong and most would agree with Perry:[7] "Xenophon of Ephesus is commonly dated sometime in the second century . . ., and that much, although vague, is the most that can be inferred with safety from such internal evidence as we have."

[4] B. Lavignini, La patria di Senofonte Efesio, Annali delle Università Toscane N.S. 10 (1926) 239–49 = Studi sul romanzo greco (Messina–Firenze 1950) 144–50.

[5] L. Robert, Bull. de Corr. hell. 52 (1928) 408f., n. 3 (= Opera minora 2, 879f.); id. Etudes anatoliennes (Paris 1937) 96–110. D. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor (Princeton 1950) 647 and 1514f.

[6] B. P. Reardon, Courants littéraires grecs des II^{e} et III^{e} siècles après J.-C. (Paris 1971) 337.

[7] B. E. Perry, The Ancient Romances (Berkeley–Los Angeles 1967) 345. See also F. Jacoby, FGrHist III B 419 and H. Gärtner, Pauly-Wissowa RE 18 (1967) s.v. Xenophon (11) von Ephesos, especially 2086f. In the introduction to the Teubner edition (Leipzig 1973) ix A.D. Papanikolaou says, "Xenophontem Ephesium saec. II p. Chr. n. vixisse constat."

The reference to Xenophon the philosopher, whether Juncus was distinguishing him from the two *historikoi* or from the well known *historikos*, now offers a piece of external evidence for dating Xenophon "of Ephesus" in the Trajanic-Hadrianic period.

Accordingly, the antithesis *historia-philosophia* was not one between history and philosophy but between entertainment literature and philosophy. The word *historia*, over which Dionysius of Halicarnassus did not hesitate, could still be used to mean historical composition, but a common use of the word and its related forms to indicate love and adventure stories led to some avoidance of pejorative overtones in this ambivalent term. For instance, Themistius thrice mentions Arrian and (Junius) Rusticus as philosophers whom Trajan, Hadrian and the Antonines had drawn into public service, but it is significant that in Oration 34 (218 Downey) Themistius says that the emperors, raising them from their books, did not let them compose philosophical works or write about courage. The *Anabasis of Alexander* like the *Anabasis* of the Ten Thousand was a work about courage, a cardinal virtue and as such perhaps a suitable subject for a philosopher in the opinion of Themistius. Even so, was not Themistius avoiding a word like *historia* but clearly suggesting the historical contributions?

Long before the second century after Christ government and courage had been recognized as philosophical themes. In the Athens of Hadrian and the Antonines, nevertheless, Clio could not have passed for one of the Philosophical Muses.[8] No one ever called Thucydides a philosopher. Therefore, the distinction made by Juncus, Cassius Dio and Eunapius between *historikos* and *philosophos* does not seem to have owed its origin to the famous ninth chapter of Aristotle's *Poetics*, where Aristotle sought to define *poietes* and *poiesis* and set these terms off from *historikos* or *historiographos* and *historia*. Poetry, he said, dealt with the universal and so was more philosophical than *historia*, which dealt with the individual. From the overwhelming modern literature (von Fritz, Düring, Louis, et alii) we cite only R. Zoepffel, Historia und Geschichte bei Aristoteles (AbhHeidelberg 1975/2), who distinguishes nicely between what Aristotle meant by *historia* (information, collection of stories and factual material) and what we mean by history. Both the collection of facts and the higher (philosophical)

[8] T. Flavius Pantaenus, donor of the library next to the Stoa of Attalus at Athens, is identified as son of the *diadochos* T. Flavius Menander and priest of the Philosophical Muses. See note 1 for *diadochoi* and see Plato, *Republic* 545D–548C for Philosophical Muses.

interpretation of facts were desirable, but the Aristotelian term *historia* applied properly to the former. A writer who tried to interpret historical facts was more than or different from a *historikos*; he was more philosophical but not of necessity immediately recognizable as a philosopher. Another antithesis, that between philosophy and rhetoric, stood in the way. Everyone admired Thucydides, even those who had complaints about him and did not accept the term *philosophia* for a higher type of historical writing. Cicero, *Orator* 39 uses the word *canit* of Thucydides; when Cicero himself sought to give to the world the true meaning of his actions as consul, he turned naturally to verse. Quintilian 10.1.31 said *Historia est proxima poetis et quodam modo carmen solutum.* No wonder that Marcellinus in the *Life of Thucydides* 41 protested, "Concerning his composition taken as a whole there were some who dared to assert that it was not a product of the art of rhetoric but of the art of poetry." On the other hand, prose poems did not make the difference. Neither the *philosophia* of Isocrates nor the *aletheia* of Aelius Aristides won the title *philosophos* for either of these orators who claimed to interpret the true meaning of historical facts.[9]

Poetry could be described as more philosophical than history in that it was not bound to what actually happened on just one occasion, but the great model-practitioners of history seemed more poetical than philosophers in that they, like poets, preferred expressions, words and usages which differentiated their diction from that of ordinary speech, whereas philosophers wrote prose dialogues and essays in the everyday language of their contemporaries. Of course Plato in certain passages rose to great poetic heights of language and imagery, but his ordinary style retained much of everyday speech, charming in its wit and naturalness but essentially distilled, more precise and less repetitious. Only Homer stood with Plato as a national treasure. Between the style of Herodotus and Thucydides,[10] on the one hand, and that of Theophrastus and Aristotle, if not Plato, on the other, there was a difference of vocabulary. Xenophon in style belonged

[9] For Aelius Aristides in the Panathenaic the review of Athenian history was an evaluation of the πράξεις, a word he uses twenty-nine times (see the index published in The Civilizing Power [Trans. Amer. Philos. Soc. 58/1, 1968]). Aristides pretended to give meaning to the factual material collected by earlier writers. He was composing not a συγγραφῆς ἔργον ψιλῆς but a deeper interpretation of τὰ πεπραγμένα τῇ πόλει. The one time he uses the word *historia* it means "study" or "tourism" rather than "history," for which he had no real term.

[10] On the uncommon or poetical style of each of these authors see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Thucydides* 23–24 with W. K. Pritchett's commentary.

rather to those who employed artistically the diction and simplicity of everyday speech, and this may have reinforced the impression that Xenophon and Arrian should be classed as philosophers.

Among true historians, however, the main division lay between philosophy and rhetoric as preparation for life and work. Because of the Melian dialogue and the speeches Thucydides could be claimed by the later rhetoricians, who regarded him as a student of Antiphon,[11] while teachers of the Roman period regarded Xenophon, author of the *Memorabilia*, as a student of Socrates and so as belonging more to philosophy. Just as Arrian was described as a philosopher by Athenian admirers, the historian Dexippus in the prose heading of the Athenian monument erected to him by his sons is identified as "the rhetor and author."[12] Dexippus was the son (and pupil) of a distinguished sophist, and so the classification is that of "rhetor" first and foremost, while the poem below the heading describes his field as *historie*. The primary question about an author and teacher seems to have been out of which of the two main systems of education did he emerge, so that *philosophos* may mean "product of philosophical training" and *rhetor* may mean "product of rhetorical training." *Sophistes* in the Empire usually indicated success as an orator trained under either system. The distinction would explain what Philostratus *Vit. Soph.* 1.8.1 says about Favorinus that "as with Dio of Prusa it was his *euglottia* which caused Favorinus the philosopher to be included among the sophists." The product of philosophical rather than rhetorical training, Favorinus (no philosopher at all by our standards) achieved great fame as an orator.[13] Dexippus, then, is said to be the product of rhetorical training and to have achieved fame as an author of histories.

[11] Falsely: see U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Die Thukydideslegende, Hermes 12 (1877) 326–67 on 335.

[12] IG II² 3669. See further F. Millar, P. Herennius Dexippus: The Greek World and the Third-Century Invasions, Journ. of Roman Stud. 59 (1969) 12–29.

[13] Observations by C. P. Jones about philosopher, rhetor and sophist will be found in G. W. Bowersock (ed.), Approaches to the Second Sophistic (Am. philol. Assoc. 1974) 11–16. But these terms were never synonymous. The *sophistes* was essentially a recognized artist in the display or public use of ordinary language.

STEELE COMMAGER

Some Loose Ends

A Metrical Note on Horace's *Satires*

In Horace's hexameter poetry there are only two hypermetric lines, *S.* 1.4.96, and *S.* 1.6.102.[1] They are customarily treated as mere accessories to the twenty such lines in Vergil, which have received somewhat closer attention.[2] Since Horace's two *hypermetra* are relatively minor offenders (*-que* and *-ve*), and, moreover, can be forgiven as a youthful indiscretion, they have been summarily dealt with by those editors who do not dismiss the case entire.[3]

The two cases may deserve further consideration, if only as precedents for our judgment of Vergil. The first seems straightforward enough:

mentio si quae
de Capitolini furtis iniecta Petilli
te coram fuerit, defendas ut tuus est mos:
"me Capitolinus convictore usus amico*que*
a puero est, causaque mea permulta rogatus
fecit, et incolumis laetor quod vivit in urbe;
sed tamen admiror, quo pacto iudicium illud
fugerit." hic nigrae sucus lolliginis, haec est
aerugo mera: quod vitium procul afore chartis
atque animo, prius ut, si quid promittere de me
possum aliud vere, promitto. liberius si
dixero quid, si forte iocosius, hoc mihi iuris
cum venia dabis: insuevit pater optimus hoc me,
ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando.

[1] Although P. Lejay, Oeuvres d'Horace, Satires (Paris 1911), discovers, oddly, another at *S.* 1.6.94. There are few previous examples: Lucilius, 457 (M); Lucr., 5.849; Cat., 64.298, 115.5. All are arguably mimetic.

[2] Thus, W. Christ, Metrik der Griechen und Römer (Leipzig 1879) 190–91; L. Mueller, De Re Metrica (Leipzig 1894) 351ff.; A. H. Carpenter, Philol. Quart. 9 (1930) 351ff.; J. Soubiran, L'Élision dans la Poésie Latine (Paris 1966) 466ff.

[3] Bentley ignores them, but most other editors give a sampling of parallels. None, so far as I know, ventures on a specific explanation.

Horace is defending himself against the charges of libel and insult that, apparently, plagued the satirist.[4] Protesting such accusations to be false, he cites as a truer example of malice the sort of backbiting that others – but not he – indulge in. Typical is the supposed friend of Petillius Capitolinus, an intimate of Capitolinus since boyhood (97). ("Anyone," as Oscar Wilde was to put it, "that has such a man for a friend needs no enemies.") The "friend" praises Capitolinus for the many (*permulta*, 97) services that Capitolinus has rendered him, and claims to rejoice that Capitolinus survives unscathed (98). But his final remark is a complete betrayal: "Still, I do wonder how he managed to get out of that trial!"[5] Like the clock that strikes thirteen times, his final observation renders suspect all that came before. Such "friends", Horace suggests, are worse than any satirist:[6] their remarks are like the ink of a cuttlefish, or destructive rust (100–101). May such a fault (*vitium*, 101) be far from his pages!

The radical sense of *convictore* (96) is illustrated by the intimate interlocking order: *me Capitolinus convictore usus amicoque*. The triple elision of *convictore usus amicoque / a puero est* (particularly striking after the bald monosyllables ending the preceding line) furthers the claimed closeness of Capitolinus and his false friend. But the hypermetric elision may suggest, as well, that their longstanding intimacy is as overblown and faulty as the "friend's" final remark (99–100) proves it to be.

Permulta . . . fecit (97–98) is surely intended to point up the hypermetron: metrically, Horace has himself just *permulta fecit*.[7] As though to redirect our attention to his metrical *vitium*, Horace promises that the flaw (*vitium*, 101) of malice will be far from his pages. Such a flaw he likens to the spreading ink of the cuttlefish, or to the encroachment of rust – the comparisons are equally appropriate to his metrical excrescence. Next, we have a plea for pardon, if he has said anything too freely (*liberius*, 103) or jocosely (104) – again, a reference to his overly free metre suggests itself. And then, a final excuse: his father had instilled in him the habit of

[4] Cf. *S.* 1.10, 2.1. The satirist's need to justify himself goes back to Lucilius: cf. the fragments of Book 30, and U. Knoche, Roman Satire (Bloomington 1975) 43–44.

[5] Verba defensoris Petillii, qui cum defendere eum et excusare deberet, magis laedit (*Schol. Cruq.*). Cf. L. F. Heindorf, Q. Hor. Fl. Sat. (Leipzig 1859) *ad loc.* On the legal meanings of *incolumis* and *iudicium*, see Kiessling-Heinze, Q. Hor. Flacc. Satiren (Leipzig 1921) *ad loc.*

[6] *Amicoque* (96) may be intended to recall, and contrast with, the (false) charges against the satirist: *non cuiquam parcet amico* (35).

[7] Cf. the two hypermetra in C. 4.2.22–23, which are anticipated and glossed by the description of Pindar as *numerisque fertur lege solutis* (11–12).

avoiding flaws (*vitiorum*, 106) – but only by recording them first! A bravura display: how can we, after so ingenious a plea, fail to forgive Horace his excesses?

The second of Horace's hypermetra is even more interesting, since it epitomizes one of the principal themes of the entire poem. Horace has just asserted (*S.* 1.6.93ff.) his contentment with his own parents. Should Nature bid him live his life over again, choosing other parents, he would gladly stay with his own, preferring them to those honored – or burdened – by public office. Mad he may be in the crowd's estimation, but surely sane in that of Maecenas:

demens
iudicio vulgi, sanus fortasse tuo, quod
nollem onus haud umquam solitus portare molestum.
nam mihi continuo maior quaerenda foret res
atque salutandi plures, ducendus et unus
et comes alter uti ne solus rusve peregreve
exirem; plures calones atque caballi
pascendi, ducenda petorrita. nunc mihi curto
ire licet mulo vel si libet usque Tarentum,
mantica cui lumbos onere ulceret atque eques armos.

Were Horace to become a public figure, he would at once be overwhelmed: more money would be necessary (*maior quaerenda res*, 100) more duties (*salutandi plures*, 101), more companions (*ducendus et unus et comes alter*, 101–02); grooms and horses would demand to be fed (*pascendi*, 104), wagons would have to be marshalled (*ducenda*, 104). The five gerundives are threatening enough,[8] while the litany of *maior . . . plures . . . unus et alter . . . plures* is as burdensome as the life they propose. Sandwiched – almost smothered – in the center is Horace's plaint that he would never be able to travel in the country or abroad unencumbered: *ne solus rusve peregreve / exirem* (102–103). The hypermetron is eloquent. At the very moment that Horace thinks he might be alone, he finds himself attached to unwanted, and unwonted, companions: no clean break (*exirem*, 103) is possible. The line (103) is encumbered by unneeded and unnatural excess, as Horace himself would be.

We take his point. It is confirmed by the description of his present "ignoble" freedom and straitened circumstances (104ff.). Now, no un-

[8] For a similarly sinister effect, cf. C. 2.14.11ff.: *unda enaviganda . . . visendus ater Cocytos . . . linquenda tellus.*

necessary followers trail behind him.[9] A modest mule (*curto mulo*, 104–05)[10] suffices him; on it, he is free to escape even as far as Tarentum. As the double elision of line 106 suggests, the only burden will be on the mule, not on its rider. The final position of *curto* (104) is emphatic, particularly since it matches that of the offending *peregreve*, two lines before (102). The contrast is further emphasized by the hiatus between *curto / ire*. The open break recalls, and refutes, the clinging *peregreve / exirem* of 102–03.

The distinction between the similarly placed *ne . . . peregreve / exirem* and *curto / ire* epitomizes one of the themes of the poem. Horace is writing of public life and private, of continence and incontinence, of limitation and bloated excess.[11] Overburdened excursions beyond one's proper limits are quite unnecessary. All that Horace whishes is to remain, in his verse as in his life, *purus et insons* (69). That, after all, is what tradition, in the person of his father, has taught him.

[9] Contrast the description, in the immediately following lines (107ff.), of the Praetor Tillius, accompanied on his journey by five slaves carrying his equipment. The ending of 109 is properly overloaded: *lasanum portantes oenophorumque*.

[10] The humble *curtus mulus* is in sharp contrast to the ponderous *caballi* of the previous line (103). Compare also the *Satureiano caballo* (59) that Horace rejects.

[11] See N. Rudd, the Satires of Horace (Cambridge 1966) 36ff.

Eugen Dönt

Horaz II 13

Die Richtung, in der man das Gedicht von dem Unglück, das Horaz in seinem Garten fast betroffen hätte, verstehen müsse, hat Friedrich Klingner[1] gewiesen und uns damit von einer gewissen Beschämung befreit, wenn wir angesichts eines Horazgedichts ratlos gestehen mußten, nicht feststellen zu können, ob sich in ihm das Grauen der Todesfurcht[2] oder witzige Selbstironie[3] des Dichters ausspricht. Klingner hat damit auf etwas verwiesen, das ich das „poetische Zentrum" eines lyrischen Gebildes nennen möchte und das aufzusuchen die einzige Möglichkeit zu sein scheint, sich der Einheit eines horazischen Gedichts zu nähern, soll es sich unserem Verständnis – verfangen in die gängige romantisch – hegelsche – (und letzthin) Staigersche Vorstellung von Lyrik – nicht auf immer entziehen.[4]

In den folgenden Zeilen möchte ich in eben dieser Richtung weitergehend versuchen, an der dreizehnten Ode des 2. Buchs konkreter, als es von Klingner unternommen wurde, die typisch horazische Einheit der Lyrik des Horaz aufzuzeigen, also die Art und Weise zu beschreiben, wie

[1] Macht und Ohnmacht des musischen Menschen, in Hermeneia, Festschr. O. Regenbogen (Heidelberg 1952) 119f. = Studien zur gr. u. röm. Lit. (Zürich/Stuttgart 1964) 325f.

[2] R. Heinze in der Einleitung zu II 13 (Q. Horatius Flaccus, Oden und Epoden, erklärt von A. Kiessling, 9 Aufl. v. R. Heinze, [Berlin 1958]).

[3] R. A. Schröder, Die Gedichte des Horaz [Wien 1935]; M. Puelma-Piwonka, Dtsche Lit. Zeitg. 70 (1949) 441.

[4] Kritik an den Staigerschen Aufstellungen über Lyrik (bes. Grundbegriffe der Poetik (Zürich 1946 = Deutsch. Taschenb.verl. [München 1971 (= 1956³)]) 60) neuestens bei W. Hinck, Von Heine zu Brecht (Frankfurt 1978) 125f. Gerade der horazischen Lyrik gegenüber versagt der enge Begriff des Subjektiven, „Bedeutungslosen", usf., sie verlangt einen Zugang von vielfältigeren Aspekten her, wie sie etwa Ezra Pound mit seinen Termini von Logopoiie, Melopoiie und Phanopoiie umschrieben hat (Literary Essays of E. Pound, ed. by T. S. Eliot [New York 1968] 25). In entsprechender Modifizierung sind sie durchaus geeignet, die Richtung eines ersten Verständnisses zu weisen, d. h. anzudeuten, welchen Anteil und Stellenwert Aussage, Sprache, Gegenständliches innerhalb eines Gedichts besitzen, welchen Anteil jedes der drei Elemente an seiner Einheit hat, ob und wie das poetische Zentrum in einem von ihnen oder im Miteinander von allen dreien gründet usf. Von hier aus erledigen sich für Horaz auch die geistvollen Ausführungen E. Howalds, Das Wesen der lateinischen Dichtung (Zürich 1948).

sich konkrete Gegenständlichkeit, persönliches Erleben und persönliche Anschauung bei Horaz zu dem Allgemeinen eines lyrischen Kunstgebildes verdichten und runden.

Der Eingang scheint zunächst etwas von der „furchtbaren Realität" an sich zu haben, die Goethe „besonders in den Oden" gefunden hat. Freilich wird der Schrecken, der Horaz getroffen hat, gleich in zweifacher Weise vom Dichter in eine Distanz gerückt: einerseits dadurch, daß dem Konkret-Gegenständlichen des Unglücksbaums, dem einzelnen zufälligen Ereignis mit der Frage nach seiner Ursache, mit dem Aufweis eines Begründungszusammenhangs eine über diese Vereinzelung hinausgehende Allgemeinheit verliehen wird. Andererseits dadurch, daß – neben dieser gewissermaßen „philosophischen" Erhöhung – poetisch-technisch das Sachliche, also die Bezeichnung des konkreten Unglücks bis an das Ende der dritten Strophe hinausgerückt wird. Das bedeutet, daß Horaz schon von Beginn des Gedichts an nicht so sehr das schreckliche Ereignis selbst, wie vielmehr seine Beurteilung (*crediderim*) desselben zum Thema macht, daher ist das logische Objekt der Verwünschung auch nicht der Baum, sondern der an den Anfang gestellte „Verursacher" seines Aufwachsens, daher überfällt der Dichter den Hörer nicht, besser: nicht mehr mit einer krassen Schilderung des Unglücksgegenstands und Unglücksvorgangs. Der Schrecken ist von Anfang an bereits „aufgehoben" in doppeltem Sinne, eben bis nahezu zum Ende des ersten Drittels des Gedichts, zweitens in die Allgemeinheit der Frage nach dem Kausalzusammenhang, in eine durch einen poetischen Topos „vermittelte" Betrachtung. Über die Ausführung dieses Topos selbst wird man sich weniger verwundern, über die an das Erlebnis mit einem morschen Baum geknüpften Anschuldigungen weniger lächeln, wenn man sieht, daß sich für Horaz in diesem Erlebnis das zweckhafte, zielgerichtete (*in perniciem*) Tun eines Verbrechers eröffnet, das Unschuldige, darunter eben auch ihn selbst treffen mag: Ausgangspunkt (*ille*) und Betroffener (*domini caput inmerentis*) umrahmen die Überlegung des Dichters in den ersten drei Strophen, die uns hinlänglich darauf vorbereitet haben, den zweiten Teil des Gedichts nicht als unangemessene Abschweifung von der Schilderung eines konkreten Erlebnisses, sondern als die Fortsetzung der Gedanken angesichts jeglichen denkbaren Unglücks (*quidquid usquam concipitur nefas*) zu verstehen. Wir werden jedenfalls weder sagen können: „Am Anfang des Gedichts herrscht nun das Drohende, Nahe, Grelle, Laute, Unmittelbare, auf der Seite des Dichters

[5] Klingner, Römische Geisteswelt (Hamburg–München 1961[4]) 189

der Schreck, die blinde Gegenwirkung"[5], noch: „So läßt sich der Dichter (im folgenden) scheinbar willenlos weit ab von seinem Ausgangspunkte führen"[6].

Der Beginn der vierten Strophe führt den Charakter des persönlichen Abstandes von dem Ereignis, der die ersten drei Strophen kennzeichnet, weiter und lenkt mit der allgemeinen Feststellung *quid quisque vitet numquam homini satis cautum est* das Interesse des Hörers in die Richtung der Beispielsreihe, die nun folgt und deren Typologie das Gedicht im Grunde bis zum Ende hin bestimmt.

Die Beispielsreihe wird begonnen mit dem Seefahrer, dessen ängstliche Aufmerksamkeit allein den Gefahren des Bosporus gilt, und der nur auf diesen seinen Fahrten, sonst nirgends (*neque . . . aliunde*) ein ihm heimlich bereitetes Geschick fürchtet. Die nächsten Beispiele stellen der römische Soldat und der parthische Krieger der fünften Strophe: auch sie vermögen – trotz ihrer aufmerksamen Furcht – ihr Schicksal nicht vorauszusehen (*improvisa leti vis = caeca fata*). Seefahrer und Soldat, keiner von ihnen kann sich hinlänglich (*satis*) und jederzeit (*in horas*) vor dem Tod schützen, der unvorhergesehen, ohne Ankündigung die Menschen zu allen Zeiten (*rapuit rapietque*) überfällt. Mit diesen allgemeinen Feststellungen wird der erste Teil der Beispielsreihe umrahmt (V. 13/4 – V. 19/20).

Mit der sechsten Strophe, genau in der Mitte des Gedichts, beginnt Horaz seinen fiktiven Abstieg in die Unterwelt, der nur befremdet, wenn man nicht sieht, daß damit die vorangegangenen Beispiele fortgesetzt und nun in ihren Konsequenzen verfolgt und ausgeführt werden. Der Anschluß an das Vorhergehende ist fugenlos: auch Horaz hat das Unglück – in seinem Bereich – nicht vorausgesehen, hätte es aber sehr plötzlich fast sehen müssen: *vidimus* in V. 22 schließt unmittelbar an die *improvisa vis* in den V. 19/20 an. Horaz zeigt zuletzt am Beispiel seiner eigenen Person, wie er trotz aller Sicherung gegen alles Störende, trotz alles Befreitseins von Furcht im Frieden seines Guts, den er uns im siebzehnten Gedicht des 1. Buchs schildert, gleichwohl nicht jede Bedrohung auszuschließen vermochte. Bedrohung überschattet jegliche Lebensform, und es sollte ja längstens hier klar geworden sein, daß es Horaz bei der ganzen Beispielsreihe auf die verschiedenen menschlichen Lebensformen abgesehen hat, die er im Eingangsgedicht der Sammlung nebeneinanderstellt: I 1,14 *pavidus nauta* (*navita perhorrescit*), 23/4 *castra bellaque detestata* (*miles, fuga*), 34 *Lesboum barbiton* (*Aeoliis fidibus*).

[6] Heinze a. a. O.

Die im Widmungsgedicht in Praeambelform geäußerte Selbsteinschätzung des Horaz kehrt in unserem Gedicht wieder und wird von seiner Mitte an thematisiert. Insofern reicht die Beispielsreihe von der vierten Strophe bis zum Schluß des Gedichts.

Der Beginn der zweiten Hälfte des Gedichts ist einerseits Abschluß der Aufreihung der verschiedenen Lebensformen und Lebensbereiche, der nicht nur mit Aeoliis fidibus auf die eigene Tätigkeit und Leistung weist, sondern mit der eine ganze Strophe umfassenden Beschreibung des Totenreichs gegenüber dem abstrakten *leti* V. 19 auch eine Steigerung und einen Höhepunkt erreicht. Vor allem und zugleich ist die Strophe mit *Aeoliis fidibus* Überleitung und Themenangabe für die folgende, ebenfalls praeambelmäßig formulierte Selbsteinschätzung des Dichters Horaz.

Daß nur von dieser aus die Begegnung mit den lesbischen Dichtern Sappho und Alkaios verstanden werden kann, wurde allenthalben gesehen. Nicht beachtet wurde jedoch die eigentümliche Rolle, die Horaz dem Alkaios in der Unterwelt zuweist. Alkaios besingt handfesten Stoff (*plenius*), und zwar genau das Schicksal *der* Menschen, die Horaz in den Strophen 4 und 5 seiner eigenen Lebensform gegenübergestellt hat: *dura navis* (*navita*) – *fugae* (*fugam*) – *belli* (vgl. V. 18/9). Und mögen die Schatten der Unterwelt Sappho ebenso bewundern, so drängt sich doch vor allem (*magis*) das Volk (*volgus*), derb und plebeiisch, um eben den Gesängen des Alkaios von Schlacht und Flucht zu lauschen (*pugnas, exactos tyrannos*). Das *sacrum silentium*, das die Schatten dem Gesang der Dichter entgegenbringen, gründet jedoch beim Volk im Interesse an den konkreten Stoffen des Alkaios, – es sieht in der Dichtung Mittel zum Zweck, Trost für persönliches Ungemach (*dura navis, fugae, belli*), nicht Zweck – nicht in der Einsicht in die Macht der Dichtung selbst. Hätte es diese Einsicht, so wäre an dem betroffenen Schweigen nichts Wunderbares: *quid mirum. . . .*? (Damit wird deutlich das mirantur von V. 30 aufgenommen.) Die *carmina* selbst – als solche bezeichnete ja Horaz seine Sammlung! – sind es, gewissermaßen die reine Dichtung (*dulcis sonus* V. 38), die ihre Macht besitzen über irrationale Gewalten, hier vertreten durch den Höllenhund und die Schlangen der Erinyen, und über Leid und Qual, vertreten durch die Büßer Prometheus, Tantalus, Orion, nicht ihr Inhalt.

Wie Horaz also zunächst die einzelnen Lebensformen und ihre Gefahren einander gegenübergestellt hatte, so hier das einzelne Verhalten der Betroffenen im Unglück und im Tod. Erst hier wird ganz deutlich, worauf das Gedicht weist und worin seine Einheit zu sehen ist: seine Existenz und sein Selbstverständnis als Dichter und sein Verständnis von Dichtung

lassen ihn Gefahren gefaßter überwinden und sich im Tod reiner bewähren und sondern ihn hierin vom Volk. Mit den Worten des Horaz selbst: *me leves chori secernunt populo* I 1,32 und natürlich *odi profanum volgus* III 1,1, aber besonders in dem eigentlichen Alkaiosgedicht I 32: die Dichtung an sich ist *laborum dulce lenimen mihi*, für Horaz, wie sie es für Alkaios *inter arma sive iactatam religarat navim* war. Poetisch-technisch beruht die Einheit des Gedichts auf einer in zweifacher Weise ablaufenden Beispielsreihe, angehängt an ein persönliches Erlebnis, dessen symbolhafte Bedeutung für Horaz aus seiner mehrfachen Erwähnung feststeht: II 17, III 4, III 8.

Am Schluß steht das Bild vom Verbrecher Orion, womit das Gedicht seine vollkommene Rundung erhält. Selbst das Tun, nicht nur das Leiden, des verbrecherischen Menschen, das Horaz am Beginn des Gedichts beschreibt, erfährt durch die Dichtung Läuterung und Milderung: Orion vergißt seine Jagdleidenschaft. Das Gedicht endet versöhnlich, im ruhigen und ehrerbietigen Vertrauen (= *pietas mea* I 17,13) des Horaz auf die Macht der Dichtung.

Daß es in diesem Bereich jedoch auch so etwas wie eine Sünde wider den Geist gibt, zeigt III 4: hier wird das absolut Bedrohende als eine solche beschrieben, wobei das große Musengedicht im Grunde eine Ausführung dessen in größerem Rahmen ist, worauf II 13 weist: es geht aus von dem persönlichen Erlebnis, bei dem sich Horaz unter dem sicheren Schutz der Musen wähnen durfte, deren eine das Gedicht anruft. Diese Sicherung vor Bedrohung (ebenfalls in Form eines Topos beschrieben, zu Heinzes Anmerkung tritt vor allem noch Pindar *Ol.* VI) ist für das Volk ein Wunder (*mirum*), für Horaz Grundlage des Vertrauens auf sein Geschütztsein in allen fiktiven Lebenslagen. Neben den Unglücksbaum tritt wiederum Krieg und Seefahrt (*navita Bosporum temptabo*). Das konkrete Bild der Bedrohung mit Bär und Schlange ist nicht ironische Übertreibung, sondern Ausdruck von Glück, frohen Muts oder, wenn man so will, daraus entspringender guter Laune (vgl. I 22). Die Muse, die Dichtung selbst ist Ursache für alles Gelingen, für jegliche Ordnung, für jegliches ordnende Planen: consilium. Von diesem Gedanken der Ordnung (41/65) wird das konkrete Bild des Gewalttätigen, des Chaos umrahmt. Seine Überwindung ist für Horaz ein Beweis (*scimus* 42, *testis* 69) für die Macht der Kunst: Apollo wird unter den göttlichen Gegnern eine ganze Strophe gewidmet. Die Mitte des Gedichts nimmt Augustus ein, er verkörpert auf Erden im großen das Vertrauen auf die Macht der Dichtung, das für Horaz die bestimmende Grundlage seiner Existenz und der Überzeugung ist, die Karl

Kraus so formuliert hat: „Wenn zweimal zwei wirklich vier ist, wie sie behaupten, so verdankt es dieses Resultat der Tatsache, daß Goethe das Gedicht Meeresstille geschrieben hat." Doch auch dieses Gedicht klingt nicht ganz unversöhnlich aus, die Reihe der Frevler wird abgeschlossen mit dem *amator Peirithous*: nicht nur assoziiert man sein kurios-komisches Unterwelterlebnis, seine Sünde ist gegenüber der seiner Leidensgenossen poetisch, daher läßlich.

Noch eins: dürfen wir in den Versen 25–32 etwas von Horazens Urteil über Alkaios vermuten? Und über Sappho, der rühmende Verse in IV 9 gelten? Ich glaube nicht. Das Gedicht enthält vielmehr zugleich ein Stück Literaturtheorie, wenigstens der Lyrik: nämlich den Hinweis, wie man an das Kunstgebilde eines lyrischen Gedichts vornehmlich heranzugehen hat. Bei dem hier in Rede stehenden Gedicht hat man jedenfalls diesen Hinweis lange nicht verstanden.

GILBERT LAWALL

Seneca's *Medea:* The Elusive Triumph of Civilization

Most discussion of Seneca's *Medea* limits itself to the admittedly impressive and dominant figure of Medea.[1] A complete interpretation, however, must account also for Creon, Jason, and the choral odes, especially the two central ones dealing with man's incursion into nature through seafaring and the voyage of the Argo.[2] Seneca's radical reshaping of the Euripidean figures of Creon and Jason and his introduction of new themes into the choral odes produce a highly original, distinctly Roman, and remarkably successful reworking of Euripides' play.

The Argonautic voyage was an attempt by men to control nature and to impose human rule and laws upon the sea (second choral ode), yet at the same time it was an act of violence against nature that inevitably brought retribution in its wake (third choral ode). Similarly, Creon's responsible and statesmanlike attempt to create a new political order in Corinth by accepting Jason as his son-in-law and banishing the baleful Medea beyond the borders of his realm in order to prevent war with Acastus is an attempt to manipulate and control this passionate and dangerous woman in the interests of the safety and security of the kingdom. Yet, at the same time, it is an act of violence against her marriage and her motherhood and inevitably brings retribution in its wake, too. Tiphys' attempt to civilize and pacify the seas thus parallels Creon's attempt to establish political order and security in Corinth. Neither the sea nor Medea is tractable to man's civilizing forces. Neptune's punishment of all the Argonauts but Jason is recounted in the third choral ode, and at the end of the play Medea both avenges the wrongs done to her and serves (unwittingly) as the agent of the

[1] See, for example, G. Maurach, Jason und Medea bei Seneca, Ant. & Abendl. 12 (1966) 125–140; D. H. and B. Walker, Loss of Identity: Medea superest? A Study of Seneca's Medea, Class. Philol. 62 (1967) 169–181; and W. Kullmann, Medeas Entwicklung bei Seneca, Festschr. Karl Büchner (Wiesbaden 1970) 158–167.

[2] C. Blitzen, The Senecan and Euripidean Medea: A Comparison, Class. Bull. 52 (1976) 86–90, has good comments on Creon and Jason yet neglects the choral odes.

sea in avenging itself upon Jason for his part in the Argonautic expedition. All of this belies the happy optimism of the second choral ode with its vision of a nature that yields to man's efforts (*nunc iam cessit pontus* 364) and accepts his rule (*omnes patitur leges* 364–365). This happy vision, which is accompanied by a famous prediction that nature will open herself yet further to man's exploration and the extension of human endeavors, is shattered by Medea's triumph and Jason's anger and despair at the end of the play. The play is an exploration of the clash between raw, untamed nature and man's attempt to impose political and technological control over his world. Medea, the embodiment of raw, untamed nature, destroys both Creon, the statesman, and Jason, the obedient subject and the last of the Argonauts. The triumph of civilization envisioned by the chorus at the end of the second choral ode remains an elusive dream.

In Seneca's *Medea* it is Creon, not Jason, who takes the initiative in arranging and justifying Jason's marriage to Creusa. The whole situation is quite unlike that in Euripides' play. In Seneca's version, Acastus, king of Thessaly and son of Pelias, whom Medea treacherously murdered, is threatening war against Medea, Jason, and Corinth which is now harboring the two fugitives. Creon believes that by banishing Medea war with Acastus can be prevented, since it was Medea, not Jason, who was responsible for the murder of Pelias. The banishment of Medea and the wedding of Jason to Creusa are thus part of a political maneuver to hold off Acastus, make peace between Thessaly and Corinth, and provide Jason, whom Creon considers to be innocent of the murder of Pelias, with security and wealth in Corinth. Medea herself recognizes that this is indeed the situation, and she excuses Jason as being under the power of Creon. She assumes that Jason was forced by Creon to accept the new marriage against his will, and this assumption is shown to be correct by Jason's own words. Yet, Creon fears not only war with Acastus, but also the very presence in his realm of the baleful and treacherous Medea. His decree of exile is prompted by a wholly justifiable fear for the safety of his people and his realm. He regards Medea as a *monstrum saevum horribile* (191). She must obey his kingly *imperium*, and submit to his *constitutum decretum* (198). Medea in turn regards Creon as *tumidus imperio* (178), and *sceptro impotens* (143), but he assures her that he is not a violent ruler who tramples haughtily upon the wretched. As evidence of his responsible and humanitarian rule, he cites his choice of the wretched and fearful exile Jason as his son-in-law. Jason was fearful because Acastus was seeking both him and Medea to punish both of them for the murder of Pelias. Creon, however, has examined the case and passed his

own judgment, finding Jason innocent and Medea guilty. Thus, in breaking the marriage between Jason and Medea and in sending her into exile, Creon is not only protecting his realm from her baleful presence, but also rescuing Jason from the threat of punishment for a crime of which Creon does not regard him as guilty. Creon is prompted by honorable motives; he has acted as a responsible statesman, with genuine concern for humanity and justice.

At the end of her confrontation with Creon, Medea appears to yield and accept her exile as inevitable; she adopts a suppliant posture and begs for a brief delay to say farewell to her children. Creon, suspecting treachery and deeply fearful, nonetheless yields. He yields to her prayers now just as he yielded to Jason's earlier when he begged Creon not to put Medea to death, which had been Creon's initial and preferred solution to the problem of Medea's presence in his kingdom. Creon's yielding at these two moments confirms his denial that he is a violent ruler trampeling haughtily upon the wretched, and his yielding to Medea's tearful and motherly desire to implant her final kisses upon her children seems to result from the same humanitarian spirit that prompted him to protect the wretched and fearful Jason.

Alongside Creon's tragic humanitarian weakness there lies an equally tragic insensitivity or crudeness in his handling of Medea and ultimately a tragic underestimation of the threat posed by the woman. He is too quick to believe that when she falls before him as a suppliant and declares that she is leaving (*supplex recedens* 282) he has imposed his *imperium* upon her. Yet, it is clear that he does believe this. And, it is exactly his apparent success here in handling Medea that justifies the optimism of the choral ode which immediately follows, in which the sea is described as submitting to the will of sailors just as Medea has apparently submitted to the will of the statesman.

The second choral ode explores man's incursion as a seafarer into the world of nature, his imposition of control over nature, and nature's yielding to the ever expanding extension of human control.[3] The echoes of Horace's third ode of his first book are clear in Seneca's emphasis on the excessive boldness of the first mariner in setting forth on the seas amid the dangers and uncertainties of nature in a flimsy craft. Yet, Seneca's passage on early seafaring implies that progress is possible and thus moves in a different direction from its Horatian model. With the building of bigger

[3] With the interpretation presented here compare J. D. Bishop, The Choral Odes of Seneca's Medea, Class. Journ. 60 (1965) 313–316.

and stronger boats, seafaring will become safer; with an increase in man's knowledge and experience, nature will become less treacherous, fickle, and uncertain. Tiphys, the helmsman of the Argo, already achieved a significant advance in man's mastery of nature through seafaring (*leges . . . novas scribere ventis* 319–320) and thus harnessed nature to man's needs and desires. The technological triumph of the Argonautic voyage was a great turning point in human history that brought an end to the Golden Age by uniting lands which had previously been separated by nature's laws. Yet, this change is described not as a violent disruption of natural law or as an act of impiety, as Horace describes it, but rather as a unification of the world (*traxit in unum* 336). Even so, man must suffer for his encroachment on nature, and his suffering consists of the fear which inevitably accompanies seafaring. Even here, however, the second choral ode is remarkably optimistic. The first example of the Argonauts' fear is the passage through the Clashing Rocks, which was so terrifying that Tiphys' hand slipped from the tiller and Orpheus' lyre fell silent, thus reducing these two symbols of man's ability to control nature through human technology and art to impotence. Yet, despite the debilitating terror, the Argo did pass through the Clashing Rocks. Next, Scylla's barking terrified the Argonauts, yet apparently constituted no serious physical threat. Finally, there are the Sirens, but Orpheus not only checked their threat, but nearly forced them to follow the Argo, instead of allowing the Argo to be lured by the Sirens to shipwreck on the rocks. Here man through his art clearly triumphs over nature. While the Argonauts thus triumph, they bring back with them as the *pretium* ("reward," "price," "punishment") of their voyage Medea: *maius . . . mari Medea malum, merces prima digna carina* (362–363). Yet, while the other evils of the sea were surmounted or checked by the technology of the Argonauts, Creon has conceived and apparently successfully deployed a plan to remove Medea's evil presence from his realm. With the terrors of the voyage now a thing of the past and Medea removed from Corinth, a new age of security not unlike the Golden Age could begin. But there would be no reversion to the primitivism of the Golden Age; the conquest of the sea and the advancement of technology are irreversible. The sea has now yielded to man (*nunc iam cessit pontus* 364), and it obeys all of the laws man has imposed upon it (*omnes patitur leges* 364–365). So also, Medea has yielded to Creon and agreed to leave, obeying Creon's *imperium* just as the sea obeys man's laws. The chorus sings a paean to a glorious age of seafaring that represents a triumph of human technology and a continuous yielding of nature:

venient annis
saecula seris, quibus Oceanus
vincula rerum laxet et ingens
pateat tellus Tethysque novos
detegat orbes nec sit terris
ultima Thule. (374–379)

Nothing could be further from Horace's pessimistic moralizing at the end of his ode to seafaring:

neque
per nostrum patimur scelus
iracunda Iovem ponere fulmina.

Yet, unfortunately, the chorus is just as wrong in its optimistic reading of human and natural history as Creon is wrong in believing that Medea has now submitted to his will. The third choral ode will show that the sea has no more been tamed than has Medea. Yet, the second choral ode has brilliantly celebrated the ideal of the civilizing power of man and human supremacy over nature, which finds its corollary in the statesman Creon's efforts to create peace and security in his realm by expelling Medea, the arch symbol of human wickedness, and thereby removing the threat of war with Acastus.

If Creon is the statesman and king who has passed judgment and decided what best to do with Jason and Medea, basing his decision on both his humanitarian impulse to protect the harassed, fearful, and innocent Jason and his protective instinct to guard his citizens against the threat posed by Medea's presence – if Creon is thus the concerned ruler attempting to govern his subjects in as fair and civilized a manner as possible, then Jason represents the obedient subject who finds himself placed in a very difficult and painful situation by the arrangement decided upon by Creon, but who finds he has no choice but to submit and reconcile himself to the inevitable. He is essentially a passive character subject to pressures from outside; Creon has presented him with the choice of obedience or death. This means death for himself and for Medea or obedience to Creon and abandonment of his marriage to Medea. He chooses the latter out of *pietas* toward his children, who otherwise would be put to death along with their parents. Again, Seneca has radically transformed the situation from that found in the Euripidean play. There is a marked Vergilian cast to the situation in Seneca. Jason must break faith with Medea in order to protect his children, just as

surely as Aeneas must abandon Dido in order to protect the future of his son, Ascanius. Seneca has thus provided a Roman and at least partially sympathetic reworking of the obnoxiously egotistic, selfish, male-chauvinistic Jason as he appears in Euripides' play. Yet, Seneca's Jason, although an obedient subject motivated by Vergilian *pietas* toward his children, is a totally ineffectual character in his dealing with the passionate and headstrong Medea. He approaches her in an attempt to get her to see the wisdom of the choice he has made and to persuade her to place the interests of their children before her personal feelings about her marriage. But all his efforts are futile. He succeeds only in alienating Medea further and in revealing to her the way in which she can pain him most deeply in her search for revenge.

The third choral ode, which follows the Jason-Medea scene, establishes a parallel between Medea's threatened punishment of Jason and Neptune's punishment of the Argonauts for violating the sea. While the two themes are kept discretely separated in the ode, there are suggestions that Medea in carrying out her revenge will unwittingly be serving as an agent of Neptune. The ode begins with the unbridled fury and aggressiveness of Medea as a *coniunx viduata taedis*. When at the beginning of the fifth stanza the chorus prays that Jason be spared, it is natural to assume that it has in mind his safety from the threat posed by Medea. Yet, it turns out that these lines serve as a pivot to the chorus' concern that Jason be spared from the wrath of Neptune, who is enraged over the conquest of the seas. The remainder of the ode deals with Neptune's wrath and his cruel punishment of the Argonauts. While the optimism of the second choral ode harmonized with Creon's apparently successful effort to gain Medea's submission and exile, the pessimism of the third ode is in keeping with Jason's failure to reconcile Medea to Creon's plan and Medea's dark threats of revenge. While in the second ode the Argonauts were portrayed as surviving and even triumphing over the threats of the sea, in the third the death of Phaethon illustrates the doom that heedless daring such as that of the Argonauts brings down upon itself. The chorus is emphatic in its insistence that all of the Argonauts have paid or will pay the penalty for their violation of the sea, and the penalty is no longer merely the endurance of terrors as in the second ode, but dreadful death (*exitu diro* 614). Tiphys, whose power over the sea is expressed in his epithet *domitor profundi* (617), does not escape with being merely terrified by the Clashing Rocks but suffers a piteous death far from his home. Orpheus, whose power to charm nature is celebrated here as in the second ode, is no longer able to use that power to save his life, and lies scattered in pieces over the Thracian fields. While these

examples refer to the previous ode and undercut its optimism, three of the following examples foreshadow the details of Medea's vengeance upon Jason. The flaming death of Hercules and the destruction of his body by his wife's gift of a poisoned robe (*munere nuptae* 642) point toward the poisoned robe that Medea will send to destroy Creusa and Creon and burn down the palace. Meleager's death at the hands of an enraged mother (*dextra matris iratae* 645–646) prefigures Medea as an angry mother slaying her children. The death of the *puer* Hylas (649) suggests Medea's slaying of her *pueri.* The punishment of the Argonauts and the punishment of Jason also overlap at the end of the ode. The last in the list of those killed as punishment for the expedition is Pelias, the one who ordered the voyage and also the one person in the list killed by Medea herself. Medea has thus already served, unwittingly to be sure, as an agent of Neptune. While the chorus concludes with a prayer that Jason be spared, the audience knows that he will not be. In punishing Jason Medea will again be carrying out the wrath of Neptune. This crossing of roles is eased by an association throughout the play of Medea with the sea, the wild, destructive powers of nature, and the monsters of the deep.

By the beginning of the final act, the audience or reader is thus prepared to see Jason punished by Medea for both his rejection of her and his crime against the sea. Medea's final soliloquy in the last act, at the climax of which she slays the first child, is as complex as is the character of Medea herself. She is torn between her roles as *coniunx* and *mater,* between her *ira* and her *amor,* and she is wracked with pangs of guilt over the crimes she committed to save Jason and the Argonauts. One thing that is clear, however, is that the slaying of the first child is directly related to the voyage of the Argo, while the second child is specifically slain to punish Jason for his present desertion of Medea. Once again, Seneca has engineered a radical departure from his Euripidean model.

As the Furies close in upon Medea, the ghost of her dismembered brother Apsyrtus appears. She orders her brother's ghost to send the Furies away, wishing to be left alone with only her brother, whom she invites to use her hand that has drawn the sword. The first child is slain to appease the ghost of Apsyrtus: *victima manes tuos placamus ista* (970–971). Jason's present desertion of her is far from her thoughts as she commits this first murder, although he will certainly be pained by it. The murder is staged as a private matter between Medea and her own past crime. Yet, Jason, too, was implicated in that past crime, which was in fact committed for his benefit as much as for Medea's. The success of the voyage and the Argonauts'

triumph over the sea were bought with the slaying of Apsyrtus. The first child is thus slain to pay the penalty for criminality involved in the voyage of the Argo, and Jason shares in the criminality of the voyage not only with regard to the slaying of Apsyrtus but also with regard to the voyage itself as a culpable violation of Neptune's realm. In paying with the life of his child for the slaying of Apsyrtus, Jason is receiving his appropriate punishment for his part in the expedition. Both Apsyrtus and Neptune will be satisfied.

While the murder of the child will bring pain and grief to Jason, it produces a splendid exultation and joy in Medea. Her guilt is expiated; the violence done by the Argonautic voyage has all been undone.[4] Everything is restored to the state in which it was before the expedition took place:

> iam iam recepi sceptra germanum patrem,
> spoliumque Colchi pecudis auratae tenent;
> rediere regna, rapta virginitas redit. (981–984)

The old pre-Argonautic world is restored; the chorus' dream of progress into a civilized future with an ever closer cooperation and harmony between man and nature is shattered, as Medea turns time backwards. Creon the statesman lies dead with his daughter in his palace that is ablaze with an uncontrollable fire that is fed rather than quenched by water and that threatens to burn down the entire city. When Jason, the loyal but ineffectual subject-citizen, obedient to Creon's civilized plan for law and order, arrives on stage, his second son will be mercilessly slain to punish him for obeying Creon and deserting Medea as wife and mother. Having lost the things that are dearer than life itself, Jason will no longer find any meaning in the world: *testare nullos esse, qua veheris deos* (1027), he shouts to the triumphant Medea as she departs. Creon's humane and just attempt to arrange a solution to the political problems caused by the presence of Medea and Jason in his realm has proven as futile and disastrous as the attempt of Tiphys and the Argonauts to impose human control upon the seas. The political values of Creon as a humane statesman and those of Jason as a loyal and disciplined citizen fall victim to Medea's onslaught just as surely as the technological and artistic powers of Tiphys and Orpheus are annulled by the wrath of Neptune. The chorus' dream of unlimited progress and harmony between man and nature (364–379) – one of the most inspired visions in pagan Latin literature – vanishes before the raw, untamed fury of Medea and the sea.

[4] See A. L. Motto and J. R. Clark, Senecan Tragedy: Patterns of Irony and Art, Class. Bull. 48 (1971–1972) 71.

WOLDEMAR GÖRLER

Kaltblütiges Schnarchen

Zum literarischen Hintergrund der Vesuvbriefe des jüngeren Plinius

Die beiden Briefe des jüngeren Plinius über den Vesuvausbruch des Jahres 79 n. Chr., die lange als schlechthin zuverlässige Augenzeugenberichte galten, sind seit einiger Zeit in ein gewisses Zwielicht geraten. Je deutlicher die philologische Interpretation den kunstvollen Aufbau der Briefe hervortreten ließ und je klarer es wurde, daß in Darstellung und Wortlaut des Plinius beziehungsvolle Zitate und Anspielungen Eingang gefunden hatten[1], um so weniger war man geneigt, Plinius Glauben zu schenken[2]. Sein Bericht schien weniger der Wirklichkeit als künstlerischen Prinzipien zu folgen. Die nachstehenden Bemerkungen sind geeignet, das Mißtrauen gegen Plinius zu verstärken; es läßt sich nämlich zeigen, daß der literarische Hintergrund der Vesuvbriefe noch breiter und vielschichtiger ist, als man bislang annahm. Aber die Frage nach der Glaubwürdigkeit der plinianischen Berichte mag zunächst ausgeklammert bleiben.

Zu Beginn des zweiten Briefes (6,20) vergleicht sich Plinius durch ein wörtliches Zitat (*Aen.* 2,12f.) unmißverständlich mit Vergils Aeneas: Wie jener vor Dido den Untergang Trojas berichtet hatte, will er nun Tacitus die Schrecknisse beim Untergang der Vesuvstädte schildern. Seit langem ist bekannt, daß dieser Vergleich bis in Einzelheiten hinein durchgeführt ist. Aeneas hatte sich aus dem brennenden Troja gerettet, Plinius rettet sich aus dem brennenden, vom Einsturz bedrohten Misenum; und wie Anchises sich für den Sohn opfern und in Troja sterben will, so will Plinius Mutter den Sohn durch ihre Begleitung nicht belasten.[3]

[1] Vgl. vor allem F. Lillge, Die literarische Form der Briefe Plinius d. J. über den Ausbruch des Vesuvs, Sokrates (Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen, N.F.) 6 (1918) 207–234 u. 273–297.

[2] Selbst die Todesursache des älteren Plinius wurde in Zweifel gezogen: Er sei einem Herzschlag erlegen; nur in der stark idealisierenden Darstellung des Neffen erscheine das Ende als Opfertod eines Forschers (vgl. H.-P. Bütler, Die geistige Welt des jüngeren Plinius. Studien zur Themamatik seiner Briefe [Heidelberg 1970] 80 Anm. 41, mit älterer Literatur).

[3] Man vergleiche auch *Aen.* 2,317 . . . *pulchrumque mori succurrit in armis* mit Plin. *ep.* 6,20,15 *erant, qui metu mortis mortem precarentur; Aen.* 2,324 *venit summa dies et*

Unlängst hat nun F. Trisoglio in seiner trefflichen kommentierenden Ausgabe[4] darauf hingewiesen, daß auch zu Lucan 1,469–498, wo die Panik in Rom beim Anrücken Caesars (Januar 49 v. Chr.) geschildert wird, eine enge Beziehung besteht:

Lucan 1,469–472

vana quoque ad veros accessit fama timores
inrupitque animos populi clademque futuram
intulit et velox properantis nuntia belli
innumeras solvit falsa in praeconia linguas.

Lucan 1,484–486

. . . sic quisque pavendo
dat vires famae, nulloque auctore malorum
quae finxere timent.

Plinius 6,20,15

nec defuerunt, qui fictis mentitisque terroribus vera pericula augerent . . .

Plinius 6,20,19

plerique lymphati terrificis vaticinationibus et sua et aliena mala ludificabantur.

Lucan 1,490–498

tunc quae tuta petant et quae metuenda relinquant
incerti: quo quemque fugae tulit impetus, urget
praecipitem populum, serieque haerentia longa
agmina prorumpunt; credas aut tecta nefandas

ineluctabile tempus mit Plin. 6,20,15 . . . *aeternam illam et novissimam noctem mundo interpretabantur* (vgl. u. zu Verg. g. 1,468); Aen. 2,360 *nox atra circumvolat umbra* mit Plin. 6,20,14 *nox, non qualis inlunis aut nubila, sed qualis in locis clausis lumine exstincto.* – Lillge, a.a.O. 292 Anm. 2 vermutet, Plinius habe die Anregung für den Vergleich des Vesuvausbruchs mit dem Untergang Trojas von Seneca, ben. 3 (bei Lillge irrtümlich: 6), 37 empfangen, wo Aeneas mit den beiden Jünglingen aus Catania, Anapias und Amphinomus, zusammengestellt ist, die ihre Eltern bei einem Ausbruche des Aetna retteten. Das ist möglich, aber selbstverständlich war Plinius für den Einfall nicht auf Seneca angewiesen. Die Verbindung vulkanischer Phänomene (Erdbeben) mit dem zweiten Aeneisbuch findet sich bei Seneca übrigens auch *nat.* 6,2,2. – In Plin. 6,20,15 *aeternam illam et novissimam noctem* (vgl. auch o.) erkennt Lillge, a.a.O., 290 Anm. 1, zu Recht eine Anspielung auf Verg. g. 1,468 *impiaque aeternam timuerunt saecula noctem*, „die umso näher lag, als ein paar Verse weiter (472–474) ein Ausbruch des Aetna kurz geschildert wird." Es geht um Prodigien nach der Ermordung Caesars.

[4] Plinio Cecilio Secondo, Opere, a cura di Francesco Trisoglio, vol. 1–2 (Torino 1973).

corripuisse faces aut iam quatiente ruina
nutantes pendere domos; sic turba per urbem
inconsulta ruit.

Plinius 6,20,7

sequitur volgus attonitum, quodque in pavore simile prudentiae, alienum consilium suo praefert ingentique agmine abeuntis premit et impellit.

Plinius 6,20,6

iam quassatis circumiacentibus tectis, quamquam in aperto loco, angusto tamen, magnus et certus ruinae metus.

Auch auf Lucan 1,504–506

nullum iam languidus aevo
evaluit revocare parens coniunxve maritum
fletibus . . .

hätte Trisoglio noch verweisen können; man vergleiche Plinius 6,20,14:

alii parentes, alii liberos, alii coniuges vocibus requirebant, vocibus noscitabant; hi suum, illi suorum casum miserabantur.

Schon die wörtlichen Anklänge lassen keinen Zweifel daran, daß es sich um bewußte Zitate handelt. Hinzukommt eine andere, bislang nicht bemerkte Anspielung auf Lucan. Der drohende Einsturz von Wohnhäusern war bei Lucan 1,494f. als Gegenstand unbegründeter Furcht genannt worden; im Prooemium dagegen ist der Verfall als Realität ausgemalt (1,24–26):

at nunc semirutis pendent quod moenia tectis
urbibus Italiae lapsisque ingentia muris
saxa iacent . . .

Man könnte die Anklänge der drei Stellen untereinander, die bis in die Konstruktion hinein gehen (Luc. 1,24 *semirutis . . . tectis*, Luc. 1,494 *quatiente ruina*, Plin. 6,20,6 *quassatis . . . tectis*)[5] für Zufall halten. Aber Lucan selbst hat im Prooemium unmittelbarbar zuvor eine klare Beziehung zum zweiten Aeneisbuch geschaffen.

[5] Vgl. auch *Aen.* 2,463–466 und Luc. 7,403f., sowie u. Anm. 13. – Plin. *ep.* 6,20,6 *iam hora diei prima, et adhuc dubius et quasi languidus dies* erinnert an Luc. 1,233–235 *iamque dies primos belli visura tumultus / exoritur; seu sponte deum, seu turbidus Auster / inpulerat, maestam tenuerunt nubila lucem.* Auch der erste Tag des Bürgerkrieges war ein Unglückstag par excellence, aber bewußte Anspielung scheidet wohl aus.

Vers 21

tum, si tantus amor belli tibi, Roma, nefandi . . .

erinnert unüberhörbar an Vergils (*Aen.* 2,10)

sed si tantus amor casus cognoscere nostros . . .

und setzt damit die Zerstörung der italischen Städte durch den Bürgerkrieg in Parallele zum Untergang Trojas. Auf den gleichen Vergilvers hat nun auch Plinius in der Einleitung des Briefes 6,20 angespielt (1): *Ais te . . . cupere cognoscere, quos . . . casus pertulerim . . .*, was freilich auch dem antiken Leser erst durch das folgende wörtliche Zitat deutlich geworden sein dürfte. Es ist wohl zu spitzfinding, daraus den Schluß zu ziehen, Plinius habe nicht nur Lucan zitieren, sondern zugleich auch auf Lucans Zitat – und dadurch indirekt nochmals auf Troja – hinweisen wollen. Aber es gilt festzuhalten: Plinius hat neben Troja auch das im Bürgerkrieg vernichtete Italien als Hintergrund für die Schrecken des Vesuvausbruchs suggeriert.

Ein dritter Vergleich wird dem aufmerksamen Leser auf andere Weise nahegelegt. Das eigentümliche Verhalten des jungen Plinius, der bereits in *ep.* 6,16,7 seine Bücher der Überfahrt zum Vesuv vorgezogen hatte und jetzt (6,20,5) ungeachtet des immer bedrohlicher werdenden Bebens seine Studien fortsetzt, hat schon immer Befremden ausgelöst. Nun sagt er selbst, er habe nur *quasi per otium* gelesen; er hat also eine Rolle gespielt. An welches Vorbild er dabei gedacht hat, läßt sich unschwer erraten: Der achtzehnjährige Plinius verhält sich – ein wenig kindisch und demonstrativ-theatralisch – wie Archimedes bei der Eroberung von Syrakus im Jahre 211 v. Chr.; über seinen Studien vergißt er, was um ihn herum vorgeht. Diese Vermutung wird bestärkt durch den Gegenstand seiner Lektüre: Er liest das Geschichtswerk des T. Livius, damals wie heute die Hauptquelle für den zweiten punischen Krieg. Ferner: Die Parallelität zwischen dem Untergang Trojas und dem Fall von Syrakus liegt auf der Hand: Beide Städte fallen durch List und Verrat, die Eroberer haben leichtes Spiel mit den wein- und schlaftrunkenen Verteidigern (Liv. 25,23). Manches spricht also dafür, in Plinius' Aussage, er sei dem Erdbeben zum Trotz *intentus in librum* gewesen, ein wörtliches Zitat aus Livius 25,31,9 zu sehen: . . . *Archimedem memoriae proditum est . . . intentum formis . . . interfectum.*

Wenn diese Interpretation richtig ist, hat sich der junge Plinius nicht nur die fürsorgliche Kindesliebe des Aeneas sondern auch die hingebungsvolle Unerschrockenheit des Archimedes durch Anspielung und Zitat be-

scheinigt. Was sollen wir davon halten? Lillge[6] sieht die Absicht des inzwischen gereiften Plinius (die Briefe 6,16 und 6,20 sind etwa 20 Jahre nach den Ereignissen verfaßt) entschieden zu simpel, wenn er unterstellt: „Von dem Glanze jener Tat, auf der Aeneas' Ruhm vor allem sich gründete, der Rettung des Vaters aus der brennenden Stadt, sollte auch auf ihn selbst und seine Tat, die Rettung der Mutter, helles Licht fallen." Dagegen hat schon Bütler[7] mit Recht eingewandt, es habe Plinius ferngelegen, sich die Rolle eines zweiten Helden (nach dem Onkel) zuzuschreiben; „niemand hätte ihm das abgenommen." Aber auch er hält es für möglich, daß Plinius „etwas von dem Mute und der *constantia*, die er später im öffentlichen Leben genug bewiesen zu haben glaubte, bereits in seine Jugend (habe) zurückprojizieren" wollen. Es fällt schwer, daran zu glauben. Eine nüchterne und objektive Schilderung seines Verhaltens in jener Schreckensnacht hätte durchaus zeigen können, daß bereits der Jüngling Plinius mutig und entschlossen war; der hochgegriffene Vergleich mit Aeneas aber zeigt das gerade nicht. Neben Aeneas kann Plinius nur klein und epigonal wirken. Das gilt in noch höherem Maße für die von uns angenommene Anspielung auf den in Gelehrsamkeit ergrauten Archimedes. Man darf in beiden Vergleichen schwerlich mehr sehen als ein leicht selbstgefälliges Kokettieren mit der eigenen Belesenheit; vor allem aber ist ein deutlicher Schuß von Selbstironie nicht zu überhören.

Etwas anders steht es mit der Schilderung des Onkels in Brief 6,16. Auch er ist, wie man längst bemerkt hat, durch deutliche Anspielungen zu großen Vorbildern in Beziehung gesetzt. Als der Bootsführer, erschreckt durch den immer heftigeren Fall von Asche und Bimsstein, zur Umkehr rät, ermutigt ihn der ältere Plinius mit den Worten *‚Fortes Fortuna iuvat: Pomponianum pete'* (6,16,11). Kein antiker Leser konnte den Anklang an Caesars berühmten Ausspruch[8] auf der stürmischen Adria überhören. Die Kaltblütigkeit und Unerschrockenheit, mit der Plinius, aller Gefahren vergessend, die Einzelheiten des dramatischen Geschehens notiert und diktiert (6,16,10), hat Bütler[9] überzeugend mit Horaz c. 3,3 in Verbindung gebracht – *Iustum et tenacem propositi virum . . . impavidum ferient ruinae.* Wie Aeneas nach dem Schiffbruch vor Karthago gibt sich Plinius vor der Abendmahlzeit bewußt heiter und sorglos[10]. Alle diese Assoziationen stehen ohne jede Frage im Dienste einer gewissen Idealisierung.

[6] a.a.O. 291f.
[7] a.a.O. 82.
[8] Plutarch, *Caesar* 38,5 u.ö.
[9] a.a.O. 81.
[10] *Aen.* 1,209.

Aber die Angleichung an berühmte Muster geht noch weiter. Kaum hat Plinius sich zur Ruhe gelegt, verfällt er in echten und tiefen Schlaf. Wer an seinem Gemach vorüberging, konnte sich davon überzeugen: Er schnarchte laut und vernehmlich. Trisoglio[11] sieht in diesem „particolare realistico" ein Zeichen dafür, daß es dem Neffen fernlag, seinen Onkel zu idealisieren. In der Tat scheint die Erwähnung des Schnarchens, das mit der Leibesfülle des Onkels erklärt wird, mit dem Bilde eines Helden schwer vereinbar. Und doch stehen beide Plinii auch mit diesem Detail ihres Verhaltens bzw. ihres Berichtes in guter alter Tradition. Bereits Alexander hatte seine überlegene innere Ausgeglichenheit vor der Schlacht bei Gaugamela durch eindrucksvolles Schlafen bekundet. Daß es ein echter, tiefer Schlaf war, konnten seine Begleiter daran erkennen, daß er mehrfach geweckt werden mußte; fast hätte er den Beginn der Schlacht versäumt[12]. In zwei anderen bekannten Fällen konnte man sich auf die gleiche Weise wie beim älteren Plinius davon überzeugen, daß die Helden vor einem dramatischen Morgen wirklich schliefen. Über den jüngeren Cato berichtet Plutarch (*Cato min.* 70) er habe in der Nacht vor seinem Selbstmord so tief geschlafen ὥστε τοὺς ἐκτὸς αἰσθέσθαι, und wenn es in ähnlicher Formulierung über Kaiser Otho (Plutarch, *Otho* 17) heißt, ἤδη τὸ λοιπὸν ἀνεπαύετο τῆς νυκτός, ὥστε τοὺς κατευναστὰς αἰσθάνεσθαι βαθέως αὐτοῦ καθεύδοντος, so wird man auch hier an den gleichen Gegenstand des αἰσθέσθαι denken: an ein vernehmliches Schnarchen.[13] Es ist kaum zu bezweifeln, daß Plinius, der „Zitatengewaltige"[14], diese für uns bei Plutarch greifbaren Anekdoten gekannt und eben deshalb das ‚realistische Detail' in seinen Bericht eingeflochten hat. Eine Idealisierung im herkömmlichen Sinne ist das sicher nicht, aber doch ein bewußter Hinweis auf eine ‚Tradition'.[15]

[11] a.a.O. 625, Anm. 219.

[12] Curtius Rufus 4,13,49; Plutarch, *Alex.* 32,1.

[13] Diese beiden Stellen entnehme ich der ebenso kuriosen wie fleißigen Materialsammlung von A. A. M. Esser, Vom Schnarchen in der Antike, Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften, 34 (1941) 90–96, hier 93f. Unsere Pliniusstelle ist dort übersehen. Der schlafende Plinius tut genau das, was Juvenal als unzumutbar ansieht (3,196, über den geizigen Verwalter, der die Risse des baufälligen Hauses nur oberflächlich kitten läßt): *securos pendente iubet dormire ruina.*

[14] Bütler, a.a.O. 20: „Er, der Zitatengewaltige, sich immer wieder an Leitsätzen Orientierende . . .".

[15] Das wird auch dadurch wahrscheinlich, daß Plinius offenbar mit einem uns verlorenen Genus der kaiserzeitlichen Literatur gut vertraut war: mit den *exitus illustrium virorum.* Vgl. Plin. *ep.* 5,5,3 und 8,12,4 über Fannius und Capito als Verfasser derartiger Schriften sowie F. A. Marx, Tacitus und die Literatur der *exitus illustrium virorum,* Philologus 92 (1937) 83–103; A. Ronconi, *Exitus illustrium virorum,* Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica N.S. 17 (1940) 3–32; P. Schunck, Römisches Sterben. Studien zu Sterbeszenen in der

Wie steht es mit der Glaubwürdigkeit der plinianischen Vesuvbriefe? Zeigt sich nicht immer deutlicher, daß Plinius Zitat an Zitat, Klischee an Klischee reiht – wird nicht das berichtete Ereignis bloßer Anlaß für ein geistreiches Phantasiebild? Gerade das letzte Beispiel kann lehren, daß ein solcher Schluß zumindest nicht zwingend ist. Der Wortwechsel mit der Mutter, die pathetische Ermutigung des Steuermannes durch den Onkel könnten nachträgliche Erfindungen sein. Aber für die Schnarchgewohnheit des Onkels gab es Zeugen, und das Detail ist zu unheroisch, um erfunden zu sein. Es ist eher umgekehrt: Plinius folgt der Realität, aber er ist so belesen und er ist so wendig darin, Übereinstimmungen zu erkennen zwischen den Zufällen der Gegenwart und der literarischen Tradition, daß er für fast jede Situation einen Vergleich oder ein passendes Zitat zur Hand hat.[16]

kaiserzeitlichen Literatur, besonders bei Tacitus (Diss. Heidelberg 1955) [masch.], 2–5; H. W. Traub, Pliny's Treatment of History in Epistolary Form, Trans. Amer. philol. Assoc. 86 (1955) 213–232, hier 230 Anm. 56.

[16] Der jüngere Plinius setzt auch sonst gern seine gegenwärtige Situation zum Mythos in Parallele, und zwar mit durchaus verschiedenem Ethos. So antwortet er in 9,13,12 vor einem wirklich gefährlichen Unterfangen den zur Vorsicht mahnenden Freunden mit den Worten des Aeneas gegenüber der cumanischen Sibylle vor dem Gang in die Unterwelt (6,105): *omnia praecepi atque animo mecum ante peregi.* Der Vergleich ist wohl ernst gemeint, obwohl für unser Empfinden recht hoch gegriffen. Wenn er dagegen in 6,33,1 den Adressaten auffordert, alles andere beiseitezulegen, um unverzüglich die soeben überreichte eigene Rede zu lesen, und sich dabei der Worte des Vulcanus (*Aen.* 8,439) bedient *tollite cuncta . . . coeptosque auferte labores,* so ist die Selbstironie unüberhörbar. Das gilt wohl auch für 6,8,3 wo Plinius einen Freund, der einen unverschämten Volkstribunen fürchtet, mit den gleichen Worten beruhigt, wie einst Achill den Kalchas (*Il.* 1,88). Ein bemerkenswertes Beispiel für Plinius' Findigkeit beim Aufspüren von mythologischen Entsprechungen ist auch Brief 4,11, in dem das Schicksal der unglücklichen Vestalin zum Tode der Polyxena in Beziehung gesetzt wird. Plinius (4,11,9) zitiert wörtlich einen Vers aus Euripides (*Hec.* 569); wie Polyxena (545) entzieht sich die Vestalin der Berührung durch den Henker; wie Neoptolemos packt sie der Henker an der Hand. – Die Parallelisierung von Gegenwart und mythisch-historischer Tradition ist ihrerseits in Rom fast eine Tradition. Es sei erinnert an das Ilias-Zitat des Scipio Aemilianus auf den Trümmern von Karthago (*Il.* 4,164f. – App. *Pun.* 132 u. ö.) und an seine Reaktion auf die Nachricht von der Ermordung des Ti. Gracchus (*Od.* 1,47 – Plut. *TG* 21,7), beide von hohem Pathos getragen. Caesars ἀνερρίφθω κύβος ist in gewissem Sinne ein Gegentyp: Er untertreibt fast salopp die Bedeutung des Rubikonübergangs, indem er seinen Schritt vergleicht mit dem Beschluß einer Komödienfigur, gegen den Rat seiner Freunde zu heiraten (Menander fr. 59,2 Körte/Thierfelder).

Korrekturzusatz: Zu Plinius, *ep.* 6,20 vgl. jetzt auch R. Römisch, Der Mensch in einer Katastrophensituation. Plinius *ep.* 6,20, in: Impulse für die lateinische Lektüre. Von Terenz bis Thomas Morus. Hrsg. v. H. Krefeld (Frankfurt a. M. 1979) 124–137. Römisch (132) liefert eine wichtige Ergänzung zum Vorstehenden, indem er auf den Aetnaausbruch verweist, den die Troer in ihrer ersten Nacht auf Sizilien erleben (*Aen.* 3,571.587; vgl. bes. Plinius *ep.* 6,20,8 multa ibi miranda patimur mit *Aen.* 3,583f. inmania monstra / perferimus).

GERALD M. BROWNE

A New Papyrus Codex of the *Sortes Astrampsychi*

When I published The Papyri of the Sortes Astrampsychi in 1974,[1] I presented revised versions of P. Oxy. XII 1477, XXXVIII 2832 and 2833, the only papyri of the *Sortes* available at the time. Subsequently, two additional texts have come to light: 1) P. Oxy. XLVII 3330, from the same roll as 2832, and 2) P. Oxy. inv. 63 6B. 70/B (1–2) a and E (1–3), hereafter referred to as P. Oxy. ined.

A transcription of the new Oxyrhynchus piece, together with a brief introduction, translation, and textual notes, will appear in a future volume of P. Oxy. In the present article I provide some comments on the text as a whole, to serve as prolegomena to the forthcoming edition.

P. Oxy. ined. is written in an informal book hand; ligatures abound, and there is no claim to calligraphy. It is more carefully executed than 1477 and 2833, both composed by a documentary hand, but it falls short of the "Biblical uncial" style approximated by 2832 and 3330. On paleographical grounds, the new piece should probably be assigned to the second half of the fourth century of our era; it is thus later than the other papyri of the *Sortes Astrampsychi*, all of which come from the late third or early fourth century.[2]

The format of P. Oxy. ined., a codex, also differs from that of its predecessors, which come from rolls. Three sheets (A, B, C), as well as several small fragments, are extant. Each sheet contains parts of two conjugate leaves. Despite damage to most of the margins, reconstruction suggests that each leaf originally measured ca. 17 cm. (breadth) by ca. 28 cm. (height); the codex therefore belongs to Turner's Group 5.[3]

[1] Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 58 (Meisenheim am Glan); hereafter I shall refer to this work, which should be consulted for further bibliography, as P. Sort. Astram.

[2] See the introductions to 1477, 2832, and 2833 in P. Sort. Astram. and that to 3330 in P. Oxy. XLVII.

[3] E. G. Turner, The Typology of the Early Codex (Pennsylvania 1977) 16f. and 24.

The new Oxyrhynchus text comes from that part of the *Sortes Astrampsychi* which contains decades of answers. The content may be tabulated as follows:

A	Recto →[4]	Verso ↓	Recto ↓	Verso →
		68.7–10	70.3–10	72.4–10
	Dec. 66.2–9	69.7–10	71.1–10	73.1–10
	67.6–10	70.1–2	72.1–3	74.1–4
B	Recto →	Verso ↓	Recto ↓	Verso →
	93.1–10	95.8–10	115.9–10	117.10
	94.1–10	96.1–10	116.1–10	118.1–10
	95.1–7	97.1–10	117.1–9	119.1–10
C[5]		Recto ↓	Verso →	
			174.9–10	
		172.1–10	175.1–10	
		173.1–8	176.1–2	

Study of the decade numbers is useful in determining how the codex was formed. Let us start with B; assuming an average of 22 lines per page, we see that the text lost between 97.10 and 115.9 would fit on eight pages (four leaves). Similarly, eight pages suffice for the loss between 74.4 (end of A) and 93.1 (beginning of B). Note that A's decades are numbered consecutively; i.e. no intervening pages have fallen out after the end of the verso of the first leaf and before the beginning of the recto of the second. Clearly this cannot be a single-quire codex; rather, evaluation of the decade numbers in A und B reveals a quaternion structure: A is the fourth double leaf of one quaternion, B the second of the next. I here give a reconstruction of the two quaternia:

[4] The recto and verso of the first leaf of A are badly damaged. (The arrows, → ↓, indicate fiber direction: Turner, Typology 56.)

[5] Of this sheet both leaves survive, but one is badly damaged and its decade numbers cannot be restored. We cannot ascertain whether this leaf preceded or followed that with 172.1–176.2. See further below.



Precise line-by-line distribution of the decades in the lost pages is unattainable. Line numbers vary from page to page in the preserved text and must be presumed to do so in what is no longer extant; at times one answer occupies more than one line of writing. Hence, the farther we go from the physical remnants, the more speculative the reconstruction becomes.

In the case of C, the third sheet, accurate placing is hardly realistic: too much has been lost between the end of B (119.10) and the place where C

[6] The first preserved line is 66.2. The top of the leaf is broken off, but considerations of spacing make it very likely that the page began with 65.9.

begins (172.1). If we had all of C, the decade numbers might have been useful in ascertaining its original location within a gathering; but in its present damaged condition, we have substantial remnants of only one leaf (see above, n. 5), and for restoring the other we lack parallels. As we shall see below, the other manuscripts of the *Sortes*, both ancient and medieval, have only either 100 or 103 decades. The text which P. Oxy. ined. represents went at least to decade 176. How far it ran beyond that cannot be determined without additional evidence.

In P. Sort. Astram. 3–14, I argued that two editions of the *Sortes Astrampsychi* were in circulation, both composed by the same person. "The first consists of 91 questions, numbered from 12 to 102, and 100 decades of answers; it contains, therefore, nine decades of fake answers, i.e. answers which the user of the work can never reach and which were inserted to make the work more baffling. The second edition is characterized by 92 questions, numbered from 12 to 103, and 103 decades of answers, i.e. eleven decades of fakes" (3).[7] P. Oxy. 1477 represents the second edition, while 2832, 2833, and 3330 come from the first.[8]

At first sight, P. Oxy. ined. offers an entirely new recension: it is unique in having decades extending at least to 176. But examination of the decades which find parallels elsewhere (viz., 66–74 and 93–97) shows that the basis of the Oxyrhynchus text is clearly the second edition. The extra decades were simply added after 103, either by the original compiler or by someone who wanted to make the book more comprehensive.

The affinity of P. Oxy. ined. is established by the similarity of the preserved part of its decade 69 with the corresponding decade of the second edition (see Table 1 at the end of this article). In the first edition, decade 69 contains genuine answers, except for 1–3, whereas in the second it is a complete fake, composed of answers which can never be used by anyone who consults the *Sortes*. There are a significant number of decades which have been renumbered in the conversion of the first edition to the second, and 69 is one of them.[9]

If we now turn to decade 97, we cannot help but feel uneasiness (see Table 2). Here P. Oxy. ined. appears to follow the first edition rather than the second. Such vacillation between the two editions would render the book useless to anyone consulting it. Our uneasiness is dispelled if we

[7] For the fake answers, see in particular 12–14.
[8] P. Sort. Astram. 3f., and introd. to 3330 in P. Oxy. XLVII.
[9] P. Sort. Astram. 14.
[10] For the dagger (†), see below, n. 14.

Table 1 (Decade 69)[14]

P. Oxy. ined.		First Edition		Second Edition	
		α ὁ συνεχόμενος ἀποθνῄσκει	103†	α πλέεις νῦν	12†
		β οὐκ ἔχεις ἱερατεῦσαι	101†	β ἀπολύεται ὁ συνεχόμενος νῦν	103†
		γ ἀπολύεται ὁ συνεχόμενος	103†	γ καταλλάσσῃ τῇ γυναικὶ διὰ χρόνου	102†
		δ οὐ καταλλάσσῃ τῇ γυναικί	102	δ οὐκ ἔχεις γένεσιν ἐπισκόπου. μὴ ἔλπιζε	101†
		ε οὐκ ἰσχύεις ἱερατεῦσαι	101	ε οὐ καταλαμβάνῃ μοιχός	100†
		ς καταλαμβάνεσαι ἐὰν μὴ σπεύσῃς	100	ς ἀγοράζεις χωρίον ἢ οἰκίαν	99†
[παραμένει σ]οι ἡ φί[λη[15]	(98†)	ζ ἀγοράζεις, ἀλλὰ μετὰ κόπου	99	ζ παραμένει σοι ἡ γυνή σου σωφρονοῦσα	98†
[παραμένει σ]οι ἡ γυ̣ή	(97†)	η παραμένει ὁ πάλλῃξ	98	η οὐ παραμένει σοι ἡ γυνή. φίλον ἔχει	97†
[ἀπαλλάσσῃ] τῆς φί̣λης	(96†)	θ οὐ παραμένει σου ἡ γυνή	97	θ ἀπαλλάσσῃ τῆς φίλης ζηλώσας	96†
[γίνῃ δεκάπ]ρωτος	(95†)	ι οὐ συγκροτεῖσαι ἀπὸ τοῦ φίλου	96	ι οὐ γίνῃ δεκάπρωτός ποτε	95†

Table 2 (Decade 97)

[ἐργά]σῃ ἐκ κόπων[16]	(13†)	α ἐπιβαλέσθαι ὥρα ⟨ἐστὶν⟩ ἅπαξ μόνον	13	α εὐτυχήσεις ἱλαρῶς	19†
[ὁ ἀπόδ]ημο[ς] ἀπέθανεν	(80†)	β ἐὰν πλεύσεις, ναυαγήσεις	12	β μὴ συναλλάξῃς. περίμεινον ἄρτι	18†
[ἐὰν πλε]ύσ[ῃ]ς, ναυαγῖς	(12†)	γ ὁ ἀπόδημος ἀπέθανεν	80†	γ οὐκ ἀποδημεῖς ταχέως. ἐπέχει γάρ	17†
[ἀπαρτίζει]ς ὃ ἐπιβάλλῃ	(93†)	δ ἀπαρτίζεις ὃ ἐπιβάλλῃ	93†	δ προκόπτεις ταχέως καὶ εὐτυχεῖς	16†
[πρ]εσβε[υ]τὴς [ἔ]σῃ κινδύνως	(87†)	ε πρεσβεύεις καὶ κινδυνεύεις	87†	ε στρατεύῃ νῦν καὶ ὠφελῇ πολύ	14†
[προ]γράφετε τὰ σά	(82†)	ς προγράφεται τὰ σὰ ἅπαντα	82†	ς κοινωνεῖς καὶ οὐ συμφέρει σοι. ζημιοῦσαι γάρ	15†
[ἀπ]οκαθί̣στασαι εἰς τὸν τόπον	(77†)	ζ ἀποκαθίστασαι εἰς τὸν τόπον	77†	ζ ἐπιβαλοῦ μετὰ καθαροῦ συνειδότος	13†
οὐκ οἰκ[ο]δομ[ῖ]ς[17] νῦν	(60†)	η οὐκ οἰκονομεῖς. οὐ δέδοται	60†	η πλέεις μετὰ τὸ ἐγκοπῆναί σε	12†
ὁ συνεχόμενος ἀπολύαιται	(103)	θ ἀπολύεται ὁ συνεχόμενος	103†	θ ὁ συνεχόμενος ἀπολύεται τῆς συνοχῆς	103
οὐ καταλλάσσῃ τῇ γυνεκί	(102)	ι οὐ καταλλάσσῃ τῇ γυναικί	102†	ι ἀπαλλάσσῃ τῆς φίλης.[18] μωροποιεῖται. συμφέρει σοι	102

posit the following progression from the first edition to the final form of the second: 1) the first edition originally had its answers arranged thus: 13 12 80†[10] 93† 87† 82† 77† 60† x†[11] 102†; 2) in preparing the second edition, the compiler renumbered "unshuffled" decade 112 (= 84 in the first edition) as 97,[12] added an answer corresponding to question 103, and came up with this series: 13† 80† 12†[13] 93† 87† 82† 77† 60† 103 102 – this is the stage reached by P. Oxy. ined.; 3) later, the compiler or someone familiar with the *Sortes* imposed a more orderly sequence on the answers in this decade: 19† 18† 17† 16† 14† 15† 13† 12† 103 102 – this is the level which we find in the medieval witnesses of the second edition.

Assumption of such a progression, which allows us to maintain the affinity of P. Oxy. ined. with the second edition, could not be tolerated in the case of genuine answers, but, since we are dealing with so many fakes, it is readily acceptable.

Our piece, then, is to be classed with the papyri and manuscripts of the second edition. But, with its extra decades, it is a significant deviant. We expect textual fluidity in a sub-literary work like the *Sortes Astrampsychi*, and our expectations are certainly not thwarted by the new find from Oxyrhynchus.

[11] x† = some unknown answer, later replaced in the first edition with an answer to 103; the replacement may well have been the result of contamination from the second edition.

[12] P. Sort. Astram. 14.

[13] Since the answers are now fakes, there was no need to keep the original order, 13 12 80. Of course, the compiler may have mechanically taken 13 12 80 from the first edition, and the sequence 13 80 12 is due to scribal alteration. Similar considerations apply to the order 16 14 15 mentioned below.

[14] In the case of the first and second editions, I have made use of the material assembled for my Teubner text of the *Sortes Astrampsychi* (in progress). The second edition corresponds roughly to the text of the editio princeps (R. Hercher, Astrampsychi oraculorum decades CIII, Jahresbericht über das Königl. Joachimsthalsche Gymnasium [Berlin 1863]). The numbers to the right of each column refer to the questions involved, and a dagger (†) indicates that the answer is a fake.

[15] See P. Oxy. 2832.5 n. and 2833 i 2 n. (P. Sort. Astram. 39 and 58).

[16] See P. Oxy. 2833 ii 33 n. (P. Sort. Astram. 62f.).

[17] I. e. οἰκονομεῖς.

[18] For the interchange of ἀπαλλάσσομαι and καταλλάσσομαι, cf. 2832.13 n. (P. Sort. Astram. 40f.) and 3330.33 n., and for that of φίλη and γυνή, see above, n. 15.

Elizabeth Ann Fisher

Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Planudes and Ausonians

1250 years after the death of Augustus, Constantine's New Rome on the Bosphorus had accepted the Christian religion, Greek language and culture, and medieval social institutions; its ruler and subjects, however, continued to describe themselves as "Αὔγουστος" and "Ῥωμαῖοι." Among these medieval "Ῥωμαῖοι" the poet Ovid found an energetic admirer in the person of Maximos Planudes,[1] whose position as a monk and teacher in a monastery of Constantinople contrasts almost comically with Ovid's own reputation as an immoral thorn in Augustus' imperial flesh.[2] Nevertheless, Planudes translated both Ovid's *Heroides* and *Metamorphoses* into Greek, making accessible to his contemporaries a literature which had been virtually unknown among them.[3] The translations prompt a number of questions. What sort of transformation did Ovid's Latin poetry undergo into Byzantine Greek? What sort of impression as literature would Planudes' translations have made on a Byzantine audience? And why did Planudes – or anyone – bother to translate Latin poetry into Greek? In order to suggest answers to these questions, I propose first to examine a sample passage from the translations and then to attempt to place the Greek translations of Ovid into the larger context of Byzantine intellectual activity. As sample passage, I have chosen the prologue to the Metamorphoses:[4]

[1] For a full discussion of Planudes' career and scholarly activities, see C. Wendel, Pauly-Wissowa RE 40 (1950) 2202–2253.

[2] L. P. Wilkinson, Ovid Recalled (Cambridge 1955) 297–300.

[3] Planudes also translated Boethius' *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis* with Macrobius' commentary, the *Disticha Catonis*, Augustine's *De Trinitate*, ps.-Cyprian's *De Duodecim Abusivis Saeculi* and – perhaps – Ovid's *Ars Amatoria*, *Remedia Amoris*, and *Amores*, and Juvenal's *Satires*. See W. O. Schmitt, Lateinische Literatur in Byzanz, Jb. d. österreich. byz. Ges. 17 (1968) 131–147.

[4] I have chosen the *Metamorphoses* translation because (1) it is longer than the *Heroides*, and its very bulk suggests that the translator deemed it worth considerable time and effort, (2) on superficial reading, it is more polished than the *Heroides* translation, and (3) unlike

In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas	τὰς εἰς καινὰ σώματα μεταμειφθείσας μορφὰς ὁ νοῦς με λέγειν διανίστησιν.
corpora; di, coeptis (nam vos mutastis et illas)	Ὦ Θεοί (καὶ γὰρ οἱ θεοὶ μετεβάλετε ταύτας), τῷ ἐμῷ ἐπιπνεύσατε ἔργῳ,
adspirate meis primaque ab origine mundi	κἀκ πρώτης τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως εἰς τὸν ἡμέτερον χρόνον συνεχῆ κατάγοιτε
ad mea perpetuum deducite tempora carmen![5]	τὴν ᾠδήν.[6]

Planudes uses the archaizing dialect which characterizes sophisticated literature in the Byzantine period.[7] This dialect preserves vocabulary and syntax used in Greek of the classical and Roman periods but no longer current in the spoken language of Planudes' time (in this passage, for example, the datives in line 4, the optative in line 6, and the particle γὰρ in line 3).[8] Since Planudes translates into Greek prose, he is free from metrical constraints and may remain close to the Latin text when he chooses. Planudes thus retains the sentence boundaries and sentence structure established by Ovid and regularly repeats case, number, tense and mood from the Latin original within the limits allowed by Greek idiom;[9] even the expression *fert animus dicere* (1.1) appears in a parallel Greek construction, explicated by the addition of με (1.2). The Greek word order is more prosaic than Ovid's, avoiding interlocking phrases and reproducing the exact order of simple sentences only (e.g., Greek 1.3, Latin 1.2). (A few deviations from these translation patterns will be discussed below.) Latin compound words appear as parallel formations in Greek (e.g., *ad-spirate* 1.3, ἐπι-πνεύσατε 1.4; *per-petuum* 1.4, συν-εχῆ 1.6;

the translation of the amatory poems sometimes attributed to Planudes, it survives complete (see P. E. Easterling and E. J. Kenney, Ovidiana Graeca: Fragments of a Byzantine Version of Ovid's Amatory Works, Proc. of the Cambridge philol. Soc., Suppl. 1 [1965]). I have chosen the *Metamorphoses* prologue because it is short and self-contained; it also introduces the work to the reader and forms his first impression of it.

[5] Text from P. Ovidius Naso Metamorphosen, ed. M. Haupt and R. Ehwald (Berlin 1853, Zürich 1966[10]).

[6] Text from Publii Ovidii Nasonis Metamorphoseon Libri XV Graece Versi a Maximo Planude, ed. J. F. Boissonade (Paris 1822).

[7] R. M. Dawkins, Graeco-Barbara, Trans. of the philol. Soc. (1939) 4, and G. Böhlig, Volkssprache und Reinsprache im griechischen Mittelalter, Aus der byzantinistischen Arbeit der D.D.R., I (Berlin 1957) 3–4.

[8] Dative: A. N. Jannaris, An Historical Greek Grammar (London 1895) §§ 1242, 1348, 1351. Optative: Jannaris, § 1924. γὰρ: Dawkins, 12.

[9] Note, however, Planudes' polite optative request of the gods in 1.6 replacing Ovid's imperative in 1.4.

de-ducite 1.4, κατ-άγοιτε 1.6). Finally, the elision of καὶ ἐκ : κἀκ (1.5) reflects the elision of *-que ab* (1.3).

Planudes' translation, however, is more than a Greek duplicate of the Latin original. The Greek version displays niceties of style which neither appear in the Latin text nor obstruct its structure and meaning. These stylistic embellishments are also very appropriate to the elegant artistry of Ovid's poetry. Most striking perhaps is the word choice and arrangement of the first sentence, which achieves an alliteration of *m* and an ingenious wordplay upon the title of the work – *μεταμειφθείσας μορφὰς* – as well as a dactylic cadence in classical terms (i.e., by syllable quantity): νοῦς μὲ λέγειν διανίστησιν (1.2) Line 4, however, contains a dactylic cadence in medieval terms (i.e., by stress accent): ἐμῷ ἐπιπνεύσατε ἔργῳ.[10] The stress accents of line 3 also fall into a dactylic cadence: γὰρ οἱ θεοί μετεβάλετε ταύτας. To achieve these accentual cadences, Planudes departs from an exact rendering of the Latin text: *vos* (1.2) becomes οἱ θεοὶ (1.3) and *coeptis* (1.2) becomes ἔργῳ (1.4). Use of two metrical systems, accentual and quantitative, suits the aesthetics of Planudes' time, for sophisticated medieval poetry maintained a double rhythmic pattern – quantitative for the eye of the classical scholar, accentual for the ear of the medieval speaker.[11] The Greek translation also achieves aesthetically pleasing word arrangement by intruding an unrelated element amid syntactically related words (e.g., τῷ ἐμῷ ἐπιπνεύσατε ἔργῳ 1.4, συνεχῆ κατάγοιτε τὴν ᾠδήν 1.6–7). This simple device, which also occurs in the Greek of the New Testament,[12] unifies a sentence as Ovid's truly interlocking constructions do, but without their complexity. It is appropriate to Planudes' prose style in the *Metamorphoses*.

Because Planudes' Greek *Metamorphoses* not only follows the syntax of Ovid's Latin original but also rearranges and elucidates its complex word order, the translation would have been very useful to Greek students of the Latin language. It seems that Planudes did not translate for teaching purposes, however, since none of his students are known to have learned

[10] I am grateful to Patricia N. Freiert (Gustavus Adolphus College, St. Peter, Minn.) for pointing out to me "accentual clausulae" in the *Metamorphoses* translation.

[11] Establishing metrical feet typical of classical (quantitative) poetry by means of *stress* accent (as Planudes does here) is *not* characteristic of Byzantine poetic practice. See Romilly J. H. Jenkins, The Hellenistic Origins of Byzantine Literature, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 17 (1963) 41–42.

[12] A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research (New York 1914) 418.

Latin,[13] and since the Latin and Greek texts do not appear together in our manuscripts. Instead, Planudes apparently intended the Greek *Metamorphoses* to stand on its own merits as a work of Byzantine literature. Such activity on behalf of "foreign" Latin literature is very unusual – some might say unprecendented – among Byzantine intellectuals, who typically confined their interests to their Hellenic and Byzantine literary heritage.[14] I would like to suggest, however, some features of Greek intellectual life in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries which might have disposed Planudes' contemporaries to embrace the *Metamorphoses* translation with interest.

The contents as well as the style of the Greek *Metamorphoses* surely appealed to scholars of the early Palaeologan period (ca. 1250–ca. 1350), for they vigorously cultivated literature related to mythology. Planudes himself worked on Hesiod's Erga, the Byzantine triads of Sophocles (*Ajax, Electra, Oedipus Rex*) and of Euripides (*Hecuba, Orestes, Phoenissae*), Pindar, and a collection of epic works.[15] Scholars of this period are responsible for the oldest or best surviving manuscripts of Apollodoros, Apollonios of Rhodes, Aristaenetus, the Homeric Hymns, the Scholia to the *Odyssey*, Nonnos' *Dionysiaka*, and Euripides.[16] The Greek *Metamorphoses* fits into such literary company very well.

Among the foremost intellectual figures of the early Palaeologan period was Theodore Metochites,[17] statesman, polymath, and, incidentally, acquaintance of Planudes.[18] In Essay 93 of his *Miscellanea*,[19] Metochites remarks that his compatriots eagerly studied the Greek past as guide and inspiration for the present without regard for the great events and inspiring deeds recorded in the literatures of other nations because, as Metochites declares, the Greeks could not read other languages. In this essay Meto-

[13] Schmitt 145.

[14] The various factors which supported Byzantine indifference to classical Latin literature are discussed by D. Geanakoplos, Interaction of the "Sibling" Byzantine and Western Cultures (Yale 1976) 109–117.

[15] H. Hunger, Von Wissenschaft und Kunst der frühen Palaeologenzeit, Jb. der österreich. byz. Ges. 8 (1959) 140–142.

[16] Hunger 124–125.

[17] For a full discussion of Metochites' career and of his importance in the intellectual life of his time, see H. G. Beck, Theodoros Metochites: Die Krise des byzantinischen Weltbildes im 14. Jahrhundert (München 1952) passim.

[18] I. Ševčenko, Etudes sur la polémique entre Theodore Métochite et Nicéphore Choumnos (Brussels 1962) 59–63.

[19] Theodori Metochitae Miscellanea Philosophica et Historica edd. Chr. G. Müller, Th. Kiessling (Leipzig 1821) 591–596.

chites mentions in specific terms only two historical periods – that of the Athenian Empire and that of the early Roman Empire. He names the early emperors Augustus and Trajan together with Constantine and Theodosius as persons of such virtue that any author rehearsing their praises would be worthy of study. Metochites does not directly exhort Greeks to read Latin literature of the imperial period, but his remarks recommend by implication a translation like Planudes' *Metamorphoses*.

Sometime after Planudes died, his student Gregorios composed two grave epigrams for him, each emphasizing the translations as an important part of Planudes' scholarship.[20] The longer of the two epigrams mentions Planudes' skill in both the Greek and Latin languages first among his various scholarly achievements. The shorter epigram celebrates only Planudes' translations from Latin, and was apparently intended to accompany a pictorial representation of one of the translations in symbolic or personified form:[21]

Αὐσονίης διαλέκτου μ', ὦ ξεῖν', ἐκμετενεγκὼν
Μάξιμος ἀρτίφρων μουσοπόλος σοφίης
ψαύσας ἄκρα γε πείρατα θῆκεν ἐς Ἑλλάδα φωνήν,
δείγμά τε ἧς σοφίης, ἐσ⟨σ⟩ομένοις δὲ χάριν.

Epic/tragic vocabulary (e.g., μουσοπόλος 1.2, ἧς 1.4) sets a dignified tone in this brief epigram, and the epithets applied to the translation ("a sample of his [Planudes'] wisdom and a joy to future generations," 1.4) indicate

[20] Epigrams published in: Maximi Monachi Planudis Epistulae, ed. M. Treu (Breslau 1886–90) 190–191.

[21] For text and discussion, see Carl Wendel, "Planudes," Byzantinische Zeitschrift 40 (1940) 444–445. Two features of the poem deserve notice here. First, Walter Burkert's emendation in line 3 ἐσσομένοις (suggested in correspondence) is, I feel, correct. Second, Gregorios' hexameters violate the metrical standards observed by Greek classical authors in a number of respects: (1) in both hexameters, diaeresis occurs after the third foot (cf. D. S. Raven, Greek Metre: An Introduction [London 1962] p. 44 § 57), (2) in line 1, diaeresis follows a long monosyllable at the end of the fourth foot, transgressing the "Bucolic Bridge" (cf. Paul Maas, Greek Metre, trans. Hugh Lloyd-Jones [Oxford 1972] p. 93), (3) in line 3, a word break occurs after the fourth trochee, transgressing "Hermann's Bridge" (cf. Maas, p. 60 § 87), and (4) in line 3, none of the three acceptable hexameter caesurae occur (cf. Maas, p. 59 § 85). In considering (1), (2), and (3) above, one must observe that Homer also violated these standards at times ([1] Raven, p. 44 § 57; [2] Maas, p. 93; and [3] Maas, p. 60 § 87). Concerning (3), it is an interesting circumstance that the Latin poets generally disregarded "Hermann's Bridge" (Maas, p. 61 § 88) and that Ovid actually favored a word break after the fourth trochee (A. G. Lee, P. Ovidi Nasonis Metamorphoseon I [Cambridge 1953] p. 36). This poem is too short, however, to support any inferences about the effect of Latin hexameter patterns on Gregorios' metrical practices.

that Gregorios appreciated its literary excellence. Significant for this discussion, Gregorios says that Planudes translated from the "Ausonian" language. "Ausonian" and "Ausonia" refer to South Italy and, by extension, to all of Italy, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for example, explained in the first century A.D., and John Tzetzes repeated in the twelfth.[22] "Ausonia" also connotes great venerability, for, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus observed, in the remote past the Greeks applied it to Italy, and, as Tzetzes commented, it derived from the eponymous hero "Auson," son of Odysseus and Circe.[23] Αὐσονίης (1.1) is therefore a very appropriate designation for the original, classical Latin language from which Planudes translated a variety of literary works (listed *supra*, n. 3). At this time, however, the word Αὔσονες and its compounds had also gained limited currency as a term for the Byzantines themselves. Explaining why some of Planudes' Byzantine contemporaries referred to themselves by using a word which connoted ancient Italy may help to explain their interest in Planudes' translations from Latin literature.

The usage "Ausonian" = "Byzantine" first appeared in the twelfth century, when Constantine Manasses applied "Ausonian" to the Byzantine emperors and to the Byzantine army,[24] and John Tzetzes censured this extension of the word's meaning.[25] In the twelfth century, calling the Byzantines "Ausonian" or "connected with (ancient) Italy" helped legitimize the plans of the Byzantine emperors to regain their former territories in Italy from the Normans.[26] (To some degree, of course, Byzantines could justify this timely nomenclature because they perceived

[22] Dion. Hal. *Ant.* 1.11,4; 1.22,3; 1.28,2; 1.35,1. Tzetzes, *Scholia ad Lyc.* 44: Αὐσονία δὲ κυρίως, ὡς Δίων γράφει ὁ Κοκκειανός, ἡ τῶν Αὐρούγκων γῆ μόνη λέγεται μέσον Καμπανῶν καὶ Οὐολκῶν παρὰ θάλασσαν κειμένη, συχνοὶ δὲ μέχρι τοῦ Λατίου Αὐσονίαν εἶναι ἐνόμισαν ὥστε καὶ πᾶσαν Ἰταλίαν ἀπ' αὐτῆς. Also *Ad Lyc.* 615, 702, and Tzetzes, *Epistle* 6,1. Although it is not my purpose to list all occurrences of "Ausonia" in classical and medieval literature, see also *Etymologicum Magnum* s. v. Αὔσονες: οἱ Ἰταλοί· καὶ Αὐσονία, ἡ Ἰταλία.

[23] Dion. Hal. *Ant.* 1.35,3: [Ἰταλίαν] τὰ δὲ πρὸ τούτων Ἕλληνες μὲν Ἑσπερίαν καὶ Αὐσονίαν αὐτὴν ἐκάλουν, οἱ δ' ἐπιχώριοι Σατορνίαν . . . Tzetzes, *Scholia ad Lyc.* 44, 702, 1232; *Chiliades* 5.564–579.

[24] Constantinus Manasses, *Chronicle* 2550 (Αὐσονάνακτα Manuel Comnenus), 3189 (Αὐσονοκράτωρ Justinian), 3294 (αὐσονάνακτα Justin), 5977 (Αὐσονίκος Byzantine soldiers), 6059 (αὐσονοκράτωρ Romanos Argyropulos).

[25] Tzetzes, *Scholia ad Lyc.* 615: τὰ δὲ τῶν πάνυ νεωτέρων ἐπίσταμαι ὅτι ἀμαθίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας ἀδείᾳ καὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ γένους ὄντας Αὔσονας καλοῦσιν. Also 44 and 702.

[26] I am grateful to Angeliki E. Laiou-Thomadakis for this observation. See A. A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire (Madison 1952) 414.

that the Byzantine Empire descended from the Roman Empire founded in Italy by Augustus.) Although the Byzantines were finally excluded from Italy in 1158,[27] the usage "Ausonian" = "Byzantine" actually increased in frequency during the thirteenth century, when it no longer served a Byzantine political program. This usage occurs especially in epithets for the Emperor, and especially in the works of authors associated with the imperial court.[28] Since "Ausonian" summoned all the glories of their ancient Roman heritage for a people who had recently been humbled and deprived of their imperial capital by the Crusaders, calling themselves "Αὔσονες" enabled Byzantines to place an inspiring and reassuring emphasis on the venerability of their imperial past. Those of Planudes' contemporaries who took special pride in their identity as "Ausonians" or "persons connected with (ancient) Italy" might be expected to take special interest in translations – such as the *Metamorphoses* – from the "Ausonian" language of imperial Rome.

[27] Vasiliev 425.

[28] Manuel Philes, *Carmina Inedita*, ed. E. Martini (Napoli 1900). Of the Emperor Andronikos II: 2.4–5 τὴν πνοὴν τῶν Αὐσόνων; 2.129 and 92.39 Αὐσονοκράτωρ; 2.157 ὁ τεκνοποιὸς τῆς γονῆς τῶν Αὐσόνων; 7.24 ὁ κρατάρχης Αὐσόνων; 35.23,65 (note), and 67.52 ἄνακτος Αὐσονων γένους. Of his Empress Irene: 7.52 Βασιλὶς Εἰρήνη τῶν Αὐσόνων. Of the Byzantine army: 44.4 ὁ στρατὸς τῶν Αὐσόνων. Constantinus Meliteniotes, *De Processione S. Spiritus* (Migne PG 141). Of the Emperor Michael VIII: 1037D τὸν ἡμέτερον αὐσονάρχην; 1237A τοῦ θεόφρονος Αὐσονάρχου. Ephraem, *Chronicle*. Of the Emperor Theodosius: 622 and 768 Αὐσονοκράτωρ. Of the Emperor Manuel Comnenus: 4029 Αὐσονάρχην. Of the Emperor Joannes Vatatzes: 8592 and 8630 Αὐσονάρχην. Of the Roman Emperor Claudius: 13 αὐσοναρχίας. Letter of M. Holobolos (published by M. Treu, Byz. Zschr. 5 [1896] 554–557; attribution to Holobolos p. 558): 39–40 . . . καὶ τὰ παρ' Ἰταλοῖς σεμνολογούμενα τίνα πεφύκασι μὴ πάνυ καὶ τοὺς τῶν Αὐσόνων παῖδας διαλανθάνοιεν.

Bernhard Kytzler

Marginalia Utopica

Acht Beobachtungen zur Utopia des Thomas Morus (1478–1978)

500 Jahre sind seit der Geburt jenes Autors vergangen, dessen kleines „Goldenes Büchlein", *libellus vere aureus non minus salutaris quam festivus,* wie der Titel verheißt, heute wohl weltweit die bekannteste und am meisten beachtete lateinische Schrift darstellt. Mehr als alle Werke des Altertums, die gegenwärtig weithin im Schatten stehen, entzünden sich zur Zeit Diskussion und Reflexion an den Vorstellungen der „Utopia", an den Gedanken vom besten Staat und der vernünftigsten Form menschlichen Miteinanders. Die Entwicklungen, die diese Diskussion in dem besagten halben Millennium genommen hat, detailliert darzustellen, wäre wohl ein wichtiges Werk; hier soll der Blick weniger auf diese Seite der Tradition gerichtet sein als vielmehr auf jenen Bereich, aus dem der Humanist Morus so viele seiner Anregungen schöpfte: das Klassische Altertum. Gewiß sind nicht wenige antike Texte, deren Gedankengut in die Utopia eingeflossen ist, bereits belegt[1]; auf einige weitere hinzuweisen ist das Ziel der folgenden Kapitel.

Es sei nicht vergessen hinzuzufügen, daß die folgenden Ergänzungen zu dem Kommentar der führenden Ausgabe nicht als negative Kritik zu verstehen sind; seine umfassende Leistung für die Förderung der Renaissance-Studien bleibt unbestritten, auch wenn der Klassische Philologe an der einen oder anderen Stelle Zusätze zu sehen wünscht. Dabei wird oft weniger eine einzelne Stelle als Quelle aufzuweisen sein als vielmehr Hinweise zu geben auf die Breite, Tiefe und Mannigfaltigkeit des Traditionsstroms, der sich Morus darbot und aus dem er gewiß geschöpft hat, auch wenn der Ort der Anregung selbst nicht genau zu bezeichnen ist. Dabei wird man die Warnung nicht vergessen, die P. Edward Surtz, S. J., in seine Übersicht der Quellen und Parallelen eingeflochten hat[2]: „. . . it is quite

[1] The Complete Works of St. Thomas Morus, Vol. 4, Utopia, edited by Edward Surtz, S. J. and J. H. Hexter (New Haven and London 1965). – Die im folgenden gegebenen Zitate des Utopia-Textes beziehen sich auf diese Ausgabe und bezeichnen Seite und Zeile.

[2] CLXIII.

evident that the study of the classical sources can proliferate and multiply to infinity". Diese gewiß grundlegende Voraussetzung darf doch nicht hindern, den Hintergrund zu erhellen, vor dem sich Gedanken und Formulierungen des humanistischen Autors abzeichnen. Wenn anders der Ausdruck „renatae litterae" zu Recht benutzt wird, dann ist es nicht nur legitim, sondern zwingend, jene Vorformen aufzuspüren und nachzuweisen, die im Werk des Renaissance-Autors ihre „Wiedergeburt" erlebt haben. Ein „Zuviel" kann es dabei nicht im Material, sondern nur im Umfang der Darstellung geben: allzu weites Ausbreiten der Bezeichnung von Beziehungen bewirkt selten Bekräftigung, sondern meist eher Verwässerung der Argumentation. So sollen die folgenden Hinweise, um nicht dem Verdikt der „infinity" zu verfallen, den Bezug jeweils nur knapp konstatieren und weiterführende Überlegungen offenlassen. Sie gehen in einer ersten Tetraktys in der im Buch belegten Reihenfolge auf Einzelstellen der eigentlichen Utopie-Erzählung ein, während sich die zweite Vierergruppe dem Rahmen zuwendet.

Ex auro matellas conficiunt[3]

Wert und Unwert des Goldes sind ein altes Thema. Auch die Utopier haben da ihren Standpunkt: sie bewerten es bei sich selbst allein nach seiner Nützlichkeit, d. h. es rangiert weit hinter Eisen u. a. an letzter Stelle, derart daß nur die erbärmlichsten Gefäße, vasa sordidissima, aus Gold gefertigt werden. Paradefall sind güldene Nachttöpfe. Für diese glaubt der Kommentar die Quelle (germ) in einem Martialepigramm (1,37) zu finden. Aus der Antike sind noch Tacitus (Germ. 5 für die Geringschätzung des Goldes bei den Germanen) und Herodot (2,172 für die Umformung eines goldenen Fußwaschungsgefäßes in ein angebetetes Götterbild) zitiert. Hinzu kommt schließlich Patrizis (inkorrekter[4]) Hinweis auf die Statuen des Demetrios. Diese wenigen Stellen geben aber gewiß nicht genügend Kunde von der weiten Verbreitung dieses Motivs.

[3] 152,6–8.

[4] lt. Diog. Laert. 5,77 wurden nicht, wie Patrizi sagt, 300 Statuen des Demetrios umgeschmolzen, sondern es heißt, daß einige verkauft, andere vernichtet und schließlich sogar auch einige zu Nachttöpfen umgeschmolzen wurden, wobei die letzte Angabe immerhin noch relativiert wird durch ein angefügtes λέγεσθαι καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο – man berichtet sogar auch dieses.

Kern des Motivs ist die Geringschätzung des Goldes, die sich in seiner Verwendung für *sordidissima vasa* zeigt. Aber bereits in der als Erstbeleg benannten Herodotstelle kehrt sich der Gedanke in eine andere Richtung: goldene Götterbilder genießen große Verehrung, während doch das Gold an sich auch für Verrichtungen niedriger und niedrigster Art (Fußwaschung) Verwendung finden kann. Die Tendenz geht nicht gegen das Gold, sondern gegen die unsinnigerweise verehrten Götterbilder – eine Tendenz, die von den christlichen Apologeten gern aufgegriffen wurde. Es gilt also bei den Belegstellen genau zu unterscheiden, ob die Erwähnung etwa eines aus Gold gefertigten Nachtgeschirrs den Wert des Goldes an sich in Frage stellen soll, wie bei Morus, oder ob sie die goldglänzenden Götterbilder ridikulisiert, wie bei Herodot. Hinzu kommt der dritte Verwendungsbereich des Motivs, wie er bei Martial begegnet: reale oder parodistische Portraits von Protzen und Parvenus, die durch ihren Reichtum zu den abwegigsten Demonstrationen ihres Besitzes verleitet werden.

Um diesen letzten Strang zunächst aufzugreifen: Auch Petron portraitiert einen protzigen Parvenu, der sich eines silbernen Nachttopfes bedient (27,3–6)[5]. Wird hier parodiert, so paradiert anderwärts der nämliche Fall als Realität: Heliogabal *onus ventris auro excepit* (Lampsid. 32,2).

Doch nicht erst die Spätantike kannte solche Entartung. Bereits der Triumvir Antonius soll dieser Reihe zugezählt haben: *Messala orator prodidit Antonium triumvirum aureis usum vasis in omnibus obscenis desideriis* (Plin. *n. h.* 33,50). Natürlich darf Juvenals bissige Bemerkung über den Parasiten in dieser Linie nicht fehlen (3,106–108): *laudare paratus, si bene ructavit, si rectum minxit amicus, si trulla inverso crepitum dedit aurea fundo*[6]. Auch die Philosophie verwendete den Topos frühzeitig: Chrysipp, heißt es bei Plutarch (*de Stoic. rep.* 1048b = Stoic. vet. Fr. III 153), habe im 3. Buch „Von der Natur" erklärt, manche würden wegen ihrer Macht und ihres Reichtums für glücklich gepriesen ὅμοιον εἰ χρυσαῖς ἀμίσι χρώμενοι.

Machten diese Texte den falschen Gebrauch des Goldes zum Gegenstand ihrer Attacke, so wird in der Nachfolge der zuvor erwähnten Anekdote Herodots in der christlichen Apologetik gern von unserem Motiv Gebrauch gemacht, um die Lächerlichkeit goldener Götzenbilder anzuprangern. Speziell spielen auf den Vorgang an Justin, *I Apol.* 9,2 (ἀτίμων ... σκευῶν); Min. Fel., *Oct.* 24,7 (*de immundo vasculo*); Athenag. *Suppl.*

[5] Dazu Parallelen Plin. *n. h.* 33,152; Mart. 11,11,5f.; Ulp. *Dig.* 34,2,27,5.

[6] Der Kuriosität halber sei auch auf den von Friedländer z. St. angeführten „silbernen Nachtstuhl mit goldenem Gefäß des Cardinals Pietro Riario zu Rom 1473" verwiesen.

26,6; *Timoth.* 1,10; *Ep. ad Diogn.* 2,2–4; Clementin. *Hom.* 10,8; *Acta Apollonii* 17 (Knopf-Krüger 31), mehr allgemein auch Philo, *De vita contempl.* 7; Tert. *Apol.* 12,2; Prud. *Peristeph.* 10,229 f.[7].

Auch in romanhaften Schilderungen erscheint das Motiv, daß gewisse Völkerschaften das Gold geringer schätzen als das Eisen. Theopomp[8] berichtet, in dem Fabelland jenseits des Okeanos „herrscht Überfluß an Gold und Silber, so daß dort das Gold einen geringeren Wert besitzt als bei uns das Eisen". Ähnliches weiß Heliodor[9] von den Äthiopiern zu erzählen: bei ihnen „dient Gold denselben Zwecken wie bei anderen Völkern das Eisen". Bemerkenswert, daß hier von goldenen Fesseln die Rede ist ebenso wie bei Morus (152,8f.): *catenas et crassas compedes, quibus cohercent servos: iisdem ex metallis operantur.*

Als tiefste Erörterung des ganzen Gedankens, ihn freilich weit ins Ontologische transzendierend, ist Platons Betrachtung *Tim.* 50a über die verschiedenen aus Gold verfertigten Figuren anzusehen, an die Aristot. *de gen. et corr.* 2,1,329a 17 anschließt. Aus welchem Arme des breiten Traditionsstromes Morus geschöpft hat, ist wohl kaum klar zu konstatieren; daß er auf ein weites überzeitliches Motiv-Reservoir zurückgreifen konnte, sollten die genannten Texte dartun. Noch Voltaire schwelgt in seiner Anwendung bei der Beschreibung Eldorados (*Candide* Kap. 17f.).

Doctrina – ingenium – animus[10]

Ihre überlegen unabhängige Haltung dem Reichtum gegenüber verdanken die Utopier ihrer Erziehung und ihrer Bildung (*educatione . . . doctrina et litteris*). Dieses Vorzuges erfreuen sich alle Utopier insgesamt, während nur einige wenige von manueller Arbeit freigestellt sind und sich ganz den Wissenschaften widmen können (Z. 5–6). Für die Auswahl dieser Spezialisten sind zwei Kriterien klar konstatiert:

> *hi videlicet in quibus a pueritia egregiam indolem, eximium ingenium, atque animum ad bonas artes propensum deprehendere . . .*

[7] Verwandt die Verspottung der „Gottwerdung" des Priap aus einem Holzklotz bei Horaz *sat.* 1,8, von Lactanz, *Div. Inst.* 2,4,1, zitiert und von Bert Brecht im 8. Bild des „*Galileo Galilei*" integriert.

[8] Bei Aelian, *Var. Hist.* 3,18.5 Ende = FGrHist 115 F 75.

[9] 9,2.

[10] 158,3ff.

Die zwei geforderten Voraussetzungen sind also einmal die natürliche Begabung (*indoles, ingenium*), die überdurchschnittlich vorhanden sein muß (*egregiam, eximium*)[11], zum anderen das persönliche Interesse an der Welt des Geistes und ihren einzelnen Bereichen (*animus ad bonas artes propensus*). Sind beide Voraussetzungen gegeben, dann kann sich auch der gute Unterricht der Utopier (*educatio, doctrina, disciplina*) auswirken und voll seine Früchte tragen. Es zeichnet sich also ein dem Erfolg dieses Erziehungssystems zugrundeliegendes Dreierschema ab: Die allgemeine Ausbildung der Utopier ist an sich gut und der europäischen weit überlegen, sie wird auch allen zugänglich gemacht; für den Gelehrtenstand treten zu ihr jedoch noch hinzu zum einen die besondere Begabung des einzelnen, zum anderen sein persönliches intensives Interesse – erst alle drei Voraussetzungen gewährleisten die Verwirklichung einer geistigen Elite in jenem Glücksland.

Dieses Dreierschema ist nicht von Morus neu erfunden; es begegnet vielfach in antiken Texten, so daß man eine direkte „Quelle" für den Humanisten kaum wird festlegen können. Die wichtigsten frühen Belege sind wohl die in Platons *Phaidros* (269d) und am Anfang des *Menon*: Beide Male wird, sei es für die vollkommene Tugend (ἀρετή) im *Menon*, sei es für die Rhetorik im *Phaidros*, die Frage nach den Voraussetzungen gegliedert durch die Trias φύcιc – ἐπιcτήμη – μελέτη, d. h. zur Begabung müssen auch gute Ausbildung und eigenes Bemühen treten; warnend ist im Phaidros hinzugefügt, daß, wenn etwas davon fehlt, die Vollkommenheit nicht zu erreichen ist. Bemerkenswerterweise sind diese Gedanken auch bei Isokrates zu finden (*Contr. Soph.* 17f., *Antidos.* 187); ihre frühe Verbreitung ist bereits untersucht worden[12] wie ihr Auftreten in Ciceros *Brutus*[13] und bei Quintilian[14]. Eine zusammenfassende Darstellung der Geschichte dieses Gedankenschemas steht noch aus. Für Morus einen einzelnen Text als Quelle zu etablieren, erscheint nicht gegeben; man wird sich damit begnügen, zu deklarieren, daß hier – deutlich genug – ein antikes dreiteiliges Denkschema durchschimmert, ohne doch sagen zu können, ob Morus seine

[11] Auch 180,18 wird darauf hingewiesen, daß es sich bei den Scholaren unter den Utopiern um Menschen *selectissimis ingeniis* handle, deren Lernerfolg neben dieser Voraussetzung auch auf ihrem eigenen Interesse (*sua sponte*) wie auch auf der Weisung der Oberen beruhe.

[12] P. Shorey, Trans. Amer. philol. Assoc. 40 (1909) 185–200.

[13] Verf., Cicero „*Brutus*" (München 1970[1], 1977[2]) 268ff. = Ciceros literarische Leistung (Darmstadt 1975) 471ff.

[14] B. Appel, Das Bildungs- und Erziehungsideal Quintilians nach der Institutio oratoria (Donauwörth 1914) 46–81.

Kenntnis der einen oder anderen bestimmten antiken Quelle verdankt oder auch mehreren.

Ineptissimus ritus in coniugibus deligendis[15]

Unter den paradoxen Erfahrungen, die der Besucher Utopias auf sich zu nehmen gezwungen ist, findet sich eine, die selbst von ihm, dem Freund und Bewunderer utopisch weiser Bräuche, mit vorsichtigem (*uti nobis visum est*) Kopfschütteln konstatiert wird: *Porro in deligendis coniugibus ineptissimum ritum (uti nobis visum est) adprimeque ridiculum, illi serio ac severe observant.* Der *ridiculus ritus* wird alsbald vom Erzähler erklärt und mit den Überlegungen der Utopier wenn nicht verteidigt, so doch wenigstens verständlich gemacht: jede Braut, sei sie Jungfrau oder Witwe, wird vor der Hochzeit von einer würdigen Matrone nackt dem Bräutigam vorgestellt, der Bräutigam wird ihr gleicherweise durch einen vertrauenswürdigen Mann im sog. Adamskostüm gezeigt. Die Besucher können diesen Brauch ganz und gar nicht billigen: *Hunc morem quem velut ineptum ridentes improbaremus;* die Utopier verteidigen ihn dagegen entschieden: erscheint ihre Sitte anderen *ineptum* und *ridiculum*, so staunen sie selbst platterdings über die außerordentliche Dummheit (*insigni stultitia*) im Verhalten der anderen Völker, sprich: der Europäer. Dieses Staunen wird in einem drastischen Bild dargetan: Kauft man anderwärts für wenig Geld ein Roß, so ist man vorsichtig genug, es eingehend ohne alle Hüllen zu inspizieren; nimmt man hingegen ein Weib, das doch ein Leben lang entweder Freude oder aber Verdruß bringen kann, so geht man so sorglos vor, daß man sich mit einer Handbreit begnügt und das Gesicht allein betrachtet, während der ganze Körper wohlverhüllt in Gewändern verborgen bleibt.

Brechen wir die bräutlichen Betrachtungen der Bewohner Utopias bei dieser bemerkenswerten Begründung ihres Brauches ab. Zu Recht betont der Kommentar (480) „The Utopians' method of open-eye-selection owes something, but not everything, to several sources". Hier soll nun das Augenmerk nicht so sehr auf die Methode als auf die Begründung gerichtet sein[16]. Was nämlich der *aureus libellus* des Morus aussagt, das sagt auch der *aureolus liber*[17] des Theophrast „Über die Ehe", eine Schrift, die zwar als Ganzes verloren ist, jedoch durch Vermittlung Senecas sich im Auszug bei

[15] 186,33.
[16] Für die der Kommentar *ibid.* allein Erasmus anführt, hingegen kein Vorbild aus der Antike.
[17] Hieron. *Adv. Iovinianum* I 313f.

Hieronymus berichtet findet[18]. Ebenso wie hernach des Humanisten Utopier es den anderen Völkern vorwerfen, so hat auch der griechische Philosoph, wie wir bei dem christlichen Autor erfahren, darüber geklagt, daß man bei der Heirat nicht zu einer rechten Auswahl komme: *Adde quod nulla est uxoris electio, sed qualisquumque evenerit, habenda;* und gleichwie die Utopier räsonniert der Peripatetiker, daß man die Defekte der Dame erst nach der Eheschließung in Erfahrung bringen könne: „*Si iracunda, si fatua, si deformis, si superba, si fetida – quodcumque vitii est post nuptias discimus*"; ganz genau so geht auch der Gedankengang weiter im Bild des sorgfältig prüfenden Einkäufers und des im Gegensatz dazu unbesonnen allzu willig heiratenden Ehekandidaten: „*Equus, asinus, bos, canis et vilissima mancipia . . . probantur prius et sic emuntur; sola uxor non ostenditur, ne ante displiceat quam ducatur*".

Der Dreischritt der Argumentation bei Theophrast und Morus ist praktisch pausenlos parallel: der erste und der zweite Abschnitt, d. h. Konstatierung der fehlenden Auswahlmöglichkeit und Hinweis auf die fatalen Folgen für eine förderliche Vereinigung stimmen gänzlich überein; grundsätzlich auch der letzte Gedanke, die Kontrastfigur des klugen Käufers gegenüber dem unbesonnenen Hochzeiter, nur daß hier Theophrast durch eine Aufzählung verschiedener Kaufgegenstände dem Gedanken Nachdruck verleiht, während Morus dasselbe durch genauere Ausmalung des (bei Theophrast an erster Stelle genannten) Pferdekaufs bewirkt.

Der Bezug des Utopia-Textes auf das antike Werk *de nuptiis* wird auch durch die Hochschätzung nahegelegt, die Morus für Theophrast hegte. Nur drei große griechische Philosophen haben die Utopier von ihrem Besucher kennengelernt und ihre Bücher übernommen[19]: „*Habent ex me Platonis opera pleraque, Aristotelis plena, Theophrastum item de plantis*". Theophrast's Buch wird noch durch eine kleine heitere Anekdote hervorgehoben: es ist an mehreren Stellen lückenhaft, da während der Schiffahrt ein Affe damit gespielt und es vielfach beschädigt hat[20]. Wenn Morus es für wert hielt, den Utopiern neben Platon und Aristoteles auch Theophrast's „Werk von den Pflanzen", selbst in lückenhaftem Zustande, zu übereignen, dann liegt die Annahme nahe, daß er ihnen auch des Theophrast Gedanken zum Thema Ehewahl zueignete und daß sein libellus aureus aus dem *aureolus liber* schöpfte.

[18] Vgl. zuletzt K. Gaiser, Für und wider die Ehe (München 1974) 68f. mit weiterführender Literatur.

[19] 180,25ff.

[20] 180,29–31.

Homo pro deo[21]

Unter verschiedenen Varianten utopischer Religiosität erscheint nach der Gestirnverehrung (Sonne – Mond – ein bestimmter Planet) als letzte der kleineren Gruppen, vor dem Glauben der Majorität[22], auch noch die Gruppe jener Gläubigen, deren Haltung so erklärt wird:

> *Sunt quibus homo quispiam, cuius olim aut virtus aut gloria enituit, non pro deo tantum, sed pro summo etiam deo suspicitur.*

Das Belegmaterial, das der Kommentar für diese, von der Religionswissenschaft bekanntlich als Euhemerismus bezeichnete Glaubensrichtung bietet, bedarf der Ergänzung; er nennt außer der griechischen Hauptquelle (Diodor. Sic. 5,46,3; 6,1,1–91) nur noch je zwei heidnische (Cic. *Tusc.* 1,28f. und Plin. *N. H.* 2,18f.) und zwei christliche Belege (Augustinus und Antoninus). Damit bleibt die bedeutende Rolle unerwähnt, die diese Erklärungsmöglichkeit paganer Kulte in der Patristik, aber auch schon zuvor in heidnischer religionsphilosophischer Auseinandersetzung besessen hat. Ohne „to inifinity" fortschreiten zu wollen, sei doch folgendes festgehalten:

Der Reiseroman des Euhemeros von Messene (um 300 v. Chr.) erzählt von einem utopischen Staatswesen auf einer Inselgruppe im Weltmeer, wo auf einer heiligen Inschrift (daher auch der Titel Ἱερὰ Ἀναγραφή) von den Urkönigen Uranos, Kronos und Zeus berichtet ist. Diese sind also nicht unsterbliche Götter, sondern wegen ihrer Leistungen vergöttlichte Herrscher. In Ausweitung dieses Konzepts wurden hernach auch „Erfinder" dem Euhemerismus zugeordnet, die aufgrund ihrer Gaben resp. Wohltaten für die Menschen und ihre Zivilisation (Beispiel: Bakchos) göttliche Ehren genossen, jedoch rational als bedeutende Menschen erklärt werden sollten. Festzuhalten bleibt, daß der Gedankengang zwar nicht von Euhemeros erfunden, jedoch von ihm so ansprechend formuliert worden ist, daß die Gedankenrichtung heute nach ihm ihren Namen trägt, wie auch in der Antike sein Werk von Ennius ins Lateinische übertragen wurde und darüber hinaus sein Name in der weitverbreiteten Diskussion[23] immer wieder zitiert

[21] 216,9f.

[22] *Maxima pars* Z. 11.

[23] Gründliche Darstellung mit überaus zahlreichen Belegen aus Heidentum, Judentum und Christentum sowie Literaturhinweise von K. Thraede in Reallexik. f. Ant. u. Christ. VI, 877–890 (wo jedoch leider gerade die als „beste Charakteristik des Werkes" des Euhemeros angegebene Laktanzstelle falsch zitiert ist: 879 Z. 15 statt „*inst.* I,2,33" lies I,11,33). – Ausgezeichnete Charakterisierung durch H. Dörrie in „Der Kleine Pauly" (Stuttgart 1967) s. v. Euhemerus.

wurde. Wichtig ist aber, daß in der „Utopia" des Morus ein Gedanke auftritt, der seine klassische Wurzel in einer antiken Staatsutopie[24] besitzt. Ob dem Humanisten diese Deszendenz bewußt war, bleibt offen; ihr Bestehen zu konstatieren erscheint nicht unnütz.

Die zweite Hälfte dieser Beobachtungen gilt dem Rahmen der Utopie-Erzählung. Dieser ist zweifach aufzufassen: als geographischer und als literarischer. Wenden wir uns zunächst dem topographischen Detail zu, einmal dem der Phantasie, dann dem der Realität.

Mare circa terram duxit[25]

Auf besondere Weise betont Morus den Inselcharakter seines Phantasielandes: Es handelt sich ursprünglich um eine Halbinsel, die erst der Gründungsheros Utopus durch einen Kanalbau vom Festland abgetrennt und so zur Insel gemacht hat. Man mag zunächst denken, daß dies eine recht natürliche Überlegung ist und keiner literarischen Anregung bedarf[26]. Ohne für Morus ein bestimmtes Vorbild in Anspruch nehmen zu wollen, sei doch auf die nicht geringe Anzahl von auf Inseln lokalisierten utopischen Gemeinschaften in antiken Texten verwiesen und zum Schluß ein Sonderfall herausgestellt; sie alle mögen sehr wohl direkt oder indirekt die Phantasie des Renaissance-Autors befruchtet haben.

So hat Euhemeros[27] sein Phantasieland Panchaia placiert auf einer Inselgruppe im Okeanos gegenüber dem äußersten Ende von Arabia Felix[28]. Iambul seinerseits spricht von seiner Aussendung aus Äthiopien zum Zwecke kultischer Reinigung im Boot „in Richtung Mittag, wo sie zu einer glücklichen Insel gelangen würden und zu guten Menschen, bei denen sie ein gesegnetes Leben führen würden"[29]. Beide Utopien sind verhältnismäßig ausführlich beschrieben und, wenn auch nur in Auszügen erhalten, doch für uns deutlich genug dargestellt[30]; der Inselcharakter spielt jeweils

[24] Zum utopischen Charakter des Romans des Euhemeros im allgemeinen und zu seiner Einordnung in den Rahmen antiken utopischen Denkens vgl. Verf., l.c. (Anm. 30) 61f.

[25] 112,8f.

[26] Über die Rolle der Insel als Ort utopischer Gemeinschaften vgl. A. Doren, Wunschräume und Wunschzeiten, Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg 4 (1924/25, erschienen 1927) 159–205.

[27] Vgl. oben bei Anm. 23.

[28] Diodor 5,41.

[29] Diodor 2,55ff.

[30] Vgl. Verf., Utopisches Denken und Handeln in der klassischen Antike, in: R. Villgradter/F. Krey (Hrsgb.), Der utopische Roman (Darmstadt 1973) 61f.

eine gewichtige grundlegende Rolle: Entfernung von der Oikumene und Isolation begünstigen Ausbildung und Erhaltung eigentümlicher Lebensformen – gewissermaßen ein soziologisches Galapagos 2000 Jahre vor Darwin.

Zwei weitere bekannte Bilder beschaulichen Behagens bieten mythische Inseln an entgegengesetzten Enden der Welt: die μακάρων νῆσοι, die Sertorius anzusteuern strebte[31] und Horaz aufzusuchen empfahl[32], die wohl mit den heutigen Trauminseln des Tourismus, den Kanarischen, gleichzusetzen sind; umgekehrt findet sich „nach Hekataios und anderen[33] in den Gegenden jenseits des Keltenlandes im Okeanos eine Insel, nicht kleiner als Sizilien": Es ist die Insel der Hyperboreer, von der auch anderwärts[34] viel Wunderbares berichtet wird.

Zu solchen Vorstellungen fügt es sich dann auch zwanglos, wenn Platon im „*Kritias*" das Gegenbild seines Urathens auf die ferne Insel Atlantis verlegt: die beiden sonst meist geschiedenen utopischen Kategorien der „Wunschzeit" (fernes Altertum resp. Zukunft) und des „Wunschraumes" (ferne Insel) treffen hier sogar zusammen. Der feste Platz, den die Vorstellung der Insel im utopischen Denken der Antike zur Lokalisierung des Glückslandes besaß, ging auch im Mittelalter nicht verloren: So beschreibt die Traumvision Brendans ebenfalls eine ferne Inselwelt[35]. Genug: Durch Hekataios, Iambul, Euhemeros, Platon, durch die Vorstellungen von den Inseln der Seligen und den Inseln der Hyperboreer[36] ist es mehr als deutlich belegt, wie für den Humanisten Morus die Placierung seines Glückslandes auf einer Insel gewissermaßen vorgegeben war. Es kommt aber noch ein weiterer wichtiger Text hinzu, der möglicherweise dem Renaissance-Autor die Anregung gegeben hat für das Motiv der Isolierung seiner Glücksgesellschaft.

[31] Vgl. Plut. *Sert.* 8f.

[32] *Epod.* 16.

[33] bei Diodor 2,47 = FGrHist 264 F 25.

[34] z. B. Aelian, *hist. animal.* 11,1.

[35] Vgl. T. Molter, „Glückliche Inseln", Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu Bremen 18 (1974) 315–325.

[36] Eine gewisse Umkehrung des Inselmotivs ist bei Theopomp festzustellen: Für ihn sind „Europa und Asien und Libyen nur Inseln, welche der Okeanos im Kreise umströmt; Festland ist allein jenes, das außerhalb dieser Welt liegt, von unermeßlicher Größe . . ." (bei Aelian, *Var. Hist.* 3,18,2 = FGrHist 115 F 75). Hier schrumpfen also die Kontinente Europa, Asien und Afrika diesseits zu („Realitäts"-)Inseln zusammen, mit denen das utopische Fabel-Festland jenseits des Okeanos kontrastiert; eine interessante Vorstellung, die durch ihre Variation gewissermaßen spiegelbildlich seitenverkehrt die traditionelle Sicht bekräftigt und bestätigt.

Unter den vom Erzähler den Utopiern übermittelten antiken Texten findet sich auch das Werk Homers[37]. In diesem begegnet der moderne Leser einer Schilderung, die vielfach als früheste Utopie Europas verstanden wird[38]. Der 6. Gesang der Odyssee schildert am Anfang die Vorgeschichte der Phäaken: Sie hatten ursprünglich in Hypereia ihre Heimat, wo sie unter ihren übermächtigen Nachbarn, den Kyklopen, zu leiden hatten. Ihr Urkönig Nausithoos aber führte sie von dort nach der Insel Scheria, „fern von den gewinnstrebenden Menschen" (V. 8), errichtete dort eine herrliche Stadt und stiftete ein glückliches Gemeinwesen.

Als wie nah oder wie weit auch immer die Beziehungen zu bewerten sind zwischen der ersten Utopie Europas und der Utopie, die als erste diesen Namen trug und ihn der ganzen Gattung gab: Festzuhalten bleibt, daß in beiden Fällen der mythische Gründerkönig sein Volk absichtlich separierte, als Sieger zwar Utopus, als Verlierer Nausithoos, doch beide beseelt von demselben Willen, durch diese Trennung von der übrigen Welt eine entscheidende Voraussetzung für die ungestörte – und unzerstörbare – Glückseligkeit ihres Volkes zu schaffen. So wird man beim künstlichen Kanal des Utopus nicht nur an den Ärmelkanal, bei der künstlichen Insellage Utopias nicht allein an England zu denken haben: Mögen solche Bezüge auch unbestritten bleiben, so gibt doch die breite antike Tradition der utopischen Trauminsel und insbesondere das homerische Bild des frühen Phäakenvolks dem Inselcharakter der humanistischen Utopie eine weitere historische Dimension eigenen Ranges.

Taprobanen delatus[39]

Einen merkwürdigen Platz in der Geschichte der Utopie nimmt Ceylon ein: die Insel Taprobane ist nicht nur der Ort, an dem Hythlodaeus, der Rückkehrer von Utopia, wieder bekannte Bereiche betritt, das Bindeglied gewissermaßen zwischen den Bezirken der Phantasie und der Realität. Sein nur marginales Auftauchen in der Utopia des Thomas Morus hat eine Vor-[40] und eine Nachgeschichte.

[37] 182,3.
[38] Vgl. Verf., l.c. 54.
[39] 50,16f.
[40] K. Sallmann hat mich auf diesen Komplex aufmerksam gemacht; ihm sei auch hier herzlich gedankt.

Während Ceylon bei Morus nur eine Randrolle spielt, gelangt es in einer anderen lateinischen Utopie zu höheren Ehren: Campanella placiert seinen Sonnenstaat auf Taprobane selbst[41]. Das mag eine Reverenz sein, die der spätere Autor seinem Vorgänger erweist. Eigenartig bleibt aber die Tatsache, daß Taprobane auch schon in der Antike einer Art Utopie Heimstatt gegeben hat. Plinius[42] berichtet, zur Zeit des Kaisers Claudius habe eine aus vier Männern bestehende Gesandtschaft aus Taprobane Rom aufgesucht und von ihrer Heimat berichtet. Man[43] hat in dieser Erzählung „eine plinianische Kontrast-Utopie zu Rom aus der Sicht der von Tiberius bis in die Flavierzeit lebendigen ‚philosophic opposition'"[44] sehen wollen. Obschon man es in diesem Bericht über ein weit entferntes Naturvolk gewiß nicht im strikten Sinne mit einer Utopie, sondern mit idealisierender und moralisierender Darstellung zu tun hat, so bleibt doch festzuhalten, daß sich bereits in der Antike an Taprobane Utopie-Elemente festmachen ließen. Kommt auch eine direkte Beeinflussung Plinius – Morus kaum in Betracht, so ist doch das Zusammentreffen der drei Autoren Plinius, Morus, Campanella merkwürdig genug; vielleicht finden sich noch weitere Elemente, die dann doch eine Kette zu konstruieren erlauben[45].

In horto considentes[46]

Zum Ende dieser Eluzidationen treten wir aus dem Kontext des Berichts über die Insel Utopia heraus und betrachten den Rahmen dieser Erzählung. An zwei entscheidenden Punkten, beim Beginn des Gesprächs wie beim Beginn des Berichts, zeichnen sich Bezüge zu klassischen Vorlagen klar ab.

Der Ort des Gesprächs ist kurz nach Buchbeginn bezeichnet: „. . . *inde domum meam digredimur, ibique in horto considentes in scamno cespitibus*

[41] Tommaso Campanella, *Civitas solis*, Einleitung.

[42] *N. H.*. 6,81–91. Vgl. den Forschungsbericht von K. Sallmann, Lustrum 18 (1975) 145–150.

[43] C. G. Starr, Class. Phil. 51 (1956) 27–30.

[44] K. Sallmann a. O. 147, dessen kritische Korrektur der Auffassung Starrs zu beachten ist.

[45] Dabei soll freilich der Wert der Realität gegenüber der Phantasie und der literarischen Tradition nicht zurückgesetzt werden. Die auf die Erwähnung von Taprobane folgende Nennung von Caliqut (50,17) beispielsweise am Beginn des Berichts bedarf bestimmt keiner besonderen Begründung: Es war dazumal der bedeutendste Handelshafen der Region und hatte zugleich gegenwartsgeschichtliches Interesse: Vasco da Gama war hier am 20. Mai 1498 nach seiner – der ersten historischen – Reise um das Kap der Guten Hoffnung gelandet und hatte so den Seeweg nach Indien erschlossen.

[46] 50,24.

herbeis constrato, confabulabamur". Vom Kommentar zur Stelle[47] wird zwar auf die Vorliebe nicht allein von Morus, sondern insgesamt der Renaissance-Autoren für Gartenszenen verwiesen; doch die verheißungsvolle Ankündigung „The convention began early" wird nicht voll eingelöst: Es fallen Namen wie Poggio und Macchiavelli; der wirklich „frühe" Beginn dieser „Konvention" und ihre breite Bezeugung bleiben unerwähnt[48]. Das Motiv des gedankenreichen Gesprächs, geführt von Gelehrten im Grünen sitzend, geht weit zurück: bereits bei Platon nimmt Sokrates mit Phaidros zusammen in solcher Umgebung seinen Platz (καθίζεσθαι *Phaidr.* 229a). Vor allem Cicero liebt es, in der Nachfolge Platons (*de orat.* 1,28), seine Dialoge in den Gärten seiner Villen, die ihm *voluptariae possessiones* waren (*ad Att.* 12,25,1) und ihn zum Denken anregten (*de orat.* 2,119), oder denen anderer vornehmer Römer zu lokalisieren[49]. Es ist nun nicht nötig, die wichtige Rolle, die die Gärten in der geistigen Welt Roms gespielt haben, zu belegen, da dies bereits von berufener Seite besorgt worden ist[50]. Festzuhalten aber bleibt, daß des Morus und seiner Freunde Vorliebe für Gärten als gegebener und gern gesuchter Rahmen für geistvolle Gespräche gewiß von ihnen nicht nur unmittelbar empfunden wurde, sondern auch eine geistige Wurzel besaß in der Tradition jener früheren Welt, deren Weite sie bewußt in neuer Belebung gestalteten[51].

Hunc in modum exorsus est[52]

Auch der Beginn der in Buch 2 gegebenen Erzählung von der Reise nach Utopia ist am Ende von Buch 1 markiert in einer Weise, die klassische Muster memoriert. Das große Vorbild ist der Beginn einer anderen Reiseerzählung am Anfang eines anderen 2. Buches:

[47] 304.

[48] Immerhin ist in der Einleitung auf Platon verwiesen: „The dialogue form of Book I is an obvious Platonic contribution to the Utopia. The interlocutors in both the Republic and the Utopia, repair to a private residence after a religious ceremony in a seaport" (p. CL VII).

[49] Vgl. *de rep.* 1,9(14),12(18); *Tusc.* 1,4,7; *de fin.* 1,13.3,7; *Brutus* 10,24; *de leg.* 1,13–14 (am Ufer des Liris); *de am.* 2.

[50] Pierre Grimal, Les Jardins Romains (Paris [1943¹] 1969²) 383ff.

[51] Nicht unerwähnt bleiben darf die nachdrückliche Betonung, mit der Morus die Liebe der Utopier zu ihren Gärten beschreibt, die diese auf ihren Gründer und Urkönig Utopus selbst zurückführen (120,9–26); vielleicht mag hierin ein weiteres verborgenes Indiz zu sehen sein dafür, daß auch des Autors eigene Beziehung zum Garten auf ferne frühe Vorbilder führt.

[52] 108,30f.

Conticuere omnes intentique ora tenebant.
Inde toro pater Aeneas sic orsus ab alto . . .

Diese Vorlage Vergil erscheint in der Wiederaufnahme der Wendungen „*Is ergo ubi vidit intentos . . . hunc in modum exorsus est*" ebenso wie im spielerischen Bezug auf den Erzählbeginn an der Buchgrenze I/II[53]; hinzu treten noch das anfängliche Zögern des Erzählenden (*cum paulisper tacitus et cogitabundus assedisset* 108,29f.[54] = *Aen.* 2,3–9) und die Begier der Hörer, alles zu erfahren (*ubi nos vidit intentos atque avidos audiendi* Z. 10f. = *Sed si tantus amor casus cognoscere nostros et breviter Troiae supremum audire laborem . . .* und Z. 1 . . . *intenti . . .*).

Man muß sich andererseits vor Augen halten, daß auch andernorts diese Wendung begegnet; vgl. Min. Fel. *Oct.* 39: *Cum Octavius perorasset, aliquamdiu nos ad silentium stupefacti intentos vultus tenebamus.* Der christliche Autor wollte gewiß, wie während der Dauer des ganzen Dialogs, so auch am Ende eine klassische Reminiszenz einflechten; das Vokabular fügt sich ohnehin der Rahmung einer Erzählung resp. eines Vortrags mit Leichtigkeit. Dennoch dürfte das vergilische Vorbild nicht nur dem Apologeten des 3., sondern auch dem Humanisten des 16. Jahrhunderts als bekannteste Vorlage unmittelbar geläufig gewesen sein; beider bewußte Bezugnahme auf den antiken Epiker bleibt anzunehmen.

Wir haben uns am Ende dieser Darlegungen dem Anfang der Erzählung von Utopia zugewandt. Denn nicht nur vielfach der Inhalt, auch der Rahmen des Berichts bezeugen, daß das erfolgreichste lateinische Buch der Neuzeit sich darstellt als das, was ein antiker Autor in einem besonderen Fall fordert – *ingenti flumine litterarum inundatus*[55].

[53] Für weitere Belege dieses Vorgangs vgl. Verf., Das früheste Aeneis-Zitat, in: Aparchai 4 (Gedenkschrift Georg Rohde) (Tübingen 1961) 151–167.
[54] Entgegen dem späteren „Nihil faciam libentius": Z. 23.
[55] Petron. 118,3.

List of Plates

Plates 1–6: G. M. Sifakis, Boy Actors in New Comedy

1 Menander's *Synaristosai*: Mosaic in Mytilene. (Photograph by courtesy of Mr. Elias Tsirivakos, Mytilene Museum.)

2 Menander's *Synaristosai*: Mosaic by Dioskourides in Naples. (Photograph by courtesy of Soprintendenza archeologica delle province di Napoli e Caserta.)

3 Menander's *Theophoroumene*: Mosaic in Mytilene. (Photograph by courtesy of Mr. Elias Tsirivakos, Mytilene Museum.)

4 Menander's *Theophoroumene* (?): Mosaic by Dioskourides in Naples. (Photograph by courtesy of Soprintendenza archeologica delle province di Napoli e Caserta and Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, Rome.)

5 Menander's *Epitrepontes*: Mosaic in Mytilene. (Photograph by courtesy of Mr. Tsirivakos, Mytilene Museum.)

6 Wall painting from the Casa della Grande Fontana, Pompeii (now lost). (From M. Bieber, Die Denkmäler zum Theaterwesen im Altertum [Berlin and Leipzig 1920] fig. 136.)

Plate 7: Th. Drew-Bear

A Metrical Epitaph from Phrygia Funerary Altar from Hasanlar, Phrygia. (Photograph by Th. Drew-Bear.)

PLATE 1

Meander's *Synaristosai*: Mosaic in Mytilene

PLATE 2

Menander's *Synaristosai*: Mosaic in Naples

PLATE 3

Menander's *Theophoroumene*: Mosaic in Mytilene

PLATE 4

Menander's *Theophoroumene* (?): Mosaic in Naples

PLATE 5

Menander's *Epitrepontes*: Mosaic in Mythilene

PLATE 6



Wall painting from the Casa della Grande Fontana, Pompei

PLATE 7

Funerary Altar from Hasanlar, Phrygia